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## **the review of metaphysics**

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## ARTICLES

### THE LIFE OF SIGNS

JOHN HALDANE

Now spoken sounds are signs of affections in the soul, and written marks signs of spoken sounds And just as written marks are not the same for all men, neither are spoken sounds But what these are in the first place signs of—affections of the soul—are the same for all, and what these affections are likenesses of—actual things—are also the same

Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, 16a3–8 <sup>1</sup>

Every sign *by itself* seems dead What gives it life?—In use it is *alive* Is life breathed into it there?—Or is the *use* its life?

Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Part 1, §432 <sup>2</sup>

IN HIS COMMENTARY on Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, Garth Hallett records Wittgenstein's extensive reading of Augustine's *Confessions* By contrast, he remarks that Wittgenstein never read anything of Aristotle. However, he also reports Rush Rhees as saying that at the time of his death Wittgenstein had in his possession the first two volumes of a German-Latin edition of Aquinas's *Summa Theologiae*,<sup>3</sup> containing questions 1–26 of the *Prima Pars* Question 13 concerns the Divine Names, the first article asking whether a name can be given to God. Aquinas begins his answer by referring to the passage from *De Interpretatione* quoted above. "Since, according to the Philosopher, words are signs of ideas, and ideas the similitudes of things, it is evident that words function in the signification of things through the conception of the intellect"<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Aristotle, *De Interpretatione*, trans J L Ackrill (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1963)

<sup>2</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans G E M Anscombe (Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1976)

<sup>3</sup> See Garth Hallett, *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations* (Ithaca. Cornell University Press, 1977), appendix

<sup>4</sup> See *Summa theologiae* I, q 13, a. 1, in *Basic Writings of St Thomas Aquinas*, ed Anton C Pegis (New York Random House, 1944) Unless

Nowhere, so far as I know, does Wittgenstein discuss Aquinas. Famously, however, the *Investigations* begins with a quotation from Augustine's *Confessions*, and the passage in question might be thought to presume a view of signification akin to that presented by Aristotle and quoted by Aquinas. Augustine writes:

When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn [*sic*] by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind. Thus as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learned to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.<sup>5</sup>

Wittgenstein makes this passage a target of critical discussion, but interestingly the aspect he focuses upon is the suggestion that words are names of objects.<sup>6</sup> Here I am concerned with another, and I believe more central, aspect of Augustine's remarks, namely the idea, explicit in Aristotle and Aquinas, that the meaningfulness of utterances derives from that of mental concepts. I want to suggest that some version of that view may be defensible, even allowing the efficacy of Wittgenstein's attacks on ideational theories of meaning.

## II

Allowing that meaning is independent of speakers in the sense that an individual cannot use a term just as he wishes and still expect

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otherwise indicated all quotations of Aquinas are from this translation. Elsewhere Aquinas comments on the original passage as follows: "Apropos of the order of signification of vocal sounds [Aristotle] proposes three things, from one of which a fourth is understood. He proposes writing, vocal sounds, and passions of the soul, things are understood from the latter, for passion is from the impression of something acting, and hence passions of the soul have their origin from things", *Aristotle on Interpretation Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan*, trans. John T. Oesterle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962), lect. 2, p. 24.

<sup>5</sup> Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, pt. 1, §1 quoting *Confessions* 1.8.

<sup>6</sup> Compare this with the opening of the *Brown Book*: "Augustine, in describing his learning of language, says that he was taught to speak by learning the names of things", Ludwig Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books*, ed. Rush Rhees (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969), 77.

to be understood, it is also true that were it not for individuals seeking to express themselves language would not exist. In concluding his examination of the debate between theorists of communication-intention and those of formal semantics, Strawson remarks that "as theorists we know nothing of language unless we understand human speech."<sup>7</sup> What he is observing is that we shall not have an adequate idea of the nature of meaning unless we attend to the fact that language exists to express beliefs, intentions, desires, and the like, and to serve their communication between one person and another.

The compatibility of a view of meaning as involving speakers' psychological attitudes with the affirmation of the relative autonomy of linguistic sense requires an account of speech-acts as formed by and conforming to established patterns of use. Let it be agreed, then, that a major constraint on linguistic behaviour is constituted by certain practical norms of the community. Whether one tries to explain this feature by reference to implicit conventions, tacit rules, or whatever else, is secondary to affirming that at least part of what give strings of sounds or marks meaning are patterns of usage to which they are related. Famously, Wittgenstein observes, "Every sign *by itself* seems dead. *What* gives it life?—In use it is *alive*. Is life breathed into it there?—Or is the *use* its life?"<sup>8</sup> We can and do use words to speak of the world, and it is natural to ask how this is possible. Considered in itself a word "seems dead," and it is right to say that the particular kind of life it has is due to the expressive behaviour in which it features and to the patterns implied by this. Yet, and Wittgenstein's emphasis on the role of use notwithstanding, this answer seems incomplete, for we also want to say what the passage seems designed to deny, namely, that life is "breathed into it there" and that this life is imparted by thought, or more generally by the intellect.

### III

The latter idea is supported by a familiar style of argument which is a variant on an old scholastic proof traditionally cast in terms of *instrumental* and *formal* signification and of a relation of dependence

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<sup>7</sup> Peter F. Strawson, "Meaning and Truth," in Peter F. Strawson, *Logico-Linguistic Papers* (London: Methuen, 1971)

<sup>8</sup> Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, pt. 1, §432.

of the first upon the second<sup>9</sup> Consider the sort of rules of use that might feature in an account of language. It might be explained that an expression "*N*" denotes an individual *a*, only if there is a rule (*R*) of the language in question (*L*) governing its use (I put this in the form of a necessary condition because I want to abstract from the question of whether meaning must be extension-involving.) Thus if one knows *R* one knows that it is conventionally accepted among *L* speakers that one can talk about *a* by means of "*N*." This suggests that this use of "*N*" is its life as a sign. Now suppose I introduce a novel expression "¥." If this is to have semantic value then it must be fitted into the pattern of linguistic behavior, so yielding an appropriate rule. But all that such rules tell us is how to proceed in *L* activity, they advert to a usage but do not explain how it is possible for the usage itself to exist. To explain that "cat," say, can refer to a cat because people use "cat" to refer to cats, does not yet explain how this or any other sign *can* be invested with significance. In use "*N*" acquires a property (*ref*<sub>(*a*)</sub>) of standing for *a*. "*N*" does not have this *ref* property intrinsically but has it conferred upon it. The question arises. From what does "*N*" acquire *ref*? If we say it is bestowed by *X*, then either *X* has *ref* intrinsically or it has received it by association with *Y*, and so on. Therefore, if anything has content or significance, then either it or something else has significance intrinsically, otherwise no adequate explanation of content can be given. The search for a class of meaning-bestowing items is then brought to a halt with the claim that signs are used by persons to express intrinsically contentful intentional states.

The idea that thoughts are *intrinsically* significant is part of the Brentanist thesis involving the claim that they are always about something or other. It seems we have a proof of this derived from consideration of the possibility of meaning.<sup>10</sup> The major link between

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<sup>9</sup> See, for example, John of St Thomas, *Ars Logica, Prima Pars*. The introductory section has been published as *Outlines of Formal Logic*, trans F C Wade (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1955). For the formal-instrumental sign distinction see bk 1, chap 2, "Definition and Division of Signs." For modern scholastic versions of this style of argument see John T Oesterle, "Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning," *The Thomist* 7 (1944) 233–63, and John Deely, "The Ontological Status of Intentionality," *New Scholasticism* 46 (1972) 220–33.

<sup>10</sup> Note incidentally the parallel with first-cause arguments in natural theology. With that in mind one might title the reasoning above a "prime signifier" proof—though, of course, unlike the cosmological argument it is not

thought and language is that semantic properties depend upon intentional ones, and if this dependence is not to generate a vicious regress we must suppose that in the mental realm content is intrinsic. Of course, linguistic meaning is related to public use and is sustained by interpersonal conventions, but what these animate are speakers' expressive and communicative intentions—so, at any rate, is the conclusion of this line of reasoning.

## IV

As I indicated, there is an important connection between the foregoing argument and the ancient distinction between natural and instrumental signs, for what the latter articulates is the Aristotelian suggestion that spoken words are signs of "passions in the soul." A great deal was made of this by medieval authors from Augustine to Ockham and by later followers, and I shall return to one phase of the scholastic tradition shortly. In more recent times, however, essentially the same argument has been presented by John Searle.<sup>11</sup> Starting with some familiar observations about the apparent similarities between thought and talk he raises the issue of the order of priority between them. Since language has meaning but "speech acts have a level of physical realisation, *qua* speech acts, that is not intrinsically intentional,"<sup>12</sup> the problem is to explain the source of their acquired "aboutness." The solution he offers is as follows: "The mind imposes intentionality on entities that are not intrinsically intentional by intentionally conferring the conditions of satisfaction of the expressed psychological states upon the external physical entity."<sup>13</sup>

In the last twenty years, and in keeping with certain widely shared assumptions about the causal nature of psychological explanation,<sup>14</sup> many other writers have reintroduced the idea of behavior-producing

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aiming to establish the existence of a single cause. But see also note 16 and sections IX and X below.

<sup>11</sup> John Searle, *Intentionality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

<sup>12</sup> Searle, *Intentionality*, 27.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>14</sup> These are assumptions which I believe, and have argued, are mistaken. See John Haldane, "Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behaviour," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 62 (1988), 223–54.

inner states and have tried to show that these states can be ascribed representational character. Just how this might be so remains a matter of dispute between those who, like Fodor, take intentionality to be a real feature of the inner and so regard cognitive psychology as an independent area of study; and those others who, following Dennett, argue that intentional ascriptions are nonfactive but reflect aspects of observed behavior. The latter accordingly see cognitive psychology as a conflation of two different projects: first, that of explaining the character of the inner realm which belongs to something like computer engineering; and second, that of providing a neo- and/or logical-behaviorist theory of meaning. According to which of these positions one adopts, talk of "the language of thought" is either to be taken as a highly appropriate description of the system of mental representation underlying linguistic and other purposeful activity, or else it is a potentially misleading metaphor based on the extension of a concept beyond its proper field of application.

My own view of these rival doctrines (for which I have argued elsewhere)<sup>15</sup> is that while the first is right in recognizing the reality of intentionality it errs in conceiving of this as a species of relation between a subject and an intended object, and can give no coherent account of content. The second, by contrast, is mistaken in holding that the intentional can be explained away as a projection, but recognizes an important truth, namely, that the contentfulness of a psychological state cannot be accounted for in terms of the interpretation of a symbol by either a Cartesian Self or a subpersonal computational operation, since both would lead to vicious regresses.<sup>16</sup> These conclusions give rise to two important questions. First, how is it possible for a mental state to be intrinsically intentional? and second, what part

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<sup>15</sup> See John Haldane, "Psychoanalysis, Cognitive Psychology and Self-Consciousness," in *Mind, Psychoanalysis and Science*, ed. Peter Clark and Crispin Wright (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), John Haldane, "Naturalism and the Problem of Intentionality," *Inquiry* 32 (1989): 305–22, John Haldane, "Reid, Scholasticism and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind," in *The Philosophy of Thomas Reid*, ed. Melvin Dalgarno and Eric Matthews (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), and John Haldane, "Putnam on Intentionality," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52 (1992): 671–82.

<sup>16</sup> Notwithstanding that the argument presented above may seem to be a clear case of what he is criticizing, I am largely in agreement with Simon Blackburn's dismissal of what he terms "dog-leg" theories of Meaning. See Simon Blackburn, *Spreading the Word* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), chap. 2. For some discussion of the representational theory of mind see Haldane, "Reid, Scholasticism and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind."

does the idea that psychological attitudes are in some sense language-like have to contribute to our understanding of thought?

## V

In attempting to answer these puzzles it may be instructive to consider an early attempt by Augustine to make sense of mental representation. At one point in the *Confessions* he tries to explain how we can be said to know formerly experienced but now absent objects, and he suggests that our thoughts are directed upon images of them

When these objects were present, my memory received images from them so that they remain present in order for me to see them and reflect upon them in my mind, if I choose to remember them in their absence<sup>17</sup>

Elsewhere he considers the possibility that mental picturing also explains our thoughts of objects of which we have had no immediate experience

When we acquire beliefs from the reading or hearing of material things which we have not seen, the mind cannot but form for itself some image in outline and shape such as may present itself to thought<sup>18</sup>

Immediately following this, however, he goes on to address a difficulty in this idea.

But it will not be a true image or if it is, as may very exceptionally happen, there will be no advantage in retaining it for the maintenance of our belief, though it may serve a purpose in suggesting to us something else. Most people who read or hear the writings of St Paul or his history will form some picture of his appearance, and of that of all the other persons whose names occur in connection with his. One will picture the forms and features of these persons in one way, one in another but none can say whose picture is the nearest resemblance. The bodily appearance of the Lord himself is represented by an innumerable variety of mental images. [and] the salutary element is not in the mental image, which may be a long way from the facts, but in the idea of Man, fixed in our knowledge is a definite standard of human nature, by which we immediately recognise, upon seeing that which conforms to it, that this is a man or a human form<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Augustine, *Confessions* 10 16, in *The Library of Christian Classics*, ed J Bailie, J McNeill, and H Van Dusen (London SCM Press, 1955), 7 216

<sup>18</sup> Augustine, *The Trinity* 8 7 4, in *The Library of Christian Classics*, ed J Bailie, J McNeill, and H Van Dusen (London SCM Press, 1955), 8 44

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*

The point at issue is that of how a mental image can represent something when it may not resemble it. Relatedly the passage raises the question of how the occurrence of qualitatively dissimilar images in different minds can explain their various thoughts' being of the same object. Augustine takes these problems to be solved by the further claim that it is the *general* character of a given image that provides intentional content, yet this is unconvincing for reasons advanced by Wittgenstein. I shall turn to these reasons shortly, but at this point it is worth anticipating the following dilemma facing Augustine's refined account. If imaginal content is irrelevant then the point of introducing this kind of representation is lost. Alternatively, if mental picturing is the medium of thought then the fact that pictorial resemblance is not necessary to secure reference suggests that it is at most the *vehicle* of cognition and not that in which it consists

As is familiar, Wittgenstein considers a related point—that resemblance is not sufficient for reference—when examining the suggestion that to imagine King's College on fire is to attend to a mental picture. He observes that such an image might be taken to represent a multitude of buildings and then introduces the further suggestion that this picture is accompanied by a mental caption: "For saying it is like writing the words 'Portrait of Mr So-and so' under a picture. It might have been that *while* you imagined King's College on fire you said the words 'King's College is on Fire.'"<sup>20</sup> As Wittgenstein explains, this amendment does not improve matters since, if one considers the occurrence of the caption to consist in the display of another kind of image, the problem remains of explaining how something of this sort can represent the unique object. Moreover, it has yet to be said how one recognizes the content of the verbal or pictorial images.

To this one might offer the following as an answer. Thought involves mental pictures and words, and these stand in a relation similar to that of illustrations and narrative—the *words* perhaps being internal versions of *public* expressions. As was suggested by the regress or "prime signifier" argument, however, the content of speech-acts depends upon that of the intentional states they express, so it will hardly do to appeal to internalized public language to explain mental content. Rather the natural thought is that the latter is prior, and this indeed is the line taken by Augustine—again favoring an imagistic account.

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<sup>20</sup> Wittgenstein, *Blue Books*, 39



When I want to describe Carthage, I enquire of myself and I find an image of Carthage in my own mind. But I have got it by way of sense perception, having been in the town in bodily presence, seen it and remembered it so that the right word may be at my disposal whenever I want to describe it. Its word is the actual image in my memory—not the sound of three syllables when I say “Carthage,” [*Carthago*] nor the silent passing of the name through the mind: it is the object of my inward vision, when I pronounce, or before I pronounce, the three syllables. Similarly if I want to describe Alexandria which I have never seen, an image of it is at my disposal. I have been credibly informed that it is a great city, and have constructed a picture of it as described to me to the best of my ability. And that is the word of it in my mind, when I want to speak of it.<sup>21</sup>

The suggestion is that meaning is bestowed on language by association with mental entities, and that this provides a justification for describing the latter as words. The “illustration-plus-text” proposal collapses, however, for the text is either in the mental language (hereafter, “Mentalese”), or else reduces to it; and Mentalese, so far as Augustine is concerned, is a *pictorial* system of representation. Images in the soul, he believes, are intrinsically contentful and are natural signs of what they represent.

Clearly this conclusion involves a return to the incoherent theory. Pictorial resemblance is neither necessary nor sufficient for mental reference, patterns only represent under an interpretation and the introduction of an interpreting *homunculus* is viciously regressive. The representational properties of images are either *particular*, in which case generality is left unexplained, or else they are *general* and singular reference remains unaccounted for. Moreover, the theory provides no satisfactory explanation of how appropriate images are formed in the first instance. In concentrating on thought in the absence of its objects Augustine neglects to consider how original perceptions are possible. Perceptions presuppose the exercise of concepts in determining their content. The most that could be true is the possibility indicated earlier, that is, that pictorial images are the stuff of which thought is made—its medium—but that their significance is not intrinsic and depends on something prior, namely, concepts. Further, while it may be true that thinking sometimes takes the forms of imaging, there are good phenomenological and logical reasons for believing that it is not always so. Next, therefore, it will be useful to look at a later medieval attempt to develop the idea, touched on by

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<sup>21</sup> Augustine, *The Trinity*, 874

Augustine, that what lies behind the utterance of a significant sound is a *mental word* (*verbum mentis*).

## VI

Ockham takes seriously the idea of a language of thought. He accepts both aspects of the *De Interpretatione* passage that words are symbols of ideas and that while the former are only signs by convention, the latter signify in virtue of their own nature.<sup>22</sup> Elsewhere he distinguishes between a spoken term, a written term, and a thought, and speaks of the latter as a "conception of the soul" (*intentio animae*). He also adheres, however, to a strict nominalism, and this presents him with certain difficulties in giving account of the genesis and content of mental representations. In contrast and in opposition to Aquinas, for example, he aims to give a theory of how a thought (*conceptus*) can have content, *without* appealing to conceptual universals (*species intelligibilis*).

The immediate problem, then, is to provide a basis for the use of general words by reference to the character of certain ideas. To possess Mentalese is to have a capacity to produce signs which may stand for one thing or "confusedly" for many, and thus raises the question as to how the capacity is acquired. In providing an answer he is more radically empiricist than Aquinas, who postulates an active power of concept formation involving the abstraction of common natures received through experience. For Ockham, however, there is nothing for the mind to do but to receive the imprints of individual things. Thus starting with "intuitive judgement"—a type of direct acquaintance with an object—he gestures towards a form of retention of the product of this, a mental impression. This mental impression establishes a disposition (*habitus*) exercised in the recall of this representation, thereby making possible "abstractive judgement"—thought in the absence of its object.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> "The conceptual term is an intention or impression of the soul [*passio animae*] which signifies or consignifies something naturally and is capable of being part of a mental proposition [*propositionis mentalis*]", Ockham, *Summa Logicae, Prima Pars*, trans. M. J. Loux, *Ockham's Theory of Terms* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974), 1.

<sup>23</sup> See Ockham, *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* I q. 13, a. 3, in *Ockham Philosophical Writings*, trans. Philotheus Boehner (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 30–5.

In elaborating the nature of these processes, and in applying the theory to problem cases—for instance, thought of nonexistent—Ockham is forced to introduce a number of extreme theses, such as that God provides *intentionalia* where no actual objects exist. The central problems, though, are those of how mental terms have representational power and of how, given Ockham's view of them, they can signify unique individuals *and* bear a reference to several, or rather potentially infinitely many things. As he describes it, it is a matter of forming a picture of a horse, say, that is not a picture of any particular horse but is somehow sufficiently like all horses to represent them. Echoing Augustine he writes, "The intellect, seeing a thing outside the mind, forms in the mind a picture resembling it . . . The case [is] similar, analogously speaking, to the activity of an artist. . . And this picture in the mind can be called a universal, because it is a pattern and relates indifferently to all the singular things outside the mind."<sup>24</sup>

The problem confronting this suggestion is one discussed by Wittgenstein in response to a view very like Ockham's. If we provide the image with features that some of the things it is taken to represent lack, or conversely try to rid it of elements that other things of the same kind possess, how can it represent all of them? A picture has a determinate form, and if representation is taken to depend precisely on this then only things having just that form can be represented by it. We could say that an image serves as a general schema, and this is sometimes the case; but this possibility presupposes something else, namely, that the image is understood in one way (as general) or another (as particular), and that in turn depends upon the existence of prior intentional states.<sup>25</sup>

Subsequently Ockham abandoned his picture theory of ideas but without substituting any clear alternative. In his own commentary on the *De Interpretatione* he no longer takes ideas to be intentional objects but treats them as mental acts themselves. While the notion of

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<sup>24</sup> *Ordinatio* II, q 8, a 1, see *Philosophical Writings*, p 44

<sup>25</sup> See Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, pt 1, §73 "So if I am shown various different leaves and told 'This is called a leaf', I get an idea of the shape of a leaf, a picture of it in my mind —But what does the picture of a leaf look like when it does not show us any particular shape, but 'what is common to all shapes of leaf'? 'But might there not be such "general" samples? Say a schematic leaf, or a sample of pure green?' —Certainly there might. But for such a schema to be understood as a schema — this in turn resides in the way the samples are used"

picturing seems less prominent, a role for resemblance is preserved in the explanation of their functional character:

To sum up the mind's own intellectual acts are called states of mind. By their nature they stand for actual things outside the mind or for other things in the mind just as the spoken words stand for them by convention. By such a confused intellection, singular things outside the mind are known. For instance to say that we have a confused intellection of man, means that we have a cognition by which we do not understand one man rather than another, but that by such a cognition we have cognition of a man rather than a donkey. And thus amounts to saying that such a cognition, by some kind of assimilation, bears a greater resemblance to a man than to a donkey, but does not resemble one man rather than another.<sup>26</sup>

It is difficult to find any more explicit account of the positive content of the later view, though I will suggest an interpretation that links a central part of it with a radical thesis espoused by his contemporary Meister Eckhart. All Ockham himself gives us are comparisons between the relation of thought to world and other kinds of natural signification. smoke indicating a fire, weeping signifying grief and laughter, internal joy.<sup>27</sup>

Although Ockham's views are inadequate they are nonetheless suggestive, and there is a danger of missing something if one simply supposes that the doctrines of natural meaning and inner language can be set aside as wholly confused. In *Mental Acts* Peter Geach takes this view of Ockham's appeal to mental language and seeks to demonstrate its absurdity. It should be clear enough, however, that Ockham assumes that the significance of language is due to the intentionality of thought and that this is the basis of his claim that whatever is necessary in a speech act (*propositio vocalis*) for a distinct "signification" has a corresponding component in a mental act (*propositio mentalis*). While it is true that the detail with which he pursues the program of revealing the syntactical structure of Mentalese goes beyond philosophical interest and sometimes leads to implausible results, Geach does Ockham less than justice when he suggests that his criterion for attributing structures to thought is "very simple minded" "[Ockham] merely transfers features of Latin grammar to Mental,

<sup>26</sup> Ockham, *Expositio super librum Perhermenias* (Commentary on De Interpretatione), *Philosophical Writings*, 47–8

<sup>27</sup> Ockham, *Summa Logicae* I, c. 14, Loux, *Ockham's Theory of Terms*, 78

and then regards this as explaining why such features occur in Latin . . . Clearly nothing is explained at all."<sup>28</sup> On the contrary what guides Ockham is the principle that since utterances are meaningful and true in virtue of thoughts, the latter must have at least all that the former have in the way of essential content. Thus while perhaps mood need not be attributed, psychological mode corresponding to illocutionary force is a likely feature.<sup>29</sup> Similarly Geach mistakes the source of the claim that thought, unlike language proper, needs no interpretation. He writes that "Ockham supposes that Mental, unlike Latin, is intrinsically intelligible, simply because its medium is not material but spiritual."<sup>30</sup> In fact the principal reason for holding that Mentalese is intrinsically intelligible is clearly the recognition that it cannot be a matter of convention what content a thought has, nor can it require the thinker to interpret a *propositio mentalis* in the way in which one interprets sentences in a natural language. The point about the immateriality of Mentalese follows upon these considerations. Ockham believes that since every token of a natural language is both physical and not intrinsically intelligible, whatever possesses intrinsic intelligibility must lack physicality. As it stands the argument is invalid and a good deal more would need to be added before it could be made persuasive. Nevertheless it is evident that Ockham is not simply relying on the assumption that immateriality, in and of itself, yields intrinsic intelligibility.

It would be disappointing, and surprising, if there were absolutely no suggestions in the later work as to what thought consists in, if not in the entertaining of pictorial ideas. There are, I believe, some indications of a generalization of the claim that cognition is a unique type of relation constituting direct engagement of the mind with its objects. This carries over from the earlier view the notion of cognitive intuition or acquaintance which was taken as the primary form of mental activity. Now, however, is not the occasion to speculate further about Ockham, for it is more profitable to look to an explicit statement of the radical thesis which I suspect may lie in the background and which I shall call the doctrine of *pure intentionality*.

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<sup>28</sup> Peter Geach, *Mental Acts* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), 102.

<sup>29</sup> See *Summa Logicae* I, q. 3, Loux, *Ockham's Theory of Terms*, "On the Correspondence between Vocal and Mental Terms," 52–4. In connection with this issue compare Searle, *Intentionality*, chaps. 1, 6.

<sup>30</sup> Geach, *Mental Acts*, 103.

## VII

Clearly there are real difficulties in reconciling the various features we are inclined to attribute to cognition. Equally, attempts to characterize thought in terms of an internal display of pictures or words are doomed to failure. In these circumstances it is tempting to draw back from the problems and to conclude that thought is a phenomenon so unlike any other that analysis is impossible and only metaphor can begin to reflect its *sui generis* nature. Such a view is presented in two short, but quite remarkable, discussions written by Master Eckhart in answer to the questions, "Are Existence and Understanding the same in God?" and "Is an Angel's Understanding, as Denoting an Action, the same as his Existence?"<sup>31</sup> His central thesis is that the intellect is nothing. This is not to claim that talk of "intellect" is empty but rather that what it concerns is nonbeing, only an indefinite (and infinite) potentiality for receiving natures into it. Eckhart presents various arguments in favour of this conclusion, several of which are directly concerned with the idea that in thought we meet reality and not any proxies for it.

Interesting and suggestive as these arguments are, however, there is not the space to explore them here. Instead it will be enough to extract the essential elements of his view. Eckhart is writing against a background of neo-Aristotelianism and, in common with Aquinas, follows the general account of cognition as involving the reception of the forms of things without the matter that is a necessary aspect of their instantiation in nature (*esse naturale*).<sup>32</sup> Where he differs from Aquinas and other contemporaries is in casting off the psychological structure of cognitive faculties, powers, and processes involving abstraction and the establishment and exercise of mental dispositions. He believes these must limit consciousness and confine its scope within the subject. On his alternative and radical view intellect is a deprivation of being, always ready to be filled by one thing or another and to be wholly informed by the nature of its object so long as this is present.

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<sup>31</sup> Master Eckhart, *Parisian Questions and Prologues*, trans. Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), qq. 1, 2.

<sup>32</sup> For a contemporary presentation and defence of this idea see John Haldane, "Mind-World Identity Theory and the Antirealist Challenge," in *Reality, Representation and Projection*, ed. John Haldane and Crispin Wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).

Anything made to serve a purpose is made to suit that purpose. Now the purpose of a [cognitive] likeness is to represent something to the intellect. Hence it should be such as to better represent that thing, and it represents it better if it is not a being than if it were a being. In fact if it were a being it would detract from its representative function. Consequently it is not a being—unless you call it a being in the mind.

Knowledge is a quality and a true, though potential, being. It has the being of a habit. Thus knowledge belongs rather on the side of the subject, which is something interior, whereas the intellect and the [cognitive] likeness belong on the side of the object, which is something exterior. Consequently, existence being something interior, these have no existence.<sup>33</sup>

On this account one might say, in words echoing those of Wittgenstein, “if God looked into us he would not see there of what we were thinking, for thoughts are beyond us in the world enveloping their objects.” This view is undoubtedly appealing. It avoids the various problems associated with theories of mental representation, prohibits even the formulation of methodological solipsism or the egocentric predicament, and affirms the impression given in consciousness that the content of a thought is exhausted by its objects. Moreover, Eckhart is not alone in espousing such a theory. Apart from a tradition of “intuitionism” in scholastic philosophy, related ideas have been presented in recent phenomenological and analytical writings. Compare, for example, the following passages from writings by John McDowell with Eckhart’s doctrine:

God (or anyone) might see whom we have in mind, by—for instance—seeing whom we are looking at as we speak. That sort of thing—seeing relations between a person and bits of the world, not prying into a hidden place whose contents could be just as they are even if there were no world—is (in part) what seeing into a person’s mind is.<sup>34</sup>

Allowing intrinsic object-dependence, we have to set whatever literally spatial boundaries are in question outside the subject’s skin or skull. Cognitive space incorporates the relevant portions of the “external” world. So its relations to that world should not pose philosophical difficulties in the Cartesian style.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> Eckhardt, *Parisian Questions*, qq 2, 6, trans Maurer, p 53

<sup>34</sup> John McDowell, “On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name,” *Mind*, 86 (1977) 159–85

<sup>35</sup> John McDowell, “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space,” in *Subject, Thought and Context*, ed P Pettit and John McDowell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 167

Allowing for differences of style, the resemblances are intriguing. The pressing question, however, is whether Eckhart's discussion contains a plausible theory. It should be noted, for example, that the conclusion that the intellect is nonbeing is fallaciously inferred. Allowing that the rejection of substance-dualism is in order, and even that it makes sense to think of the intellect as a potentiality or as a capacity, nonetheless a power, if not a substance, is yet a *something*. The determination of this capacity in respect of content is also a something, namely, an existing state of the individual whose power it is.

## VIII

The doctrine of direct engagement with reality is an important one and needs to be taken seriously. On reflection, however, it should be clear that its bold assertion in the form of the theory of pure intentionality conceals a hollow edifice. In its rejection of Aquinas's cognitive structures, and of his and Augustine's media of thought, the theory gives no account of either the genesis or the content of understanding, and of how it succeeds or how it fails.

Direct acquaintance is certainly a condition of realism, but it requires the exercise of concepts to structure the sensuous presentations of the world. What we need, therefore, is some account consistent with realism but which explains the role of sense-experience, says something of the nature of concepts and of their origins, indicates how the contents of thought are structured and can recur in other thoughts, shows how consciousness can embrace reality while allowing for thoughts that either miss the target or aim at none, and, finally, gives an explanation of how thought is intrinsically intelligible. The list is formidable and I believe that of the various theories of intentionality and mental reference that have been mentioned here only the Thomist one offers even the promise of meeting these requirements<sup>36</sup>. It is appropriate, therefore, to consider briefly the account it has to give of the way in which mental entities are natural signs of their objects, and about the sense in which thought is language-like.

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<sup>36</sup> For some discussion see John Haldane, "Brentano's Problem," *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 35 (1989) 1–32, and Haldane, "Mind-World Identity theory and the Anti-realist Challenge."



## IX

Given that the concept of a language is roughly that of a conventional system of representation, it cannot be the case that at the fundamental level cognition consists in the occurrence of linguistic expressions. Thus talk of "the language of thought" must be analogical. One reason for speaking of a *verbum mentis* is supplied by the argument concerning the origin of contentfulness and this is adverted to by Aquinas:

Word taken in its proper sense has a threefold meaning. The clearest and most common sense is that in which *word* is said of what is spoken by the voice, and this proceeds from an interior source as regards two things found in the exterior word—that is, the vocal sound itself, and the signification of the sound. For, according to the Philosopher, vocal sound signifies the concept of the intellect, or according to another text, the vocal sound proceeds from the signification or the imagination, as is stated in *De Anima*, 11. The vocal sound which has no signification cannot be called a word, wherefore the exterior vocal sound is called a word from the fact that it signifies the interior concept of the mind. Therefore it follows that, first and chiefly, the interior concept of the mind is called a word, secondarily, the vocal sound itself, signifying the interior concept, is so called, and thirdly, the imagination of the vocal sound is called a word.<sup>37</sup>

A "word" might feature in different ways, that is, its relation to the subject might either be that of a speech-act performed by him, or of an utterance or inscription to which he attends as an auditor or reader. These two possibilities correspond to the rival "act" and "object" theories of ideas about which there was much dispute in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.<sup>38</sup> Both philosophy of mind and epistemology provide good reasons to reject the latter and it is gratifying, therefore, to find Aquinas eschewing it.

The way in which he does so is not obvious, however, especially given later Cartesian conceptions of thought. Of the three kinds of referents of "word" that he identifies, that which provides the source of the meaningfulness of public speech acts is *not* the conscious process of inner soliloquy "saying in the heart," or "thought" in the now-standard sense of the term. In fact the latter is derivative from public

<sup>37</sup> *Summa Theologica* I, q. 34, a. 1.

<sup>38</sup> See Haldane, "Reid, Scholasticism and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind", and John Haldane, "Whose Theory? Which Representations?" *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, forthcoming.

utterance, being an imaginative rendition of it. The cognitive source of signification (the ultimate source is the extramental world) is an "interior concept" which is also the immediate significate of spoken words.

Dealing with these claims in reverse order, the idea that words signify concepts might seem to be quite at odds with the kind of realism implied above. What Aquinas intends, however, is that our capacity to think of things in general terms (and to think of universals themselves) is an achievement resulting from the formation of general concepts. Therefore, to speak of an individual as an *F*, or to characterize *F*s as *G*s, involves speaking of them *via*, or under the aspect of, certain general conceptions; but this is compatible with the claim that in speaking or thinking of an *F* one succeeds in referring to *it* and not to some intervening representation. The *verbum mentis* gives the *sense* of a term, and in that capacity is signified by it, but *referentially* the term takes us to the world and specifies an extramental nature.

Since on this view one does not think of a thing by thinking of a representation of it, one might wonder why "mental utterances" of any kind are necessary, especially since they themselves are not identified with inner speech in the Cartesian sense. The answer is that cognitive activity requires a medium both to provide a means through which concepts can be exercised and to make possible the articulation of complex thoughts. Again we find Aquinas showing his awareness of these requirements and suggesting that we can call what satisfies them a "language".

In us to speak means not only to understand, but to understand [or "*think*"] and to express a certain conception. Nor can we understand in any other way except by so expressing a concept. Consequently, for us to understand is, properly, to speak.<sup>39</sup>

[What thought *per se* is, is that] which the intellect conceives in itself concerning the thing thought of, whether that be a definition or an enunciation, according as two operations are posited in III *de Anima*. What is thus conceived is called an interior word [*verbum interius*].<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> *De Veritate*, q. 4, a. 2. Aquinas also writes that "the conception of the intellect is a medium between the intellect and the thing understood", so the conception is not only *that which* is thought, but also *that by which* the thing is thought of."

<sup>40</sup> *De Potentia*, q. 9, a. 5.

The intentional content of thought, however, cannot be explained by the view that the ultimate foundations of thinking are literally linguistic; hence concepts cannot be identified with words. Nevertheless the activity of thinking is a form of representing, and representation requires a medium in which content is invested. Here the notion of something language-like is appropriate, and if intentional states have logical and semantic structure this explains reasoning, creativity, and so on. In the last passage quoted above Aquinas acknowledges the fact that concepts can be exercised in different, more or less complex, ways. Again the appeal to a "linguistic" medium seems apt when one considers the character of these different modes of thought, for the two operations to which he refers—what he calls "composing and dividing" (*compositio et divisio*), and "thinking of simples" (*intelligentia indivisibilium*)—correspond roughly to *propositional* and *objectual* attitudes—having the forms, "*X*  $\varphi$ s that *Y* is *F*," and "*X*  $\varphi$ s of *Y*" respectively—and it is plausible to suppose that these differences are attributable to a quasi-linguistic means of conceptual expression. It needs to be emphasized, however, that this activity is not to be identified with any particular conscious process, nor is it an unconscious one. What I mean is that forming concepts and exercising them in propositional (and objectual) thought is something we do, and it is this that invests public speech with meaning. However, the doing of it is not another activity like speaking, except performed out of sight. Whenever there is the use of signs, be it public or private (as in mental soliloquy), conceptions need to be specified in explaining the possibility of this; but the only embodiment of these conceptions may be the speech acts (or inner sayings) themselves.

If the analogy is justified it has also to be applied judiciously. As Geach observes, writers have too often been misled precisely because they have identified thoughts with sentences, and in consequence have produced absurd results. The cases of Ockham and Fodor provide just two examples drawn from widely different traditions. Several reasons for resisting this identification have already been indicated, but the most fundamental is that concepts must be naturally and not conventionally linked with what they signify. This truth, central to the classical tradition descending from Aristotle, precludes the reduction of intentional content to language.

Thus the mystery remains as to how mental states can be intrinsically meaningful. The solution given by Aquinas is an elegant one. Intentional states are structured by general features derived from the

subject's transactions with the environment in which these features are also exemplified. The central idea is simple and compelling. Intellect is a potentiality for receiving reality and not, *pace* the various versions of Cartesianism, a *source* of form. Concepts are formed under the influence of that which they (re)present: "Because the *intelligible species*, which is the form of the intellect and the principle of the act of thought, is a likeness [*similitudo*] of the external thing, it follows that the intellect forms an intention like that thing, for as something is, so it acts. And since this intention is like the thing the result is that the intellect, by forming it, thinks of the thing itself."<sup>41</sup>

## X

What of the claim implicit in Wittgenstein's questions about the life of a sign? For one thing, I think we need to be more cautious in glossing Wittgenstein's text. He is certainly hostile to ideational theories of meaning that hold that we are directly acquainted with a private stock of concepts, the existence and content of which is wholly prior to and independent of the meaning of terms in a public language. That leaves space, however, for acceptance of a subtler interpretation of Aristotle's dictum that spoken words are signs of passions in the soul. I have suggested that such an interpretation is to be found in Aquinas's reflections on the *verbum* in the *Summa* and elsewhere. This raises the interesting question of what Wittgenstein's attitude to such a view might have been. Had he read the third volume in the edition of the *Summa* of which he possessed the first two, he might at least have found it necessary to advance further arguments against the idea of the mental animation of signs. For the idea of the mental as it occurs in Aquinas is very different from that, found in Augustine and Descartes, from which Wittgenstein sought to free us.

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<sup>41</sup> *Summa contra gentiles* I, 53

# ARISTOTLE ON GOD AS THOUGHT THINKING ITSELF

THOMAS DE KONINCK

## I

ARISTOTLE'S DESCRIPTION OF GOD'S ACTIVITY as *νόησις νοήσεως*, a "thinking of thinking," in chapters 7 and 9 of *Metaphysics* 12 raises some of the most significant and challenging questions in philosophy. These and other related chapters surely deserve Whitehead's praise in his own chapter on God in *Science and the Modern World*, where he accords to Aristotle "the position of the greatest metaphysician," adding, concerning Aristotle's God, "in his consideration of this metaphysical question [Aristotle] was entirely dispassionate; and he is the last European metaphysician of first-rate importance for whom this claim can be made . . . It may be doubted whether any properly general metaphysics can ever, without the illicit introduction of other considerations, get much farther than Aristotle"<sup>1</sup>

It ought to surprise no one, then, if difficulties surrounding this crowning achievement should abound and even reduce some to make little sense of it. How, indeed, is one to understand the so-called thought of thought or thinking of thinking of the Prime Mover? Nothing is easier than the *reductio ad absurdum* clearly anticipated in that striking passage in the Aristotelian corpus—possibly Aristotle's own—which speaks of God in contemplation of himself as an absurdity. The author is wondering "whether the self-sufficient man will or will not need friendship" and dismisses the analogy of the Divine life as unhelpful and misleading. "For the argument about the Divine Being that we meet with is this. 'Since God possesses all good things and is self-sufficient, in what will His action consist? For His existence will not be one long sleep. Nay, He will contemplate something; for this is the noblest kind of activity and the most suited to Him. What then will He contemplate? If He contemplates anything else, it

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<sup>1</sup> Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 173

must be something still better than Himself. But that anything should be better than God is absurd. It follows that He will contemplate Himself. But this too is absurd. If a man makes himself the object of his own research, we stigmatize him as a dullard. God in contemplation of Himself is therefore an absurdity.' ”<sup>2</sup>

Self-contemplation in the anthropomorphic sense here described is a plain absurdity to anyone. So, however, is the Aristotelian God as read, say, by Eduard Zeller, W. D. Ross or, more recently, Klaus Oehler.<sup>3</sup> I mean the interpretation—to quote Richard Norman’s apt phrases—that “lends an air of unnecessary absurdity to the whole account,” suggesting “that the Prime Mover is a sort of heavenly Narcissus”<sup>4</sup>. One obvious culprit is the either/or most clearly formulated by Ross: either God knows himself, or he knows other things. By asserting that God knows one Aristotle would therefore exclude the other. “For him,” writes Ross, “that God should know Himself and that He should know other things, are alternatives, and in affirming

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<sup>2</sup> *Magna Moralia* 2 15 1212b38–1213a7, trans. G. C. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962). The anthropomorphic character of this description is brought out clearly by Pierre Aubenque in *La Prudence chez Aristote* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), 181–3. See also *Eudemian Ethics* (hereafter, *EE*) 1 12 1245b14–19.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Klaus Oehler, *Der Unbewegte Bewegter des Aristoteles* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1984), see also Klaus Oehler, “Aristotle on Self-Knowledge,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 118, no. 6 (December 1974): 493–506.

<sup>4</sup> Richard Norman, “Aristotle’s Philosopher-God,” *Phronesis* 14, no. 1 (1969): 63–74, on this particular point see pp. 63–4, 72. Oehler’s interpretation is best summed up by himself: “In Aristotle’s view the divine mind is a form of self-reference which cannot be understood from without and therefore it is inscrutable. In this sense it is a blanket term and, in a certain way, it is a blank. Nevertheless, the expression ‘thinking of thinking’ has a meaning which is fundamental for Aristotle’s philosophy as a whole. This expression (*Noēsis noēseos*) refers to a reflexive relation, indeed to a total abstract equality, a complete reflexivity ( $X = X$ ), and its meaning consists in its reciprocal relation”, Oehler, *Self-knowledge*, 505. Hans Joachim Kramer rightly stresses how remote from Greek thought is such a description, which “an die moderne Reflexionsbewegung erinnert und als solche etwas eminent Ungriechisches an sich hat”, Hans Joachim Kramer, *Der Ursprung der Geist-metaphysik* (Amsterdam: B. R. Gruner, 1974), 159, see also Hans Joachim Kramer, “Grundfragen der aristotelischen Theologie,” *Theologie und Philosophie* 44 (1969): 363–382, 481–505, Hans Joachim Kramer, “Zur geschichtlichen Stellung der aristotelischen Metaphysik,” *Kant-Studien* 58 (1967): 313–54, and Hans Joachim Kramer, *Platonismus und hellenistische Philosophie* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971), 131–87.

the first alternative he implicitly denies the second.”<sup>5</sup> Thus either/or is pure invention, or misconception, as we shall see. Yet it has become part of what Stephen Clark calls the “orthodox interpretation”<sup>6</sup>

A long list of distinguished commentators can be cited, of course, from Themistius to H. H. Joachim, Ingemar Düring, Gunther Patzig, and Jonathan Lear in our day, who understand Aristotle here along quite different lines. They include Avicenna, Maimonides, Aquinas, Trendelenburg, Franz Brentano and many others, not least Hegel whose lectures on Aristotle contain ten pages or so of close commentary on these and other chapters of *Metaphysics* 12 most essential to the question of God—lectures punctuated by such exclamations of praise as “one can hardly believe one’s eyes” (*man traugt kaum seinen Augen*), in the very midst of chapter 7.<sup>7</sup> The prevailing view among these commentators could be stated. “The principle of all things knows them all through knowing himself”; or, quoting Aquinas *intelligendo se, intelligit omnia alia*.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (New York: Meridian Books, 1959), 179 (referring to 1074b22), identical text in W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 1 cxli. I use this also for the text, together with *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, ed. W. Jaeger, Oxford Classical Texts (London: Oxford University Press, 1957). Oehler makes Aristotle's God sound like the odd student: “We have to learn that for Aristotle the perfection of the First Being does not consist in knowing everything but in the freedom from the necessity to be obliged to know everything”, Oehler, “Self-knowledge,” 502, cf. pp. 501–3, and Oehler, *Unbewegte Beweger*, 83–6.

<sup>6</sup> Stephen R. L. Clark, *Aristotle's Man* (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 178.

<sup>7</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. 2, *Werke*, vol. 19 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), 132–249, esp. 158–68, the quoted exclamation occurs on p. 161. The problem of the significance of νόσις νοήσεως in Hegel's own thought—made evident by the culminating quote in Greek, without translation or comment, of twelve lines taken from the *Metaphysics* (1072b18–30) at the very end of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*—is beyond the scope of this paper. Its treatment would have to take into careful account, among other things, his lectures on Plotinus, in which the theme of νόσις νοήσεως plays an important role. Nor can the complex question of Hegel's general value and shortcomings as a reader of Aristotle, together with his obvious differences from him, be dealt with briefly, as it would have to be here. For a more extensive, though incomplete, discussion of this see my essay, “La ‘Pensée de la Pensée’ chez Aristote,” in *La question de Dieu selon Aristote et Hegel* (hereafter, “QDAH”), ed. Thomas De Koninck and Guy Planty-Bonjour (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), 69–73.

<sup>8</sup> Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 6261 n. 2, Thomas Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio* 12, lect. 11, n. 2614 (cf. nn. 2615–18),

In order to entertain the opinion that Aristotle's God in *Metaphysics* 12 is ignorant one needs to isolate that book from the rest of the corpus, making it contradict a whole variety of other texts in Aristotle stating or implying the opposite. These are the texts most often brought forward to defend Aristotle against this interpretation, especially since Brentano. There is no denying that their cumulative effect is impressive. It seems evident from them that in Aristotle's view for God to be ignorant of anything is a contradiction in terms; any form of ignorance is a manifest imperfection and God is perfect if anyone is perfect. Jacques Brunschwig is surely right: "pour Aristotle lui-même la proposition 'Dieu ne connaît pas toute chose' joue le rôle d'une conséquence absurde en soi."<sup>9</sup>

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ed M-R Cathala and R M Spiazzi (Turin Marietti, 1950). Cf *Summa contra gentiles* I, 49, *Summa theologiae* I, q 14, a 5, *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate*, q 2, a 3. Salomo Pines translates into English many of the relevant passages of Themistius's Commentary on *Metaphysics* 12 as well as those of Avicenna, Maimonides, Averroes, and others in his "Some Distinctive Metaphysical Conceptions in Themistius' Commentary on Book Lambda and their Place in the History of Philosophy," in *Aristoteles, Werk und Wirkung* (hereafter, "AWW"), ed J Wiesner (Berlin Walter de Gruyter, 1987), 2 177–204. See also Rémi Brague, *Aristote et la question du monde* (Paris Presses Universitaires de France, 1988), 325 n 2, cf p 450 n 77. He shows that "cette idée n'est pas introduite dans l'aristotélisme du dehors"—witness its presence in Themistius already—and notes "sa résurgence, même là où les intérêts d'une philosophie religieuse ne sont plus en jeu." See also Rémi Brague, "Le destin de la 'Pensée de la Pensée' des origines au début du Moyen Âge," in *QDAH*, 153–86. Aquinas does not take kindly to the idea of imputing to Aristotle a God who would know nothing but himself "In maiorem insaniam inde procedentes, aestimant Deum nihil nisi se ipsum intellectu cognoscere," *De substantiis separatis*, in *Opuscula philosophica*, ed R M Spiazzi (Turin Marietti, 1954), chap 13, no 116, cf chap 14, nos 119–27. The most ardent modern defender of Aristotle in this regard is Franz Brentano. See his *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles* (1867, reprint, Darmstadt Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967), 186–94, 234–50. Brentano is arguing against E Zeller. See E Zeller, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics*, trans B F C Costelloe and J H Murhead (London Longmans, Green, and Co., 1897), 1 397–416. The more recent controversy between Klaus Oehler and H J Kramer is well summarized by Kramer himself, with the chief references, s v "Noësis noëseōs," in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, ed J Ritter et al (Darmstadt Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1984), 6 871–3, as well as in the new Überweg *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie Philosophie der Antike*, vol 3, *Ältere Akademie Aristoteles-Peripatos*, ed Helmut Flashar (Basel-Stuttgart Schwabe, 1983), 378–81. For more general studies of Aristotle's theology see Leo Elders, *Aristotle's Theology* (Assen Van Gorcum, 1972), and Carlo Natali, *Cosmos e divinità. La struttura logica della teologia aristotelica* (L'Aquila. Japadre, 1974).

<sup>9</sup> See *Études sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote. Actes du VI<sup>e</sup> Symposium Aristotelicum* (hereafter, "EMA"), ed Pierre Aubenque (Paris J Vrin, 1979),



A further *prima facie* case against postulating ignorance in Aristotle's God is the fact that it contradicts such self-evident attributes of divinity as omniscience and immutability acknowledged by philosophers well before Aristotle, starting with Xenophanes<sup>10</sup> It also denies the essential link between knowledge and power most clearly expressed in Anaxagoras's views on the divine Mind, which are cited by Aristotle with constant full approval (his reservations were on other

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224 Most of the relevant texts of Aristotle are to be found in an excellent summary by Jean Pépin, in his *Idées grecques sur l'homme et sur Dieu* (Paris Les Belles Lettres, 1971), 233–248 The most often quoted are *Metaphysics* 3 4 1000b2–5, and *De Anima* 1 5 410b4–7, where Aristotle criticizes Empedocles for not realizing that the latter's views would force him to hold that God does not know everything

<sup>10</sup> It is false and misleading to claim, as does Oehler, that the traditional doctrine "according to which omniscience and immutability are necessarily properties of the most perfect being" is one of "later ages" than Aristotle, Oehler, "Self-Knowledge," 502 (emphasis added), cf Oehler, *Unbewegte Bewegung*, 86 It is on the contrary a commonplace well before Aristotle One among many illustrations, Xenophanes, ought to suffice Xenophanes' critique of theological anthropomorphism and his importance for epistemology have been eloquently emphasized by Karl Popper, see Popper's *Conjectures and Refutations The Growth of Scientific Knowledge* (New York Harper Torchbooks, 1968), 25–6, 152, 225–6, 229 As Werner Jaeger points out in his *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1947), 38–54, Xenophanes's key theological concept is best expressed through the word *ἐπιπρέπει*, "it is fitting" It comes up in fragment 26 (see Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* [hereafter, DK], 10th ed [Berlin, Weidmannsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1961], vol 1, 21B26) to exclude motion from God—the "one God," *εἷς θεός*, of fragment 23 As Jonathan Barnes puts it, "the phrase 'it is not fitting' is Xenophanes's archaic and poetical version of 'it is not logically possible' It does not 'fit' the essential nature of god, or our concept of what it is to be divine, to imagine that divinities locomote that is to say, 'God moves' is self-contradictory", Jonathan Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (London Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), 1:85 See the whole of chap 5, but esp pp 89–92 on Xenophanes' monotheism, see also 137–143 Barnes brings out with equal felicity the link in Xenophanes between omniscience and mastery, offering the following translation and comment for fragment 24 "He sees as a whole, he thinks as a whole, and he hears as a whole" "Divine omniscience is both traditional (e.g. *Iliad*, II, 485, *Odyssey*, IV, 379, 468) and a plausible corollary of divine mastery If god is omniscient, his organs of perception can hardly be localized (he needs eyes in the back of his head" (p 93), see also p. 322 Jaap Mansfeld (in *Die Vorsokratiker I* [Stuttgart Philp Reclam, 1983], 208–210) rightly describes Xenophanes' whole endeavor here as a first attempt at negative theology and a first inkling of the *via eminentiae* "Bei Xenophanes finden wir also den ersten Versuch einer *negativen Theologie*, d.h. einer Umschreibung des Göttlichen durch Verneinung des Menschlich-Vorstellbaren Auch die sogenannte *via eminentiae* der rationalen Theologie ist bei Xenophanes schon vorgebildet" Cf also notes 11 and 12 below

scores).<sup>11</sup> To this may be added the fine wonder, universally expressed in ancient Greek literature and thought, before mind's evident ubiquity and its affinity with whole, or totality.<sup>12</sup> Third, the view that the divine *νοῦς* knows only itself would make Aristotle contradict common conceptions. In view of Aristotle's characteristic respect for common conceptions and his appeal to them even in the *Metaphysics* this fact presents an even stronger objection—if a stronger objection is possible—against this interpretation.<sup>13</sup>

To summarize: apart from its intrinsic absurdity, such an interpretation forces one into at least three rather gross contradictions. Éric Weil's warning ought, instead, to be heeded, with Aristotle "on ne saurait . . . être trop prudent: la contradiction n'est pas toujours dans les textes, elle est assez souvent dans l'esprit de l'interprète"<sup>14</sup> Jonathan Lear's questions are much closer to the mark "What does God's thinking himself consist in? Is this a totally empty conception, a mere

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<sup>11</sup> See the whole splendid fragment 12 (DK 59B12). For Aristotle's appreciation of Anaxagoras—whose treatment of *νοῦς* makes him appear, Aristotle says, "like a sober man among babblers"—see *Metaphysics* 1.3 998b15–18. On dominance and knowledge of all things, see *De Anima* 3.4 429a18–20, cf. *Physics* 8.5 256b24–27, *Metaphysics* 12.10 1075b8.

<sup>12</sup> This is, of course, already obvious to anyone who has read the pre-Socratics or Plato, where wisdom (*σοφία*) and a true knowledge of everything are synonymous. See, for example, Heraclitus's famous fragment 50 (DK 22B50), saying that to the wise all things are one. For a broader range of references in ancient Greek literature see Brague, *Aristote*, 39–44, esp. p. 40. On this same aspect of mind, and on the arguments relating to God derived from it, see the wealth of texts to that effect from Pindar, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, and Philo, collected and translated by A.-J. Festugière in *La révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, vol. 2, *Le Dieu cosmique* (Paris: Gabalda, 1949), 80–91, 444–5, 543–4, 561, 610. According to Plato's *Laws* (903b–e), "God takes simultaneous care of the whole and of every detail in the whole" (p. 88). This second volume of Festugière's *magnum opus* contains still largely unexploited mines of information on other ways to God in ancient literature and philosophy, particularly in the early Aristotle (chiefly his *Peri philosophias*) and on Aristotle's influence in this regard. See also volume 4, *Le Dieu inconnu et la gnose*, for Plato especially.

<sup>13</sup> For Aristotle "an *endoxon* that is shared by all men is *ipso facto* beyond challenge", G. E. L. Owen, *Tithenai ta phainomena*, in *Aristote et les problèmes de méthode*, ed. Suzanne Mansion (Louvain, 1961), 90, cf. pp. 83–92. See also W. J. Verdenius, "Traditional and Personal Elements in Aristotle's Religion," *Phronēsis* 5 (1960) 56–70. Aristotle appeals explicitly to the common conception of God's causality and science in *Metaphysics* 1.2 983a6–10.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Éric Weil, *La place de la logique dans la pensée aristotélicienne*, in *Essais et conférences*, vol. 1 (Paris: Plon, 1970), 44–80, see p. 48n. I have elaborated at greater length on these various points in my "Pensée de la pensée," 80–8.

solution to a puzzle? If so, how could Aristotle have believed that God was an unmoved mover of the world? . . . It is incredible that Aristotle should allow the bare solution to a dialectical puzzle to serve as one of the foundations of his entire metaphysical outlook. We do have before us a rich conception of God's relation to the world."<sup>15</sup>

Be that as it may, those who assign only self-knowledge to the divine *νοῦς* can still maintain that book 12 must just contradict everything else, including good sense. The chapters concerned need therefore to be gone into with care in order to see if this is true. In any case, there are greater and much more genuine difficulties that warrant such a venture. The central question is probably best formulated by Plotinus: How can you eliminate all duality from a being whom you describe as thinking about himself? Can thought remain *one* and *indivisible* while considering itself? And if it is one and indivisible (as Aristotle insists God must be), how can it think of this indivisible which it itself must be? It would appear, says Plotinus, that the simplest (*ἀπλούστατον*) reality does not think of itself, for it would then be multiple. Hence it does not think of itself and one cannot think about it. "If anything is the simplest [*ἀπλούστατον*] of all, it will not possess thought of itself: for if it is to possess it, it will possess it by being multiple. It is not therefore thought, nor is there any thinking about it."<sup>16</sup>

I shall suggest in the following that this difficulty and its correlates are well foreseen by Aristotle, who is no less concerned than Plotinus to eliminate all duality from God. Aristotle's very careful progress in these chapters of book 12 (and others that their understanding presupposes, for example, *De Anima* 3.6 on *νόησις* and the indivisibles), provides the best answer to such difficulties.

Whatever the answers, these and other related problems obviously require a fair actual reading of the relevant texts with a concern

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<sup>15</sup> Jonathan Lear, *Aristotle: the Desire to Understand* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 300. Together with T. H. Irwin's *Aristotle's First Principles* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), and Brague's *Aristote* (all three very different works), Lear's book must count among the best recent monographs on Aristotle. It contains the most intelligent recent treatment of Aristotle's God in my view, one of its outstanding merits being its grasp of the central significance of indivisibility in Aristotle's account.

<sup>16</sup> *Enneads* 5.3.49-13, trans. A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), cf. also *Enneads* 5.6.24. *in toto* and 6.7.38.

for the arguments structuring the whole instead of the peacemeal picking at phrases out of context that has too often prevailed—an approach that disregards content, meanings, and definitions, as well as the remarks on method repeated by Aristotle. Such aspects are quite beyond the scope of philology left to itself, *a fortiori* of mere musings. The quality of scholarship and the greater respect for philosophical form and content shown by many of the best interpreters of more recent years in the ever expanding field of Aristotelian studies will prove of considerable help. Forbidding though they may seem at first, it ought to become clear also that access to the higher flights of *Metaphysics* 12 is facilitated by their remarkable consistency with explanations and clarifications provided throughout Aristotle's other works, as well as by his constant return to ordinary experience.

## II

Guthrie rightly calls book 12 of the *Metaphysics* “the most masterly exposition, in lecture-note form, of any left us by Aristotle”<sup>17</sup> At the outset of *Metaphysics* 12.7 one is dealing with the primary source of all motion, the source that therefore moves without being moved and must be “eternal, substance and actuality” (1072a25–6) Chapters 1 to 5 have summed up the essential prerequisites, which are more fully elaborated elsewhere, especially in the *Physics*. The causal role of the Prime Mover has been reaffirmed in chapter 4: “besides these there is that which as first of all things moves all things” (1070b34–5). Chapter 6 has shown that motion presupposes a cause whose very substance must be actuality (ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια; 1071b20) and without matter (ἄνευ ὕλης; b21)<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Guthrie, *History*, 252 He adds, “it is a short, self-contained *opusculum*” On this insufficiently examined notion see W J Verdenius, “The Nature of Aristotle's Scholarly Writings,” in *AWW*, 1 12–21 I leave aside the notoriously uncertain questions of chronology

<sup>18</sup> Charles Kahn rightly points out that “in the order of knowability for us, metaphysics is the debtor to physics But in the order of explanatory or intrinsic knowability (which is also the order of being or *ousia*) physics as the study of motion is essentially incomplete and must borrow its first principle from the study of unmoving substance”, Charles Kahn, “On the Intended Interpretation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*,” in *AWW*, 1 325 It is worthy of notice that the first words of *Metaphysics* 12 are Περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία (“The subject of our inquiry is substance”, 12 1 1069a18) Small wonder, as a consequence, that the essential prerequisites recollected here (chapters 1–

How is the cause to move without being moved? Here is Aristotle's own summing up of his answer:

And the object of desire [ὁρεκτὸν] and the object of thought [νοητὸν] move in this way, they move without being moved. The primary objects of desire and of thought are the same. For the apparent good [φαινόμενον καλόν] is the object of appetite [ἐπιθυμητόν], and the real good [ὄν καλόν] is the primary object of rational wish. But desire is consequent on opinion rather than opinion on desire for the thinking is the starting-point [ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις]. And thought is moved by the object of thought, and one of the two columns of opposites [συστοιχία] is in itself the object of thought, and in this, substance is first [ἡ οὐσία πρώτη], and in substance, that which is simple and exists actually. [The one [έν] and the simple [ἀπλουν] are not the same, for 'one' means a measure, but 'simple' means that the thing itself has a certain nature.] But the beautiful [καλόν], also, and that which is itself desirable [δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν] are in the same column, and the first in any class is always best [ἄριστον ἀεὶ], or analogous to the best (12 7 1072a26–1072b1).<sup>19</sup>

5) are those that concern substance, in *Physics* 1, 7, and 8. The proof for the existence of an immobile, wholly unmoved substance that moves everything and is eternal and without magnitude covers two full books of the *Physics* (*Physics* 7–8), and presupposes the various definitions and proofs of the six other books, not least book 6 on the quantitative parts of motion. The proof of the essential proposition, "everything that is in motion must be moved by something," is provided at the outset of book 7 by showing that anything in motion must have parts and is therefore dependent on these. As Kahn emphasizes, a number of propositions "baldly stated" in *Metaphysics* 12 6–7 are "argued at length in the physical treatises." See the *De Caelo* and *De Generatione et Corruptione*, besides the *Physics*, to which one should add the treatises on the living, *De Anima*, *De Sensu*, the various ones on animals, and so forth. Nor should the treatises of so-called practical philosophy be forgotten: the two *Ethics*, and the *Politics*. What *Metaphysics* 12 6–7 add "are the specific contribution of First Philosophy", Kahn, "Intended Interpretation," 318. All quotes from the *Metaphysics* will be from *The Works of Aristotle*, vol. 8, *Metaphysica*, trans. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960).

<sup>19</sup> *De Anima* (hereafter, "DA") 3 10 provides a more detailed analysis of the respective role of the two principles of motion, intellect (*νοῦς*) and desire (*ὁρεξις*), the latter including the will or "rational wish" (*βούλησις*, cf. 433a23–5), as well as the essential terms of motion, the first of which, the unmoved mover, is the "practical good" (433b16). For the text of *De Anima*, I use Aristotle, *De Anima*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), indicating a different reading adopted where necessary. Unless otherwise indicated, I quote from D. W. Hamlyn, *Aristotle's De Anima, Books II and III, with certain passages from Book I* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968). For an excellent discussion of perception and desire, and emotion and cognition with reference to the *De Motu Animalium*, the *De Sensu*, and the *De Anima*, see Martha C. Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, "Changing Aristotle's Mind," in *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie O. Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 37–41.

Aristotle evidently wants to show that the Prime Mover is at once first "object of thought" and first "object of desire," and that this is how it moves.<sup>20</sup> The very first object of "rational wish" (βουλευτὸν δὲ πρῶτον) is the "real good" (ὄν καλόν; 1072a28; cf. Bonitz *ipsium pulchrum*—says Bonitz, "the beautiful itself"<sup>21</sup>). The principle of discernment between the latter and the "apparent good" (φαινόμενον καλόν; a28), is none other than thought or intellection, namely νόησις (cf. a30). Thus the order of goodness corresponds to that of intelligibility. For among "objects of thought" some are principles of intelligibility for others. Between, say, two opposites, one is always defined by reference to the other, which is "in itself the object of thought." The full significance of this will be clearer further on. (It did not escape Hegel, whose exclamation—"one can hardly believe one's eyes"—is provoked by precisely this passage in Aristotle's account)<sup>22</sup> The word συστοιχία evokes, of course, the Pythagorean table of contraries, but it is a leading theme in Aristotle that "in the list of contraries one of the two columns [ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία] is privative, and all contraries are reducible to being and non-being, and to unity and plurality"<sup>23</sup>

Among all "objects of thought," substance clearly comes first (accidents are all defined by reference to it). On the other hand, it is well-established that νόησις, thought, goes back to the simple, which

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<sup>20</sup> One should bear in mind that such terms as "object of thought," taken for convenience from the Ross translation, may bring in modern connotations that are somewhat foreign to Greek thought, the Greek text speaks quite naturally of νοητόν, the "intelligible," referring directly to νοῦς, "intellect" or "mind."

<sup>21</sup> Hermann Bonitz, *Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentarius* (1849, reprint, Hildesheim Georg Olms, 1960), 496. Καλόν may also be translated, of course, as "the Good" (*bonum*). By retaining here its more literal meaning of *pulchrum* ("the Beautiful") Bonitz makes a fine point, warranted by the context.

<sup>22</sup> To be exact, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία καθ' αὐτήν (1072a30–1), translated "die andere Reihe an und für sich selbst" according to one version, and "das andere Coelement [συστοιχία] an und für sich selbst" according to another. Cf. Hegel, *Vorlesungen*, 161 (in the edition cited in note 7 above), and the edition by G. J. P. J. Bolland (Leiden A. H. Adrian, 1908), 477.

<sup>23</sup> *Metaphysics* 2.2 1004b27–8, cf. 10.4 1055b26–7. "It is evident that one of the contraries is always privative." For further references see Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, 2.375–6, Bonitz, *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, 81, 497, Osvaldo Norberto Guariglia, *Quellenkritische und logische Untersuchungen zur Gegensatzlehre des Aristoteles* (Hildesheim Georg Olms Verlag, 1978), chiefly 66–104, 125–31.

any synthesis of thoughts presupposes as its element.<sup>24</sup> Hence, among substances the simple are principles of intelligibility. Likewise, potency is defined from act. Hence the first object of thought must be a simple substance existing actually (ἡ ἀπλὴ καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν; 1072a32). A parenthesis (a32–4) then underscores further still the meaning of “simple” (ἀπλοῦν), as describing substance itself.

Furthermore, this first object of thought must also be the first object of desire. The beautiful or the good, that which is in itself desirable, belong to the same series (ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ, συστοιχία; a35). Since “the first in any class is always best, or analogous to the best,” it follows that simple substance, actual and first object of thought, is what is best of all and therefore first object of desire.

In a word, the first source of all motion is not only unmoved, “eternal, substance, and actuality,” as was pointed out at the outset. It is in addition the indivisible principle of all intelligibility, that is, first object of thought, and principle of all goodness, that is, the good or the beautiful *par excellence* it is not only τὸ ὄν καλόν, “real good,” but the first good and therefore the best and most perfect. Following immediately upon these are the famous lines (1072b1–13) in which Aristotle explains the teleological causality of goodness. They begin with an important distinction reiterated at least five times in the Aristotelian corpus which reads as follows: “That a final cause [τὸ οὐ ἐνεκα] may exist among unchangeable entities is shown by the distinction of its meanings. For the final cause is (a) some being for whose good an action is done [τινὶ], and (b) something at which the action aims [τινός]; and of these the latter exists among unchangeable entities though the former does not. The final cause, then, produces motion as being loved [κινεῖ δὲ ὡς ἐρώμενον], but all other things move by being moved” (1072b1–4).<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> See DA 3 6 430a26–b4, notably the example of Empedocles' zoogony.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. K. Gaiser, *Das zweifache Telos bei Aristoteles*, in *Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theophrast*, ed. Ingemar Düring (Heidelberg: Lothar Stahm Verlag, 1969), 97–113, particularly 100–3, 110–11, 113. Gaiser has shown (1) that the series of opposites (συστοιχία) is again illustrated here; and (2) that it recalls Diotima's speech in Plato's *Symposium* (cf. 210e, and 204d–205a; and *Lysis* 218d–222a). The phrase αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν signifies beauty or the good itself, on the one hand, on the other, all things desiring it. Gaiser further analyzes five texts in the Aristotelian corpus, including this one, where this distinction between two meanings of “that for the sake of which” is central: the four others are EE 8 3 1249b15; DA 2 4 415b2–3 and 415b20–1; and *Physics* 2 2 194a35–6. Three of these concern God, whose perfection causes all becoming (see p. 111). To this must be added a frag-

That is to say, the simple, perfect substance just described exercises the highest form of causality without ever changing. It is through desire that what is good moves. "But the eternally noble and that which is truly and primarily good, and not good at one time but not at another, is too divine and too honorable to be relative to anything else. The first mover, then, imparts movement without being moved, and desire and the faculty of desire impart movement while being themselves moved."<sup>26</sup>

Hence, a little farther on in the same chapter of the *Metaphysics*. "On such a principle, then, depend the heavens and the world of nature" (1072b13–14). "On such a principle" refers to 1072b7–8 and 10–11. "But since there is something which moves while itself unmoved, existing actually [ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν], this can in no way be otherwise than it is." It exists, in other words, "of necessity" (the meanings of necessary are given out again in b11–13). Insofar as it does so it is καλῶς "its mode of being is good, and it is in this sense a first principle" (καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή, b11).

There is no room here for comment on these splendid developments except to agree with Gunther Patzig when he reports that "the journey to the highest principles and causes, which Aristotle has so energetically pursued from the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, is here at last completed in a few giant strides." The word πρῶτον, "first"—beginning with "first object of thought," as we have seen—plays a central role; indeed, the good (or the beautiful) itself is described as *par excellence* πρῶτον. Again, Patzig's words, a few lines later, can hardly be improved upon: "The substance of the first mover is

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ment from the *Peri philosophias*, see *Aristotelis Fragmenta selecta*, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press), fr. 28, drawn from *Physics* 194a27–36. See also Kramer, "Geschichtlichen Stellung," 326–7, on the philosophical arguments concerned; see especially Henri-Paul Cunningham, "Téléologie, nature et esprit," in *QDAH*, 5–35.

<sup>26</sup> *De Motu Animalium* 670b32–701a1, in *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium*, Text with Translation, Commentary and Interpretive Essays by Martha Craven Nussbaum (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). See Martha Nussbaum's first essay "Aristotle on Teleological Explanation," 59–106. On the importance of this text cf. Ingemar Düring who brings out its closeness to Plato, and suggests, as parallels in Plato, *Symposium*, 210e–211a, and *Phaedo* 100d. See Ingemar Düring, *Aristoteles Darstellung und Interpretation seines Denkens* (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1966), 223–4, 341. Likewise, Willy Theiler, *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965), 95.



paronymously first among substances; it is 'the substance of substances'. . . Aristotle is only consistent when, immediately after this proof (XII, 7, 1072b14), he turns to the exposition of the intellectual activity and the happiness of the divine substance. We can now say that this exposition is the kernel of his ontology, for theology and ontology are paronymously interrelated in just the way in which their objects, the prime mover and being as such, are. The very name of 'first philosophy' gives us an indication of how closely it is related to that high object."<sup>27</sup>

### III

But why "a thinking of thinking"? What must the divine life itself be like? Aristotle says that "it is a life such as the best which we enjoy," albeit, in our case, briefly (1072b14–18). The most enjoyable life for us is found in perception and thought when they are fully awakened and we are fully conscious of them, as is clear from *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.9. The chief part of human life is activity: ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ (1170a18).<sup>28</sup> For the σπουδαῖος, the good man, life is good and enjoyable. Now to live and to be conscious of living are but one thing—we perceive that we perceive, think that we think (καὶ νοῶμεν, ὅτι

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Gunther Patzig, "Theologie und Ontologie in der 'Metaphysik' des Aristoteles," *Kant-Studien* 52 (1960/61) 199–200, I quote from the English translation in *Articles on Aristotle*, vol. 3, *Metaphysics*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield, Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1979) 44–5. On the πρῶτον κινῶν ("Prime Mover") as described here and elsewhere in Aristotle, see especially During, *Aristoteles*, 210–5, 220–4, and John J. Cleary, *Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1988), esp. 78–85.

<sup>28</sup> For the *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter, "EN") I shall be quoting from Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. J. A. K. Thompson, rev. Hugh Tredennick (London: Penguin, 1976). This whole development in EN 9.9 is of great importance. Cf. Charles H. Kahn, "Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle's Psychology," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie* 48 (1966) 43–81; Jacques Brunschwig, "Aristote et l'effet Perrichon," in *La passion de la raison: Hommage à F. Alquié*, ed. Jean-Luc Marion and Jean Depran (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1983), 361–77, esp. 375–6; Richard Bodéus, "Notes sur quelques aspects de la conscience dans la pensée aristotélicienne," *Phronēsis* 20 (1975) 63–74. This exposition has a serious contender in EE 7.12 1244b23–1245b19. See also Brague's excellent analysis of parallel passages in the *Protrepticus* in his *Aristote*, 57–110, and pp. 135–148 on the implicit experience of the self.

νοοῦμεν; 1170a32)—and thus are conscious of existing. Full activity here is most pleasurable, for to the good man existence itself is good (cf. 1170b4), and perception of what is in itself good is naturally pleasant. Hence the great pleasure we take in contemplation, even at the sense level, which is manifest in the sharing of it in communication and in friendship proper (cf. 1170b11–14)

By contrast with ours, divine life is perpetual wakefulness (διαγωγῇ, 1072b14; ἀεὶ, b15), pure joy.<sup>29</sup> The central notion here is of course pleasure, which, it must be remembered, is not in Aristotle's view a process, its form is "complete at any given moment" (*EN* 10.4 1174b5–6); it is comparable in that respect to the act of seeing, which is "regarded as complete at any moment of its duration, because it does not lack anything that, realized later, will perfect its specific quality. Now pleasure also seems to be of this nature, because it is a sort of whole" (1174a14–17). A movement is not complete at any given time, "whereas pleasure is something that is whole and complete" (1174b7); it is instantaneous, and that which is "in the now" (ἐν τῷ νῦν) is a whole (b9). Among the fine lines of *Metaphysics* 9.6 that were restored by Bonitz we read, "At the same time [ἄμα] we are seeing and have seen, are understanding and have understood, are thinking and have thought (while it is not true that at the same time we are learning and have learnt, or are being cured and have been cured)" (1048b23–5). Process, or movement (κίνησις) is, of course, imperfect actuality (ἄτελής; *Physics* 3.2 291b31–2), which ceases to be when its end has been reached, whereas the actuality here described is itself its own end and is at once all it can be (cf. *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a21–3). To quote Victor Golschmidt, "Un tel acte est d'emblée tout ce qu'il peut être. Sa fin lui est immanente, et lui-même est immanent à l'agent."<sup>30</sup> All of this makes perfect sense of the remark

<sup>29</sup> The exact meaning and connotations of διαγωγῇ are very well explained in Brague, *Aristote*, 437–46, who traces the theme back to the *Protrepticus* see pp. 82–9, "l'amour naturel de la veille est un amour de la vérité" (p. 89). On ἡδόνη ("pleasure"), ἐνεργεία ("actuality"), and ζωή ("life") see Wolfgang Welsch, *Aisthesis Grundzüge und Perspektiven der Aristotelischen Sinneslehre* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987), 418–23, esp. 418–19, and 418 n. 55 on "die Gottlichkeit von Lust überhaupt" in Aristotle.

<sup>30</sup> Victor Golschmidt, *Temps physique et temps tragique chez Aristote* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1982), 179, referring to *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a35–b3. He adds, "On touche ici à l'une des intuitions constitutives de tout le système" (p. 180), cf. pp. 147–189. *Metaphysics* 9.6.1048b23–4, just quoted, is part of the text (b18–36) restored by Bonitz, *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, 396–398, and kept by

in the *Nicomachean Ethics* regarding God's pleasure. "If any being had a simple nature, the same activity would always give him the greatest pleasure. That is why God enjoys one simple pleasure for ever. For there is an activity not only of movement but also one of immobility, and there is a truer pleasure in rest than in motion" (*EN* 7.14.1154b24–8)

In a word, the higher the actuality, the more perfect and the greater the joy. The primary cause, we have just seen, is substance, actuality and nothing but actuality (cf. *Metaphysics*, 1071b20). The highest actuality is that of the intellect or of thought (*νοῦς*), since it is thinking, we have also just seen (cf. ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις; 1072a30), that understands the simple, the actual, the first object of thought and the first object of desire, the beautiful or the real good. Hence the lines that follow at 1072b18–19 "And thinking in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thinking in the fullest sense with that which is best in the fullest sense."

Aristotle then goes on to say,

And thought thinks on itself because it shares the nature of the object of thought, for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking [*θιγγάνων καὶ νοῶν*, 1072b21] its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of thought, i.e. the essence, is thought [*καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς*, b22]. But it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the possession rather than the receptivity is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder, and if in a better this compels it yet more. And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God, for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality, and God's self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say

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both Ross and Jaeger. See Brague, *Aristote*, 454–76. Cf. *De Sophisticis Elenchis* 22 178a9, *De Sensu* 6 446b2, and *EN* 10 4.1174a17–23 "at no moment in time can one fasten upon a pleasure the prolongation of which will enable its specific quality to be perfected. For this reason pleasure is not a process, because every process is in time, and has an end (e.g. the process of building), and is complete when it has accomplished its object. Thus it is complete either in the whole of the time that it takes or at the instant of reaching its end. The particular processes that take place in the parts of this time are all incomplete, and different in kind from the whole and from one another." For a discussion of these and other parallel texts see J. L. Ackrill, "Aristotle's Distinction between *Energeia* and *Kinesis*," *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, ed. R. Bambrough (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 121–41, and Gérard Verbeke, "L'argument du livre VII de la *Physique*," in *Naturphilosophie bei Aristoteles und Theophrast*, 250–67, esp. 254–61.

therefore that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God, for this *is* God (1072b19–30)

In the strict sense, most remarkably, the word *θεωρία*, “contemplation,” means the actual exercise of knowledge, and it appears always to signify some actual knowing.<sup>31</sup> These lines bring up again the famous teachings of the Aristotelian Ethics on contemplation, including the “contemplation of God” (τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν) described at the conclusion of the *Eudemian Ethics* (8.3 1249b13–21) as the best mode and the finest standard for human life.<sup>32</sup> In a splendid passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (10.7 1177b26–1178a8) Aristotle urges us to live the life of the divine element in us, the intellect, even if between human and divine activity there is only “some likeness” of such activity (ὁμοίωμα τι; EN 10.8 1178b27).<sup>33</sup> The fact remains that *θεωρία τοῦ*

<sup>31</sup> See John Dudley, “La contemplation (*theōria*) humaine selon Aristote,” *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 80, no. 47 (1982) 387–413, particularly 388–392, and Gott und *Theōria* bei Aristoteles *Die metaphysische Grundlage der Nikomachischen Ethik* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1981).

<sup>32</sup> Aristotle explains in his conclusion to the *Eudemian Ethics* that “whatever mode of choosing and of acquiring things good by nature—whether goods of the body or wealth or friends or the other goods—will best promote the contemplation of God [τοῦ θεοῦ θεωρίαν], that is the best mode, and that standard is the finest, and any mode of choice and acquisition that either through deficiency or excess hinders us from serving and from contemplating God—that is the bad one,” *EE* 8.3 1249b17–21, trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961). Olof Gigon is right, I think “Ausserdem kommt es sicherlich vor, daß Aristoteles sich über den Gegenstand des *theōreîn* und *noeîn* des Menschen nicht näher aussert. Hier aber wird dieser Gegenstand mit aller Deutlichkeit genannt *ho theos*,” Olaf Gigon, *Zwei Interpretationen zur Eudemischen Ethik des Aristoteles*, in *Museum Helveticum* 26 (1969) 214. See further W. J. Verdenius, “Human Reason and God in the Eudemian Ethics,” in *Untersuchungen zur Eudemischen Ethik. Akten des 5. Symposium Aristotelicum*, ed. P. Moraux and D. Harlfinger (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971) 285–97. Verdenius reestablishes a much more satisfactory text from attempts to remove or change various occurrences of the word *θεός* in that work, along the same lines, cf., in the same volume, E. Berti (192–184), G. Verbeke (154) and C. J. Rowe (85–87).

<sup>33</sup> Kahn draws a list of objections to “the prevailing view” that “the divine *nous* knows nothing of the world order” derived from precisely these analogies between human *θεωρία* and divine *νόησις*. For instance “The more completely a human being engages in noetic contemplation, the more fully he grasps the formal structure of the cosmos. If the divine represents the goal to which human thought at its best aspires, surely the divine must grasp the *whole* of this structure rather than *none* of it,” Kahn, “Intended Interpretation,” 327 n. 24. See also J. A. Dudley, “The Love of God in Aristotle’s Ethics,” in *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphi-*

θεοῦ would apply best of all to God himself, as we see here in the *Metaphysics*. The *Nicomachean Ethics* is clear “The activity of God, which is supremely happy, must be a form of contemplation” (*EN* 10 8 1178b21–2). The activity of each of the senses was said to be perfect when it is in good condition and directed towards the highest, or “most beautiful” (κάλλιστον, 1174b15), the best (κράτιστον, b19) of its objects; it will then be “most perfect and most pleasurable” (b20). Thought and contemplation will likewise be “most perfect and most pleasurable,” repeats Aristotle, when directed to the worthiest (σπουδαιότατον) of its objects (cf b21–3). That having been said, “it is evident—as Themistius stresses in his Commentary to Lambda—that the Intellect has much greater joy and delight than the senses (rejoicing) in their perceptions. For (the Intellect) intellects that which is more excellent than the other perceptions (namely) Himself and His own existence.”<sup>34</sup>

*Iosophæ* 25, no. 2 (1983) 126–137, for a remarkable outline of the moral ideal according to Aristotle. One may wonder, along with the author (pp. 131–132), at the persistent attempt by scholars like von Arnim to alter, against manuscript evidence, such particularly explicit texts as those of the *Eudemian Ethics*. For an excellent discussion of this see Anthony Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics* (Oxford, 1978), 173–8. Von Arnim, “at the cost of a manipulation of the text of which there are but few examples” (Vianney Décarie, in his annotated translation into French of *EE* [Paris, J. Vrin/PUM, 1978], 222 n. 80), had decided, for 1249a21–b25, to read νοῦς (“intellect”) wherever manuscripts had θεός (“God”), in order to eliminate any reference to a transcendent God. “The proposal has no support from any manuscript or version, and is implausible in itself,” Kenny, 174. Von Arnim also changed θεραπεύειν (“serve”) [God] into ἐνεργεῖν, Dirlmeier would reduce θεός to the θεωρητικόν, namely, a human faculty of divine character, θεῖον, or “god in us.” But the context is formal and does not allow these reductions. See also, against these, the refutations by Gigon and by Verdenius referred to in the previous note. Other texts in the *Ethics* more directly concerned with the divine, or with God, are again *EN* 10 8 1178b28–32, and *EN* 10 7 1177a12–1178a8, cf. 10 4 1174b15–23. On the divine in the Aristotelian *Ethics*, see further Vianney Décarie, “Le divin dans l’éthique aristotélicienne,” in *QDAH*, 37–68, concerning the Politics, which should not be neglected, Lionel Ponton, “Le divin comme préoccupation politique chez Aristote et chez Hegel,” in *QDAH*, 187–202.

<sup>34</sup> Trans. Salomo Pines, from the Arabic and the Hebrew version, in his “Metaphysical Conceptions,” 181. The Greek original is lost, the Latin version reads in part “ita intellectus quoque valde laetatur, cum omnium intellegibilium nobilissimum intellegit. Nobilissimum vero omnium intellegibilium illud est, quod intellegit se suamque essentiam absque molestia ac sine ullo impedimento vel intermissione sensuum,” “In Aristotelis Metaphysicorum Librum A paraphrasis hebraice et latine,” *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (hereafter, “CAG”), vol. 5, pt. 4, ed. S. Landauer (Berlin: Reimer, 1902), 22 18–21, cf. 11 14–17).

How is this? We just saw that for Aristotle self-awareness is indispensable for a good life, as is best shown in *EN* 9 9 and *EE* 7 12 regarding friendship.<sup>35</sup> The long passage just quoted from *Metaphysics* 12 7 (especially 1072b19–23) clearly refers as well to teachings developed at greater length in the *De Anima*. The famous, extraordinary statements spring to mind. “Actual knowledge is identical with its object” (repeated twice word for word: *DA* 3.5.430a19–20, 3.7.431a1–2) “In general, the intellect in activity is its objects” (7.431b17). More literally, the mind, that which thinks, νοῦς, is things (πράγματα). Chapter 4 (429b9) specifies that the intellect can “think itself” (αὐτὸν νοεῖν)<sup>36</sup> once it “has become each thing in the way that one who actually knows is said to do so” (b5–7)<sup>37</sup>

Aristotle raises, in the latter part of *DA* 3 4 (429b22–430a9), two *aporiae* which are germane to the questions we mentioned at the

<sup>35</sup> For an excellent analysis of this point and of the role of the Good even in *Metaphysics* 12 7 and 9, see Horst Seidl, “Aristoteles’ Lehre von der νόησις νοήσεως des ersten, göttlichen Vernunftwesens und ihre Darstellung bei Plotin,” in *AWW*, 2 157–76, esp 159–62. On friendship according to Aristotle, and particularly on *EN* 9 9, see my forthcoming “Philia et Anerkennung,” in *Éthique et politique chez Platon, Aristote et Hegel*, ed Lionel Ponton and Jean-Louis Vieillard-Baron (Paris Presses Universitaires de France, 1994).

<sup>36</sup> My translation, reading αὐτὸν νοεῖν. As Charles Kahn says, “there is no justification for Bywater’s emendation at 429b9, which replaces αὐτὸν νοεῖν by a pointless repetition of δι’ αὐτοῦ νοεῖν from 429b7. The theme of self-cognition, introduced here, prepares for the *aporia* developed later in this chapter (429b26–9). In Ross’s text this connection is lost”, “Aristotle on Thinking,” in *Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima*, ed Martha C Nussbaum and Amélie O Rorty (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1992), 373 n 27.

<sup>37</sup> See Jonathan Lear, “Active Episteme,” in *Mathematics and Metaphysics in Aristotle Akten des X Symposium Aristotelicum*, ed Andreas Graeser (Berne-Stuttgart Paul Haupt, 1987), 149–174. It is noteworthy that for Hegel, this actual identity of “object” and thinking is the “chief moment” of Aristotelian philosophy. “Das Hauptmoment in der Aristotelischen Philosophie ist, dass das Denken und das Gedachte eins ist, — dass das Objective und das Denken (die Energie) ein und dasselbe ist”, Hegel, *Vorlesungen*, 162–3. Richard Rorty has emphasized that, instead of “the subject’s becoming identical with the object,” the notion usually taken for granted since Descartes is of “representations which are in the ‘mind’”, so that knowledge becomes “the possession of accurate representations of an object”, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Oxford Basil Blackwell, 1980), 45. “Once Descartes had entrenched this way of speaking it was possible for Locke to use ‘idea’ in a way which has no Greek equivalent at all” (p 48). Charles Taylor offers a most enlightening discussion of two modern perspectives thus utterly different from the one we see in Aristotle, “Descartes’s Disengaged Reason” and “Locke’s Punctual Self”, see Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1989), 143–76, 538–44.

outset. The first (429b22–5) is this. Since it is ἄπλουν (simple, indivisible) and ἀπαθές (impassible), and since it has nothing in common with anything (as Anaxagoras says), how will the intellect think? The second is: “Can it itself be thought?” (b 26). We will return to the first aporia later. The answer to the second reads as follows: “And it is itself an object of thought, just as its objects are. For, in the case of those things which have no matter, that which thinks and that which is thought are the same, for contemplative knowledge and that which is known in that way are the same” (430a2–5).

In *Metaphysics* 12.7 Aristotle sums that up in less than three lines (1072b19–21). Given that intellect and what it thinks are one in the very act of thinking, the intellect itself becomes intelligible in that same act. Here, however, Aristotle adds the word *θιγγάνων* (b21), evoking contact and the sense of touch, just as he does earlier concerning thought of incomposites (9.10.1051b24–5). One of the many contributions of Brague’s book on Aristotle has been to bring this out, showing how the sense of touch—and *not* sight, as is usually said—is “un analogue privilégié de l’intellect”<sup>38</sup>. When I feel this object in my hand, I am simultaneously aware of myself as distinct from it and sense it as at once present and external. Hence no doubt the proverbial certainty of touch. Whereas light, the medium indispensable to vision, is “not strictly speaking visible in itself, but because of the colour of something else” (*DA* 2.7.418b5–6), in the case of touch, “that medium which enables us to perceive is itself perceptible, is internal to us”, it is our body, our flesh<sup>39</sup>. Touching is accordingly more like thinking than even seeing because of its self-awareness while sensing. Other common traits would doubtless be intimacy and sureness: *νόησις* cannot err in its first grasp of the indivisible, according to *DA* 3.6.430a26–7. Error always comes from “composition,” synthesis τὸ γὰρ ψεῦδος ἐν συνθέσει αἰεί (430b1–2). Similarly, according to *Metaphysics* 9.10.1051b17–27 on “incomposites” (ἀσύνθητα), “contact [*θιγγεῖν*] and assertion are truth (assertion not being the same as affirmation), and ignorance is non-contact [*μὴ θιγγάνειν*]. For it is not possible to be in *error* regarding the question what a thing is, save in an accidental sense; and the same holds good regarding

<sup>38</sup> See Brague, *Aristote*, 369–373, cf. pp. 259–261. The seminal article is Stanley Rosen, “Thought and Touch: A Note on Aristotle’s *De Anima*,” *Phronesis* 6, no. 2 (1961): 127–37.

<sup>39</sup> Brague, *Aristote*, 372, referring to *De Anima* 2.11.423b12–15.

non-composite substances (for it is not possible to be in error about them)" (1051b23–8).

Now the object of thought in question in *Metaphysics* 12.7 is οὐσία, substance (translated by Ross here as "essence"; cf. 1072b22)<sup>40</sup> Its actual possession gives the intellect its dignity, indeed its "divine" character (b22–3). As was pointed out some time ago by D. M. MacKinnon, "it is impossible to understand at all Aristotle's conception of God without some grasp of what he means by substance"; here Aristotle is "stressing the fact that God in a way unique among substances exists of himself."<sup>41</sup> In lines 1072b26–30 (the last of the long quote above) he then describes the actuality of thought which is God as life and life most good and eternal. A fundamental proposition from the *De Anima* is at play here "For living things it is living that is existing" (τὸ εἶναι, their being, 2.4.415b13)—the proposition is better known in its Latin version: *vivere viventibus est esse*<sup>42</sup> The activity of intellect is a form of life (cf. *DA* 2.2 413a22–3), in fact its best form is perpetual wakefulness, uninterrupted θεωρία, as we saw. The very being of the first substance of which we were speaking, since it

<sup>40</sup> Bonitz understands it as meaning τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, see his *Aristotelis Metaphysica*, 501. One may recall that it is with regard to the same that, if one is to believe *De Anima* 3.6 430b27–8, νοῦς is always right. As to the translation of οὐσία the following remarks by Pierre Aubenque are relevant: "J'ai essayé autrefois (*Le problème de l'être*, passim) de traduire toujours *ousia* par 'essence', mais je dois avouer que cette traduction ne rend pas la connotation 'substrative' souvent présente dans *ousia*. J'en reviens donc à la traduction traditionnelle par 'substance' en me réservant d'employer 'essence' lorsque le contexte le justifie et de rappeler aussi souvent qu'il est nécessaire que *ousia* dérive de *einaí*", Pierre Aubenque, "Plotin et Dexippe, Exégètes des Catégories d'Aristote," in *Aristotelica Mélanges offerts à Marcel De Corte* (Bruxelles-Liège, 1986), 12 n. 11.

<sup>41</sup> D. M. MacKinnon, "Aristotle's Conception of Substance," in *New Essays on Plato and Aristotle*, ed. Renford Bambrough (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), 103, 112. He rightly points out also that "the kinds of criticism of the Aristotelian conception of substance which stem from the well-known passages in Locke's *Essay on Human Understanding* dealing with the substratum are hopelessly wide of the mark. Berkeley displayed a much fuller sense of the centrality to the notion of substance, of the conception of self-existence. Yet Locke's influence on the proper evaluation of the notion of substance in British philosophy has been disastrous" (p. 114).

<sup>42</sup> See Brague, *Aristote*, 99–102. On the great theme of God as ζωή, life, (to which it is impossible to do justice here) see Franco Volpi, "La détermination aristotélicienne du principe divin comme ζωή (*Mét.*, Λ, 7, 1072b26–30)," *Les Etudes philosophiques*, no. 3 (1991), 369–87. Cf. also Aristotle, *De Caelo* 2.3 286a8–10.



must be the best life, has to be the very act of uninterrupted thinking. This appears indeed to be how ordinary humans see it, adds Aristotle, for we say of God that he is a living being, eternal, most good, or perfect. In other words, life itself and "duration continuous and eternal" belong to Him. To repeat, then, "God is perpetual life" means God is undivided thought, forever actual. Furthermore, and most importantly, this appears to be confirmed for Aristotle by common human conceptions on the subject.<sup>43</sup> Richard Bodéus is probably right: "Aristote entend établir ici que la nature de la première substance, telle qu'il vient de la décrire, correspond exactement à la conception qu'un chacun possède de l'être divin."<sup>44</sup>

Chapter 7 ends with two clarifications. The first chides the Pythagoreans and Speusippus for supposing "that supreme beauty and goodness are not present" in the first principle (1072b35-1073a3). The second reads:

It is clear then from what has been said that there is a substance which is eternal and unmovable and separate from sensible things. It has been shown also that this substance cannot have any magnitude, but is without parts and indivisible (for it produces movement through infinite time, but nothing finite has infinite power; and, while every magnitude is either infinite or finite, it cannot, for the above reason, have finite magnitude, and it cannot have infinite magnitude because there is no infinite magnitude at all). But it has also been shown that it is impassive and unalterable, for all the other changes are posterior to change of place (1073a3-11).

<sup>43</sup> It will be clear that at 1072b28 I read *φαμὲν δὲ* (instead of *δὲ*), proposed by Bonitz, followed by both Ross and Jaeger, without the support of manuscripts. According to R. Walzer, "whether Themistius can be referred to in support of *δὲ* [cf. Ross' apparatus] is doubtful but not impossible", see Richard Walzer, "On the Arabic Versions of books A, α, & Λ of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*," in Richard Walzer, *Greek into Arabic* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 122-3.

<sup>44</sup> Richard Bodéus, "En marge de la théologie aristotélicienne," *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, no. 73 (1975) 22-3. That this God, *πρώτη οὐσία*, pure actuality, soon to be called *νοήσεως νόσις*, and so forth, should so satisfy common notions associated with divinity—eternity, perfect happiness, omnipotence (cf. pp. 17-20)—does seem to corroborate, for Aristotle, his more "scientific" conclusions. Ingemar Düring expresses this aspect of the Aristotelian method very well: "He thus unites in his thought an invariably sober 'common-sense' with an abstraction pushed to its extreme limits"; Ingemar Düring, *Aristoteles*, 210. "One keeps discovering anew that even for his most extraordinarily abstract theories, Aristotle starts from simple facts of experience. I believe this to be the case also with the theory of *νόσις νοήσεως*" (p. 220).

Roughly paraphrased, the argument seems to run as follows. It is now manifest that there exists an external unmoved substance, not perceptible to sense. It has also been proved (see *Physics* 8.10.267b17–26) that it is impossible for that substance to have any magnitude at all; it must be without parts and indivisible. Nothing finite can have an unlimited force, *infinite power* (δύναμιν ἄπειρον, 1073a8; cf. *Physics* 267b22–3). Every magnitude is either infinite or finite. That substance cannot, then, be finite, for the reason given—namely, nothing finite has infinite power—but it has infinite power. Nor can it be infinite in the quantitative sense, since no infinite magnitude can *actually* exist (cf. *Physics* 3.5; *Metaphysics* 9.6.1048b14–17). It must therefore be “indivisible, without parts and without magnitude” (ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι καὶ ἀμερὲς καὶ οὐδὲν ἔχον μέγεθος; *Physics* 8 10.267b25–6 [the last lines of the entire treatise]), while its power is infinite.<sup>45</sup>

#### IV

The expression νόησις νοήσεως occurs explicitly in *Metaphysics* 12.9, in a concluding sentence (1074b33–5): “Therefore it must be of itself that the divine thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking [καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις].” In its opening sentence, the chapter acknowledges that difficulties subsist regarding divine thought (cf. 1074b15–17). The question is, How can the activity of that substance held to be the most divine make it so? You cannot say the divine intellect thinks of nothing, like someone asleep, nor that it thinks of something other than itself, because this implies imperfection, or potency, dependence on something else. As we just saw again, it must be pure actuality, the best form of life, perpetual wakefulness, and so on. Should it depend for thought on something other, its very own substance would no longer be the act of thinking (νόησις), but a potency (δύναμις)—which will hardly do for the best substance (1074b20), whose dignity, as we saw also, is owed to actual thinking (b21).

<sup>45</sup> See André Doz, *La logique de Hegel et les problèmes traditionnels de l'ontologie* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1987), 68 n. 32. As he says further, “Le fait demeure que la puissance infinie lui est attribué. Ces traits négatifs—indivisible, sans parties, sans grandeur—, vus à partir de Hegel, mais non seulement à partir de lui, sont l'index de la spiritualité” (p. 68).

What, then, does it think? "Either itself or something else; and if something else, either the same thing always or something different" (1074b22–3; slightly altering Ross). Does it really matter what? What difference does it make, whether it is the good (τὸ καλόν, b24) which it thinks or any chance thing? The answer is that there are some things which it is obviously absurd to meditate upon (διανοεῖσθαι, b25). It must be evident that the first substance must think what is most divine and of the greatest worth (b25–6). Nor will it change (b26)—to answer the query. does it think something different? Any change from the most divine and precious would inevitably be for the worse, besides implying movement where it was proved there can be no movement (b26–7) <sup>46</sup>

To return to the questions raised supposing the divine thought not to be actual thinking (νόησις) but a potency (δύναμις, 1074b28), the continuity of its thinking would be wearisome (b29). Moreover, since in that case it would need to be actualized by an object of thought other than itself, that object would hence be of greater worth, or nobility, than the intellect in question. Its dependence would be such that even the most unworthy objects of thought—things one prefers to avoid looking at—even those would acquire the status of actuality with regard to it. Whatever actualizes something is, to that extent, more noble than that which it actualizes. The νόησις then would not be ἄριστον, the "best of things" (b33). But God, we saw, must be τὸ ὄν καλόν, perfection itself. In Richard Norman's words, "If it is δύναμις, that which it thinks is better than the [prime mover] itself." To this one should add that even the worst object of thought would then be better in that regard, for it would be actual with respect to the prime mover. It makes no sense to reduce divine νόησις to potency, for it would make its dignity depend on the dignity of what actualizes it. <sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup> See also *De Caelo* 1.9 279a30–b1. "In the more popular philosophical works, where divinity is in question, it is often made abundantly clear by the discussion that the foremost and highest divinity must be entirely immutable, a fact which affords testimony to what we have been saying. For there is nothing superior that can move it—if there were it would be more divine—and it has no badness in it nor is lacking [ἐνδεές] in any of the fairness proper to it [τῶν αὐτοῦ καλῶν]", Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, trans. W. K. C. Guthrie (Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960)).

<sup>47</sup> Cf. Norman, "Aristotle's Philosopher-God," 71; Aquinas, *In Metaph* 12, lect. 11, n. 2612 (Marietti), Themistius. "If its *intellectum* were something extraneous to it, [this *intellectum*] would be nobler and more excellent [than the Intellect]. For it would be the cause of the Intellect's

The conclusion, quoted already, is that it must think itself, since it is *κρατιστόν*, "the most excellent of things," and its *νόησις*, "thinking," is a *νοήσεως νόησις*, "thinking on thinking" (1074b33–34). This raises a new problem. It would appear that science, sensation, opinion, and discursive thought are always concerned with some other thing, and with themselves concomitantly (*ἐν παρέργῳ*; b36). (We alluded to this earlier referring to *EN* 1170a32. we perceive that we perceive while seeing this color or hearing this sound, for instance, and think that we think while thinking of this or that.) Further, given that to think and to be thought are distinct, as they seem to be at least by definition, to which of the two would the excellence we were speaking of belong—to *νόησις* or to *νοήσεως*? (cf 1074b36–38).

We were reminded above that science *is*, in certain cases, the thing known: in the productive sciences, omitting the matter, it is the substance and the essence (*ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*),<sup>48</sup> in the theoretical sciences, the definition, the thing and the thinking (*ἡ νόησις*) are but one (1074b38–1075a3). This is so *a fortiori* in the present case. "Since, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of things that have no matter, the divine thought and its object will be the same, i.e. the thinking will be one with the object of its thought" (1075a3–5).

Chapter 9 concludes with one last—and most important—question. Is the object of divine thought composite (*σύνθετον*)? This would imply that "thought would change in passing from part to part of the whole" (1075a6), which was excluded by eliminating from the first substance any change whatever. Moreover, "everything that has

intellecting. Everything that exists in consequence of [having] something other than itself as its cause is inferior to the thing that is posited as being its cause. Thus the Intellect would be *in potentia*. We shall say that He intellects the things that are of the utmost excellence. If He were to intellect inferior things, He would derive His nobility from inferior things. This [conclusion] must be avoided", trans. Pines, "Metaphysical Conceptions," 183. "At turpe absurdumque est ponere substantiam talem et simul statuere, ut ante se honorabilius quidpiam digniusque habeat", Themistius, in *CAG*, vol. 5, pt. 4, p. 31.27–9.

<sup>48</sup> See the explanations in *Metaphysics* 7.7, for example, 1032b10–14. "The process from this point onward, i.e. the process towards health, is called a 'making'. Therefore it follows that in a sense health comes from health and house from house, that with matter from that without matter, for the medical art and the building art are the form of health and of the house, and when I speak of substance without matter I mean the essence [*λέγω δὲ οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*]."

not matter is indivisible" (a7) Finally, whereas the human intellect—at any rate its thought of composite things—can reach what is best for it only after a certain time—neither in this part nor in that one, but as to a whole distinct from it—divine thought thinking itself enjoys this best throughout eternity (cf. 1075a7–10).

To sum up, none of the alternatives mentioned in chapter 9 exclude knowledge The fact of thinking the other first in no way excludes self-knowledge, it in fact includes it concomitantly, ἐν παρέργῳ. Does knowing itself not concomitantly but directly exclude from the divine intellect any other knowledge—at the very least concomitantly, as Gadamer observes?<sup>49</sup> The word "only" is a typically unfortunate gloss, nowhere to be seen here in Aristotle.<sup>50</sup> Neither in chapters 7 or 9, nor anywhere else in Aristotle for that matter, does *knowledge* of one reality, for instance, of self, entail ignorance of another This is so least of all—oddly enough—in the case of opposites, as was seen above in chapter 7 (1072a30–1) and will be obvious again further on.

What we did see Aristotle deny is the attribution of any form whatever of potency, of want or dependance, to God. To attribute ignorance under any form to God would clearly on Aristotle's principles be to introduce back into God what he has denied, namely, potency—imperfection, a contradiction in terms when speaking of the most perfect being. Ignorance is invariably a want, a privation of knowledge. What is perfect, "complete and whole" (τέλειον καὶ ὅλον) is defined by Aristotle as "that which has nothing outside it," "that from which nothing is wanting"<sup>51</sup> In order to understand his view of God—or any such view, for that matter, as Xenophanes first brought out so well—one must avoid

<sup>49</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer, in a letter to Klaus Oehler reprinted in an Appendix to Oehler's *Unbewegte Beweger* "Das ἐν παρέργῳ das mir so wesentlich scheint, mit der νοήσις αὐτῆς vereinbar" (p. 120)

<sup>50</sup> That the either/or formulated by Ross is not in Aristotle is shown by Richard Norman in his "Aristotle's Philosopher-God" As for Oehler, see once more Gadamer "Von da aus habe ich auch meine Zweifel, ob die *Alternative*, in der Sie sich für die 'abstrakte' Selbstreferenz entscheiden, überhaupt korrekt ist", in Oehler, *Unbewegte Beweger*, 120

<sup>51</sup> Cf. *Physics* 3.6 207a8–15, the recurring formula is οὐ μὴδεν ἔξω or equivalent expressions For the text, I am using W. D. Ross, *Aristotelis Physica* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950) The translation is that of R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye in *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation* (hereafter, *ROT*), ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), vol. 1

fabricating a *quid imaginatum*. One instance of such an imaginary representation would surely be the fantasy that a pure actuality such as God would be limited to itself by its very perfection!

Unless I misunderstand him such is, however, the opinion of at least one eminent Aristotelian scholar.

If as with Aristotle a separate substance is a finite form, it is obviously not all other things or any other thing. It is limited to itself. To become and be anything else in cognition, it would have to undergo change. But it has no potentiality for change whatever. Accordingly it is unable to know anything other than itself. Because of its complete actuality it is limited to its own form and consequently to cognition of itself alone. But is not separate substance the primary instance of being? In knowing itself, then, should it not thereby know all the secondary instances that exemplify it and imitate it? Does it not as primary instance contain all the perfection that is merely shared by the secondary instances? Thus reasoning would hold if Aristotelian separate substance were infinite in being. As infinite, it would contain within itself all other beings. In knowing itself it would know them. But in point of fact it is finite. It contains only its own perfection, not the perfections of other things. In knowing itself it does not know them.<sup>52</sup>

One could not, I submit, be more completely mistaken. It is actuality (or form) that defines potency, never the opposite. The more perfect the form, the less it excludes and the more perfections, or other forms, it contains. The most patent text, to which authors as diverse as Gunther Patzig, Ingemar Düring, and Thomas Aquinas rightly refer,<sup>53</sup> reads, "the soul is in a way all existing things" (*ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς*

<sup>52</sup> Joseph Owens, "The Relation of God to World in the *Metaphysics*," in *EMA* (see note 9 above), 219–20. He adds "For Aristotle the finitude of pure actuality does not allow even the knowledge of something else that might serve as the basis for a real relation to that thing" (p. 229 n. 26). Cf. p. 213 "In any case, an immaterial form is regarded by Aristotle as something finite, not infinite" (referring, for instance, to *Metaphysics* 1.5 986b18–21). Similar confusions (cf. notes 53–57 below) are implicit in Klaus Oehler's statement, "The Divine Mind is so perfect that it can only know itself", "Self-Knowledge," 502, *Unbewegte Beweger*, 85.

<sup>53</sup> Gunther Patzig, "Discussion," in *EMA*, 226; Düring, *Aristoteles*, 47. "Daher ist das Denken gewissermassen die Gesamtheit der Dinge", cf. p. 580. See also Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* 1 chap. 44, n. 377. "Inter perfectiones autem rerum potissima est quod aliquid sit intellectivum: nam per hoc ipsum est quodammodo omnia" (referring to *De Anima* 3.8 431b21), cf. *SCG* 3, chap. 112, n. 2860. "unaquaeque intellectualis substantia est quodammodo omnia, in quantum totius entis comprehensiva est suo intellectu."

ἐστὶ πάντα; DA 3 8 431b21), more specifically their forms “for it is not the stone which is in the soul, but its form” (431b29)<sup>54</sup> It is, says Aristotle, “as the hand is; for the hand is a tool of tools, and the intellect [νοῦς] a form of forms” (εἶδος εἰδῶν, 432a2). If our intellect is a form of forms, *a fortiori* so is the divine νοῦς.

In fact for Aristotle it is matter—potency—which excludes, always accompanied as it is by privation (as he will repeat at *Metaphysics* 12.10 1075b21–4) The actual exclusion of contraries takes place when the immediate subject is material. Hot chases cold from my hand, not from my thought<sup>55</sup> One ought not be misled by the connotations of the word “finite” or its equivalents in modern languages If you translate τέλειον or its synonyms here by “finite,” you must keep in mind that what is meant is “perfect,”<sup>56</sup> namely, again, “that from which nothing is wanting” For Aristotle, Parmenides, who claimed that being was “finite” (πεπερασμένον), spoke better than Melissus, who claimed that being was “infinite” (ἄπειρον).<sup>57</sup> “The

<sup>54</sup> Cf. Heinrich Cassirer, *Aristoteles' Schrift "Von der Seele" und ihre Stellung innerhalb der aristotelischen Philosophie* (Tübingen J C B Mohr, 1932, reprint, Darmstadt Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968), 83–6, 157–162, 192–3 See also Brague, *Aristote*, 343–357 Brague notices (p 351) that “all” comes up five times in the six first lines of DA 3 5 on the agent intellect.

<sup>55</sup> Brague gives a good account of this fundamental theme in Aristotle, *Aristote*, 345–7 In the case of physical changes “une forme cède la place à une autre forme qui la chasse de la matière qu'elle occupait auparavant L'âme ne devient pas chaude, elle devient la chaleur—laquelle n'a rien de chaud” (347) On matter and privation, the best reading remains *Physics* 1 7–9 189b30–192b4 The reality of privation, or lack (στέρησις), is brought out forcefully many times in these pages, for example 190a17–18 the subject of becoming subsists (ὑπομένει), but the privation does not “There is always both a persisting subject and a non-persisting contrary”, Irwin, *Aristotle's First Principles*, 85

<sup>56</sup> This connotation is sometimes preserved in French at least, in speaking of a “polished” work, for instance “Nous confondons à tort finitude et imperfection Le langage pourtant nous éclaire Ce qui est fini est achevé, donc parfait”, Jacques de Bourbon Busset, *La force des jours* (Paris Gallimard, 1981), 33 Cf. Aristotle, *EN* 2 6 1106b9–11 “It is customary to say of well-executed works that nothing can be added to them or taken away, the implication being that excess or deficiency alike destroy perfection, while the mean preserves it”

<sup>57</sup> See *Physics* 3 6 207a15–32, cf. Parmenides, *DK* 28B8 42–4, 32–3 “Therefore it is right that what is should not be imperfect; for it is not deficient”, G S Kirk, J E Raven, M Schofield, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, 2d ed (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1983), 252 The passage cited by Owens (*Metaphysics* 986b18–21) in support of his statement “an immaterial form is regarded by Aristotle as something finite, not infinite” concerns Parmenides and Melissus and repeats the same teaching as in the *Physics*

infinite turns out to be the contrary of what it is said to be. It is not what has nothing outside it that is infinite, but what always has something outside it" (*Physics* 3 6 207a33–b2). In this sense of the word, then, "infinite" means deprived, wanting, in potency—the opposite of the perfection that defines actuality as such.

Thus something is infinite if, taking it quantity by quantity, we can always take something outside. On the other hand, what has nothing outside it is complete and whole. For thus we define the whole—that from which nothing is wanting, as a whole man or a box. What is true of each particular is true of the whole properly speaking—the whole is that of which nothing is outside. On the other hand that from which something is absent and outside, however small that may be, is not "all" (207a7–12)

"Infinite" may of course in another, extended, sense also be used to describe perfection—in Greek as in English. We have just seen Aristotle speak of the "infinite power" of primary substance, pure actuality. In this case the suggestion becomes again one of inclusion, not of exclusion. In point of fact forms extend to many. universals obviously do, to a potential infinity of individuals. Matter, on the contrary, is possessive, admitting of only one form at a time—hence there is change and its *successive* contrary determinations, or forms, as when your hand freezes in the cold and needs warmth again. Every relatively "perfect" physical object one may imagine—this knife as knives go, or this race horse, or this great work of art—all possess matter and to that extent will have the properties—the lesser or greater imperfections, exclusions, vulnerabilities to change, and so forth—that all material things possess, whatever their relative perfection. To claim that perfection excludes is hence to attribute to form the properties of the matter in which it finds itself. Imagination must be transcended for full perfection to be conceived.

May not one object, "actuality separates" (ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει, *Metaphysics* 7.13.1039a7)? This would be much more to the point, and brings us a little nearer to the main question that was raised

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passage just quoted. The lines from the *Physics* are, however, more explicit and show that πεπερασμένον, "finite," means for Aristotle the opposite of what Owens takes him to mean. Cf. notes 53 to 56 above and the references and quotes from the *Physics* in our main text. On the infinite in Ancient Greek thought see Marcel Conche's commentaries in his *Anaximandre Fragments et Témoignages* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991), 63–77, 87–135.



earlier with the help of Plotinus. One substance cannot be made up of several *actual* substances (1039a3–4). Democritus rightly says that “one thing cannot be made out of two nor two out of one” (1039a9–10). Substance number two is a new form, undividedly one, provided of course that the two units which make it up are two only potentially. Two actually existing things never do make one actual thing, though one thing may be potentially two, as this continuum which I now divide into two halves. To be actually one something can be multiple only virtually: actuality separates in that sense (cf. 1039a4–14).

If you claim—Aristotle, we saw, repeatedly does—that in the activity of knowing the intellect and the “intelligible,” or “object of thought,” *are* actually *one*, surely you cannot mean that the intellect is simultaneously identical to several actual objects of thought? Or can you? Did we not just quote Aristotle to the effect that one thing cannot be at the same time many, save virtually, potentially? On the same account, no intellect—so the objection would run—could be *πάντα τὰ ὄντα*, “all things,” or “beings,” or simply “forms.” Surely not *actually* all, at any rate. Did we not observe that “actuality separates”? This much at least can be seen at once: You can only divide what was previously one; prior to separating one thing from another in your mind, you must have them both together somehow. Here again it leaps to the eye that inclusion is prior to division or exclusion.<sup>58</sup> But how is this?

## V

To try to solve this much more genuine aporia and others like it, one must look more closely into *νόησις*. Aristotle wrote an entire,

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<sup>58</sup> On another level, *mutatis mutandis*, this was of course Hegel's main argument against Kant on another famous issue, namely, the possibility of metaphysics. See, for example, G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse* (1830), ed. Friedrich Nicolai und Otto Poggeler (Hamburg: Felix Manner, 1969), pt. 1, *Wissenschaft der Logik*, par. 60, pp. 83–4. Hegel points out that a limit can only be known to one who is at the same time *beyond* it (“darüber hinaus”). Only unconsciousness (“Bewusstlosigkeit”) can therefore explain the failure to see that to declare something finite or limited (“Endlichen oder Beschränkten”) contains the proof of the actual presence of the infinite, of the unlimited; for knowledge of a limit can only take place on the condition that “the unlimited is on this side of conscience” (“das Wissen vom Grenze nur sein kann, insofern das Unbegrenzte *diesseits* im Bewusstsein ist”). Unawareness of their limits is a characteristic of natural things like stones and not of living things who, as soon as awareness begins to emerge, experience pain and so forth.

marvellously lucid—though difficult—chapter on νόησις, *De Anima* 3 6<sup>59</sup> The least one can do, on the subject of νόησις νοήσεως, is to consider it.

It emerges from that chapter that νόησις, thinking, is *always* about indivisibles. But indivisibles are of three kinds. The first kind offers the beginning of an answer to the question just raised. Take a continuum: this length, or line, or this given time. Thought in its unity, it is indivisible; it is actually so, and it must remain so. Nothing is easier than to show, however—as Zeno did—that the continuum contains an infinity of parts. Divide the line *AB* at *C* into two halves *AC* and *CB*. Each of these halves in turn is divisible into two halves, and so on. You quickly see that you have here, in some sense, innumerable halves. If you actually divide it into halves, however, “neither the distance nor the motion will be continuous” (*Physics* 8.8.263a26–7). In other words, those innumerable halves are there “not actually but potentially” (a28–9), or else you have in fact two lines—and soon countless ones. “For though it is an accidental characteristic of the distance to be an infinite number of half-distances, it is different in essence [οὐσία] and being [τὸ εἶναι]” (263b7–9). To quote *DA* 3 6, “these do not exist, except potentially, if the whole is not divided” (430b11). To consider the parts of a continuum in succession—therefore in time (cf. 430b12)—is one thing; it is quite another to grasp its actual unity (or indivisibility). The latter is instantaneous and does not, therefore, take place in time. “Since the undivided is twofold, either potentially or actually, nothing prevents one thinking of the undivided when one thinks of a length (for this is actually undivided),

<sup>59</sup> To this must be added *Metaphysics* 6 4, 7 17, and especially 9 10, on thought of the simple. “Un des problèmes les plus difficiles de l’aristotélisme est celui de la pensée (noēsis), divine et humaine, et quant à son contenu et quant à son mode d’exercice”, Goldschmidt, *Temps tragique*, 413. Cf. Enrico Berti, “The Intellection of Indivisibles According to Aristotle,” in *Aristotle on Mind and the Senses. Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum*, ed. G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L. Owen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), 141–63; Pierre Aubenque, “La pensée du simple dans la Métaphysique (Z 17 et Θ 10),” in *EMA*, 69–80; Thomas De Koninck, “La noēsis et l’indivisible selon Aristote,” in *La naissance de la raison en Grèce. Actes du Congrès de Nice Mai 1987*, ed. Jean-François Mattéi (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), 215–28. The great Greek commentaries, as well as those by R. D. Hicks and G. Rodier, are very helpful on this difficult chapter. Thomas Aquinas proves fully deserving of Martha Nussbaum’s recent praise of his commentary as “one of the very greatest commentaries on the work”, see *In Aristotelis librum de Anima commentarium* 3, lect. 11, esp. nn. 755–9, ed. M. Pirota (Turin: Marietti, 1948).

and that in an undivided time; for the time is divided and undivided in a similar way to the length" (430b6–10).

How is one to understand this indivisible or undivided time in which we are said to think the indivisible? Returning to our continuum, it is clear that point *C* in our example is used to differentiate the halves; it is both the end of one and the beginning of the other. It is twofold, because we use it twice in that case; yet it may serve as well to unify the two halves into one continuum, in which case the duality has again become virtual only. The same applies to the instant (or "now", τὸ νῦν), the indivisible of time according to the celebrated analysis of books 4, 6, and 8 of the *Physics*. "So the 'now' also is in one way a potential dividing of time, in another the termination of both parts and their unity. And the dividing and the uniting are the same thing and in the same reference, but in their essence [εἶναι] they are not the same" (*Physics* 4 13.222a17–20). In other words, if we think one and then the other half of the line separately, we divide it and actually split it in two in our minds, simultaneously dividing time as we do so (διαίρει καὶ τὸν χρόνον ἅμα, *DA* 430b12). If, on the contrary, we think this length in its unity—composed though it is of two virtual lengths—then we simultaneously think it in what unifies both parts of time, the now. Hence *DA* 430b10–14: "It is not possible to say what one was thinking of in each half time, for these do not exist, except potentially, if the whole is not divided. But if one thinks of each of the halves separately, then one divides the time also simultaneously; and then it is as if they were lengths themselves. But if one thinks of the whole as made up of both halves, then one does so in the time made up of both halves."

That is the most easily understood form of indivisibility, furnishing only the beginning of an answer to our question. Clearly, when our human minds think the line, they cannot simultaneously *be* all its parts in actuality, any more than the line itself can.<sup>60</sup> Although slightly

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<sup>60</sup> Cf. *Metaphysics* 9 6 1048a30–5 "Actuality, then, is the existence of a thing not in the way which we express by 'potentially', we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out, and we call even the man who is not studying a man of science, if he is capable of studying, the thing that stands in contrast to each of these exists actually." See also 1048b14–17 "But the infinite does not exist potentially in the sense that it will ever actually have separate existence, it exists potentially only for knowledge. For the fact that the process of dividing never comes to an end ensures that this activity exists potentially, but not that the infinite exists separately."

more difficult to grasp, the second type of indivisibility takes us much farther. Aristotle writes, "That which is undivided not as to quantity but in its form [*εἰδελ*] is thought in an undivided time and with an undivided part of the soul" (430b14–15).<sup>61</sup> This doubtless refers to the well-known definition of "one" through indivisibility, the first two meanings of which are precisely the continuum and the form (or the whole).<sup>62</sup> The following remark by Aristotle is helpful here: "While in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless it has unity of form, e.g. if we saw the parts of a shoe put together anyhow we should not call them one all the same (unless because of their continuity), we do this only if they are put together so as to be a shoe and to have already a certain single form. This is why the circle is of all lines most truly one, because it is whole and complete" (*Metaphysics* 5.6 1016b11–17).

Let us now consider the thought not of a continuum but of an elephant, say. The number, the diversity, the nature of its different parts is plain, but even plainer—and a greater source of wonder—is their unity, revealed in the question "What is an elephant?" (Or, to quote the untranslatable and constantly recurring Aristotelian formula literally: "what it was to be an elephant" [*τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*; *quod quid erat esse*], for which a poor substitute is "essence" or "form.") In the case of a continuum, parts and whole are all alike, homogeneous, and differing only in quantity. In contrast the parts of an elephant are heterogeneous indeed—the trunk, the feet and so on—and quite different in turn from the whole which nevertheless turns them into something one and without which they would not be the same (a severed foot is no longer a foot). When you consider them one by one in succession, you evidently think them in time, so that the case of the elephant is no different in this regard from the previous one of the

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<sup>61</sup> The transposition of this sentence after *μήκει* at 430b20 (into 20a and 20b) proposed by Bywater and retained by Ross does not fit in with *κἄν τουτοῖς* (b17), as Willy Theiler points out, *Aristoteles, Über die Seele*, trans. Willy Theiler (Berlin Akademie Verlag, 1959), 145. The justification offered by Ross is that the sentence in question "seriously interrupts the discussion of quantitative *ἀδιαίρετα*, which would otherwise be continuous from b6 to b20"; Ross, *De Anima*, 300, cf. p. 6. This assumes—wrongly, I submit—that b16–20 concern only the quantitative *ἀδιαίρετα*.

<sup>62</sup> See, for example, *Metaphysics* 5.6 1016b1–3: "In general those things the thought of whose essence is indivisible, and cannot separate them either in time or in place or in definition, are most of all one, and of these especially those which are substances", and, most importantly, 10.1 1052a15–b1.

continuum. What is new, and remarkable, is that each of those parts does possess a distinct  $\tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\tau}\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\eta}\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$  the “what it is” of a trunk is quite different from that of an ivory tooth, and so on. Having actually divided the elephant in your mind, you find parts that each have in turn an indivisible form indivisibly grasped by the intellect. How can one reconcile this with the indivisible grasp of the indivisible form “elephant” in an indivisible time?

Hence the admittedly difficult sentence which follows: “It is incidentally, and not in the same way as those [the continua], that the act and the time in which these are thought are divisible; but [then they are thought] qua indivisible” (430b16–17, my translation). The  $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda'\ \acute{\eta}\ \acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\alpha\acute{\iota}\rho\epsilon\tau\alpha$  (“but qua indivisible”) which, against all manuscript evidence, Torstrik wanted to remove, is essential to the meaning here if I understand it correctly. To think each of the parts in succession is no problem, since this is done in time. But if it is indeed the case that one thinks both the indivisible whole and its—no less indivisible—heterogeneous parts in one and the same instant and by a single indivisible act of the soul (as the previous sentence suggests), it can only be so incidentally— $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}\ \sigma\upsilon\mu\beta\epsilon\beta\eta\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$  (b16). In other words, what it is to be an elephant or a man is never *as such* divisible, even though, of course, this elephant obviously *is* divisible into both heterogeneous and homogeneous parts, and even though even its definition is divisible. Divisible and indivisible invariably pair together here again—thus the name and the indivisible  $\nu\acute{o}\eta\mu\alpha$ , the voice and the concept. I am borrowing an example from Themistius, who marvels in his commentary to the *De Anima* that “we hear in time, whereas we do not think in time but in the now”<sup>63</sup>. In that sense, adds Themistius, the concept is divisible only incidentally, “not in itself” ( $\acute{o}\upsilon\chi\ \acute{\eta}\ \acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{o}$ )<sup>64</sup>. The same would apply to the *eidos* of elephant: it is only incidentally divisible in your mind, just as the line previously discussed is only incidentally divisible. The line’s “essence” ( $\acute{o}\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ ) and “existence” ( $\tau\acute{o}\ \acute{\epsilon}\acute{\iota}\nu\alpha\iota$ ) was said to be “other” ( $\acute{\epsilon}\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$ ) than “an infinity of half-distances”—making its divisibility likewise an incidental characteristic (cf. *Physics* 8.8.263b6–9 already quoted). Again we must note

<sup>63</sup> *Themistius in Libros Aristotelis De Anima Paraphrasis*, ed. R. Heinze, (Berlin, 1899), in CAG, vol. 5, pt. 3, p. 110.22–3.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 110.28–9, cf. 1.27. “The name [ $\acute{o}\nu\omicron\mu\alpha$ ] is divisible, but the concept [ $\nu\acute{o}\eta\mu\alpha$ ] is indivisible.”

an important proviso unlike the parts of a line the parts of the elephant are heterogeneous and therefore possess their own indivisibility

Therefore, when I consider such parts in their division, successively, I evidently think them in time. The indivisible grasp of the indivisible form "elephant" in an indivisible time no more precludes virtual divisibility than did the previous case of indivisibility—just as when you form a proposition in your mind you think subject and predicate together, and when you meditate upon a difference or similarity between several things you think simultaneously of these several things. Yet again here, as in the previous case, your mind cannot in the same indivisible instant *be* simultaneously in actuality all the heterogeneous and homogeneous parts of the elephant. Hence there is an inevitable putting together, the *synthesis* which makes one liable to error (cf. *DA* 430b1–2) and makes discourse necessary. Still that undivided form, "elephant," does contain virtually all that can be said of it: propositions, differences, similarities and the like

To sum up, in every case considered so far one finds an indivisible, unifying, form. The *eidos* "elephant"—or indeed the *εἶδος* "length" or "time"—is comparable in this regard to the point and to the "now," insofar as these give time and length their "unity," as we saw (cf. 430b18–9), without, however, being "separate" from them (cf. b18. ἀλλ' ἴσως οὐ χωριστόν). We see an actual whole, a finished form—perfect in the sense recalled earlier—enabling us to define the imperfect, the inexhaustible virtual, the infinite in *that* sense

Aristotle's analysis of indivisibility in relation to *νόησις* culminates at 430b20–6. The question is now, How does one think what is totally indivisible? His meaning is made unequivocal at the outset, with the example of the point (430b20–1) described in the *Metaphysics* (5.6 1016b24–6) as "absolutely" (or "wholly". *πάντη*) indivisible, like the unit (*μονάς*, 1016b25); both are instances of "that which is indivisible in quantity" (1016b24).<sup>65</sup> The unity—or indivisibility—of substance is even greater: "In general those things the thought [*νόησις*]

<sup>65</sup> See further Hermann Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus* (1870, reprint, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960), s.v. *στιγμή*. Philoponus uses the expression *περὶ τῶν πάντη ἀδιαίρετων* in his commentary, *Joannis Philoponi In Aristotelis De Anima Libros Commentaria*, ed. Michael Hayduck, CAG, vol. 15 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1897) p. 552.2. Some commentators, Simplicius among them, add the example of the "now", see *Simplicii in Libros Aristotelis De Anima Commentaria*, ed. Michael Hayduck, CAG, vol. 11 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1882), p. 256.19. They do so with good reason: see Aristotle, *Physics* 6.3 233b33–5, 4.11 220a1–21, and *De Caelo* 3.1 300a14.

of whose essence [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι] is indivisible, and cannot separate them either in time or in place or in definition, are most of all one, and of these especially those which are substances [οὐσίαι]" (1016b1–3) Totally indivisible means not even potentially divisible. What happens when we think such entities? Can mind reach them? Except for the word "point" (στιγμή) and so on, is there an εἶδος of point—some indivisible form or determination thanks to which it can be thought—as in the case of the line or of the elephant?

The text begins as follows. "The point and every division, and that which is in this way undivided, are made known as privation is [δηλοῦται ὥσπερ ἡ στέρησις]" (430b20–1). Both the universal "every division" (πάσα διαίρεσις), and the addition "that which is in this way undivided," are important: the point itself serves to divide a line, while the "now" separates past from future.<sup>66</sup> Every division is effected by means of an indivisible. It is explained, furthermore, in *Topics* 6 6 143b33–5, that it is sometimes necessary for the definer to employ a negation when defining, for example, privations. "For a thing is blind which cannot see when its nature is to see."<sup>67</sup> To define the point one is forced into a simple denial of all divisibility: "that which has no part." As Sir Thomas Heath explains,

Definitions should, in the first place, be in terms of things absolutely prior, or prior in the order of thought, to the things defined. There being nothing in geometry prior in the absolute sense to a point, a point must be defined, if at all, either by means of a posterior term or by negation. The first method is illustrated by the definition of a point as an extremity of a line, the second by Euclid's definition of a point as "that which has no part." The latter definition or its equivalent appears frequently in Aristotle. The difficulty in Euclid's definition is the very one pointed out by Aristotle in [*Topics*] 142b25, the words "that which" in "that which has no part" almost invite the question, *what* is it that you mean by "that"?<sup>68</sup>

<sup>66</sup> R. D. Hicks is very helpful on much of this, see *Aristotle De Anima*, trans. R. D. Hicks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907, reprint, Amsterdam: Adolf M. Hakkert, 1965), 522. See also Sir Thomas Heath, *Mathematics in Aristotle* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 193–4.

<sup>67</sup> Trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in Barnes, *ROT*, vol. 1.

<sup>68</sup> Heath, *Mathematics in Aristotle* 88–9. Heath observes, to begin with, that "the difficulties connected with the definitions of the most elementary things in geometry, the point and the line, could hardly be more lucidly put than they are in the long passages just quoted [*Topics* 6 6 143b11–144a4]" (p. 88, cf. 89–91). On ancient and modern attempts to define the point, and on Aristotle's view, see Heath's further explanations in *The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements*, translated with introduction and commentary by Sir Thomas L. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, reprint, New York, Dover Publications, 1956), 1 155–8.

Such questions are partly met in the following lines of our text. "And the same account applies to the other cases, e.g. how one recognizes evil or black, for one recognizes them in a way by their opposites" (430b21–3). The *εἶδος*, as it were, of the point is its contrary (*ἐναντίω*; b23). It is constant in Aristotle that "even contraries have in a sense the same form [*εἶδος*], for the substance of a privation [*στερησεως οὐσία*] is the opposite substance, e.g. health is the substance of disease (for disease is the absence of health); and health is the formula [*λόγος*] in the soul or the knowledge [*ἐπιστήμη*] of it" (*Metaphysics* 6 7.1032b2–6)—having specified, "by form [*εἶδος*] I mean the essence [*τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*] and its primary substance [*πρώτην οὐσίαν*]" (b1–2).<sup>69</sup> Sickness or evil no more possesses a form thanks to which one could think them directly than does the absolutely indivisible. In *De Anima* (1.5.411a3–7) Aristotle gives another clear example "One element in each pair of contraries will suffice to enable it [the soul] to discern both that element itself and its contrary. By means of the straight line we know both itself and the curved—the carpenter's rule enables us to test both—but what is curved does not enable us to distinguish either itself or the straight"<sup>70</sup> Most importantly, we see in *Metaphysics* 10.3 1054a26–9 the same rule apply to the one "And the one derives its name and its explanation from its contrary, the indivisible from the divisible, because plurality and the divisible is more perceptible than the indivisible, so that in definition plurality is prior to the indivisible, because of the conditions of perception"

It is clear, then, that for Aristotle the priority of the divisible over the indivisible is not one of nature but of knowledge. Otherwise, he could not hold as he does that the one is prior to the many. This offers the beginning of an answer, at least, to the question posed by Thomas Heath concerning the priority of "point"—whose definition (*οὐ μέρος οὐθέν*) turns out to be indeed the very first one in Euclid's "Elements."<sup>71</sup> No doubt it does enjoy some sort of pri-

<sup>69</sup> On form, form in the soul, and *οὐσία* in this text, see Michael Frede and Gunther Patzig, *Aristoteles 'Metaphysik Z'*, Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar (München, Verlag C. H. Beck, 1988) 2 112–14. On *οὐσία* and *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι* see vol. 1, pp. 36–42.

<sup>70</sup> Trans. J. A. Smith, in Barnes, *ROT*, vol. 1. See further *Metaphysics* 9 2 1046b8–15.

<sup>71</sup> See *Euclid in Greek*, book 1, with introduction and notes by Sir Thomas L. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1920), 43, on its relation to Aristotle's definition see pp. 113–15.



ority *φυσεί*, by nature, but we humans are best able to define it by starting with its opposite, namely what is potentially divisible and accessible to sense—strictly speaking, the point, of course, cannot even be imagined. The natural way, once again, is to “start from the things which are more knowable and clear to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and more knowable by nature” (*Physics* 1.1 184a16–18).<sup>72</sup>

Be that as it may, it is plain from the preceding that what is wholly indivisible is no more knowable directly to us than a negative contrary is. The negation by means of which you may reach it presupposes that its opposite is already known to you, hence already in your mind somehow. This is precisely what the subsequent lines of our text in *De Anima* say, adding that such a knower must therefore be in potency “that which recognizes must be its object potentially, and one [of the contraries] must be in it” (430b23–4, altering Hamlyn)<sup>73</sup> Then, by contrast, the next sentence evokes divine knowledge. “But if there is anything, [one of the causes,] which has no contrary, then this knows itself, it is actuality and separate” (b24–26, altering Hamlyn)<sup>74</sup>

Suppose, *per impossibile*, I could not find in my mind a contrary thanks to which I could grasp the nature of evil, illness and the like; suppose I would *not* depend on some divisible, or sensible, reality to deny in order to say, or to think, the indivisible how could I do it? More profoundly, how could one know an absolute *individual* (from the Latin, *individuus*, indivisible) which would be infinitely more than a geometrical entity—a nonsensible substance, for instance? In that case, the present text seems to say, there is no other possibility but that of knowing oneself first. The *εἶδος*, or form, is no longer one with regard to which I am in potency, dependent. I am actuality

<sup>72</sup> See also *Metaphysics* 7.3 1029b3–5, and *Posterior Analytics* 1.3 72b26–30 τὰ μὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. The latter passage concerns induction, which goes from the first to the second.

<sup>73</sup> I have preferred the reading *ἐν εἶναι ἐν αὐτῷ* (“and one [of the contraries] must be in it”) at b24, to *ἐνεῖναι ἐν αὐτῷ* (“and [the contrary] must be in it”), because it has the advantage, pointed out to me by Jacques Brunschwig, of indicating a subject *ἐν* (“one”). But these options make very little difference to the main meaning, the word *ἐν* (“in”) recurs in each one.

<sup>74</sup> Reading with Ross *εἰ δέ τιμι μηδὲν ἔστιν ἐναντιόν [τῶν αἰτίων]*, αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ γινώσκει καὶ ἐνέργειά ἐστι καὶ χωριστόν. Removing, like Zeller, *τῶν αἰτίων*, or replacing it with *τῶν ὄντων* (Torstrick), makes no difference to the main point. I have explained in my “Noësis et l’Indivisible” (pp. 224–5) at some length why I cannot accept Enrico Berti’s interpretation of this sentence in his otherwise valuable “Intellection of Indivisibles.”

pure and simple and therefore separate. Neither discourse nor negations are necessary. The absolutely indivisible is directly available to me. indeed it is myself! According to Willy Theiler, agreeing here with most commentators, “the substance that has no opposite, knows itself and is pure activity, is the divine Spirit.”<sup>75</sup> It cannot admit any contraries since the most obvious property of contraries is to exclude. Accordingly *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075b21–4 says (twice) that “what is primary has no contrary” “For all contraries have matter, and things that have matter exist only potentially” (b22–3).

## VI

To conclude, then. In answer to our query regarding simultaneous knowledge of many forms we have now seen that, for Aristotle, so far as we humans are concerned, one may speak of the three types of virtual knowledge of many realities in one indivisible form just described. A fourth has been hinted at by contrast, it is obviously not for us to experience this, since we are not separate substances. Suppose, however, the existence of such a substance, and especially the first substance of chapters 7 and 9. a perfect thinking substance, pure activity forever indivisibly aware of its thinking, both itself the most intelligible and the most desirable Being. Clearly then all that is actual has to be *actually* in *that* form of forms.<sup>76</sup> The opposite view forces one into the impossible position of trying to reintroduce potency into Aristotle’s account, which carefully excludes it in every way it can, as we saw. Since, however, the potential is known through the actual,

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<sup>75</sup> “Die Wesenheit, die kein Gegenteil neben sich hat, sich selbst erkennt und reine Tätigkeit ist, ist der göttliche Geist, Met. XII 1075b22, 1074b33 (vgl. EE 1245b16f), 1071b22”, Theiler, *Über die Seele*, 146

<sup>76</sup> “Aber die εἶδη? Lassen wir einmal alles mit ὅλη Behaftete weg. Nehmen wir allem die Zahlen. Ist es so eine verkehrte Vorstellung zu sagen, das die reiner νοῦς sind (*entia rationis*), also Identität von νόησις und νοούμενα?”, Gadamer to Oehler, *Unbewegte Beweger*, 119. “If the *ousia* of God is identical with being in general, since it is primary, God knowing himself as the final cause of the world knows, in a sense, the whole world”, Gunther Patzig, “Discussion,” 226. “The Prime’s thinking Itself should not be taken as narcissism but as the contemplation of the principles of being—a contemplation which, being perfect and eternally actual, is (1) indistinguishable from the Prime’s own being and (2) leaves nothing un contemplated in its objects”, Clark, *Aristotle’s Man*, 217

and the imperfect through the perfect, they too must immediately be known to it. The perfect, we recalled, is that which lacks nothing.

It can be shown that Plotinus's critique of Aristotle "rests on a false presentation of *νόησις νοήσεως*" as Horst Seidl says and shows very well.<sup>77</sup> The excellence of Plotinus's objections quoted at the beginning of this paper is sufficient proof already that he was, as much as Aristotle, seeking for absolute simplicity or indivisibility in God. As I have tried to argue elsewhere, the views of both on this are much closer in effect than they appear to be.<sup>78</sup> All suspicion of duality in the *νόησις νοήσεως* is completely removed by Aristotle's treatment of it in *Metaphysics* 12.

This absolute unity and indivisibility of God's thought brings out particularly well both the absence of any potency in him, to be sure, but also his immediate actual knowledge of all things. Jonathan Lear has seen this with great clarity, as I indicated earlier. But he has also made the most interesting following point. The idea, perpetuated by Richard Rorty's book *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, that before Kant philosophers have held a mirror theory of the mind does not prove altogether true, for Aristotle, at least, objects ultimately conform to God or Active Mind.

Both Aristotle and Kant believe that objects must conform to knowledge rather than vice versa. But for Kant this implies that the conforming objects of knowledge must be "appearances": empirical knowledge is possible only if it is partially but significantly constituted by a contribution of the human mind. Thus it is very much *our* knowledge to which objects must conform. For Aristotle, by contrast, objects must conform to our knowledge not because they must conform to the human mind, but because they must conform to God or Active Mind. Aristotle is thus, one might say, an *objective idealist*. He is an idealist in the sense that the order of the physical world is ultimately dependent

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<sup>77</sup> See Horst Seidl, in *AWW*, 2:157–76, I quote from p. 171. The influence of Aristotle on Plotinus is a commonplace since Porphyry (*Life of Plotinus* 14.4–7). But it appears just as evident that he depended on commentators, chiefly Alexander of Aphrodisias, and probably—for the question that concerns us—on the *Liber Mantissa*. See, in particular, *De Anima cum Mantissa* and *Aporiae kai Luseis*, ed. I. Bruns, *Supplementum Aristotelicum*, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1887), 3, 38–110, esp. p. 109. Cf. A. H. Armstrong's chapters on Plotinus in *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), esp. chap. 15, pp. 236–49. On this dependence and the equivocal character of his references, which appear aimed more at Alexander of Aphrodisias than at Aristotle, see Maurice de Gandillac, in *EMA*, 249.

<sup>78</sup> See De Koninck, "Pensée de la pensée," 131–3.

on mind. Yet there is no trace of subjectivity in his idealism. Objects must conform to knowledge, but that does not reveal them to be constituted by any contribution from us. Aristotle and Kant differ not over whether objects must conform to mind, but over the location of the mind to which they are conforming. Since, for Aristotle, there is nothing distinctively human about the mind to which objects are conforming, there is no basis for saying that the essences we contemplate are mere appearances.<sup>79</sup>

It should be clear that to skip over, as is usually done, the passage on the *συστοιχία* of opposites quoted earlier, is a mistake (its importance did not, we observed, escape Hegel)<sup>80</sup>. The statement *ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἡ νόησις* ("for the thinking is the starting point", 1072a30), now takes on an even fuller significance. As Gauthier and Jolif rightly emphasize, God is even "l'intelligible au suprême degré, le premier intelligible, et c'est en tant que suprême intelligible que l'atteint la contemplation. Aristote sur ce point n'a jamais varié."<sup>81</sup> Now that supremely intelligible Being is shown in that passage to be not only the first principle of all intelligibility but also of all real goodness, more rigorously translated the statement says that thinking is *the* principle of all intelligibility and hence of true Good.

Does it follow that God would have to know relations and opposites as we do? It does not, since, as *DA* 3.6 also shows clearly, this again would introduce potency in him. The point is, rather, the essential law they illustrate: the imperfect is invariably known through the perfect—which in no way entails that this always takes place according to the same mode or by means of discourse. We just read *DA*

<sup>79</sup> Lear, *Aristotle*, 307–8, cf. pp. 306–9, and, on indivisibility, pp. 303–6.

<sup>80</sup> See, however, the difference between Hegel and Aristotle detected by Gadamer, who at the same time recognizes the importance of the lines in *De Anima* which we have just examined: "Ein besonders aufschlussreicher Text, an dem sich diese Differenz zeigen lässt, ist *De anima* III 6, 430 b 20 ff", Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Hegel und die antike Dialektik," in Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hegels Dialektik* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1971), 27. Unduly influenced by Torstrik, Ross dismisses the same lines as "a series of jottings", Ross, *De Anima*, 300. Brentano observes rightly that "wer die Form erkennt, zugleich die Privation", Brentano, *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles*, 191. He refers, however, to *Topics* I 14 105b31 alone, without establishing the link with the *συστοιχία* of opposites in *Metaphysics* 12.

<sup>81</sup> R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, *L'Éthique à Nicomaque*, Commentaire, vol. 2 (Louvain, 1970), 858. They bring together *Metaphysics* 1072a26–7, *EN* 10 7 1177a20–1, and *Protrepticus* 14W. They add "ce qui est en soi le suprême intelligible est pour nous ce qu'il y a de plus difficile à saisir par l'intelligence," reminding us that the latter is comparable to the eyes of bats in the blaze of day, *Metaphysics* 2.1 993b9–11.

430b24–6 hunting at a different mode. Should pure actuality be known directly, no potency under any guise would be left, no discourse even from one contrary to another, self and other would be known at once in one same indivisible now.<sup>82</sup> Otherwise that first immediate knowledge would be in potency again, hence no different from ours. As for potency, it is knowable through actuality alone. Seeing itself, that substance would have to see the other forms, less perfect than it is, it would hence see imperfection, as wakefulness makes one aware of sleep (the reverse not being true). We cannot ourselves picture this at all, and must have constant recourse to opposites and negations to say or to think what this might be like (as I have just revealed again!) It does not follow, if Aristotle is right, that every form of thinking must do the same, especially if it is pure light and pure intelligibility.

This reading of Aristotle on God's knowledge has the advantage of support from the great classical commentators or interpreters of his works, as well as from contemporary scholars and philosophers such as those already mentioned. Themistius writes, "The First Intellect intellects, in intellecting His own Self, all the *intellecta* together. It has become evident from all this that God is the First ἀρχή, and that He intellects together His own Self and all the things of which He is the ἀρχή. In possessing His own Self, He also possesses all things, whose substance is due to Him. . . . Now the First Intellect intellects the world. . . . From His own Self He intellects that He is the cause and the ἀρχή of all things."<sup>83</sup> Avicenna "One of the things that Themistius did well was to show clearly that the First ἀρχή intellects his own Self, and then from His own Self He intellects all things" (p. 191); "Because of His intellecting His own Self and (His intellecting) that He is the ἀρχή of all things, He intellects from His own Self all things" (p. 194). Although critical of Themistius, Averroes writes: "He knows the existents through (knowing) the Existence which is the cause of their existences" (p. 195). Maimonides "Through knowing the true reality of His own immutable Essence, He

<sup>82</sup> "Nicht dum deus calculat fit mundus, aber deus numquam desinit intellegere omnia intellegibilia simul", Gadamer to Oehler, in Oehler, *Unbewegte Beweger*, 120. "At divinus intellectus, propterea quod summe est perfectus, dum intellegit, tempus non requirit, sed simul omnia subito intellegit", Themistius, CAG, vol 5, pt 4, p. 32.23–5.

<sup>83</sup> Trans. Salomo Pines, in his "Metaphysical Conceptions," 185. Parenthetical page references in this paragraph and the next are to this article.

also knows the totality of what necessarily derives from His acts" (p. 198). One statement among many by Thomas Aquinas shows his full accord with all such statements: "Cum enim ipse sit ipsum suum intelligere, ipsum autem est dignissimum et potentissimum, necesse est quod suum intelligere sit perfectissimum perfectissime ergo intelligit seipsum. Quanto autem aliquod principium perfectius intelligitur, tanto magis intelligitur in eo effectus, eius nam principia continentur in virtute principii. Cum igitur a primo principio, quod est Deus, dependeat caelum et tota natura, ut dictum est, patet, quod Deus cognoscendo se ipsum omnia cognoscat."<sup>84</sup>

The traditional line taken to explain God's perfect knowledge of the world according to Aristotle is indeed that of his causality, as is apparent in several of the above quotes already. Even Averroes had no problem seeing that God could be "the Form, the Efficient (Cause) and the τέλος" (see p. 196). For Themistius, "if in intellecting his own Self He intellects that He is what He is, He intellects (in intellecting) His own Self the cause and the ἀρχή of all things. Ἀρχή may be said of the form, as well as of the final cause and of the ἀρχή of motion" (p. 186, cf. p. 188). Maimonides insists that God "is the efficient cause, that He is the form and that He is the end. Thus it is for this reason that they say that He, may He be exalted, is a cause and a ground, in order to comprise these three causes—that is the fact that God is the efficient cause of the world, its form and its end" (pp. 198–9). And although he puts it differently, Avicenna expresses the fundamental argument very well: "For if He intellects His own Self (together with) everything that belongs to it, He (must) (also) intellect that which is attached to it *in actu*. Accordingly he would intellect its being the ἀρχή and [this must entail?] His intellecting all [things]. For otherwise He would not intellect His own Self in its entirety" (p. 192).

There is no evidence in Aristotle's works that any of these interpretations are false—quite the contrary. Form, mover and that for the sake of which "often coincide" (ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ τρία εἰς ἓν πολλάκις; *Physics* 2.7 198a24–5). A good instance is the soul: it is "the cause and principle [αἰτία καὶ ἀρχή] of the living body. But these are spoken of in many ways, and similarly the soul is cause in the three ways distinguished, for the soul is cause as being that from which the movement is itself derived, as that for the sake of which it

<sup>84</sup> *In Metaph.* 12, lect. 11, n. 2615, quoted in Pines, "Metaphysical Conceptions," 201.

occurs, and as the essence of bodies which are ensouled" (DA 2 4.415b8–12). We have sufficiently elaborated above on God as actuality or form, and we have quoted Aristotle to the effect that God is also the first Good, the "final cause" of everything there is. The *Metaphysics* is less concerned with God as efficient cause, although even there it is often emphasized, as I have tried to indicate elsewhere and as others have also shown.<sup>85</sup> Other treatises, those that have to do with motion, focus more largely on efficient causality, for instance *Physics* 7 2.243a32–4: "the prime mover [τὸ δὲ πρῶτον κινεῖν], taken not as that for the sake of which [τὸ οὐ ἕνεκεν] but as the source of the motion [ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως] is simultaneous [ἄμα] with the thing moved." "The primary source of the change or the staying unchanged" (ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς [or κινήσεως] ἡ πρώτη ἡ τῆς ἡρεμῆσεως) is of course the "efficient cause," whereas τὸ οὐ ἕνεκα, "that for the sake of which," is usually translated as "final cause."<sup>86</sup> Both expressions, as well as references to form, are frequently applied by Aristotle to God—thus creates problems only if one expects one form of causality to exclude another, or if one confuses "creation" and "efficient cause."<sup>87</sup> Finally there are the other moving causes. whatever one may think of *Metaphysics* 12.8 and its theory of intermediate unmoved movers, it does bring out Aristotle's concern to establish more clearly the relation of this most real Being—God—and the world.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>85</sup> See my "Pensée de la pensée" (pp. 99–106) for references to Aristotle and to modern commentators. There are a wealth of excellent references and arguments in the article by Verdenius cited in note 13 above.

<sup>86</sup> See, for instance, *Physics* 2 3 194b29–30, *Metaphysics* 5 2 1013a29–30, literally "whence comes the origin of the change," as suggested by Richard Sorabji in his *Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory* (London: Duckworth, 1980), 40, see also pp. 41–4, 51–6 for Aristotle on the efficient cause. "Staying unchanged" may with advantage be substituted to the more usual "rest," to translate ἡρεμῆσεως, as in Wilham Charlton's translation which I quote here, *Aristotle's Physics I, II* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970). Examples adduced include the author of a decision, the father of the child, or generally speaking the maker of the thing made and what produces change of the changing, cf. *Physics* 2 3 194b30–2, 195a21–3, *Metaphysics* 5 2.1013a30–2, 1013b23–5).

<sup>87</sup> On this see my "Pensée de la pensée," 97–9. For an excellent contemporary discussion of God as formal, efficient, and final cause in Aristotle see Klaus Brinkmann, *Aristoteles' allgemeine und spezielle Metaphysik* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1979), 182–8.

<sup>88</sup> See especially Philip Merlan, "Aristotle's Unmoved Movers," *Traditio* 4 (1946) 1–30, and W. K. C. Guthrie's summary in his *History*, 267–76. The most important contribution on this question, since Merlan's, has been that

Two points of method may be added Aristotle says clearly (*Physics* 2 7.198a27–31) that the study of unmoved causes of movement belongs to another branch of study (*πραγματεία*) In the *De Generatione et Corruptione* (1 7 324b13–5) he writes “the active power [*τὸ ποιητικόν*] is a cause in the sense of that from which the process originates [*ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως*—that is, the “efficient cause”], but the end, for the sake of which it takes place, is not active [*τό δ' οὐ ἔνεκα οὐ ποιητικόν*] (That is why *health* is not active, except metaphorically) ”<sup>89</sup> If Aristotle is given the credit of meaning what he says, it follows that to speak in *Metaphysics* 12 of a “motion” of the end *sensu stricto* would have meant speaking metaphorically The concern for God as moving cause proper seems to belong in his eyes to natural science (in his large sense of that term), whereas *Metaphysics* 12 6–10 focuses more on God as separate substance and as end of all things.

We saw that for Aristotle, perfection implies activity, the greater as the perfection is greater *Νοήσεως νόησις* is through and through perfect thinking of the first substance—simple, immutable, eternal—by itself. We saw too that perfection is defined by Aristotle as “that from which nothing is wanting.” Exercising those three forms of causality of all there is, this thinking of thinking must necessarily know the totality of its power, down to its ultimate effects <sup>90</sup> But if it was

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of H J Kramer in the several works and articles mentioned in note 4 above Kramer has very effectively shown how much of what he calls a “theological *Realphilosophie*” one finds in Aristotle, as should be clear even from what little we have been able to say in this paper on God as *πρώτη οὐσία*, for instance, pure act, prototype of the *βιὸς θεωρητικός*, and so on (cf. Kramer, *Grundfragen*, 378–9) The main weakness of Oehler’s theory is his reduction of Aristotle’s God to a logical relation of sorts This kind of attempt has been effectively refuted by Jacques Brunschwig in “Le Dieu d’Aristote au tribunal de la logique,” in *L’Age de la science* 3 4 (1970) 323–43 For a more sympathetic account of Oehler see Franco Volpi, *La détermination aristotélécienne*, 381, 386–7 On the unmoved movers, see also my “Pensée de la pensée,” 122–6, on Oehler and Kramer see pp 133–5

<sup>89</sup> Trans H H Joachim, in Barnes, *ROT*, vol 1 To do justice to this theme one would need to go into the analysis of becomings in *Metaphysics* 7 7, notably on the sense according to which “health comes from health” (cf 1032b6–11, and the commentary by Michael Frede and Gunther Patzig) As to method and order, see again Charles Kahn’s remarks in his “Intended Interpretation” (note 18 above)

<sup>90</sup> Cf Themistius, in CAG, vol 5, pt 4, p 33 23–6 “quid impedimento erit intellectui, quominus ex se ipso agat atque intellegat? ex his igitur perspicuum fit deum esse primum principium seque intellegere et omnia simul, quorum ipse principium est ”



important to specify in which several ways that thinking is first, the chief one remains: God is "first object of desire" (1072a28), the Beautiful itself, moving all things *ὡς ἐρώμενον*. To be complete, our account would need to take into careful consideration chapter 10, which deals with this and is the chapter on which book 12 closes. We must leave the great theme of the preeminence of Good to a later enquiry.

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## THE PUBLIC AND THE PEOPLE HEIDEGGER'S ILLIBERAL POLITICS

ROBERT J. DOSTAL

IN 1926 IN THE RELATIVE ISOLATION of his hut in the Black Forest Martin Heidegger completed writing the first (and only published) portion of his influential *Being and Time*<sup>1</sup> In the same year at Kenyon College, Ohio, John Dewey delivered a public set of lectures that became *The Public and Its Problems*<sup>2</sup> Both were published the following year in 1927 These two books are obviously quite different in topic, style, occasion, and language *Being and Time* is a systematic work of fundamental ontology, while *The Public and Its Problems* is a topical set of lectures in political theory. If we are to look for the basis of a political theory in Heidegger's work, however, we must notice the central negative significance of the concept of "the public" (*die Offentlichkeit*) in his account of our everyday life. While Heidegger attacks the dictatorship of the public in contemporary affairs, Dewey in his lectures seeks to revivify the public on behalf of democracy in response to Walter Lippman's decrying its eclipse.<sup>3</sup>

This sharp contrast with regard to the public supports the common and apparently obvious views about Heidegger's German fascism and Dewey's American liberalism A closer look at the concept of the

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<sup>1</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York Harper and Row, 1962) Further references will be provided parenthetically in the text, "SZ" for the German (11th edition) followed by "BT" for the translation It is important that we recognize that *Being and Time* is an incomplete work The published text provides an "analytic" or account of *Dasein* as preparation for an account of Being as such The latter account was never published and perhaps never completed

<sup>2</sup> John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (New York Henry Holt, 1927, reprint, Chicago Gateway, 1946)

<sup>3</sup> In a footnote (*The Public and Its Problems*, 116n) Dewey acknowledges his indebtedness to two of Walter Lippmann's essays: *The Phantom Public* (New York Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1922), and *Public Opinion* (New York Harcourt, Brace and Co, 1925)

public in their work and in its historical context finds that the simple contrast and the quick conclusion is too facile, and calls for a richer and more nuanced account of their difference in this regard. We will find that by "the public" Heidegger and Dewey do not mean entirely the same thing, though their notions are related. Our primary concern here is the consideration of the political theory of the early Heidegger, the Heidegger of *Being and Time*. Dewey's political theory and his understanding of the "public" deserves closer scrutiny than we can give it here, particularly in light of the current attempts to revive a sense of "the public" as well as Deweyan liberalism.<sup>4</sup> The contrast with Dewey and a brief look at the historical context of the concept will help us come to terms with the much controverted question of Heidegger's politics.<sup>5</sup>

This question, when directed to the early Heidegger, is controverted in part because the early work is almost solely concerned with fundamental ontology and has almost nothing to say about politics. Accordingly, much of the discussion of this matter has had little substantial textual basis. Readings vary widely; there are left and right Heideggerians. The concept of the public, however, provides us with a helpful foothold in the text. Its examination helps us unravel one of the many strands which constitute Heidegger's conception of politics, vague and ill-defined as it might be. The question is complicated by the fact that Heidegger is reported to have said that his engagement on behalf of German fascism was rooted in the account of history that he develops in *Being and Time*.<sup>6</sup> In this account we find mention of

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<sup>4</sup> The notion of the public is currently receiving much attention. The sources of the current discussion are various and, in many important respects, at odds with one another. They include the recent English translation of an early work of Jurgen Habermas on the history of the concept, the return to Dewey (and Lippmann), and a revival of interest in the work of Hannah Arendt. See Jurgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989). A prominent recent example of a concern for the public that is rooted both in Dewey and Habermas is the Bellah group's *The Good Society* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), co-authored by Robert Bellah, Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton.

<sup>5</sup> The literature on the recently revived debate about Heidegger's politics is enormous. For the most complete bibliography of the discussion to date see Pierre Adler, "A Chronological Bibliography of Heidegger and the Political," *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 14/15 (1991): 581-611.

<sup>6</sup> See Karl Lowith's autobiography, *Mein Leben vor und nach 1933* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1986), 57. For the pertinent section in English trans-

"the people" (*das Volk*), a concept which parallels and contrasts with "the public."

Not only should we carefully examine the text in this regard but we should place it in its historical context and look for its historical sources. We find a direct source for the concept of the public in the work of Kierkegaard, and we find a notable difference in this regard with Kant, who for other reasons is enormously important to the project of *Being and Time* and for whom a positive concept of the public was extremely important. Heidegger, who is attempting to revive Kant phenomenologically, expressly does not wish to revive Kant's liberalism and Kant's positive conception of the public. Let us look first at the text and then at its historical context.

# I

*Being-with-others* Some readers of Heidegger's *Being and Time* have argued that this work renders all human relations inauthentic. This Sartrean "existentialist" reading of *Being and Time* sees the individual isolated and alone in the face of death. One flees one's own mortality by losing oneself inauthentically in mass man, in the "they." This reading finds Heidegger's account anti- or asocial. The political consequences of such an understanding of human relations would be anti- or apolitical. Richard Wolin has provided the most recent version of such a reading in his *Politics of Being*. According to Wolin Heidegger conflates fallenness, that is, inauthenticity, with Being-with-others. This conflation "ultimately results in a self-canceling social ontology."<sup>7</sup> This self-canceled social ontology constitutes an "ethical vacuum" which opens the way for Heidegger's fateful decision in 1933. So goes Wolin's account.

As I have argued elsewhere, however, such a picture paints Heidegger's social ontology with too broad a brush.<sup>8</sup> To be sure,

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lation see *The Heidegger Controversy*, ed. Richard Wolin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 140–3.

<sup>7</sup> Richard Wolin, *The Politics of Being* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 50.

<sup>8</sup> See Robert J. Dostal, "The Problem of *Indifferenz* in *Sein und Zeit*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 43 (September 1982): 43–58; and Robert J. Dostal, "Friendship and Politics: Heidegger's Failing," *Political Theory* 20 (August 1992): 399–423.

Heidegger's description of Being-with (*Mitsein*), like the account of *Dasein* generally, focuses primarily on the inauthentic mode, because on Heidegger's account that is just the way we are ordinarily "for the most part" — *zunächst und zumeist*. Yet, the prospect of death does not necessarily cut us off from others. Rather, "death . . . makes *Dasein*, as Being-with, have some understanding of the potentiality-for-Being of Others" (SZ, 264, BT, 309). The possibility of authentic *Mitsein* is not only provided for, but a clear, though rudimentary, account is given in §26. Here Heidegger characterizes the authentic relation to others as "leaping ahead" (*Vorausspringen*) in contrast with "leaping in" (*Einspringen*). Though there are good reasons to find this sketchy account of *Mitsein* insufficient,<sup>9</sup> we should acknowledge that Being-with-others is basic to Heidegger's account of *Dasein*. He never goes back on the assertions that "*Dasein*'s Being is Being-with" (SZ, 123; BT, 161) and that "the world of *Dasein* is a with-world (*Mitwelt*)" (SZ, 118; BT, 155). "Knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with, which understands primordially" (SZ, 124, BT, 161). Sociality or communality are constitutive of *Dasein* in the most fundamental way.

Though it is too much to say, as Wolin does, that Heidegger's social ontology in *Being and Time* cancels itself, it is difficult to see how *Mitsein* might serve as the phenomenological basis for politics. We should distinguish the social and the political. If we identify "the public" with the political, then we would want to say, borrowing phrases from Pierre Bourdieu as well as from Wolin, that the "political ontology" (Bourdieu) of *Being and Time* is "self-canceling" (Wolin).<sup>10</sup> The "public" is clearly inauthentic, and accordingly politics would be inauthentic. Heidegger, however, does not simply identify politics with the public but rather with the people (*das Volk*) as well. There are implicitly authentic and inauthentic possibilities for politics. As such, his political theory does not self-cancel, although it is clearly illiberal. Let us explore first the concept of the public in Heidegger's work and historical context and then turn to his conception of the people.

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<sup>9</sup> I have provided a few such reasons in my "Friendship and Politics: Heidegger's Failing."

<sup>10</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, *The Political Ontology of Martin Heidegger*, trans. Peter Collier (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

## II

*The Public.* In *Being and Time* Heidegger identifies publicness with inauthenticity. The public is not merely some aspect of inauthenticity in Heidegger's rich and variegated phenomenology of inauthentic everydayness but is identified with the phenomenon as such. What most essentially characterizes this phenomenon is precisely the falling away from the authentic self and absorption into the public, or *das Man*.

Perhaps the most infelicitous of Macquarrie and Robinson's translations of Heidegger's concepts is the translation of *das Man* as "the they." *Man* is the indefinite and anonymous pronoun "one," as in "one does what one is told" or "one does not do such a thing"—*man tut so was nicht*. In ordinary German, just as in English, this pronoun is not used substantively. One would not say, "the one." Thus the literal translation does not work well in English. It is also odd in German, but it works inasmuch as German, especially philosophical German, commonly makes substantives of terms that are not nouns. According to many Anglo-Saxon critics this is the basis for so much obfuscating Teutonic metaphysics. Macquarrie and Robinson's choice of "the they" is unfortunate inasmuch as "they" suggests paranoia; it suggests "us" (or "me") against "them." The absorption into *das Man*, however, is not a hostile takeover. It is the most natural and easy of occurrences whereby we escape the anxiety of existence.

The characteristics that peculiarly define the public as public are three: distantiality (*Abständigkeit*), averageness (*Durchschnittlichkeit*), and leveling down (*Einebnung*, *SZ*, 127; *BT*, 164–5). In his initial definition and fairly abstract description of the public in §27 ("Everyday Being-one's-Self and the 'They'") we find hints of the political dimension of the public inasmuch as it is described in terms of "subjection," "dominion," and "control." The public "controls every way in which the world and *Dasein* get interpreted"; it is a "dictatorship." The "averageness" and "leveling down" of everything by the public render one "insensitive to every difference of level [*Niveau*] and genuineness . . ."; "every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed." Everything becomes the same, comfortable and familiar. Even the difference of the self and the other is suppressed. As members of the public, we are all the same, dominated inconspicuously by the very public in which we participate. We thereby lose our distinctive self

and give up our responsibility for ourselves (*Verantwortlichkeit*, translated as "answerability") We live inauthentically. The two concrete examples of the public that Heidegger offers are the use of public transportation (everyone is the same, a rider) and the newspaper (everyone is a reader, and the newspaper's "information" inconspicuously creates public opinion)

The loss of "niveau," of "priority," and of distinction and distinctiveness clearly is central to this account. Pierre Bourdieu tries to capture this aspect of what he calls Heidegger's "political ontology"—that is, Heidegger's outrage at the homogeneity of modern industrial society—by calling it Heidegger's "repressed aristocratism." Bourdieu claims to see "a clear line running from the repressed aristocratism of *Being and Time* to the philosophical assimilation of Nazism."<sup>11</sup> Inasmuch as Heidegger would reclaim hierarchy of some sort we might well call his view "aristocratic," though many readers see obvious signs of Heidegger's own *kleinburgerlich* (or petty bourgeois) background—that is, he does not speak from the viewpoint of the aristocrat.<sup>12</sup> The "socialism" of National Socialism would seem to run against any aristocracy. Further, Bourdieu never makes clear the nature of this "line" that runs to Nazism, particularly inasmuch as he characterizes Nazism as the "heroic attempt to overcome limits."<sup>13</sup> Heidegger's insistence on human finitude and powerlessness (*Ohnmacht*) in *Being and Time* as well as in his later work, together with his attempts to restore some meaning to the notions of history and place—not to mention his ruing the loss of niveau and distinction in the modern public—all work against the overcoming of limits. We shall return to the concept of heroism.

The three most important structural characteristics of *Dasein*, called "existentials," are understanding (*Verstand*), disposition (*Be-findlichkeit*, translated as "state-of-mind"), and language (*Sprache*)

<sup>11</sup> Bourdieu, *Political Ontology*, 38

<sup>12</sup> Heidegger's position is "aristocratic" in the sense that he objects to leveling and argues for hierarchy, a hierarchy of poetry and thought. This aristocratism is not at all "repressed"; it is explicit and open. He is not aristocratic in the sense that he wishes to preserve the privileged place of the upper classes or remnants of nobility in Germany. His sympathy with the upstart and vulgar Nazis shows his distaste for the German "aristocracy" of his day. Heidegger's aristocratism bears resemblance to what Bruce Detwiler describes as Nietzsche's aristocratic radicalism. See Bruce Detwiler, *Nietzsche and the Politics of Aristocratic Radicalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).

<sup>13</sup> Bourdieu, *Political Ontology*, 38

These are ways in which *Dasein* is in the world, modes of Being-in. Disposition is indicative of our facticity, the givenness of our situation and the mood in which we find ourselves; it is oriented more toward the past than to the present or the future. The disposition of the public *das Man* is the tranquility of tranquilization. Understanding concerns *Dasein*'s existentiality, it is related to the project of *Dasein* and, as such, is futural. As corrupted by the public, it shows itself as curiosity and ambiguity. Language or speech, as exhibited by the public "one," is gossip and idle talk. Heidegger defines *Dasein* by way of the triad of facticity, existentiality, and fallenness. They are present in the temporal definition of *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world which is expanded to read, "Being-ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within the world)" (SZ, 327; BT, 375).

*Being and Time*, an incomplete attempt at a fundamental ontology, culminates in an account of time and historicity. Time is to be the central feature, uniting *Dasein* and *Sein*. It is only through an understanding of our own temporality that we can achieve an understanding of Being. For authentic *Dasein* the temporal aspect of the future has priority; this happens in the moment (*Augenblick*) in which *Dasein* heeds the silent call of conscience (an aspect of understanding) that presents itself in anxiety (an aspect of disposition) and faces with resolve one's own death. The inauthentic person allows him or herself to be absorbed into the public (and anonymous) "one," loses him or herself in the present, and ignores the self's Being-towards-death.

On the basis of this account of the temporality of *Dasein* Heidegger concludes this part of the projected work by developing the implications of his account for an understanding of history and *Dasein*'s essentially historical character. Among other things, he wishes to correct what he takes to be the ordinary understanding as time and history: time as the infinite string of moments, one after the other, "the multiplicity of nows." This notion is modeled on the number line. Heidegger calls it "clock-time." Clock-time is contrasted with the ecstatic unity of past, present, and future in authentic time. An important feature of clock-time is the way it allows time to be measured. Here too the concept of the public is an important aspect of the account of the ordinary (and scientific) and inauthentic time. Clock-time is public time, or rather, it is time "made public" (*veroeffentlichte*). It is the same time for all. Each measured moment is the same as the



next, public time is homogeneous just as the other aspects of the life of the public "one" <sup>14</sup>

### III

*The Masses* We could understand this harshly negative account of the public simply as a romantic reaction to modernity. In this way Heidegger becomes an icon of the German resistance to modern industrial and secular culture, of the shock wave that swept German culture as a result of the dissolution of the last vestiges of premodern medieval institutions and mores. In the nineteenth century in the wake of the Napoleonic wars, the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire, and the heralding of the rights of man, the romantic movement registers its disgust with the tawdriness of modernity by nostalgically recalling the Middle Ages, by evoking the sacred, and by turning away from the city and its machines to the countryside and Nature. The romantics turn away as well from science and rational planning—that is, from the Enlightenment—to poetry, art, and religion. In the twentieth century, in the wake of the industrialization of the newly formed German nation-state and the defeat of World War I, life-philosophy (*Lebensphilosophie*) and the philosophy of existence attack the inauthentic leveling of contemporary society. The rationalization of modern society becomes the basis of a negative critique of rationality.

There is much to be said for this large-scale analysis of the modernization of Germany and the way high-culture reacted to these developments. The reactionary German mandarins often—but not always—naïvely fed the widespread enthusiasm for National Socialism, especially in its attempt to retrieve a distinctively German mythology. <sup>15</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Heidegger gives the same account of the publicness of clock-time in his lectures of the summer of 1927, shortly after the publication of *Being and Time*. See Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 24 (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), 369–74, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 261–70.

<sup>15</sup> The German intellectual elite did not promote Nazism as much as it actively undermined the Weimar Republic. See Fritz Ringer, *The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890–1933* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), and Hans Sluga, *Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

This is the sort of account that we can find in Pierre Bourdieu, Jurgen Habermas, and Victor Farias, as well as in much of the current American discussion of Heidegger's politics. Bourdieu writes of the "social unconscious" that is operative in Heidegger's work.<sup>16</sup> Habermas sees Heidegger as yet another, albeit distinctive, voice of German romanticism.<sup>17</sup> Farias finds the source of Heidegger's politics in his south German antimodern lower middle class Catholicism.<sup>18</sup> These accounts, however much we find them insightful, fail in two ways. First of all, such accounts are large-scale. According to them Heidegger is just an example of a social movement or phenomenon. As such, they cannot illuminate very well the specificity of Heidegger's philosophical work and political engagement. Second, and more importantly with regard to our concern, this "social unconscious" or "romantic" or "Catholic" account passes over in silence the troublesome phenomenon of the "public" in the contemporary world. These accounts tacitly suggest that the rejection of the public is tantamount to fascism.

Consider the following simplistic syllogism. Democratic politics rely on the public. The public is of necessity inauthentic. Therefore, democratic politics are necessarily inauthentic. It follows that fascism is the authentic choice. There is, of course, a large leap from the conclusion of the syllogism as to the inauthenticity of democratic politics to the claim that authentic politics are fascist. Monarchism,

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<sup>16</sup> Bourdieu, *Political Ontology*, 105. With the gesture toward the "social unconscious" Bourdieu relieves himself (and the reader) from considering the particular voices to which Heidegger listened and the specific path he took.

<sup>17</sup> See Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).

<sup>18</sup> Victor Farias, *Heidegger and Nazism*, ed. Joseph Margolis and Tom Rockmore, trans. Paul Burrell (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). Farias's book first appeared in French in 1987. Hugo Ott's more accurate and less polemical biography offers a different view of the milieu of Heidegger's youth and his Catholicism, see Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt: Campus, 1988). For Ott, the decisive biographical element of Heidegger's Nazi involvement was not his conservative Catholic background but his break with Catholicism and then with Christianity. Ted Kiesel's recent essay on the young Heidegger is supportive of Ott's view inasmuch as it shows Heidegger taking interest early on in radical or progressive Catholic thought as well as the non-Catholic thought of writers such as Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky, and Rilke. See Ted Kiesel, "Heidegger's Apology: Biography as Philosophy and Ideology," in *The Heidegger Case*, ed. Tom Rockmore and Joseph Margolis (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), 11–51.

anarchism, and socialism would be three quite different alternatives to modern mass democracy and all three had many proponents in Weimar Germany. Of greater interest to us, however, is the syllogism itself and its negatively critical attitude toward the public and, presumably, toward democratic politics. It would be rash to ascribe a fascist or even antiliberal stance to anyone who adopted a critical attitude toward the modern public. Prominent contemporaries of Heidegger, such as Karl Jaspers, Jose Ortega y Gasset, and Gabriel Marcel, all made significant contributions to the development of such a critique, and none of them can rightly be called fascist<sup>19</sup>. All three, each in their own way, endorsed liberal democratic politics. Ortega helped create the Spanish Republic and was a foe of Franco's fascism. In Germany Jaspers was a defender of the Weimar republic and constitutional representative democracy. On behalf of democracy in France Marcel criticized what he took to be the fanaticism of both the fascist Right and the Marxist Left. All three thinkers were vitally concerned with the question of the individual and his or her freedom in the context of modern organized society, and all three understood the masses as a force that dissolved the individual together with the individual's freedom and responsibility. Modern individualism turns out, on their account, to be a false individualism inasmuch as it betrays the individual to the masses.

The account of the public from the left, especially the Frankfurt school, is very much the same. For thinkers such as Max Horkheimer,

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<sup>19</sup> In his influential *The Revolt of the Masses* (1929) Ortega specifically pursues the question as to how the public has come to be dominated by the masses, that is, how in the twentieth century these two have become equivalent—the mass-man has become the public. He argues that society is by its very nature aristocratic, that is, hierarchical, while at the same time he defends liberalism as a noble development of European civilization. Marshall McLuhan, an avid reader of Ortega, makes Ortega's point when he writes that "the public, in the sense of a great consensus of separate and distinctive viewpoints, is finished", Marshall McLuhan, *The Medium is the Message* (New York: Random House, 1967), 22. McLuhan ties this shift to his thesis about the media: "Print technology created the public. Electric technology created the mass" (p. 68). In *Man in the Modern Age* (1932) Jaspers identifies technology and the masses as the dominating forces of the modern age. He considers the public only as "public opinion," which is mass opinion. Marcel, in *Man Against Mass Society* (1951), draws on the work of Heidegger, Jaspers, and Ortega as well as the experience of fascism, bolshevism, and the Second World War to similarly analyze modern society in terms of technology and the masses. The masses do not support democracy but rather, through fanaticism and propaganda, mass-man submits to technocracy.

Theodor Adorno, and Walter Benjamin the public has become the manipulated masses. Though Horkheimer writes of the "baseness of public life," for the most part the Frankfurt School does not explicitly discuss "the public." It is concerned, rather, with what has become of the public in late capitalist society, that is, the "masses."<sup>20</sup> Unlike orthodox Marxism, which attempts to exonerate the proletariat from any responsibility for the rise of fascism and to foster a politics based on solidarity with the proletariat, the Frankfurt School argues that the proletariat has become the debased masses. The distinction between classes, much like the distinction between private and public, has been dissolved by what Horkheimer calls "the social." Modern liberal democracies are, accordingly, not genuinely democratic.

The criticisms leveled by these thinkers and many other like-minded philosophers in the first half of this century (such as Max Scheler) anticipate in important ways the contemporary communitarian critique of liberalism. These twentieth-century debates about modern society and modern politics, in which the concept of the public plays an important role, are anticipated in turn by the debates a century earlier that occurred in the face of the demise of monarchical Europe and the revolutions in America and France. Of particular concern for our assessment of the politics of the early Heidegger is the very rich and complex discussion in what was to become Germany. If we try to find our way in the discussion by way of the concept of the public two landmarks stand out: Immanuel Kant and Søren Kierkegaard. These two figures, for reasons unrelated to the concept of "publicity" and politics generally, are extremely important background

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<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Max Horkheimer, "Art and Mass Culture," in *Critical Theory: Selected Essays*, trans. Matthew O'Connell (New York: Seabury Press, 1972), 273–290. Here Horkheimer discusses the "baseness of public life" (p. 277). Like Kierkegaard and Heidegger, Horkheimer decries "the disappearance of the inner life" (ibid.). See also the collection of important essays in English translation, *The Essential Frankfurt School Reader*, ed. Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Continuum Press, 1982). There are many similarities and a deep affinity between the critique of the masses by the Frankfurt School and Heidegger's critique of the public. Critics who have drawn attention to this, especially in regard to Adorno who sharply criticized Heidegger, include Jürgen Habermas, Hermann Morchen, and Fred Dallmayr. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), 385; Hermann Morchen, *Adorno und Heidegger* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981); Fred Dallmayr, *Between Freiburg and Frankfurt* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1991).

figures for Heidegger's thought in *Being and Time*. What is most noticeable with respect to the concept of the public is what positive importance the concept holds for Kant, who invests much in the notion on behalf of his republicanism, and what negative significance the notion holds for Kierkegaard who, like Heidegger, finds it at the center of what is wrong with "the present age."

#### IV

*Kant's Public* At the time when he is working on *Being and Time* Heidegger's attention shifts from Aristotle to Kant. In his first three important publications—*Being and Time* (1927), *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (1929), and *On the Essence of Reasons* (1929)—Heidegger attempts to make Kant a phenomenologist, that is, to retrieve Kant phenomenologically.<sup>21</sup> Clearly Kant provides resources not so much for the content of Heidegger's account of *Dasein* as for the method of the work.<sup>22</sup> Nonetheless we should recognize how central to Heidegger's project are the concepts of time, freedom, and responsibility, and how closely (if violently) Heidegger identifies his own project with Kant's in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

Though Heidegger deems it important to come to terms with Kant's understanding of freedom, he never addresses Kant's political writings. Accordingly, he never notes the role the concept of the public plays for Kant. Kant's politics are republican and cosmopolitan. The distinguishing feature of the human for Kant is reason. As rational agents we should consider ourselves world citizens. Ideally,

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<sup>21</sup> See also Heidegger's lectures *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (winter semester, 1927–28), *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 25, and *Wom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (summer semester 1930), *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 31. The latter concerns itself primarily with Kant's notion of freedom. In the former Heidegger says that "some years ago, as I studied the *Critique of Pure Reason* anew and read it against the backdrop of Husserl's phenomenology, it is, as it were, as though scales fell from my eyes and Kant became for me an essential confirmation of the rightness of the path on which I searched" (p. 431).

<sup>22</sup> For a study of the methodology of *Being and Time* see Carl Friedrich Gethmann, *Verstehen und Auslegung* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974). For an excellent discussion of Heidegger's Kantian turn see Daniel Dahlstrom, "Heidegger's Kantian Turn," *Review of Metaphysics* 45 (1991): 329–61, and Daniel Dahlstrom, "Heidegger's Kant-Kommentar," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* (1989): 344–67.

politics and morality should coincide. Justice would thereby prevail within nations and between nations, and there would be perpetual peace. Unfortunately the only perpetual peace we can find is in the graveyard, for humans are often not moral. Politics and morality, in fact, do not coincide. This distinction of politics and morality is rooted for Kant in his distinction of nature and freedom. This shows up in his moral writings as the tension between self-regarding desire and the moral law (duty). Freedom is doing your duty, and determinism in this context is submission to desire. Kant accepts something very close to a Hobbesian account of the natural history of the human and of politics. For his full account of human history, however, Kant introduces freedom and the moral law as radically other than "nature." For his politics of the enlightenment Kant importantly introduces the concept of the "public" and "publicity" as a mediator between these two fundamental aspects, or "realms," of human experience.<sup>23</sup>

In his famous essay on the Enlightenment, which Kant defines as liberation from self-incurred tutelage, he writes that such liberation by the individual's own efforts is exceedingly difficult, "but that the public should enlighten itself is more likely, indeed, if it is only allowed freedom, enlightenment is almost inevitable."<sup>24</sup> Granting freedom to the public (not the private) is the key to enlightenment. "The *public use* of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among mankind, the *private use* of reason may, however, often be very narrowly restricted, without otherwise hindering the progress of enlightenment."<sup>25</sup> The public realm (*die Offentlichkeit*) is the realm of public discourse, of the public use of reason. Thus we can find Kant defending the rights of the state or church to censor what is said from the lectern (in certain contexts) or the pulpit, while at the same time he argues for the right to write and publish freely.<sup>26</sup> Heidegger, by

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<sup>23</sup> Kant introduces it into "German" enlightenment thought. The notions of the public and public opinion were well established in English and in French. Habermas cites the revolutionary Friedrich Georg Forster complaining that the Germans do not understand the expression, "public opinion"; see Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, 101.

<sup>24</sup> Immanuel Kant, "What is Enlightenment?" in Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 41–2.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 42.

<sup>26</sup> In *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant limits the right of government to sanction university teaching to the three higher faculties of theology, medicine, and law. The lower faculty, the philosophical faculty, cannot rightly be

contrast, in his Rectoral Address of 1933 attacks academic freedom: "The much praised 'academic freedom' is being banished from the German university, for this freedom was false"<sup>27</sup>

The public use of reason should, according to Kant, shape the public will and provide the basis for public law. Kant makes "publicity" the criterion for public law. Public law is contrasted with "private" mores, unwritten customs which might be specific to this or that region or locale. Unlike the former, the latter are not based on reason and universal citizenship. Public discourse can serve such a vital function for much the same reason that the history of human interaction—that is, public action—has contributed to progress toward enlightenment. In *Perpetual Peace* Kant writes: "So order and organize a group of rational beings who require universal laws for their preservation—though each is secretly inclined to exempt himself from such laws—that, while their private attitudes conflict, these nonetheless so cancel one another that these beings behave publicly just as if they had no evil attitudes"<sup>28</sup> This is the cunning of reason in history. It is a variation on Adam Smith's invisible hand and Mandeville's formula, "private vices, public benefits." The secret and the private work against universal law, and publicity holds them in check. Thus Kant proposes what he calls a transcendental principle of public right: "All maxims that *require* publicity (in order not to fail of their end) agree with both politics and morality."<sup>29</sup> Publicity mediates nature and morality because it motivates the agent, who is naturally self-regarding, toward universality. The universality of the categorical imperative checks this natural self-regarding tendency. In the political and historical domain publicity and universality constitute Kant's cosmopolitanism. In the aesthetic realm, which is not a matter of universal law, Kant makes common sense, fostered by public discussion, the basis

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checked by government since its members' teaching depends solely on reason. See Immanuel Kant, *The Conflict of the Faculties*, trans. Mary Gregor (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 26–7. In this same essay Kant returns to the importance of publicity for enlightenment and progress, see pp. 161–3.

<sup>27</sup> Martin Heidegger, "The Self-Assertion of the German University," in *The Heidegger Controversy*, trans. William S. Lewis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 34.

<sup>28</sup> Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, trans. Ted Humphrey (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 124.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.

for aesthetic judgment. In general, sound thinking (both theoretical and practical) and good taste, for Kant, require communication. He asks, "But how much, and how correctly, would we think, if we did not think in common [*Gemeinschaft*] with others with whom we mutually communicate?"<sup>30</sup>

In public action (and public discourse) one's private tendencies are checked by others; similarly, the public checks the private self-serving tendencies of secret groups. Kant's emphasis on the public sought, in part, to check the power of secret societies who might, in one way or the other, exert political power behind the scenes. In particular, the power of the Freemasons seems to have been a real concern. Reinhart Koselleck in *Critique and Crisis* shows how important to the politics of the Enlightenment were secret societies and how this was a serious concern of political philosophers other than Kant, for instance, Voltaire, Diderot, and Paine. Koselleck writes that "from the outset, Enlightenment and mystery appeared as historical twins."<sup>31</sup> On his account, they were closely related responses to the rise of the absolutist monarchy. These secret societies often saw enlightenment as their goal. The initiation rites of such a society are presented dramatically and musically in Mozart's *Zauberflöte*, which shows well the curious mix of mystery and enlightenment idealism. Kant sees their secrecy, mystery, and ritual at odds with their goal of Enlightenment, that is, at odds with his understanding of politics based on reason and universal citizenship.

## V

*Kierkegaard's Public.* Jaspers writes in *Man in the Modern Age* (1932) that it was Kierkegaard who "was the first to undertake a comprehensive critique of his time. This critique of his was the first

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<sup>30</sup> Immanuel Kant, "Was Heißt Sich im Denken orientieren?" in *Kants Werke*, vol. 8 (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1968), 144. Habermas appropriately cites the *Critique of Pure Reason* (A820/B848): "The touchstone whereby we decide whether our holding a thing to be true is conviction or mere persuasion is therefore external, namely the possibility of communicating it and of finding it to be valid for all human reason." Yet Habermas overstates the significance of communication for Kant's notion of truth inasmuch as communication is only a subjective and not an objective condition of truth.

<sup>31</sup> Reinhart Koselleck, *Critique and Crisis* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 62.



to be applicable to the age in which we are now living, and reads as if it had been written but yesterday."<sup>32</sup> Though it had not been written yesterday but almost a century earlier, Kierkegaard's critical and polemical essay *The Present Age* (1846) is quite literally re-presented as though it were yesterday in Heidegger's *Being and Time*.<sup>33</sup> Kierkegaard makes the concept of publicity central to his account of the present age, just as Heidegger makes it central to his account of the inauthentic one in which we all are in our everydayness. A look at Kierkegaard's *The Present Age* supports the overly simplistic (but largely true) genealogical account of *Being and Time* that suggests that its methodology is Husserlian (and Kantian) and its anthropology is Kierkegaardian. It is almost as though Heidegger borrows his entire account of "the one" (*das Man*) from *The Present Age* while he relies on Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Dread* for his phenomenology of anxiety and Being-towards-death.<sup>34</sup> In *The Present Age* Kierkegaard contrasts his time period, the "present age," to a revolutionary age, the age of the previous generation. The defining characteristic of "the

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<sup>32</sup> Karl Jaspers, *Man in the Modern Age*, trans. Edan Paul and Cedar Paul (New York: Doubleday, 1957), 10. Just prior to this remark Jaspers refers to Fichte's *Grundzüge der gegenwärtigen Zeitalters* (Characteristics of the present age). What, according to Jaspers, makes Kierkegaard's account contemporary in contrast to that of Fichte is the account of the public which Jaspers develops under the title of "mass man." Orienting the analysis of contemporary affairs on Kierkegaard rather than on Fichte signals an important political difference between the philosophers of existence, Jaspers and Heidegger, and the larger mainstream of nationalist philosophical thought in the period of World War I and the Weimar Republic. See Sluga, *Heidegger's Crisis*, esp. chap. 2, "Fichte, Nietzsche, and the Nazis."

<sup>33</sup> Søren Kierkegaard, *The Present Age*, trans. Alexander Dru (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). This essay is only a selection of a larger literary review published in 1846 under Kierkegaard's name. The entire review has more recently been translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, *Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age. A Literary Review* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). The same selection was translated into German by Theodor Haecker and published in *Der Brenner* in 1914 under the title "Kritik der Gegenwart." For a discussion of the profound impact the essay had on Heidegger and other thinkers such as Jaspers, Buber, Husserl, Wittgenstein, and Adorno see Allan Janik, "Haecker, Kierkegaard and the Early Brenner: A Contribution to the History of the Reception of *Two Ages* in the German-speaking World," in *International Kierkegaard Commentary: Two Ages*, vol. 14, ed. Robert Perkins (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1984), 189–222.

<sup>34</sup> "Anxiety" and "dread" translate, respectively, the German *Angst* and the Danish *Angest*. See the footnote (SZ, 235, BT, 494) in which Heidegger writes that Kierkegaard had "penetrating" insights into human existence and that Heidegger learned more from the edifying discourses than from the phil-

present age" is "publicity." He writes: "A revolutionary age is an age of action; ours is the age of advertisement and publicity."<sup>35</sup> Some of the chief characteristics of the public in Kierkegaard's account are talkativeness, gossip, superficiality, curiosity, ambiguity and passionless and quickly passing enthusiasms. Talkativeness, gossip, ambiguity, and curiosity are the very terms of Heidegger's account. Kierkegaard's suggestion that the public superficially pursues one enthusiasm after another with intervals of apathy and indolence is very like Heidegger's notion of the "tranquility of tranquilization" and "turbulence" (*Werbung*). Most important, however, for both Kierkegaard's and Heidegger's accounts of the public is the specification of "leveling" as the central agency of the public. Kierkegaard writes that it is the "real Levelling-Master"<sup>36</sup> and Heidegger specifies leveling when he first introduces the notion of the public in §27, before the more detailed analysis in §§35–7. Interestingly enough, Heidegger does not take up the accompanying feature of the phenomenon of leveling for Kierkegaard: *ressentiment*.<sup>37</sup> Nietzsche's later (but presumably independent) account of modern times makes leveling and *ressentiment* its central features, and many twentieth-century philosophers, such as Max Scheler, have explored this theme.

There is a remarkable difference between Kant's and Kierkegaard's evaluations of the public. If we read more widely in this period we find a general shift in the evaluatory status of the concept. This shift clearly occurs in the revolutionary period that comes at the end of Kant's life and precedes Kierkegaard. This is the period of the

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osophical ones. He explicitly names, however, *The Concept of Dread* as an exception in this regard. Though Heidegger never names *The Present Age* it is clearly an "edifying" discourse and not a "philosophical" one. See Heidegger's Schelling lectures of 1941 (*Die Metaphysik des Deutschen Idealismus*, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 49) for the most extensive discussion yet published of the relation of *Being and Time* to the thought of Kierkegaard. See also the comment in the 1929–30 lectures that Kierkegaard was the first in philosophy to understand the moment (*die Augenblick*), Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundbegriff der Metaphysik*, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 29/30, p. 225.

<sup>35</sup> Kierkegaard, *The Present Age*, 35. Kierkegaard also refers to the ages as "generations," a concept that Heidegger uses in his discussion of historicity in *SZ* §74.

<sup>36</sup> Kierkegaard, *The Present Age*, 60.

<sup>37</sup> For the discussion of *ressentiment* see *ibid.*, 47–51. The public in its leveling resents anything which presumes to be higher. There can be no hero and no honor in such an age. Walter Kaufman in his preface (p. 24) tells us that "envy" (German *Neid*) would better translate Kierkegaard's Danish than the French *ressentiment*, which has been taken over by the English.

rise of German romanticism and German idealism. It is a period in which, at least among most German intellectuals, an early enthusiasm for the French Revolution is followed by disillusionment. Inevitably this disillusionment becomes attached to the ideals of the Revolution and their rich and complex Enlightenment background.<sup>38</sup> Terminologically, it is at this time that the political term "the masses" becomes a German term, *die Massen*.<sup>39</sup>

The development in the thought of Friedrich Schlegel is a good example of the development of the political thought of German romanticism generally.<sup>40</sup> He greeted enthusiastically the French Revolution and its ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity, and he endorsed popular sovereignty and republicanism. He heralded Athenian democracy as a political model. From the very first, however, he is concerned about possible mob rule, ochlocracy. According to Schlegel the way that ochlocracy can be avoided and genuine popular sovereignty (that is, democracy) developed is *Bildung*; that is, the education and cultivation of the people is the requirement for an appropriate politics. The obvious precedent for the fundamental significance of *Bildung* is Schiller's *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*. Aesthetic education is to bring nature and freedom, sensuousness and reason, desire and morality into harmony. These fundamental dualities or tensions in human experience according to Kant were to find

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<sup>38</sup> The best account to date in English of the political discussion in Germany in this period is Frederick Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992). He persuasively shows how the disillusionment with the course of the French revolution is attached to the disillusionment with the Enlightenment. He concludes the book with the following comment: "The attack on the *Aufklärung* in the 1790's thus cast a shadow over Germany's future, paving the way for the Restoration. To not a negligible degree, the shadow remains" (p. 365). What Habermas has done in his account is place Heidegger in this shadow. I am not contesting this placement but am asking about the character of this placement.

<sup>39</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer claims that the term *die Massen* first appears prominently in German in the work of Schiller, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Kultur und Medien," *Zwischenbetrachtungen. Im Prozeß der Aufklärung*, ed. Alex Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht Wellmer (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), 716.

<sup>40</sup> We should recall, however, in our attempt to come to terms with the context of Heidegger's political philosophy that Heidegger was no emulator of Schlegel and, in the period of his real political engagement, no advocate of the Roman Church (to which Schlegel converted). It is the enigmatic Holderlin to whom Heidegger turns to find a way out of the modern political and philosophical labyrinth.

accord in aesthetic experience, for which we require *Bildung* <sup>41</sup> We saw above how in a political context a free and enlightened "publicity" (*Offentlichkeit*) was to secure this for Kant. While Kant allowed that aesthetic experience and judgment could assist in this harmonization, Schiller renders the task primarily aesthetic and early German romanticism takes this up

As disillusionment with the French Revolution set in and the French people were judged to have lacked the virtue required of any democratic republic, the importance of *Bildung* became accentuated and the need for the appropriate communal and institutional authority to carry out the task of cultivation and education became evident. German romanticism took a conservative turn. For many, including Friedrich Schlegel, the institution most critical for the task of cultivating the citizens was the Church, either the Catholic Church (Schlegel) or some idealized ecumenical Church (Novalis).<sup>42</sup> The common objections to their age concerned its egoism, materialism, utilitarianism, and philistinism which chose comfort before all else.

Though Hegel agrees with this cultural and political critique, and though he considers art and religion important bearers of *Bildung*, they are not, for him, its most significant agent. It is only philosophy and its rational concepts that can complete and perfect *Bildung* and the politics that follow from it. In contrast with the romantics, Hegel in many ways seems to be a return to Kant—not least with respect to the concept of the public. He defines "public opinion" as the manifestation of the "formal subjective freedom of individuals" and he defines its task as the subjection of authority to reason.<sup>43</sup> It is only a manifestation of "subjective" freedom and not "objective" freedom, however. Science and reason would never be matters of "opinion." In Hegel, the weight in the expression "public opinion" shifts from "public" to "opinion." Though it can serve the task of education and

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<sup>41</sup> The tensions and distinctions are not dissolved for Kant but rather harmonized. The cultivation of the fine arts and sciences does not make us moral but prepares us for morality. See Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment* §83, also *Critique of Pure Reason*, B737. The harmony of Schiller is at the same time an overcoming of the tension.

<sup>42</sup> Beiser argues persuasively that the later, more conservative, German romanticism does not so much subordinate politics to aesthetics but rather to religion. See Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism*, 239–44.

<sup>43</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), §316, p. 204.

*Bildung*, it need not and often does not. Public opinion is tied to civil society, the domain of production and the satisfaction of desire. Just as civil society needs to be checked and guided by the state, so too should public opinion be checked and guided. If left to itself, public opinion could readily be manipulated by the powerful and wealthy producers. Hegel's demotion of public opinion opens the way to Marx's identification of public opinion with capitalist ideology. It may well have opened the way for the critique of the public by another close reader, Kierkegaard, whose critique is taken up a century later by Heidegger.

## VI

*Mill and Dewey* Thus in the nineteenth century, the century of Heidegger's birth, the intellectuals of both the political left and the religious right in Germany shared low regard for public opinion and for any role that the "public" might play.<sup>44</sup> It would be rash, however, to think that this negative evaluation of the public in the nineteenth century is characteristic merely of Germany, a land of illiberal and failed liberal politics. John Stuart Mill's treatment of public opinion in his classic *On Liberty* (1859) is exemplary of the ambivalence of liberal Anglo-Saxon thought in this regard. After defending the freedom of expression in the first section of the treatise for reasons closely related to those that Kant held, Mill then goes on to bemoan the "sober truth" that "the general tendency of things throughout the world is to render mediocrity the ascendant power among mankind. . . . At present individuals are lost in the crowd. In politics it is almost a triviality to say that public opinion now rules the world. The only power deserving the name is that of masses."<sup>45</sup> Mill equates public opinion

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<sup>44</sup> The concept of "the public" is not prominent in the work of either Schopenhauer or Nietzsche. When it appears, it appears as "public opinion." One of the few occurrences in Nietzsche's writing is in *Unmodern Observations* (*Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*) in a discussion of Schopenhauer as Educator. The context concerns a time dominated by the lazy masses. Nietzsche writes, "We must ensure that a time that entrusts its salvation to public opinion—which is to say, to private laziness—should itself be killed", Friedrich Nietzsche, *Unmodern Observations*, trans. William Arrow-smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 164.

<sup>45</sup> John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978), 63.

with mediocrity and the masses. He finds this inevitable under conditions of equality, and he is concerned about the loss of individuality. Heidegger's concern is similar, though he does not express it in the language of the "individual" but rather that of the "self." As "counterpoise and corrective" to what Mill refers to as the "tyranny of opinion" (which Heidegger refers to as the dictatorship of the public), Mill calls for "the more and more pronounced individuality of those who stand on the higher eminences of thought"<sup>46</sup> This call is based on the claim that "the initiation of all wise or noble things comes and must come from individuals; generally at first from some one individual"<sup>47</sup> This is precisely the role that Heidegger later assigns to the statesman, thinker, and especially the poet, all demigods

We should notice, however, that though Mill places high hopes on the eccentric and genial individual, he cautions against the political hero. "I am not countenancing the sort of seizing on the government of the world and making it do his bidding in spite of itself. All he can claim is freedom to point out the way."<sup>48</sup> The freedom of the individual and of the masses is not to be limited by the genius's superior wisdom. As we will see below, Heidegger does provide a special place for the hero in *Being and Time*. This is closely tied to his concept of "a people" (*das Volk*)—a concept not found in Mill. As we have noted above, freedom is a central concept for Heidegger also, but his freedom is clearly not the individualist liberal freedom of Mill.

Mill's ambivalence toward public opinion seems to come, at least in part, from his reading of Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* (1839), which he cites in the introduction to *On Liberty* concerning the possible tyranny of the majority.<sup>49</sup> Mill's presentation of public opinion uses much the same terminology and shows the same ambivalence toward public opinion as can be found in *Democracy in America*. Tocqueville writes as a friend of democracy, for whom democracy means "equality" and rule by the "masses," that is, by means of public opinion, its "mistress." In fact, "public opinion becomes more and more the mistress of the world."<sup>50</sup> The unfortunate paradox

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<sup>46</sup> Mill, *On Liberty*, 64

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 63

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, 64.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 4. In her editorial introduction to the Hackett edition Elizabeth Rapaport writes of Tocqueville's important influence on Mill (p. xiv).

<sup>50</sup> Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, trans. George Lawrence (New York: Anchor Books, 1969), 435

of democracy is as follows. Democracy provides a certain kind of independence inasmuch as it frees the masses from the authority of the aristocracy, but nonetheless "men would by no means have found the way to live in independence, they would only have succeeded in the difficult task of giving slavery a new face."<sup>51</sup> The new face of slavery is public opinion.

John Dewey's account of the public in *The Public and its Problems* is in no way so complicated or so ambivalent. The public, as such, is a sought-after and unmitigated good. He begins with Lippman's concern that the public does not exist. What Lippman and Dewey mean by "the public" is the forum in which all can participate and where the pressing political concerns can be openly and freely discussed and acted upon. Two things primarily militate against the constitution of the public: the scientific machine age which gives precedence to expert opinion, and the natural divisiveness of a large and individualistic society. "The public" in Dewey's positive sense is constituted not merely through free communication as such but, importantly, through the free communication of inquiry. What primarily is to be communicated is inquiry and its results. Though he is concerned about the problems for "the public" presented by technical expertise, clearly inquiry is, in Dewey's own broad sense, science. Dewey is suggesting that talk about science, in its various forms, will bring about democratic enlightenment and community. The phenomenon that concerns Heidegger and many of his European contemporaries, left and right, under the title of "the public"—that is, manipulated mass opinion—is dismissed by Dewey under the title "propaganda," the discussion of which "would alone . . . demand a volume, and could be written only by one much more experienced than the present writer."<sup>52</sup>

The larger underlying problem for Dewey in these lectures on the public is how the "Great Society" might become the "Great Community". "Our concern at this time is to state how it is that the machine age in developing the Great Society has invaded and partially disintegrated the small communities of former times without generating a Great Community."<sup>53</sup> Dewey expresses wonder

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<sup>51</sup> Toqueville, *Democracy in America*, 436

<sup>52</sup> Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, 181

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 126–7. Later in the essay he says with respect to the problem of finding a way for the public to come to recognize itself that "the problem

at how the Great Society could be established without at the same time establishing a great community. Dewey's enterprise is thereby based on what was first a German distinction, the distinction of *Gesellschaft* (society) and *Gemeinschaft* (community).<sup>54</sup> Ferdinand Tönnies makes this distinction in order to describe just how the very conditions for a society work against community. For Tönnies and most of the ensuing discussion of the distinction, the individualistic laissez faire liberal politics of the modern industrial state, which simultaneously promotes affluence and the great society, undermines community.<sup>55</sup> Modern society's mobility, uprootedness, and loss of tradition come hand in hand with the rationalization and organization of social structure and everyday life according to production goals. There are hints in the lectures that Dewey is well aware of this standard view concerning the deep opposition of society and community but he waves it off without much more than a gesture

What Heidegger seeks, much like Dewey, is what Dewey calls the "Great Community." Heidegger calls it *das Volk*. When Heidegger introduces the term "the people" (*das Volk*) in *Being and Time*, he does so parenthetically to "community."<sup>56</sup> Heidegger, however, clearly situates his notion of community and people in opposition to society and the public. And Heidegger would wonder at Dewey's wonder that the Great Society did not bring with it the Great Community

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lies deeper, it is in the first instance an intellectual problem the search for conditions under which the Great Society may become the Great Community" (p. 147). Dewey's phrase, "the Great Community," surely derives from Josiah Royce's essay "The Hope of the Great Community," published in a collection of essays under the same title, Josiah Royce, *The Hope of the Great Community* (New York: Macmillan, 1916). It is telling of our contemporary discussion that the Bellah group in its attempt to revive a sense of the public seeks "a good society" (the title of their most recent book, see note 4 above) and not "a great community." However much they are communitarians they find the language of "community" inappropriate.

<sup>54</sup> Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Association* (*Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*), trans. Charles Loomis (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955). The work first appeared in 1887. In the introduction Tönnies explicitly contrasts *Gesellschaft* with *Volk*.

<sup>55</sup> Tönnies himself sees this as a good, as progress toward greater rationality and enlightenment.

<sup>56</sup> "This is how we designate the historicizing of the community (*der Gemeinshaft*), of a people (*des Volkes*)", *SZ*, 384, *BT*, 436.



## VII

*The People* The word *Volk* occurs only once in *Being and Time*<sup>57</sup> It occurs, however, in the important section §74, "The Basic Constitution of Historicity"<sup>58</sup> This is the section to which Heidegger is referring in his comment to Lowith that his engagement on behalf of Nazism is rooted in the concept of historicity in *Being and Time*. As we have just noticed, the term appears parenthetical to the term *Gemeinschaft* (community). This later section on history places the earlier treatment of *Dasein* in a historical context The earlier seemingly individualist treatment becomes historically situated—both socially and communally. The earlier insistence that *Dasein* is always also *Mitsein* (Being-with) is here developed.<sup>59</sup> Attention to this treatment of the historicity of *Dasein* late in the text should correct the tendency of some readers and commentators to understand Heidegger's account in a Sartrean individualist way. As we noted above, such a reading considers being-with-others always inauthentic. Though *Dasein* is for the most part inauthentic, the account of "primordial historizing" in §74 concerns itself primarily with authentic and resolute historical *Dasein* which is, by definition, with others.

We cannot provide here a close reading of this section, but we should note that the basic structural features of historicity include

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<sup>57</sup> Otto Poggeler appropriately writes of the "unmediated" (*unvermittelt*) appearance of the term We are not prepared for its occurrence and the concept is not developed See Otto Poggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, 3d ed (Tubingen Neske, 1990), 420

<sup>58</sup> "Historicity" is Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of *Geschichtlichkeit* This is more commonly translated as "historicity" I will use the former here merely to conform to the standard translation of the *Being and Time*

<sup>59</sup> An overly individualist and "existentialist" reading of the first part of *Being and Time* and patchwork theory of the text's construction leads the reader to find a "shift" in Heidegger's thought in this second part's treatment of history For a weak version of this see Sluga, *Heidegger's Crisis*, 136–7 "In the second part of *Being and Time*, written a year or so after the first, Heidegger seems to have shifted to a more communitarian understanding of human existence. He now emphasizes that even authentic human existence shares a world with others" But sharing a world with others, authentically or inauthentically, is clear from the start with this text's definition of *Dasein* as Being-in-the-world The larger context of Heidegger's earlier publications, lectures, and letters also support the importance of history and the historical context of human existence for his thought I see no support for a claim of a shift in his thought at this time in this regard

fate (*Schicksal*), taking over a heritage (*Erbe*), destiny (*Geschick*), generation (a Kierkegaardian concept), repetition (*Wiederholung*—another Kierkegaardian concept), heroism, and loyalty. The earlier non-historical account of authentic *Dasein* treats the moment of authentic resoluteness as heeding the call of conscience. Here in the larger historical context Heidegger treats authentic resolution as the moment in which *Dasein* chooses its hero. Heidegger's account is avowedly paradoxical.<sup>60</sup> His harshest critics have found it self-contradictory or obfuscatory mystification.<sup>61</sup> "Repetition" is not the mere return of the same. Perhaps most importantly, we are to understand *Dasein*'s freedom as a function of *Dasein*'s "superior power" (*Übermacht*) and its "powerlessness" (*Ohnmacht*).<sup>62</sup> Heidegger is clearly trying to find a way between the Scylla and Charybdis of nostalgic conservatism and naive progressivism. Futurity remains primary, but it is bound by, or rooted in, the past.

We have criticized above Wolin's treatment of the supposed "self-canceling" nature of Heidegger's "social ontology." If by "social" we mean broadly our necessary connection with others—a connection that is not simply immediate but also historical—then, we have argued here and elsewhere, Heidegger's account cannot legitimately be called asocial or antisocial. This argument is based on the concept of *Mitsein* (Being-with), which is a basic structural feature (an *existentiale*) of *Dasein*. If, however, we assume a narrower and more specific meaning of social—a meaning that is established in contrast with the communal—then it would be correct to say that the social is inauthentic and self-canceling for Heidegger. It is precisely because of the controverted status of a notion such as "society" and the "social" that

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<sup>60</sup> I say "paradoxical" and not dialectical. Here I think we can note a deep proximity with Kierkegaard. Both learned much from Hegel and sometimes explored the same conceptual tensions. Both, however, refused to accept Hegel's conceptual *Aufhebung* (sublation) or resolution of these tensions at a higher conceptual level. For an excellent treatment of Kierkegaard's close and often dependent relation to Hegel see Stephen N. Dunning, *Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Inwardness* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). For Heidegger's disparagement of "dialectic" see *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik*, 276, and *Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 32, p. 105.

<sup>61</sup> The most dramatic critique is that of Gunter Grass in *Hundejahre* (Dog Years) (Neuwied am Rhein: Luchterhand, 1963).

<sup>62</sup> This concept of *Ohnmacht* remains a prominent theme throughout Heidegger's writing, early and late. It becomes a basis for his development of a concept central to his later work *Gelassenheit* (letting beings be).

Heidegger abjures this language in developing the basis structural features of *Dasein*.<sup>63</sup> Rather than speak about sociality, Heidegger uses the simple neologism of *Mitsein* (Being-with). "Being-with," by implication, can be either social or communal—*Gesellschaft* or *Gemeinschaft*, inauthentic or authentic. *Being and Time* suggests, but does not develop, the thesis that the politics of society are the politics of "the public"—alienating, uprooting, inauthentic—while the politics of community are the politics of a people—historically rooted, caring, authentic.

Let us look briefly at this single mention of *Gemeinschaft* and *Volk*. Heidegger writes,

But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as *destiny*. This is how we designate the historizing of the community [*Gemeinschaft*], of a people [*des Volkes*]. Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. (SZ, 384, BT, 436)

The alternative to community is the mere sum or conglomeration of individuals. In a footnote to the last sentence Heidegger refers us to the earlier account of Being-with, inauthentic as well as authentic, in §26. Here we find that care, freedom, and responsibility characterize authentic Being-with. Its mode is that of "leaping ahead" of the other (*vorspringen*).<sup>64</sup> "Considerateness" and "forbearance" are prominent features of this mode of comportment with one another. The inauthentic mode of Being-with is inconsiderate and indifferent. In short, in inauthenticity we do not care for one another. Without care, we constitute only a society, not a community.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Hannah Arendt shows how the concept of the social is not an innocent term. She points out that the Greek *politikos* is translated by the Latin as *socialis* and, further, that the Roman notion of *societas* had a strong political dimension that gets lost in medieval and especially modern developments of the notion of society. See Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), chap. 2, "The Public and the Private Realm." Arendt's critique of "society" may have been motivated by Heidegger, though there is a large literature concerning the notion. Arendt, of course, in opposition to Heidegger tries to reinvigorate and revalorize the notion of the public from classical, especially Aristotelian, sources. By contrast, Habermas locates the public on the level of the social in his taking over the concept of "civil society" from Hegel.

<sup>64</sup> See my discussion of this account of authentic Being-with in my "Friendship and Politics: Heidegger's Failing" (note 8 above).

<sup>65</sup> One of the few other places where we can find Heidegger using this language is in the Holderlin lectures of 1934/35 *Holderlins Hymnen* "Ger-

This leads us to the question whether a communal politics of care can be appropriate to a large modern state. Surely we would not want to say that communitarianism or a politics of care is fascist. Even the harshest critics of contemporary communitarians have not accused them of fascism.<sup>66</sup> Perhaps more to the point, no one accuses John Dewey, who seeks the "Great Community," of fascism. We cannot here take up the larger debate about communitarianism, but we should look more closely at Heidegger's very sketchy account.

How does his ethics of care become a politics of "the people"? What stands out in his very brief comments about the historical community in §74 is the choice of a hero: "The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been—the possibility that *Dasein* may choose its hero—is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness" (SZ, 385, BT, 437). This choice of a hero illustrates the unity of the future and the past in the present as well as the priority of the future. Perhaps the notion of a hero is anticipated in §26 in the "leaping ahead" of authentic Being-with, but at best this concerns being a hero and not the choice of one. There is nothing in *Being and Time* that suggests that hero would be a political leader. The context suggests, rather, someone like a fallen soldier. Perhaps Heidegger was thinking of Albert Schlager who fought to resist occupation of the Rhineland by the French after World War I.<sup>67</sup> Retrospectively we can

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*manien*" und "Der Rhein," *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 39. The concepts are not developed here. Heidegger's concern in the larger context of these lectures is what constitutes a people. He specifies that it is listening (by implication to the gods by way of poetry) that is so constitutive. He writes, "This ordinary community does not first develop by the establishment of reciprocal relationships—only society is thereby established. But rather, community is through a prior bond of each individual [*jedes Einzelnen*] to that which bonds and determines each individual from on high" (pp. 72–3). The example Heidegger gives is the camaraderie (*Kameradschaft*) of soldiers on the front. See also p. 228.

<sup>66</sup> Though some seem to insinuate this. See, for example, Stephen Holmes's Preface to his *The Anatomy of Antiliberalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993) where, after citing assertions by Alasdair MacIntyre and Roberto Unger, he writes, "These claims are not unprecedented. Indeed, they cry out to be compared with various pronouncements by fascist writers" (p. xiii). Sluga's brief account of this section of *Being and Time* corroborates my own when he writes, "But, that engagement [on behalf of Nazism] does not follow directly from the communitarianism of the second half of *Being and Time*", Sluga, *Heidegger's Crisis*, 137.

<sup>67</sup> Schlager was arrested and shot for terroristic acts in the French occupied zone in 1923. Otto Poggeler mentions that Gadamer reports Heidegger missing a lecture in 1923 in order to meet the train that brought Schla-

see how the hero of *Being and Time* becomes the *Führer* of the Rectorial Address of 1933, but it goes too far to identify political leadership and heroism in the text of *Being and Time*. It is not yet the time for that.

What is of greater interest here with respect to the political is the notion of "choice." At least two aspects of "choice" are questionable and important: (1) who chooses? and (2) what does it mean to choose? We should note that it is *Dasein* that chooses and not *das Volk*. It would be a serious mistake for us to take Heidegger's concept of "the people," for extratextual reasons, to be identical with "the public" that Heidegger has so sharply criticized earlier in the text. That is, on Heidegger's account the self is precisely not absorbed into the *Volk* such that it loses itself. Such absorption and loss of self is the essential function of the public, while *das Volk* sustains the authentic and singular self.<sup>68</sup> In §74 Heidegger explicates *das Volk* through the brief suggestion that it is constituted through communication and struggle. Communication is precisely the key for Dewey's public and Dewey's "Great Community," though struggle is not a feature of Deweyan community.

In the later *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38) Heidegger states that *das Volk* can only be understood from a consideration of *Dasein*, and further that the essence of *das Volk* is its voice (*Stimme*). He quickly adds that the voice of the people is not the voice of the man on the street.

The essence of the people is its "voice." This voice speaks precisely *not* in the so-called immediate outpour of the common, natural, unsophisticated, and uneducated "man." For this tongue, so appealed to, is already very *sophisticated* and is no longer motivated in ordinary relationships to beings. The voice of the people seldom speaks and only in a few. Are they *still* able to be brought to ring out?<sup>69</sup>

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geter's body to Freiburg. See Otto Poggeler, "Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Politics," in *The Heidegger Case*, 137. As the Nazi Rector of Freiburg University Heidegger eulogized Schlageter in May 1933. For an English translation of the eulogy see *The Heidegger Controversy*, 40–2.

<sup>68</sup> Heidegger is advocating what Charles Taylor claims the current debate between liberals and communitarians often overlooks: holistic individualism. Taylor suggests that W. Humboldt articulated such a view in the early nineteenth century. See Charles Taylor, "Cross Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate," in *Liberalism and the Moral Life*, ed. Nancy Rosenblum (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 159–82.

<sup>69</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Beiträge zur Philosophie, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 65, p. 319 (my translation).

The voice of *das Volk* is not the voice of *das Man*, who is absorbed into the public. The concepts of "voice" and "the few" are also illuminating of *Being and Time*. Let us turn to them in the context of considering the concept of decision, which is so important to the text's account of *Dasein*.

What does it mean to choose? A number of leading commentators on *Being and Time* have criticized it for its decisionism or voluntarism.<sup>70</sup> On this reading the self simply chooses. There is nothing behind the choice but the choice itself. This interpretation places Heidegger in close proximity to Nietzsche's Will to Power. If we look carefully at Heidegger's discussion of choice, however, we find two formulations of this phenomenon. In the earlier treatment of authentic resolute *Dasein* choice is a function of the moment (*Augenblick*) and the hearkening to the voice of conscience. In this later treatment of historicity, it is similarly a function of the moment.<sup>71</sup> The "moment" is clearly a moment of truth. Inasmuch as there is something beyond the mere choice such as the voice of conscience, it is fair to say that authenticity and truth for Heidegger is not a matter of subjectivity and will. Heidegger's early work, including *Being and Time*, is motivated in large part by Husserl's early phenomenological realism and Heidegger's concern to overcome the subjectivism of modernity, remnants of which he finds in Husserl, who had opened the door to its overcoming. Heidegger's middle period is largely devoted to the concept of truth in the attempt to find a way to articulate the experience of truth that does not fall back into modern representationalism and the quarrel between idealism and realism.

To ask what it means to choose in *Being and Time* is to ask about the voice, the voice of conscience. The choice is not mere voluntarism or decisionism, for it is not merely a matter of will or decision. This voice, albeit mysteriously, stands behind the choice. Choice is a function of something "higher." Heidegger gives no account in *Being and Time* of the speaker of this "voice." In fact, in *Being and*

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<sup>70</sup> See Ernst Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1970), 361, and Klaus Held, "Heidegger und das Prinzip der Phänomenologie," *Heidegger und die praktische Philosophie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1988), 123–4.

<sup>71</sup> Macquarrie and Robinson overtranslate *Augenblick* (moment) in §74 as "moment of vision." See their footnote on p. 376. Heidegger is critical of the overevaluation of sight. "Hearing" or "hearkening" is the way this moment of truth is presented.

*Time* authentic speech is not at all discussed.<sup>72</sup> The voice of conscience is clearly the voice of truth. But this only pushes the question back to question about truth and does not answer the question about the speaker of the voice. Given Heidegger's great reliance on Augustine, Luther, and Kierkegaard we might want to infer that the voice is divine, the voice of God. Yet in his writing and lectures of this period Heidegger consistently insists on the atheism of philosophy.<sup>73</sup> A Christian philosophy is a contradiction in terms, a "wooden iron."<sup>74</sup> The question of truth and the voice of conscience are clearly at the heart of the project of *Being and Time*, a project that Heidegger could not complete satisfactorily. Heidegger's turning directly to the question of truth upon putting aside the project of *Being and Time* is indicative of the centrality of our question for Heidegger.

The turn away from the specific project of *Being and Time* is accompanied not only by a turn to Nazism but also by a turn to a non-Christian theism. We cannot discuss here the dimensions of this turn or turns. In the 1930s Heidegger answers the question as to the speaker of the voice—a question he did not or could not answer in 1926. The voice of the people is the rare voice of the poet. Inasmuch as Heidegger presents the poet, especially Holderlin, as the authentic and founding voice of the people it is fair to say, as many critics have, that Heidegger aestheticizes politics.<sup>75</sup> Yet unlike those who would make aesthetics the highest court of appeal, substituting aesthetics for politics and religion, Heidegger clearly subordinates the poet to the gods, that is, to a peculiar Heideggerian religion of absent divinities

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<sup>72</sup> Poetry is mentioned suggesting an authentic possibility of speech *SZ*, 162, *BT*, 205.

<sup>73</sup> See, for example, Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 61, p. 197.

<sup>74</sup> In his 1927 lecture, "Phenomenology and Theology," Heidegger uses this phrase, *holzernes Eisen*, as well as in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, though it is translated respectively as "round square" and "square circle." For the former see *Wegmarken*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9, p. 66, *The Poetry of Thinking*, trans. James Hart and John Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), 21. For the latter see *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 40, p. 9, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (New York: Anchor Books, 1961), 6.

<sup>75</sup> See, for example, Michael E. Zimmerman, *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics, and Art* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), and Michael E. Zimmerman, "Ontological Aestheticism: Heidegger, Jung, and National Socialism," in *The Heidegger Case*, 52–89. See also Otto Poggeler, "Heidegger und die Politik," in *Neue Wege mit Heidegger* (Freiburg: Alber, 1992), 274–94.

The nineteenth-century predecessor, if there is one, is not so much Shelley's proclamation of a legislation of poets but rather the young Hegel's hope and search for a religion of the people, a *Volksreligion*.

Through his lectures and writing in the 1930s Heidegger develops a complex and opaque account of the interdependence of poetry, politics, and religion. The basic features of this account as they pertain to his notions of "the public" and "the people" are made unusually clear in the usually obscure *Contributions to Philosophy*. Though the concept of "the public" disappears for the most part in the later writings, it is clear in *Contributions* that the public remains the important contrast term to "the people." Heidegger here defines *das Volk* by way of its god: "The essence of a people is grounded in the historicity of belonging to itself out of a relationship to the god."<sup>76</sup> This relationship is defined and established by the poet. We noted above Heidegger's assertion that "the essence of the people, however, is its 'voice'." The voice is the rare and singular voice of the poet.<sup>77</sup> As Heidegger makes clear in his Holderlin lectures, the voice of the poet is constituted in the poet's listening to the gods. He considers poets, thinkers, and statesmen as mediators, demigods (*Halbgötter*) of the divine.<sup>78</sup> These rare few who attend to the divine, he writes in *Contributions* in the same context as the discussion of the people, "belong to no public."<sup>79</sup> He identifies the public with the gigantic (*das Riesenhafte*), which best summarizes for him what the late modern, highly technological, highly organized and mobilized, liberal society is about.

After the catastrophe of World War II Heidegger ceases his discussion of "the people," but he maintains his critique of "the public" as a mode of metaphysics and technique (*Technik*) in the *Letter on*

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<sup>76</sup> Heidegger, *Beiträge*, 399. Nietzsche too suggested that a people are defined by their god. See *The Antichrist* §19. For a brief account of this concept throughout Heidegger's writings see Helmut Vetter, "Anmerkungen zum Begriff des Volkes bei Heidegger," in *Heidegger Technik-Ethik-Politik*, ed. Reinhard Margreiter and Karl Leidlmayer (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 1991), 239–48. For a fuller treatment of the later development of the notion of a people see Dieter Thomas, *Die Zeit des Selbst und die Zeit danach* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1990), 542–607.

<sup>77</sup> Heidegger, *Beiträge*, 319, see also the Holderlin lectures of 1934/35, *Holderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein," Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 39, p. 217, where Heidegger states that the originary language (*Ursprache*) of a people is its poetry.

<sup>78</sup> See the second part of the Holderlin lectures of 1934/35.

<sup>79</sup> Heidegger, *Beiträge*, 400. See also pp. 109, 128, 414, 442.



*Humanism* (1947). This "letter" is a most important and controversial publication, since Heidegger had published almost nothing since the flurry of publication in the late 1920s. His philosophical reputation rested on the abandoned project of *Being and Time* and his academic career was under the cloud of his Nazi engagement. In the *Letter* Heidegger criticizes Sartrean existentialism and the existentialist reading of *Being and Time* while attempting to explain why and how he had left *Being and Time* behind. In this context Heidegger explicitly endorses his account of *das Man* in §27 and §35 of *Being and Time*.<sup>80</sup> Philosophy itself, according to Heidegger here, has accepted subservience (*Knechtschaft*) to the mastery (*Herrschaft*) and dictatorship (*Diktatur*) of the public. Both *Herrschaft* and *Diktatur* are prominent terms of the analysis of *Man* and *Offentlichkeit* in *Being and Time* §27. In the *Letter* the relation to the public marks, for Heidegger, how thinking has come to an end. Thought has become mere technique.

## VIII

The clearest precedent for Heidegger's critique of the public is, as we have seen, the prescient account of "the present age" of Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard does not develop or even suggest a political alternative. Nor is *das Volk* a significant concept for him. His concern is the Christian conversion of the self and not the political transformation of a society or state. There is no developed political theory in *Being and Time*, but in the section on historicity there are suggestions in this regard, for here the individual finds its place within a larger historical context. This context is ultimately either social or communal—and, if communal, then within a people, a *Volk*. It would not be correct to read back into *Being and Time* the later explicit attempts, however rudimentary, at a political theory, since this text was never completed and the later attempts do not remain within the bounds of the earlier project.<sup>81</sup> At the same time, we should note the

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<sup>80</sup> Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," in *Basic Writings*, trans. Frank Capuzzi and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 197, in German: *Brief über Humanismus*, in *Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9, pp. 317–18.

<sup>81</sup> See especially *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935), the Holderlin lectures of 1934/35, the Holderlin lectures of 1942 (*Holderlins Hymne "Der Ister," Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 53), and the lectures on Parmenides of 1942–43 (*Parmenides, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 54).

many continuities of the later development with *Being and Time*. We might appropriately ask what in this text allows for, or calls for, the later development. We have noted Heidegger's sharp critique of "the public" as well as the religious precedent for the critique. We might be tempted to say that it is just this aristocratic and religious disdain for the public that is the seed ground for Heidegger's Nazism. We have also noted a similar view of the public by democratic thinkers like Jaspers and Ortega, however. The avowed aristocrat Ortega in 1929 denounces the false dawns of fascism and bolshevism and asserts that "Europe needs to keep its essential liberalism."<sup>82</sup> Jaspers similarly renounces the two alternatives to democracy and writes that "the essential problem of the political history of our time is whether the masses of mankind can be democratised."<sup>83</sup> This is not Heidegger's question. Democracy for Heidegger can only mean rule by the *demos*, that is, the public, which is by definition inauthentic and committed to technological mastery and gigantism.<sup>84</sup>

We have noted the close relation of Heidegger's denunciation of the public to that of Kierkegaard. We have suggested that in tandem with his turn to fascism Heidegger in the 1930s makes religion foundational to politics, that is, the conversation of the poet with the gods founds the state. The voice of *Dasein* and the voice of history, unnamed in *Being and Time*, become the voice of the gods. The paradox in this regard for the project of *Being and Time* is its atheistic development of the philosophical anthropology of the Christian thinkers Kierkegaard and Augustine. In a footnote Heidegger clearly points

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<sup>82</sup> Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, trans. Anthony Kerrigan (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 81–3. See p. 12 for his claim that "human society is aristocratic, always, whether it wants to be or not." He distinguishes "society" from the state, however, the latter need not be aristocratic.

<sup>83</sup> Karl Jaspers, *Man in the Modern Age*, 106–7.

<sup>84</sup> In the first Nietzsche lectures of 1936–37 Heidegger writes, "Europe still tries to cling to 'democracy' and will not admit that this 'democracy' will be Europe's historical death. For democracy is—as Nietzsche clearly saw—only a kind of nihilism", Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Der Wille zur Macht als Kunst, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 43, p. 193. When Heidegger prepared these lectures for publication in the 1950s he did not include this comment. Heidegger never seems to have changed his view in this regard, in the Spiegel interview of 1966 Heidegger says, "A decisive question for me today is: how can a political system accommodate itself to the technological age, and which political system would this be? I have no answer to this question. I am not convinced that it is democracy." See Martin Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us," in *The Heidegger Controversy*, 104.

to the primary sources and context for his account of *Dasein*. "The way in which 'care' is viewed in the foregoing existential analytic of *Dasein*, is one which has grown upon the author in connection with his attempts to Interpret the Augustinian (i.e., Helleno-Christian) anthropology with regard to the foundational principles reached in the ontology of Aristotle" (SZ, 199; BT, 492). Kierkegaard, as we have noted, never attempted to provide a politics or a philosophy of history, but Augustine did. We are led to ask if the politics implicit in *Being and Time* are a version of secularized Augustinianism. One might note the parallel between Augustinian notions of original sin and Heidegger's concept of fallenness as well as parallels between Heidegger's critique of *das Man* and the public and Augustine's account of the City of Man.<sup>85</sup> Though we cannot pursue the question here, we should observe that however much the account of individual *Dasein* might be said to be Augustinian (relying more on Kierkegaard than directly on Augustine), the account of historical, communal, and political *Dasein* is decidedly not Augustinian.

The difference between Heidegger and Augustine with respect to the political is revealing. Though they might agree about the fallenness of humanity, the place and role of politics in relation to this fallenness is significantly different. For Augustine, the role of politics is not to provide salvation. The distinction of the City of God and the City of Man does not collapse. What Niebuhr calls Augustine's "moral realism" assigns the political realm the lesser task of getting along and maintaining order and peace.<sup>86</sup> Salvation for Kierkegaard and Augustine is not in time but in eternity, that is, salvation is eschatological. When Heidegger turns to Nazism and thinks he sees a movement that will redeem human history he suggests a secularized eschatology, a kind of moral and political "idealism." It is important also to recognize that though in principle fundamentally distinct the City of God

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<sup>85</sup> Heidegger cites Augustine's *Confessions* in §36 to support his account of curiosity as a central feature of *das Man*, SZ, 171, BT, 215.

<sup>86</sup> See Graham Walker, *Moral Foundations of Constitutional Thought* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 65–112; and Reinhold Niebuhr, "Augustine's Political Realism," *Christian Realism and Political Problems* (New York: Charles Scribner, 1953), 119–146. Though we might want more of politics and might find a *contemptus mundi* in Augustine, we should not confuse Heidegger with Cicero, of whom Augustine is critical. Heidegger is neither Augustine nor Cicero, he would see their differences as intra-Roman differences.

and the City of Man are, for Augustine, in history and in practice ineluctably interwoven and intermingled. Even the institution of the Church is not to be simply identified with the City of God. If we are to look for a late classical precedent we discover that Heidegger's position is closer to Gnosticism than it is to Augustinianism.<sup>87</sup> There are a number of features of Heidegger's view that suggest the parallel. The most important of these are, first, the subordination of the political to the religious, second, the sharp duality between the forces of good and evil, the authentic and the inauthentic, and third, the sharp distinction between the human and nature.<sup>88</sup> In each of these instances Heidegger accepts the Kierkegaardian injunction: either/or.<sup>89</sup>

One way this sharp duality of good and evil shows up in Heidegger's few, but revealing, explicit political comments is in Heidegger's inability to distinguish relevant political features of different political movements. As late as 1935 when Heidegger is still placing world-historical hopes on Nazism, he sees no important differences between American constitutional democracy and Soviet Stalinism.<sup>90</sup> A few

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<sup>87</sup> Hans Jonas makes a persuasive case for this in his "Gnosticism and Modern Nihilism," *Social Research* 19 (1952) 430–52. A revised version of this article is appended to the second edition of his *The Gnostic Religion* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1958).

<sup>88</sup> One of the features that I find particularly relevant is the non-natural and nonanimal character of *Dasein*. See especially the comment in *Basic Problems* (*Basic Problems*, 176; *Grundprobleme*, 250) that the difference between *Dasein* and nature is greater than the traditional distinction between God and man, the divine and the human. This is carried forward in the later *Letter on Humanism* when Heidegger claims that the humanistic consideration of the human as a rational animal ranks the human too low. What is offensive (but not discussed) in this definition is animality. Note Heidegger's comment in *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (*Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 29/30, p. 384) that the animal is separated from the human by an abyss. See my "Friendship and Politics" for a brief discussion of Heidegger's angelicism.

<sup>89</sup> For example, in his Tübingen address of November 1933, "The University in the National Socialist State," Heidegger explicitly uses the language of "either/or." "To greet the new order is not sufficient. The Either-Or reigns. One must decide to place oneself under the command of the new reality or to sink with a world going under" (my translation). See *Martin Heidegger und das "Dritte Reich"*, ed. Bernd Martin (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), 182.

<sup>90</sup> See his remark in the 1935 lectures *Introduction to Metaphysics* that "from a metaphysical point of view, Russia and America are the same" (English, p. 31, German, pp. 48–9). This assertion, in its own way, makes my point. From Heidegger's "metaphysical point of view" they are the same, though they are not the same politically. The politics do not matter to Hei-

years later when Heidegger backs away from German fascism he paints all three with the same brush, the brush of *Technik* and gigantism (*das Riesenhafte*)<sup>91</sup> Although we should acknowledge important similarities in the "rational" (that is, bureaucratic) organization of the modern state, whether it is liberal democratic, fascist, or bolshevist (and hence a certain persuasiveness of Heidegger's critique), it is nonetheless far too simple to speak of them as undifferentiated. The overgeneralized absurdity of Heidegger's critique is similarly apparent in his attack on leading Nazi intellectuals and on Nazi "people's science" (*volksische Wissenschaft*) as liberal.<sup>92</sup> Here we see the truth of the claim that Heidegger was unknowing about politics and apolitical.<sup>93</sup> This does not mean that Heidegger did not enthusiastically embrace Nazism or that he did not himself for a time have political ambitions. It is rather a very dangerous sort of political apoliticism, which rests on the reduction of the political to the religious and on grand hopes for political salvation and a reversal of history. When these hopes are betrayed, Heidegger then attacks the political as such. He becomes

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degger, only the metaphysics of *Technik* do. These are the same lectures in which he makes the oft-cited remark about the "inner truth and greatness" of National Socialism, in the English, see p. 166, in the German, p. 208.

<sup>91</sup> See Heidegger's discussion of the abandonment of Being (*Seinsverlassenheit*), the gigantic, and nihilism in *Beiträge*, especially in Part 2, *Der Anklang*. We can find similar comments in the essay "Verwindung der Metaphysik," which dates from the same time and may well have been simply extracted from this manuscript, though it was first published in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), *The End of Philosophy*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1973). The world wars and the organization of people which sees humans simply as raw material is, for Heidegger, a function of *Seinsverlassenheit*.

<sup>92</sup> In *Beiträge*, 148–9, Heidegger claims that "folkish science" and liberal science with its ideal of objectivity (a phrase which in this context evokes Max Weber) are the same. In the Holderlin lectures of 1934–35, he attacks Alfred Rosenberg and E. G. Kolbenheyer, prominent Nazi intellectuals, as liberals (*Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 39, p. 28). On the latter see Kathleen Wright, "Heidegger und die Ermächtigung der Dichtung Holderlins" in *Martin Heidegger: Kunst-Politik-Technik*, ed. C. Jamme and K. Harries (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1992), 85–94.

<sup>93</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer has consistently presented Heidegger in this way. For his contribution to the recent discussion of Heidegger's politics see his "Superficiality and Ignorance. On Victor Farias' Publication," in *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism*, ed. Gunther Neske and Emil Kettering, trans. Lisa Harries (New York: Paragon House, 1990), 141–4, German original in *Antwort: Heidegger im Gespräch* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1988), 152–6. Sluga argues that *Being and Time* displayed a "kind of apolitical and anarchic attitude", Sluga, *Heidegger's Crisis*, 136.

explicitly antipolitical. He asserts that "the political" (*das Politische*) is Roman and Christian. The Greeks, according to Heidegger and contrary to the common view, could found the *polis* and are to be considered great politically precisely because they were not political.<sup>94</sup> Finally, even the concept of the *Volk* is found to be "metaphysical" and is to be overcome.<sup>95</sup>

We have seen how Heidegger in the 1930s develops the notions of the *Volk* and the state (or *polis*) in a poetic and, above all, a religious way. Clearly the founding and the maintaining of such a state is hierarchical and top-down. We should also note the unmediated character of such a founding. The poet simply listens to the voice. On this understanding of the state there is no need of a civil society. In our own times, the bureaucratic and top-down socialism of Eastern Europe effectively destroyed the civil society of those countries. Today, the great felt need in these countries is to reconstitute somehow the organizations, societies, and corporations that might connect citizens over and above the family and relatively independent of the state. It is this civil society which constitutes the public that concerns the current defenders and promoters of "the public." The public is the space in which individuals engage with others, in word and deed, to satisfy their interests and aspirations and to represent them to the state and the larger community of citizens. It is the space in which the interests of individuals and families can find mediation—mediation with others and with the state. Though Heidegger, as we have seen, identifies the concept of the public (*Offentlichkeit*) simply as inauthentic, he does provide, in principle, for such a place of mediation in his extremely brief gloss on *Volk* in *Being and Time* when he suggests that a people are formed through communication and struggle. "Struggle" (*Kampf*) remains an important defining feature of a people and its state in Heidegger's developments of these notions, but "communication" (*Mitteilung*) disappears from Heidegger's text. An understandably common central feature of contemporary pragmatic Deweyan treatments of the public as well as of Habermas's discussion of the matter is precisely this concept of communication. With Heidegger's critique of the public as well as Adorno's and Horkheimer's

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<sup>94</sup> See the Parmenides lectures of 1942–43, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 54, *Parmenides*, trans. Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 43, 90–1, 96.

<sup>95</sup> *Parmenides*, 204, in English, 137.

critiques of mass society in mind, Habermas distinguishes communication from the mass media. This distinction we noted Dewey making when in his discussion of the public he pushes aside, somewhat too easily, the question of propaganda.

Heidegger's consideration of truth, the central issue for him at the time of his famed turn and throughout the 1930s, provides the relevant context for his treatment of politics. "Truth is freedom" is the central thesis of his 1930 essay "On the Essence of Truth."<sup>96</sup> Here and elsewhere we find Heidegger presenting truth as an event of immediacy. It is an event of revealing which, at the same time, conceals<sup>97</sup> The best example of such an event for Heidegger is, as we have noted above, the listening to the gods which enables the poet to speak. A leading metaphor for the experience of truth is the flash of lightning.<sup>98</sup> Hans-Georg Gadamer provides a telling contrast with Heidegger in this regard, for he takes over Heidegger's notion of truth as both revealing and concealing and develops it dialogically, that is, as a mediated event.<sup>99</sup> Heidegger's immediate flash of revelation requires no mediation, however. When Heidegger reads the line from Holderlin about the conversation that we are, he interprets conversation as the listening of the poets to the gods.<sup>100</sup> When Heidegger thinks of politics he

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<sup>96</sup> *Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 9, 177–202, "On the Essence of Truth," in *Basic Writings*, trans. John Sallis (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), 113–41.

<sup>97</sup> Much of Heidegger's language of revelation is cognate with *Offentlichkeit das Offene, die Offenheit, die Offenbarkeit*.

<sup>98</sup> See, for example, Martin Heidegger, "Die Kehre," in *Die Technik und die Kehre* (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske, 1962), 37–47, "The Turning," in *The Question Concerning Technology*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 36–49. Gadamer tells us in a recent essay that above the door of Heidegger's cabin in the Black Forest was placed the fragment from Heraclitus "Alles steuert der Blitz" (Lightning steers all things). See Martin Heidegger, "Hegel und Heraklit," in *Plato im Dialog, Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 7 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1991), 34.

<sup>99</sup> See the discussion of this in my "The Experience of Truth for Gadamer and Heidegger: Taking Time and Sudden Lightning," in *Hermeneutics and Truth*, ed. Bruce Wachterhauser (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, forthcoming).

<sup>100</sup> See Martin Heidegger, "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry," in *Existence and Being* (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1959), 290, in German, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 4, p. 40. See also *Holderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein"*, *Gesamtausgabe*, vol. 39, p. 217. "Das ursprüngliche Sagen des Dichters ist als Stiften kein willkürliches Erfinden, sondern das Sichstellen unter die Gewitter der Gotter, um ihre Winke, den Blitzstrahl, im Wort und der Wortwerdung aufzufangen und so das Wort mit seiner ganzen verborgenen

thinks of the same religious "conversation" and provides no place for communication and mediation, no place for the public. In criticizing Heidegger for his ignoring the need for such a public space and for his reduction of the political to the religious I am not in agreement with Richard Rorty's diagnosis of Heidegger's failing. For Rorty Heidegger's mistake is his quest for the holy—something Rorty finds to be "what was worst in the tradition"<sup>101</sup> On my account the mistake is not to seek the holy but to confuse that quest with politics.

However much his quest for the holy and his understanding of the Promethean quest for mastery blinds him in the face of the political realities of his time, we should acknowledge that there is a terrible truth in Heidegger's simple and simplistic critique of modern technological society and the modern bureaucratic state. An important aspect of its truth is its concern with the role of the public and public opinion in contemporary politics, though he does not distinguish these two and provides no space for politics, a space we might call the "public" space. Current attempts to revive the concept of the public and public discourse on behalf of democratic politics might learn something here and avoid a different sort of naivete, the naivete of Deweyan progressivism which places too high hopes on "inquiry" and does not take sufficiently seriously the phenomena of leveling, homogenization, and propaganda.

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Sprunggewalt ins Volk zu stellen" (The originary saying of the poet is, as founding, no capricious creation, but the placing of the self under the thunder of the gods, in order to catch in word and in the coming into word their signs, the flash of lightning, and thereby to place the word in the people with its entire concealed leaping force)

<sup>101</sup> See Richard Rorty, "Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey," in Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 52. I also disagree with Rorty's proto-pragmatist reading of *Being and Time* in his "Heidegger, Contingency, and Pragmatism," in Richard Rorty, *Essays on Heidegger and Others*, vol. 2 of *Philosophical Papers* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 27–49. This is an issue to be taken up elsewhere, however



## CRITICAL STUDIES

### THE NEW "CRISIS" CONTRIBUTION A SUPPLEMENTARY EDITION OF EDMUND HUSSERL'S CRISIS TEXTS

ANTHONY J. STEINBOCK

EDMUND Husserl's *Crisis* was not only one of his most important formulations of an introduction to phenomenology, but also the inspiration for a plethora of studies that have helped shape the direction of thought in the twentieth century, from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's *Phénoménologie de la perception*<sup>1</sup> to Jurgen Habermas's *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*.<sup>2</sup> It is well known that the problematic surrounding the *Crisis* occupied Husserl during his last years, from 1934 to 1937. The first critical edition of these reflections was prepared by Walter Biemel and published in 1954 as volume 6 of the Husserliana series bearing the title, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962).

<sup>2</sup> See especially Jurgen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, vol. 2, *Zur Kritik der funktionalistischen Vernunft* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987), *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2, *Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987).

<sup>3</sup> *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, Husserliana, vol. 6 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954). I will refer to this edition of the *Crisis* as *Krisis I*. English translation by David Carr: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), hereafter cited as *Crisis*. All quotations from Husserl's works in this article are my own translations.

Because the *Crisis* is such a familiar topic to the English reader, and for the sake of simplicity, I will refer to the "Crisis" problematic, and to Husserl's *Crisis* writings in general by using the English expression rather than the German "*Krisis*."

As one might suspect from a philosopher who bequeathed nearly 45,000 stenographed manuscript pages, however, we have not heard the last of Husserl on the celebrated *Crisis* issue. The latest installment of the *Crisis* problematic is a collection of supplementary writings entitled, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934–1937*.<sup>4</sup>

There is much to be learned from a text of this sort, it both placates historical curiosity about the extant material on the *Crisis* and piques thematic interest in topics the *Crisis* only promised to treat. In the following pages I would like to discuss this new *Crisis* volume in four stages. First, I will give a basic introduction to the *Crisis* problematic, second, I would like to discuss the composition of the new *Crisis* selection and its standing in relation to the first *Crisis* edition. After offering an overview of the material included in this supplementary volume in my third section, I will conclude by suggesting the direction that Husserl's incomplete *Crisis* might have taken.

## I

The condition of Husserl's research manuscripts has been explained in many works and need not be repeated in detail here.<sup>5</sup> In place of such an ambitious undertaking, let me simply emphasize some of the salient points surrounding the *Crisis* collection and, in a more cursory fashion, highlight the circumstances involving its emergence.<sup>6</sup> According to an outline for the *Crisis* prepared by Husserl's close

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<sup>4</sup> *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie Ergänzungsband. Texte aus dem Nachlass 1934–1937*, ed. Reinhold M. Smid, Husserliana, vol. 29 (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993). I will refer to this supplementary edition of the *Crisis* as *Krisis 2*.

<sup>5</sup> In particular, see the "Préface" by H. L. van Breda, and the "Einleitung" by S. Strasser in *Cartesianische Meditationen*, Husserliana, vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). See also Iso Kern's "Einleitung des Herausgebers" to volumes 13 (Erster Teil, 1905–1920), 14 (Zweiter Teil, 1921–1928), and 15 (Dritter Teil, 1929–1935) of Husserliana, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973).

<sup>6</sup> On the *Crisis* see Walter Biemel's "Einleitung" to *Krisis 1* as well as David Carr's "Introduction" to his translation.

assistant Eugen Fink (with whom Husserl held daily consultations), the *Crisis* was to be divided into five parts.<sup>7</sup> The first two parts were originally published in an international journal entitled *Philosophia*,<sup>8</sup> and were later reprinted in the critical *Crisis* edition. They are entitled, respectively, "The Crisis of the Sciences as Expression of the Radical Life-Crisis of European Humanity," and "Clarification of the Origin of the Modern Opposition between Physicalistic Objectivism and Transcendental Subjectivism." For Part 3, divisions A and B of the *Crisis*, the situation is somewhat more complicated. Let me explain.

After Husserl had assiduously reworked Part 3—already months past his deadline for publication—Fink apparently forwarded the typescript to the editor of *Philosophia*, Arthur Liebert.<sup>9</sup> After writing more amendments and supplements to this draft, however, Husserl once again rethought the conception of the "most mature results of [his] life's work of over 40 years."<sup>10</sup> In true Husserlian style, by trying to nail down an adequate conclusion to Part 3, Husserl amassed writings that he conceded would far exceed the space of two volumes of *Philosophia*. According to a letter to his former student, Jan Patočka, sheer length was one reason Husserl thought it necessary to alter his plans for a conclusion to this work, and to reevaluate how the *Crisis* should be divided.<sup>11</sup> Citing delays in thinking and writing that were due to health, the tremendous difficulties related to the themes in the *Crisis*, and the formidable task of his new way into transcendental phenomenology—to say nothing of the voluminosity of his text—Husserl requested at the end of June 1936 that Liebert return the typescript.<sup>12</sup> Part 3 never reached its final form, in Husserl's view, and was never published in *Philosophia*.

What became of the proposed Parts 4 and 5? The material for these Parts remained in the form of supplementary reflections, and Parts 4 and 5 were never composed *as such*. Nevertheless, given that Husserl did want to revise the copious material in Part 3, and given

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<sup>7</sup> See *Krisis 1*, Beilage 29, pp. 514–16, which was written around Easter, 1936, *Crisis*, appendix 10, pp. 397–400.

<sup>8</sup> See *Philosophia* (Belgrad) 1 (1936) 77–176.

<sup>9</sup> *Krisis 2*, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," xxxiii.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, xxxiii–xxxv.

<sup>11</sup> The letter to Patočka dates from June 26, 1936 and is cited by Smud; *Krisis 2*, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," xxxvii.

<sup>12</sup> *Krisis 2*, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," xxxviii–xxxix.

that there are extant manuscripts provided in Smid's edition that fit the general headings of Parts 4 and 5 as advanced in the prospectus, it does seem possible at least to suggest what may have occupied further work on the *Crisis*. I will return to this problematic in my third and fourth sections. Here I simply want to remind the reader that in place of Parts 4 and 5, Biemel's critical edition of the *Crisis* is supplemented with three treatises (including the "Vienna Lecture") and 29 appendixes (one of which is the famous "Origin of Geometry"). This material both reformulates and develops issues in the main text, and offers a glimpse into themes not yet developed.

## II

For those readers who enjoy the incomplete, inchoate, and sometimes fragmentary character of works, the new *Crisis* volume will not be a disappointment, since it continues in the style of the supplementary treatises and appendixes found in the latter half of the first *Crisis* text. While it does not have the choppiness, say, of the working notes found at the conclusion of Merleau-Ponty's *Le visible et l'invisible*,<sup>13</sup> this supplementary volume does not sport sustained documents like the main part of the earlier *Crisis* volume, save perhaps a couple of contributions including the Prague lectures and an extended foray into the problem of teleology in the history of philosophy. Adding to the dense, uneven style of Husserl's writing is the incongruous length of the pieces making up this collection: some of the texts penned by Husserl cover no more than two printed pages, while another is nearly 60 pages in length. If, as David Carr has suggested, the first *Crisis* volume can hardly be said to "flow"—even after Carr provided the English reader with a superb translation and refined Biemel's already cogent editorial undertaking—then this assertion holds even more so for the new edition of the *Crisis*.

This is no fault of the editor, Reinhold Smid, as many who have labored through the laconic and trachytic style of Husserl's research manuscripts would happily confirm. The total of thirty-four texts for volume 29 of *Husserliana* are arranged by the editor chronologically

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<sup>13</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, ed. Claude Lefort (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), *The Visible and the Invisible*, trans. Alphonso Lingis, ed. Claude Lefort (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).

within the parameters of the *Crisis* years, 1934–37, an order which Smud states also corresponds to the content of the writings.<sup>14</sup> This ordering reflects the editor's avowed historical perspective, which more than facilitated collating a prodigious assortment of unpublished material composed by Husserl in the framework of his *Crisis* reflections<sup>15</sup> Because of its makeup and wide range of topics, a detailed table of contents proves indispensable.

In editing the original *Crisis* volume, Walter Biemel deemed it simply impossible to publish *all* the research manuscripts stemming from the K III manuscript group, a group making up only a small part of Husserl's *Nachlaß*. Husserl, who thought by writing, would often begin by building up his "momentum," so to speak, that is, by repeating what he had already drafted. Along the way he would suddenly hit on a new insight, and then develop it.<sup>16</sup> This style of work means that for readers (and editors) there are inherently numerous repetitions, overlaps, emendations, and supplementations. To include all this *Crisis* material in a single edition simply would not have been feasible. The fact that Biemel had to be so selective for his edition of *Husserliana* accounts for one reason why so much supplementary material was left over for at least another volume.

Likewise, when editing the *Crisis* supplementary volume Smid's goal was very close to that of Biemel, namely, to provide material that would not duplicate writings already published in the *Husserliana* series and to select the most important material connected with the origin and development of the *Crisis*. Thus once again, this edition of more than four hundred printed pages does not exhaust all the *Crisis* material. Still, it does significantly help to clarify the different work phases on the *Crisis*, as well as to supplement the first *Crisis* volume.<sup>17</sup> The fact that *Husserliana* 29 is a supplementary collection means, of course, that it too has direct connections to the main text of the *Crisis*, and that the new supplements intertwine with those of Biemel's edition. The concerned or simply inquisitive reader will

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<sup>14</sup> *Krisis* 2, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," xi. This chronological arrangement is where Smud's edition breaks with the style of Biemel's edition.

<sup>15</sup> This material stems primarily from the K III and M III 5 groups.

<sup>16</sup> See Walter Biemel, "Louvain La 'Montagne Magique' phénoménologique," in *Husserl Collectif sous la direction de Etienne Escoubas et Marc Richir* (Grenoble Millon, 1989), 216–17. See also *Krisis* 1, "Zur Textgestaltung," 520.

<sup>17</sup> *Krisis* 2, "Zur Textgestaltung," 429–30.

be happy to learn that Smud provides a helpful chronological chart which collates, dates, and disambiguates the various supplementary writings.<sup>18</sup>

The hope for such a presentation as volume 29 is that possible directions might be sketched that suggest how the *Crisis* would or could have continued, and to offer a look into new themes that either enrich or perhaps challenge assertions found in the main *Crisis* collection. That this was a demanding, exacting, and by most standards a foreboding enterprise is testified to by Smud's thorough *textkritischer Anhang*, which runs in excess of 120 pages

### III

The present *Crisis* supplementary text has four divisions. In order to provide a basic overview of the material, let me simply state generally the subject matter of these divisions.<sup>19</sup> To do this I will follow the editor's ordering of the sections to the extent that this is possible.

1 The first division of *Husserliana* 29 bears the title *Vorstudien* or "Preliminary Studies," and spans August 1934 to November 1935, just prior to Husserl's Prague and Vienna lectures. On the whole, these writings treat the problem of "generativity," in brief, the problem of geo-social-historical becoming. Since I will regard the majority of this material as belonging to the incomplete Parts 4 and 5, let me avoid unnecessary repetition by postponing a discussion of this material until my fourth section, and let me move immediately to a discussion of the second division.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> See *Krisis* 2, "Chronologische Übersicht der edierten K-III-Manuskripte und der damit zusammenhängenden Manuskripte," 552–5.

<sup>19</sup> For a fastidious account of this edition's contents see Smud's fifty-four-page editor's introduction, which takes the reader meticulously step by step through the collection.

<sup>20</sup> I simply wish to note, first, that with regard to the problem of generativity, especially text nos 1–5 are very much reminiscent of the selections furnished by Iso Kern in *Zur Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (*Husserliana*, vol. 15). Second, there are some texts with material similar to the first *Crisis* edition such as a critique of mathematization of nature, which is extended now to the lived-body, a critique of physicalism and objectivism, and an analysis of transcendental subjectivity formulated in terms of eidetic self-variation. See especially text nos 2, 8, and 9.

2 From the predominantly historical reflections that occupy division 1 of the *Erganzungsband* we turn to division 2, whose emphases lie primarily on psychology and a static analysis of the lifeworld. These writings stem from November 1935 to the summer of 1936.

The Prague lectures, which Husserl held in Prague on November 14 and 15, 1935, formed the basis of Husserl's work on the *Crisis*. They are edited here as text no. 10. In distinction to the Vienna lectures which located the primordial institution of philosophy with Ancient Greece merely, the Prague lectures cite two sources of sense for the "spiritual form of Europe" and its immanent teleology, namely, Greek philosophy and Judeo-Christian Monotheism.<sup>21</sup>

As we shall see, the renewal of human existence is rooted, for Husserl, in a radical reform of transcendental philosophy.<sup>22</sup> In these lectures the latter is inextricably tied to "a radical reform of psychology."<sup>23</sup> Husserl characterizes the history of psychology as a history of crises, and attentiveness to these crises can assist the development of a genuine transcendental philosophy.<sup>24</sup> It is to this end that Husserl offers a historical critique of these crises through figures in the history of philosophy from Galileo to Brentano.

With the exception of the Prague lectures the second division of Husserliana 29 is a collection of drafts, appendixes, and emendations to *Crisis* Part 3 that Husserl was preparing for publication. Of those texts that deal with psychology and its relation to transcendental philosophy, Husserl's analyses hardly go beyond the impasse reached in his *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article from 1928.<sup>25</sup>

Simply stated, the problem is this. On the one hand, Husserl understands psychology as a "way" into transcendental philosophy.

<sup>21</sup> See *Krisis* 2, 109. See also his later piece on teleology, where Husserl cites both Ancient Greece and Jerusalem (p. 331). Cf. *Krisis* 1, 318–21, *Crisis*, 273–6.

<sup>22</sup> On the theme of "renewal" see Husserl's *Kaizo* articles from 1922–24, published in *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922–1937)*, ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Husserliana, vol. 27 (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989). See also Donn Welton, "Husserl and the Japanese," *Review of Metaphysics* 44 (March 1991), 575–606.

These texts on the role of self-reflection and history are also akin to *Krisis* 1, Beilagen 24–28. Beilage 28 is included in the English translation as appendix 9. See also *Krisis* 2, "Einleitung des Herausgebers," xvii.

<sup>23</sup> See *Krisis* 2, 109–10.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 122.

<sup>25</sup> See text nos. 10, 13, 14, and 16, and cf. Edmund Husserl, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana, vol. 9 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), esp. 237–301.

Psychology is still "mundane" because it takes the psyche for granted, does not transform the psychologist him- or herself into a "phenomenon," and does not inquire into its modes of givenness or modes of sense-giving, it is still exercised prior to a "transcendental opening" and requires a "transcendental *Umstellung*." Nevertheless, since psychology can still be mundane and disclose the intentional character of the psyche in its eidetic necessity, it can function as a *bridge* to transcendental philosophy.<sup>26</sup>

On the other hand, Husserl takes pains to avoid the conflation of psychology in the *mundane* attitude with a "naive *naturalistic*," mathematized psychology.<sup>27</sup> In order to distinguish radically the natural from the naturalistic, Husserl thinks a "first reduction" is in order. This "reduction" is itself curious, for it still allows the psychologist to be "interested."<sup>28</sup> Moreover, while Husserl wants phenomenological psychology to treat the region "psyche," and transcendental philosophy to be universal, Husserl goes so far in the opposite direction of naturalism that he becomes unable to differentiate "phenomenological psychology" from transcendental philosophy in a way that is meaningful. He is led to assert that psychology, too, is universal, that the psychologist is likewise an "uninterested observer," that he or she, once more, exercises the epoche and reduction, and becomes a "phenomenon."<sup>29</sup> As a result, we are left wondering precisely what role phenomenological psychology really serves, and if it does have an essential role, how we are able to distinguish it from transcendental philosophy. I will take up the significance of psychology in relation to anthropology and transcendental phenomenology below. Let me now address another major theme of division 2 of the *Ergänzungsband*, namely, the lifeworld.

The concept of the lifeworld is perhaps one of the most renowned features of Husserl's *Crisis* reflections. On the whole, and with some important exceptions, the type of analyses of the lifeworld provided in this division are static. By static I mean that either (1) they are constitutional analyses that abstract from the dimension of temporality altogether, inquiring into modes of sense-formation and layers of validity [*Geltungsaufbau*], or (2) they are

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<sup>26</sup> See *Krisis* 2, 120, 169–70, 175, 203, 209

<sup>27</sup> See *ibid.*, 132, 175, 203

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 171

<sup>29</sup> See *ibid.*, 128–9, 171–2



structural analyses that investigate invariant types, or material and formal essences, through eidetic method. In this case the investigations are mundane

As in the main *Crisis* text, four prominent modalities of the lifeworld can be found in this supplementary volume. Let me enumerate them as follows. First, the lifeworld is the world that is in principle intuitable, experienceable, concrete, and original. This is the lifeworld as it is given in evidence immediately and directly as contrasted with the objective-scientific world and theoretical constructions.<sup>30</sup> Second, the lifeworld is portrayed as a foundation or "source" of sense upon which the objective sciences build. It is literally called here the "sub-scientific lifeworld" that the sciences naively take for granted and exploit in their accomplishments.<sup>31</sup>

Third, the very contrast that Husserl belabored, namely, that between the lifeworld and the scientific world, between concrete and objective accomplishments, is called into question. Since scientific validities and theoretical praxis also "flow (back) into" (*einstromen*) the lifeworld, and since active accomplishments become sedimented, presupposed and habitual, the lifeworld itself integrates scientific truths and becomes expanded. Husserl writes: "Thus, our concept of the lifeworld begins to totter. And is this not also the case with our concept of intuition, with our concept of evidence?"<sup>32</sup> The result of this moment of lifeworld analysis means that lifeworldly truth is relativized, and the lifeworld becomes the realm of subjective-relative evidences.<sup>33</sup>

Finally, the lifeworld is regarded as the world of invariant and a priori structures, resolving "some paradoxical relativizations of the concept 'lifeworld'" just mentioned above. To the concept of the lifeworld as an a priori belongs the task of a lifeworld ontology. An ontology of the lifeworld is a leading clue to the particular sciences and to transcendental phenomenology.<sup>34</sup> Since I will treat it in some detail below, and also as what might belong to the unfinished Part 4 of the *Crisis*, let it suffice to have mentioned a lifeworld ontology in passing.

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<sup>30</sup> See *Krisis* 2, 140, 143, 154, 185, 193–4, 213–14

<sup>31</sup> See *ibid.*, 143, 176–9, 186–9, 214.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 214

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 161, 177, text no. 17.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, text no. 11, p. 173 n. 2

Throughout appendixes and emendations to *Crisis* Part 3 on the topic of the lifeworld, Husserl comes back again and again to different modes of intersubjectivity as social forms of the lifeworld. These forms are expressed in terms of broader or narrower lifeworld communities such as family, town, *polis*, nation, familiar others called "homecomrades" who belong to a specific homeworld, and alien others who belong to a particular alienworld.<sup>35</sup> Put differently, the problem of intersubjectivity is seen as endemic to the problem of the lifeworld such that Husserl must at least implicitly challenge the significance and feasibility of an egological reduction. He writes, for example, that without the modes of givenness of the other for me, and of others for others, *there would be no lifeworld at all*, and no ground (*Boden*) for idealizations or theoretical constructions.<sup>36</sup>

The intersubjectively constituted lifeworld is the most presupposed of all presuppositions, and is never made thematic in our everyday activities in its transcendently disclosed modalities as "world-horizon" (*Welthorizont*) and "earth-ground" (*Erdboden*), the lifeworld is never given like a thing is.<sup>37</sup> The task of transcendental phenomenology, according to Husserl, is to regard the lifeworld *as* world-horizon and *as* earth-ground, that is, thematically *as such* through the epoche and reduction. This makes the intersubjective accomplishments of the sense "world" problematic in a positive sense, that is, not taken for granted.<sup>38</sup>

3 Division 3 of the *Erganzungsband* concerns manuscripts from the summer of 1936 designated for reworking Part 3 of the main *Crisis* text and for working out the conclusion of the *Crisis* treatise. To this extent, they are similar to those writings in division 2

If one could specify a single underlying theme in the majority of texts making up the third division of the supplementary volume, it would be the notion of "world." On the one hand, Husserl analyzes the concept of world in a *constitutional* regard by examining the manifold ways in which the sense "world" is accepted, from individual active and passive modes of intending things in the world to intersubjective and temporal modes of constituting the world as an anthropological world. Throughout these modalities the world is constituted with the sense natural world, scientific world, ideal world,

<sup>35</sup> *Krisis* 2, 192–8, 200–2. See also text nos. 1, 4, 5

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 182

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 2, 141, 191, 193–4, 217

<sup>38</sup> See *ibid.*, 168, 225, and text no. 18

practical world, everyday world, historical world, cultural world, and so forth.<sup>39</sup> On the other hand, the world is regarded *ontologically* as a totality of facts. As we shall see below, the world viewed as a universe of facts or pure realities is gained by abstracting from the world's internal *teleological* structure<sup>40</sup>

Intimately related to the theme of "world" in these reflections is Husserl's methodological approach. Rather than carrying out Cartesian reflections, which entail bracketing the world "in one stroke" in order to progress from an indubitably given ego, Husserl undertakes *regressive* critical analyses. He does this by *questioning back* to the problem of the world as presupposed in manifold life activities. In carrying out a regressive procedure Husserl demonstrates not only a concern for Kant but also a style of inquiry inspired by Kant<sup>41</sup>

Implicit in this style of regressive questioning back are genetic and generative methods which allow Husserl (1) to examine teleological structures with respect both to the lifeworld and to philosophy (for instance, text nos. 24, 26, 27), and (2) to use anthropology and the anthropological world as a way into transcendental philosophy rather than using psychology and the psyche (for instance, text no. 28). I will take up the teleological structure of the history of philosophy when I summarize the next division, and the text on the anthropological world and generativity in section 4. At this juncture I simply want to note that what differs from the collection of essays that make up division 2 and those presently under discussion has to do with the difference between a static method on the one hand and genetic and generative methods on the other.

As both a *précis* of Husserl's reflections on teleology in this third division and a transition to the theme of teleology in the history of philosophy occupying the fourth division of the *Erganzungsband*, let

<sup>39</sup> See *Krisis 2*, text nos. 22, 26, 28.

<sup>40</sup> See *ibid.*, text nos. 25–6, cf. pp. 140, 305–8.

<sup>41</sup> Reminiscent of his writings in "First Philosophy" we find Husserl addressing the problem of "world," and reflecting on his philosophical predecessor, Kant. See Edmund Husserl, *Erste Philosophie (1923/1924) Erster Teil Kritische Ideengeschichte*, ed. Rudolf Boehm, *Husserliana*, vol. 7 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), and *Erste Philosophie (1923/1924) Zweiter Teil Theorie der Phänomenologischen Reduktion*, ed. Rudolf Boehm, *Husserliana*, vol. 8 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959). See also *Krisis 1*, 105–23, and Beilage 16, *Crisis*, 103–21, and *Krisis 2*, text no. 23. See *Krisis 2*, text 34, "Zur Kritik an den *Ideen I*."

me focus briefly on two interrelated texts, one concerning the teleological structure of the lifeworld and the descriptive sciences (text no. 26), and the other concerning the laws of propagation (text no. 27). Husserl depicts a descriptive science as having two essential traits. First, if science is to be descriptive, it must describe what is *given* in intuition. While one must attend to what is *perceptually presented* in experience, this cannot be all. A merely "static" grasping of things would miss the temporal dimensions of the thing given in experience, dimensions that are also relevant to this thing's sense and to its description.<sup>42</sup>

Descriptive science, argues Husserl, has another side that intrinsically belongs in history. To use his example, if botany is undertaken descriptively, it can only proceed from the perceptual world, but botany became botany through the primordial institution of the first botanists who had grasped botany as a goal and a task, becoming the progenitors, so to speak, of the broader community of botanists. Because this is the case, the present perceptual environing-world that the botanist describes today is implicitly the historical environing-world that refers back to that historical time of the first botanists, as they experienced it, and to what they saw in plants to describe.<sup>43</sup>

Carrying out such a descriptive enterprise, however, is not the mere appropriation of what was set forth. Instead, the botanist, to stay with the same example, judges *critically* what was experienced in the earlier generations. Such a critique is not only directed towards the past, but also towards the future, that is, to exfoliating the sense of botany in order to improve upon it, or reform it according to its sense *within* experience. Accordingly, not only does descriptive science entail present experience, but also historical "responsible critique" which is immanent and simultaneously future oriented.<sup>44</sup> Descriptive science, therefore, is not merely "descriptive," but also "normative" because it strives to direct the development of sense.<sup>45</sup>

Critique is necessary for science understood in its historical framework because in order to classify something, its dynamic internal sense must also be understood. As Husserl writes, "classification is

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<sup>42</sup> This implies that even ontology for Husserl is guided by a teleological understanding of its matters. In this case, eidetic analyses would proceed by grasping the *style* of a thing as *exemplary*. See note 73 below.

<sup>43</sup> *Krisis* 2, 312.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 313–14.

<sup>45</sup> It is not (yet) normative in an ethical regard, however.

not merely a logical game of concepts, but a law of teleology."<sup>46</sup> Such a law of teleology is taken up briefly by Husserl under the rubric of the law of propagation (*Fortpflanzung*). To do this Husserl implicitly draws on his analyses from 1917 to 1921 concerning normality and abnormality.<sup>47</sup>

Correlative to a descriptive science which attempts to grasp its "object" in its becoming is the internal teleological movement of the object itself being described. While Husserl does investigate normality and abnormality on various levels of sense constitution, restricting it at times to an individual sense organ, a teleologically normal living being is only possible in a teleological whole of such beings, namely, a species.<sup>48</sup> As Husserl writes elsewhere, normality occurs in the context of a species such that one cannot say, for instance, that eagle normality is more or less normal than human normality.<sup>49</sup>

Normality is essentially an intersubjective notion, not defined in advance, and is the very *relation* of living beings to their environing-world and to other living beings of the same type. As a relational concept, normality is a constitutional notion (not therapeutic or psychological), characterizing those modes of sense-formation that are concordant, optimal, typical, and familiar. The crucial point Husserl wants to examine in the text under discussion concerns the emergence of a new concordant and optimal order with a *unique* teleological sense. Therefore, out of living beings of a particular species a being of a new kind can emerge with a different relation to its environing-world and to its co-beings. This is what Husserl calls *Urzeugung* or "primordial generation."<sup>50</sup> Certainly the teleological sense does delineate the arena within which actions have sense for a particular species. This is simply to say that the chances for meaningful interaction are better when activities are "normal" or in accordance with the guiding sense. From this perspective, action that deviates from the "normal" can be called constitutionally "abnormal."

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<sup>46</sup> *Krisis* 2, 320

<sup>47</sup> These are entitled "Urkonstitution," or "Primordial Constitution," and are found in the D 13 group

<sup>48</sup> *Krisis* 2, 317

<sup>49</sup> See manuscript D 13 XII, 12 "Die Normalität bezieht sich auf die Spezies." See also *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität*, Husserliana, vol. 15, pp. 155, 159

<sup>50</sup> Primordial generation does not take place, according to Husserl, in a single individual. See *Krisis* 2, 317, 319

Thus abnormality, however, can institute a new “concrete teleological sense,” and thus a new normality *despite* the fact that it simultaneously refers back to the old order. Husserl writes that “the primordial institution of wolf means that this abnormality in the earlier generation of the species stably creates the new teleology ‘wolf’ through the stability of the new teleological circumstances.”<sup>51</sup> With the emergence of a new teleology concretized in a new species, we have a coexistence of species and normalities, and perhaps also a conflict of normal orders which are not determined in advance and are still in the process of becoming. From the perspective of the “previous” order, the new sense is a departure; from the perspective of the new order it is both a concordant and optimal rival at the same time that it is the latter’s fulfillment.

The discussion of teleology in the lifeworld, of the law of propagation, and of the task of descriptive science is important not only for the preeminent theme of division 4 of *Husserliana* 29, but also for the *Crisis* project in general. What is at stake is a descriptive science called “transcendental philosophy,” on the one hand, and humanity, on the other. By critically examining the primordial institution of philosophy and its teleological sense, and by interpreting the immanent sense of humanity, transcendental philosophy, according to Husserl, is in a position to realize the intention of the sense “philosophy,” and to help direct the course of humanity through a reform of its original sense. In this regard, transcendental philosophy is not only descriptive but also normative.

4 In the longest contribution to the *Crisis* supplementary volume, which is included in division 4 among other pieces composed between January and the summer of 1937, Husserl treats the notion of teleology in the history of philosophy. Judging from the thematic prospectus for Part 5 of the *Crisis*—the task of philosophy as the self-responsibility of humanity—the extended reflections included in this piece would most likely have occupied the final part of the *Crisis*.<sup>52</sup> When reviewing this division, therefore, I will also be pointing to the topic of *Crisis* Part 5.

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<sup>51</sup> *Krisis* 2, 319.

<sup>52</sup> See Smid, *Krisis* 2, “Einleitung des Herausgebers,” lviii, lxi–lxiii. Relevant to this theme also are some of the Beilagen from *Krisis* 1, namely, Beilagen 3, 13, 18, and 24. Beilage 3 is included in the English edition, *Crisis*, as appendix 6.

Philosophy, according to Husserl, is a possibility humanity has of being self-responsible. To this extent, the interpretation of the history of philosophy is an interpretation of the history of humanity becoming self-responsible. One can view this history purely descriptively, that is, simply as a history of *facts* (*Tatsachen*); this is a necessary, first approach, Husserl contends, as long as one does not focus one-sidedly on it as a "fact-fanatic."<sup>53</sup> Within this history of facts or "outer-historicity" there lies a hidden "inner" teleological unity, an "immanent historicity" that runs through the history of philosophy even though one may never encounter it as such.<sup>54</sup> Simply by living in a philosophical tradition, or by appropriating the task of philosophy, one appropriates its goals, its anticipations, and hence, at least naively, its teleological sense. This is one reason why, for Husserl, the history of philosophy is never merely a matter of ascertaining facts or discussing historical figures and their texts. Philosophy, particularly the history of philosophy, is concerned with developing philosophy's very sense, and thus becoming responsible for the development of humanity.<sup>55</sup>

Grasping the teleological sense operative in the history of philosophy is an interpretive process that is made possible by a special "teleological-historical" reflection which is a questioning back (*Rückfrage*). In light of his new "historical way," Husserl criticizes his *Ideas I*, which lacked an historical questioning back, because in it he allowed the historicity of the philosophical task to function in and through his observations, but without his making explicit the inner historicity of philosophy in doing so.<sup>56</sup> What enables one to reactivate the sense of the philosophical task is not the reawakening of its primordial sense through a mere genetic, *personal* memory (*Erinnerung*), but through a social, historical, or generative memory, remembrance (*Gedachtnis*). Remembrance as generative memory is an "awakening of the historical past in the community" through historical reflection (*Besinnung*) as a reflecting back (*Rückbesinnung*).<sup>57</sup>

Husserl maintains that philosophy is the idea of a unitary task that has been handed down intersubjectively from certain "first philosophers" who made the realization of philosophy their life's vocation. Through an attitude of openness to what is other or alien, philosophy

<sup>53</sup> See *Krisis* 2, 363, 396, 403, 406

<sup>54</sup> See *ibid*, 396, 405, 417

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid*, 373, 396, 401

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid*, 399–403, and text no. 34

<sup>57</sup> See *ibid*, text no. 30, and pp. 344–5, 382

was primordially instituted with the Greeks as a fully new universal wonder or *thaumazein*, and as a revolution in the sense-formation of the world: philosophy strove to overcome the intentional interestedness and its limited ties to a particular world in favor of disclosing the world or Being as a whole in truth and knowledge<sup>58</sup> Willing or intending the one world through a suspension of relative beliefs and interests instigated, in turn, a *theoretical task*, a futural idea of philosophy guiding present actions<sup>59</sup>

Such an institution of the task of philosophy is what Husserl calls an "absolute" primordial institution and can be distinguished from what he refers to in another text of this fourth division as a "relative" primordial institution (text no 33) By the former Husserl understands, for example, the idea of philosophy as instituted by the Greeks, as an example of the latter he cites the "new primordial institution" of philosophy that took place with Descartes and hence the modern idea of philosophy.<sup>60</sup>

Where the primordial institution is new but also relative, Husserl suggests that we have a transformed institution (*Umstiftung*) of sense. Therefore, while we can see in Kant the primordial institution of transcendental philosophy, the new institution of sense is simultaneously a fulfillment and transformation of the ancient idea of philosophy<sup>61</sup> Because the sense of philosophy undergoes transformation, philosophy is compared to artwork, and characterized precisely as an infinite work (*Werk*) in the process of becoming; it is an integral whole that takes up past accomplishments in the form of a new sense structure<sup>62</sup>

The very possibility of an *Umstiftung* means that teleological sense is *open* and *historical*. On the one hand, a telos becomes a *telos* when it is instituted through historical *facts* or events; hence Husserl alludes to Goethe's famous phrase, "in the beginning was the deed."<sup>63</sup> From that actual institution the present deed already reached beyond itself, sketching possibilities for its fulfillment and guiding the present actions from the futural telos the teleological sense of philosophy is a finite beginning of an infinite task for future generations.

<sup>58</sup> *Krisis* 2, 363, 388

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid* , 366–70, 386–9, 390–2

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid* , 399, 420, and text no 33.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid* , 417, 419–20

<sup>62</sup> See *ibid* , text no 24, esp p 287, and see p 408

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid* , 399



On the other hand, the anticipated telos is neither given in advance nor fulfilled by a blind drive. What is instituted is only a vague directedness, a "first inkling," such that the telos is something still to be completed. In the case of Descartes, there is a *new* formation of philosophy that continues the same idea of philosophy, even if unclearly. Moreover, the idea of philosophy did not trap Descartes either. Husserl maintains that a sense only functions teleologically if it *becomes* a teleology, that is, if we *make* it a teleology by reawakening it through active participation.<sup>64</sup> Accordingly, it can also become a "dead historical acquisition" in the sense that it is "never again renewed originally"; whether through thoughtlessness or the technologizing of method peculiar to the exact sciences, its sense can be lost in favor of a surrogate sense.<sup>65</sup> While Husserl does not state it in the context of these reflections, such a "surrogate" sense would also have to be viewed as a possible *Urzeugung*, that is, as the positive possibility of primordially generating a new sense.

Making a teleology a teleology entails a critical relation to the history of philosophy as a stock of presuppositions. Since the sense of philosophy's task is not given once and for all, and since it undergoes transformation and is thus contingent, it requires a critical reflection for its development—what Husserl refers to as an immanent critique. Without such a critical relation to the history of philosophy there simply would not be philosophy, for there would be no responsibility for the emergence of a philosophical task, which is the self-responsibility of humanity. In the final analysis phenomenology becomes for Husserl an *ethical* project as normative critique.<sup>66</sup>

#### IV

In the previous section I provided a schematic overview of the new supplementary volume's content, selectively highlighting the diverse themes presented in the four divisions which make up Husserliana 29. On the basis of these supplementary writings, I would like to suggest the direction in which Husserl might have continued his *Crisis* reflections. In particular, since it is highly probable that the topic of

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<sup>64</sup> See *Krisis* 2, 397–403, 405, 408

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, text no. 3, p. 35, and see p. 149

<sup>66</sup> See *ibid.*, 415–20, and *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922–1937)*

Part 5 would have at least included the material from division 4 on self-reflection (*Selbstbesinnung*), teleology, and the responsibility for humanity just discussed, I would like to focus on the more ambiguous and more elusive themes of Part 4.

In addition to an array of texts from the first division I will draw primarily on two texts, one from division 2 entitled "The Ontology of the Lifeworld and the Concrete Sciences" (text no. 11, December 1935), and another included in division 3, "The Anthropological World" (text no. 28, August 1936). In doing thus I will first discuss a lifeworld ontology and the delimitation of a privileged mundane science, anthropology. Second, I will take up the constitutional matter of generativity disclosed through this mundane science (anthropology) as a regressive leading clue to transcendental historicity and transcendental intersubjectivity pursued in a generative phenomenology. Only within the context of a generative phenomenology can the teleology of history and the philosophical task of responsibility for humanity be at all meaningful. Let me emphasize that this is a *systematic* interpretation of these ideas, and does not necessarily follow the chronological order in which they were written or edited.

According to the proposal for Part 4 of the *Crisis*, Husserl was to continue the direction of his reflections by beginning to articulate the relation of the particular sciences to a unifying transcendental philosophy. This was to be developed (1) by taking the particular sciences such as psychology, biology (and anthropology) as examples of the relation between mundane and phenomenological problems; (2) by conducting an ontology of the lifeworld and a phenomenology of idealization, and (3) by describing the "unity" of science as the unity of a universal correlative-system. For reasons which will become clearer below, an ontology of the lifeworld is the most fundamental of these projects.

In the main *Crisis* text Husserl briefly alluded to an ontology of the lifeworld as the "great task of a pure theory of essence of the lifeworld," that is, as the general doctrine of formal and material essences of *onta*, whereby the world is initially understood as the totality or universe of these lifeworldly beings.<sup>67</sup> The task of disclosing lifeworldly invariant structures, essential types, and so forth, is carried out, Husserl specifies, in the "natural attitude" *without* transcendental

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<sup>67</sup> *Crisis* 2, 144–5

interest.<sup>68</sup> The main text of the *Crisis* thus does offer us a glimpse into the problematic of a lifeworld ontology, but because it is so fleeting, it is easy to miss the profound implications it has for other sciences, and for its relation to transcendental phenomenology. The import of its function can be gleaned from two much more detailed manuscripts included in the supplementary *Crisis* edition.<sup>69</sup>

Where a lifeworld ontology is concerned, Husserl begins by citing two types of idealization that have dominated our Western world-view. The function of the first idealization, which Husserl locates in ancient Greece, can be gauged by its two consequences. First, by idealizing our experience and capabilities, the finite environing-world (*peras*) is transformed into a world *in infinitum*. This provokes a further transformation. The Earth as earth-ground, *Gaea*, which is in principle not experienced as an object, loses its formless character: the first view of nature, which had understood the *apeira* mythically as godly powers from which *things* had their origin, is inverted such that Earth becomes a disempowered, mere finite thing among things.<sup>70</sup> The second idealization is more familiar to us from the main *Crisis* work. It concerns the process of the mathematization of nature, inaugurated by the Modern technologies of Galileo and creating a homogenized infinite world.<sup>71</sup>

With respect to these idealizations the task of an ontology of the lifeworld is twofold. First, it can rehabilitate both the subjective-relative character of experience, which is rooted in finite environing-worlds, and it can disclose the world as a whole or a universe of finite beings. Second, it can sketch out a different way to overcome the subjective-relative character of experience in favor of common structures of experience. Thus, rather than quantifying experience and abstracting from it in order to reach universal "objective" truths, a lifeworld ontology goes back to the world as a concrete reality and examines its *invariant styles* or *typicalities*. It does this through eidetic analyses that seize on an *exemplary* style or type exhibited in the concrete object and to which the particular object is bound as to its essence.<sup>72</sup> Determining the a priori structures of existence requires

<sup>68</sup> *Krisis* 2, 176

<sup>69</sup> Texts nos. 11 and 28, which were initially composed as drafts for the conclusion to Part 3 of the *Crisis*

<sup>70</sup> *Krisis* 2, 141. See also footnote 78 below

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 141–4. See also *Krisis* 1, esp. §9, *Crisis*, §9

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 145, 151

"a long path of reflection," and demands a constant questioning after the conditions of the possibility of identity and how this identity is open.<sup>73</sup>

The ultimate identity for a lifeworld ontology is the world as a universe of concrete beings. This notion of world stands in contrast to the conception of world that the positive sciences posit, "the mathematically idealized spatio-temporal infinite world."<sup>74</sup> Because a lifeworld ontology functions as the basis from which one can undertake other sciences of being, Husserl considers it to be more than "a" fundamental ontology. As a probable barb to Heidegger, Husserl writes that "the ontology of the (not yet idealized) lifeworld precedes all ontologies as the true fundamental ontology."<sup>75</sup>

The function of a lifeworld ontology as a search after invariant, universal structures of being and of the world as a whole is related to a further point. When the sciences proceed by the method of quantification they fail to inquire into the original accomplishment of mathematical idealization as a *method*, and likewise take for granted the results of their analyses. For example, physics, charges Husserl, regards nature as a collection of physical bodies (*Körper*), sciences of the body treat the body as if it were, too, a mere physical thing (*Körper*) in a field of physicalistic causality, and empirical psychology "measures" processes of the psyche, resulting either in a reductionist

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<sup>73</sup> The determination of lifeworld a priori also has to be mixed with constitutive analyses. For example, by constituting itself through *Empfindnisse* (as in the process of touching and being touched), the lived-body intrinsically differentiates itself from, say, the constitution of the sense stone. See *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie Zweites Buch* (hereafter, "*Ideen II*"), ed. Marly Biemel, Husserliana, vol. 4 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952), 143–51, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy Second Book Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution* (hereafter, "*Ideas II*"), trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989), 151–9.

See also *Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie Drittes Buch*, ed. Marly Biemel, Husserliana, vol. 5 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), §§18–20, pp. 86–9, *Phenomenology and the Foundation of the Sciences Third Book Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, trans. Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980), §§18–20, pp. 73–7. Here Husserl explained the process of discerning essences as a "mixed" phenomenology and ontology. It is also described as a dual process of "elucidation" and "clarification." See also *Krisis* 2, 324, 327.

<sup>74</sup> *Krisis* 2, 155.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 151.

determinism or in an abstract spiritualism. The social and political sciences simply presuppose and project this model of the mathematized body onto a communal level; the "body politic" only exacerbates the problem. In short, both the subject matter and the methods that the diverse sciences employ presuppose a style of mathematization.

Husserl does not want to throw the baby out with the bath water, as it were, by relinquishing physics, psychology or political science; rather, he wishes to submit them to a critical evaluation by determining anew the a priori regions of investigation.<sup>76</sup> Most generally, a lifeworld ontology yields *regional* eidetic analyses or regional ontologies that enable one to arrive at *essential* structures of existence around which the particular sciences can develop free of the bias of quantification and objectivism. Husserl began such a regional investigation in his *Ideas II*, which initially examined the regional a prioris, nature, psychophysical being, and spirit.

A lifeworld ontology is the "fundamental science for all sciences of the world," because elucidating the essential structures of existence codetermines the respective sciences. Husserl writes, "the ideal would be thus a universal science of the world (under the new formation of the primordial concept of philosophy) in concrete particular sciences [*Einzelwissenschaften*], divided according to the divisions, won a priori, of the concrete world in its essential regions; in these regional sciences [one is] constantly guided by the entirely [and] systematically interpreted a priori of the world as the totality of concrete beings."<sup>77</sup> Guided by a lifeworld ontology, biology, for instance, would replace physicalism by considering the essential interrelation of psychic life in the lived-body (*Leib*) as well as how the lived-body is open; it would not regard animal life (which includes for him human life) as a physical body with a coincidental soul that arbitrarily happens to occupy the Earth.<sup>78</sup>

Husserl does refer to biology and psychology as sciences that are founded in a lifeworld ontology, but they are not the most fundamental of the particular sciences. This comes as somewhat of a surprise

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<sup>76</sup> *Krisis* 2, 145–8, 321–4

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 147

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, 149, 151. On biology see *Krisis* 1, Beilage 23. In this connection see also Edmund Husserl, "Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum phänomenologischen Ursprung der Raumlichkeit der Natur" in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), 307–25.

given Husserl's avowed preoccupation with psychology and the privileged place it had held for so long as a way into transcendental phenomenology, even in Part 3 of the *Crisis*. What science should precede even psychology? The answer, suggested in Husserl's analyses, is anthropology.<sup>79</sup> There are two basic reasons why anthropology precedes psychology, not to mention the other sciences. The first reason concerns the "fundamental concepts" of normality and abnormality, the second concerns anthropology as a leading clue to the phenomenological or *constitutive* matter of "generativity."

Normality and abnormality, as I have alluded to above, are notions that describe the constitution of our experiences of objects, the world, and ourselves as concordant and discordant, optimal and nonoptimal, typical and atypical, familiar and unfamiliar. They are not based on averageness, rather averageness is a consequence of normality and abnormality. The constitutional problems of normality and abnormality are related to an ontology insofar as they concern, at heart, the problem of identity and difference—that is, how something can be identical for us, and common to us, because of and despite diverse ruptures over time. It is not necessary, nor possible at this time, to engage in an extended discussion of these notions here.<sup>80</sup> Important to note is that anthropology is privileged because it concerns human normality and abnormality. Human normality is a necessary starting point for Husserl because there is no normal nature in and of itself, nor are there eternal standards against which humans are to be measured. Normality and abnormality arise through a *lived relation* with the world and others, and it is from and through our lived human normality or abnormality that we as humans can encounter the normality and abnormality of other species incommensurate with our own.<sup>81</sup>

One may object, however, that psychology too, indeed psychology first and foremost, treats normality and abnormality. The first part of this statement is certainly true, namely, that factually psychology does concern itself with normality and abnormality. In fact, we are most familiar with these problems from psychology. But to reassert this familiarity as a justification for precedence would only serve to reinforce our same inveterate assumptions. It would not inquire into *how*

<sup>79</sup> See *Krisis* 2, 157.

<sup>80</sup> See Anthony Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Explorations in Generative Phenomenology* (in preparation), esp. div. 3.

<sup>81</sup> See *Krisis* 2, 157–60.

psychology approaches its field of problems, nor would it articulate the parameters within which psychology takes up the problems of normality and abnormality

Psychology, even phenomenological psychology, is focused on the *individual* subject or the *individual* psyche, and at most treats a contemporaneous field of individuals, as in "mass psychology." In Husserl's language, its strictures are necessarily the *genesis* of individuals within the parameters of birth and death. Accordingly, psychology belongs within the realm of a *genetic* analysis.<sup>82</sup> Genesis, however, is not the ultimate and most concrete mode of becoming, and genetic phenomenology is not the final court for determining normality and abnormality. First, an individual can only be said to be "normal," in Husserl's sense, in and by virtue of a normal community or lifeworld.<sup>83</sup> In his treatise on anthropology Husserl writes, "the a priori prescribes that the world can only be identical for us in such a way that it is given to us as a normally appearing world of a normal *subject-community*, from which everyone can already have his normality and abnormality."<sup>84</sup> Anthropology has an advantage over psychology because it begins with community and does not proceed, as psychology does, on the basis of individual normality and abnormality, either treating the individual as isolated from community, or then expanding this individual normality to a community as a collection of individual normal subjects.<sup>85</sup> Moreover, anthropology examines lifeworld communities *over the generations* and in terms of their geo-historical *environmenting-worlds*.

I think there is good sense in Husserl's designation of anthropology as a fundamental science for other sciences, whether or not he had specific examples in mind. In lieu of his silence, let me offer just one example in support of the direction of Husserl's thought. It will concern the relation of anthropology to physiology. If we in the West

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<sup>82</sup> See *Zur Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (Husserliana, vol. 14), Beilage 1 from 1921, and *Zur Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (Husserliana, vol. 15), 619.

<sup>83</sup> *Zur Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (Husserliana, vol. 15), 142, 155.

<sup>84</sup> *Krisis* 2, 323 (emphasis added), and pp. 324–7.

<sup>85</sup> The difference between anthropology and psychology was not specified in an earlier (1931) article on anthropology by Husserl entitled "Phänomenologie und Anthropologie," in *Aufsätze und Vorträge (1922–1937)*, 164–81. Like Kant, Husserl virtually equated anthropology with psychology, although there are hints of anthropology's distinctiveness.

were to examine the phenomenon of "sickle-cell" merely physiologically, we might conclude that it is an abnormal blood cell that enables the substitution of a single amino acid in the hemoglobin protein of "normal" red blood cells, starving various regions of the body of oxygen. But if we view the sickle-cell allele anthropologically, that is, in its *relational context*, it might be understood differently. Instead of being an abnormality that needs to be "corrected" according to a certain physiological type, it would be understood as a normal *qua* optimal development for certain peoples as a resistance to deadly forms of malaria in tropical Africa. So, through cultural and physical anthropology, we would have to reevaluate sickle-cell physiologically, we would not "treat" an abstract sickle-cell allele, but regard the relations of people who exhibit a qualitatively distinct sickle-cell trait to their normal worlds.

Anthropology is distinctive because it regards normality and abnormality as essentially intersubjective notions and because it begins with an intersubjective setting in a way that psychology (and physiology) do not. It does not just bear on individual facticity, but on geo-social history and traditions. Beginning from the context of social-historical normality and abnormality in anthropology, one can then move to individual normality and abnormality (psychologically, physiologically, biologically, and so forth) in concrete relations of individuals to their environing-worlds and cosubjects.<sup>86</sup>

This brings me both to the second reason why anthropology takes the lead as a mundane science, and to the second main theme of this section, namely, generativity. It is also at this point that we have to move from predominantly ontological and "natural" concerns to predominantly phenomenological ones. I mentioned at the outset of this section that Husserl characterized an ontology of the lifeworld as a great task. In the space of just a few lines from this designation, Husserl speaks of a "very much greater task" that concerns a lifeworld ontology, but nevertheless goes beyond it.<sup>87</sup> This greater task is a transcendental phenomenology of the lifeworld. It evaluates the matters exposed in a lifeworld ontology through a "*constitutive* questing back."<sup>88</sup> Although a lifeworld ontology works hand in hand with a

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<sup>86</sup> See *Krisis* 2, 20–2.

<sup>87</sup> *Krisis* 1, 145.

<sup>88</sup> *Krisis* 2, 152, 173, 327, 329.



constitutive analysis, it itself is mundane because it presupposes the beings it describes

Anthropology, conducted also as an ontology, presents us with diverse *structures* of human existence in its environing-world. These structures include cultural phenomena such as rituals, social habits, language, landscape, traditions, stories, myths, and so forth, that have been handed down through the generations. In anthropology, however, the constitutive import of these aspects of geo-socio-historical life are not grasped. According to Husserl, it is through transcendental phenomenology that the anthropological world is disclosed in its *constitutive* dimensions. Put differently, transcendental phenomenology does not describe *what* the anthropological world *is*, but the *ways* in which the anthropological world takes on sense.<sup>89</sup> The various ways in which the anthropological world is constituted is captured by Husserl's locution, "generativity" *Generativität* (*Generativität*) is the process of historical, intersubjective movement over the generations, thus literally as the process of "generation" The primary loci of this generational movement are normal and abnormal geo-historical lifeworlds, or what Husserl calls in a constitutional regard, respectively, "homeworld" (*Heimwelt*) and "alienworld" (*Fremdwelt*).<sup>90</sup>

With anthropology guiding the constitutive problematic, one does not begin with an egological reduction but with geo-historical intersubjectivity. In this new generative perspective the phenomena of birth and death, just to cite one example, can be integrated into a *constitutive* phenomenology. If psychology functions as a clue to a genetic phenomenology of the individual, then indeed birth and death can "make no sense," since before birth and after death the individual subject does not constitute itself, others, or the world.<sup>91</sup> Within a

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<sup>89</sup> See *Krisis* 2, 329–31

<sup>90</sup> The problem of generativity and generative matters is expressed throughout Husserl's writings in the 1930s, preceding and including the *Crisis* manuscripts. In these writings he only hints at a novel generative dimension of phenomenology that goes beyond a genetic method. For a detailed discussion of generative phenomenology, generativity, and their systematic relation to a phenomenology of the social world, see Steinbock, *Home and Beyond*, esp. div. 4.

<sup>91</sup> See *Krisis* 2, 333, 337–8. See also *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918–1926, ed. M. Fleischer, Husserliana, vol. 11 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 377–81.

generative phenomenology, however, the birth and death of an individual are integrated into the sense formation of an ongoing shared tradition that extends generationally out of which and into which the individual dies and is born. The "generative framework" is one reason why communication becomes a constitutive feature in the constitution of a shared world, and why community must be constituted beyond the phenomenon of *Einfühlung*.<sup>92</sup>

Such a shift in phenomenology towards generative constitution occurs because now the scope of phenomenological description is not merely the unity of a life, but the "unity of a tradition," the "unity of historicity" bound to specific geographical territories.<sup>93</sup> Husserl writes, "the *most original* lifeworldly sense is the sense of a historical community, for instance, a community living together *generatively* in a people with a tradition."<sup>94</sup> Those coparticipating in this homeworld (which sometimes for Husserl includes animals) make up a "community of homecomrades" (*Heimgenossenschaft*) and are internally distinguished from those belonging to an alien home community or an alienworld.<sup>95</sup>

By disclosing the anthropological world normatively and constitutively in the co-relative structure, homeworld and alienworld, Husserl is able to extend the dimension of sense constitution beyond constituting subjectivity to constituting intersubjectivity. In this case, however, transcendental intersubjectivity becomes broader than a psychological account precisely as a living "tradition." Now sense or validity is said to stem from a home tradition, and not from consciousness.<sup>96</sup> Accordingly, individual sense constitution is not interpreted as the animation of *hyle*, but as the *appropriation* (*Übernahme, Aufnahme*) of pre-given sense which is bequeathed through a tradition. This takes the form of a personal or communal appropriation of sense which we take up as our own, and in taking it up as our own, continue a history as our living tradition. Some modes of appropriation include narrative story telling, learning a language, work, rituals of initiation, style of dress, communal celebrations, and shared habits.

<sup>92</sup> See *Zur Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (Husserliana, vol. 15), 171–2, 472–3, and *Krisis* 2, 87–9, 332–5.

<sup>93</sup> See, for example, *Krisis* 2, 9, 16, 57, 60, 258.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, 211 (emphases added).

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 11, 42, 63, 198–201.

<sup>96</sup> See *ibid.*, 43 and *Zur Phanomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (Husserliana, vol. 15), 433.

Appropriating a tradition is more than merely understanding it, for an alien subject can always understand our tradition without taking it up.<sup>97</sup> On the other hand, appropriation is not the ultimate mode of co-constitution, for we can live in a homeworld and contribute to its de-generation by *merely* taking over its sense uncritically. Required for *generative* co-constitution is a critical relation to our tradition. What enables us to take up such a critical relation of appropriation? For Husserl, the critique of our own world issues from various encounters with alienworlds. Openness to what is alien cannot be a matter of expanding our homeworld simply, but precisely the opportunity to pursue critical self-reflections, displacing and replacing the home in an irreducible dialogical context.<sup>98</sup> One way of taking up this critical task of generative co-constitution, we have seen, is as a philosophical task, and in particular, as a way of examining historically the teleological sense of our tradition.

In the earlier *Crisis* collection Husserl employed the term *einströmen*, or "flowing (back) into," to refer to all accomplishing activities, scientific as well as extrascientific interests, that flow back into the lifeworld and constitute it as "ground" (*Boden*) for future activities.<sup>99</sup> In the present collection the term is applied significantly to "the transcendental." That is, Husserl discusses the "mundanization of the transcendental" (*Verweltlichung des Transzendentalen*), a mundanization that even includes "phenomenologizing activities" (*phanomenologisierenden Aktivitäten*) themselves.<sup>100</sup> This leads Husserl into the generative problems of "transcendental historicity" and of "transcendental, constituting intersubjectivity." An implication of this "flowing into" is that the phenomenologist takes a critical stance within various homeworlds and in relation to alienworlds as a participation in an ongoing generative process. For Husserl, this is a matter of self-responsibility as the responsibility towards humanity. accordingly, philosophy as critical becomes a normative task as an

<sup>97</sup> *Krisis* 2, 13–4, 40, 373

<sup>98</sup> See especially *ibid.*, 7, 14–5, 41, 224–5, 235, 243, and see *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* (Husserliana, vol. 15), 220–1

<sup>99</sup> See *Krisis* 1, 141 n. 1; cf. pp. 208–9, 211, 214, 268

<sup>100</sup> *Krisis* 2, 79–80, from text no. 7. The problem of mundanization of the transcendental or "secondary mundanization" is a major theme in the sixth Cartesian Meditation. See Eugen Fink, *Sechste cartesiansche Meditation. Teil 1. Die Idee einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre*, ed. Hans Ebeling, Jann Holl and Guy van Kerckhoven (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988)

*ethical* project. That there may be many ways of becoming more ethically human is certainly entailed by Husserl's analyses of normality, abnormality, and teleology, if it is not explicitly stated by Husserl. In any case, such an ethical responsibility is the sense in which Husserl speaks of the philosopher as the "functionary" of humanity.

Let me conclude by simply emphasizing the relation of Part 4 of the *Crisis*, as I have reconfigured it here, to the project of Part 5. Based largely on material presented in the new supplementary *Crisis* volume, I have suggested that a certain *systematic* movement belongs to the incomplete Part 4 of the *Crisis*. The direction is roughly this: it begins with an ontology of the lifeworld, extends through a science of the anthropological world *via* the concepts of normality and abnormality, and concludes with a transcendental phenomenology of generative sense constitution. It is only after having clarified generative sense constitution, which is geo-social-historical movement, that the questions involved with a critical and responsible *Besinnung* on the teleology (or teleologies) of human history can be posed. Part 4, then, would set up the problem of and the necessity for a critical generative undertaking which is a communal enterprise, executed historically-teleologically, and descriptively-normatively. This Husserl understood as the task of philosophers, taking up the responsibility for the generation of humanity. It is precisely this latter topic, as we have seen, that would have occupied Part 5 of Husserl's *Crisis* meditations.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> I would like to acknowledge the Husserl Archives at Leuven, and in particular, Professor Samuel Ijsseling, for his kind permission to consult and to cite Husserl's unpublished manuscripts.

## JOHN RAWLS, *POLITICAL LIBERALISM*

RUSSELL HITTINGER

### I

IN *A Theory of Justice* (1971), John Rawls deployed a social contract theory to vindicate liberal political principles of civil liberty and distributive justice without appeal to a utilitarian calculus. Rawls described his conception of political justice as “justice as fairness.” Rational contractors, deliberating behind a “veil of ignorance,” agree to a scheme of justice prior to knowing how the scheme materially affects their individual interests or conceptions of moral or nonmoral good(s).<sup>1</sup> Perhaps the most striking and certainly one of the most controversial features of Rawls’s *Theory* was his argument that “the right” subordinates (for purposes of the political order) not only material interests in the economic sphere, but also individuals’ fully considered conceptions of the moral good, human flourishing, and final ends.<sup>2</sup> Hence, Rawls’s theory of justice was meant to be a systematic alternative both to the economic pragmatism of other modern contract theorists as well as to the classical tradition of perfectionism in political theory.

This long-awaited sequel consists of chapters based in part upon lectures and published work over the past two decades. *Political Liberalism*, however, is not simply a collection of essays.<sup>3</sup> Rawls notes that “I reached a clear understanding of political liberalism—or so I think—only in the past few years” (p. xxxi). Therefore, the book does not just refine and correct the doctrine in *Theory* but gives an entirely new focus to the project. He calls this new focus “political liberalism.”

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<sup>1</sup> John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (hereafter, “*Theory*”) (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1971), 12.

<sup>2</sup> *Theory*, 30–2, 325–9.

<sup>3</sup> John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 401 pp. All parenthetical references in the text are to this work.

Rawls explains that a "serious" shortcoming of *Theory* was his failure to adequately distinguish between "a moral doctrine of justice general in scope" and "a strictly political conception of justice" (p. xv). If justice as fairness is based upon a general moral theory, then it would seem that citizens must endorse a comprehensive philosophical doctrine in order to reach consensus about the principles which ought to inform the institutions of the polity. He now points out that this is an impractical expectation.

The fact that a doctrine of justice contains a "thin" understanding of moral values, and the fact that it stipulates general moral reasons why perfectionist values must be excluded from the principles and institutions of the political order, does not make the doctrine less "comprehensive" (in the sense given to this term in *Political Liberalism*).<sup>4</sup> For example, in comparison to Plato or Hegel, Ronald Dworkin's work represents a relatively "thin" and certainly "anti-perfectionist" account of justice. Rawls correctly observes, however, that Dworkin treats justice according to a general theory of moral values. Accordingly the constraints placed upon "public reason" are drawn from the ethical conception of values. To this extent, Dworkin's liberalism is "comprehensive."<sup>5</sup> So, too, was *Theory*.

For two decades friends and foes of *Theory* read it as a more or less complete "liberal" conception of justice that could compete with other more or less complete theories of the subject. Indeed, almost immediately upon its publication there emerged a considerable body of secondary literature, purporting to detect or develop the implicit ontology and epistemology of *Theory* in order to make it more serviceable as a comprehensive account of justice.<sup>6</sup> Yet Rawls also had in mind a narrower goal for *Theory*, which was to show how rational agents can reach consensus about the principles of justice for the purpose of political institutions. Rawls now acknowledges that there is

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<sup>4</sup> "[A moral conception] is comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole" (p. 13).

<sup>5</sup> Rawls is referring specifically to Dworkin's Tanner Lectures, *Foundations of Liberal Equality* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1990). Rawls does not object to Dworkin's view. Rather, he distinguishes it from the strictly political conception of justice defended in this book (p. 211).

<sup>6</sup> See, for example, Jeffrey Reiman, *Justice and Modern Moral Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

something “unrealistic” about the possibility of reaching a practical consensus when the comprehensive theory itself affords occasion for dispute (p. xvii).

A modern democratic society, he notes, “is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (p. xvi). Since no one of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally, we cannot expect unanimity. *Theory*, he admits, did not reckon adequately with the fact of reasonable pluralism—including a pluralism of doctrines which express or support political liberalism.

*Political Liberalism* does not abandon the main question of *Theory*. What are the fair terms of social cooperation between citizens who are free and equal? Nor does it depart from the earlier work’s principles. The rational contractors continue, in the new account, to affirm two principles of justice: (1) that each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme for all, (2) that social and economic inequalities must accord with conditions of fair equality of opportunity with respect to offices and positions, and must be to the benefit of the least advantaged members of society (pp. 5–6). These principles are entitled to govern the distribution of political benefits and burdens. No basic liberty can be restricted or denied solely because of our estimation of the public utilities, or because of our understanding of perfectionist values (p. 292). All of this is left intact (p. 7).

What changes is the background of the question, which is at once historical and political. “How is it possible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines may live together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime? What is the structure and content of a political conception that can gain the support of such an overlapping consensus?” (p. xvii). The ideas discussed in *Theory*—for instance, the priority of the right over the good, and the primary goods protected and distributed by the principles of justice—must become “political ideas” (p. 203).

They become “political ideas” insofar as the original position is now modeled on the shared fund of implicitly recognized ideas and principles of a democratic polity.<sup>7</sup> The original position is still hypothetical and ahistorical, but it is reworked in *Political Liberalism*.

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<sup>7</sup> *Political Liberalism*, 8, 13–14, 223

to raise to the surface those principles implicit to a polity such as our own. Nowhere is the new emphasis on political rather than moral theory more apparent than in Rawls's treatment of the primary goods, namely, that minimal list of goods considered by the rational contractors in the original position. In *Theory*, the primary goods—rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and self-respect—were those things needed by any agent, because they are the elements of any rational plan of life.<sup>8</sup> Rawls now says that the primary goods should not be viewed as all-purpose features of life plans, because this conception is insufficiently political. It is a philosophical conception of what human flourishing requires in terms of its minimal essentials. Critics have pointed out that the list of primary goods in *Theory* seemed to require a more far-reaching philosophical judgment than what the theory was supposed to allow. H. L. A. Hart, for instance, questioned the grounds for assigning a superordinate value to liberty without having to rest the case on a more general (in Rawls's new parlance, "comprehensive") account of human agency.<sup>9</sup> In *Political Liberalism* the primary goods are the goods of free and equal citizens in the political sphere.<sup>10</sup> Rawls's understanding of the primary goods is now based on a political rather than a general moral or anthropological conception of human needs. They are the needs of citizens in a certain kind of regime, namely, the liberal regime. Therefore, Rawls asks not what anyone needs but what citizens of a liberal regime need.

## II

"How is it possible," Rawls asks, "for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?" (p. 4). The main question of *Political Liberalism* is posed against a certain historical and social background that can be traced back to the Reformation and its aftermath. Rawls notes, however, that liberalism did not emerge simply as a response to the political

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<sup>8</sup> *Theory*, 62, 411

<sup>9</sup> See H. L. A. Hart, "Rawls on Liberty and Its Priority," *University of Chicago Law Review* 40 (Spring 1973) 551–5

<sup>10</sup> *Political Liberalism*, 40, 76, 180–1, 188



problem of religious wars but also as a more wide-ranging set of responses to the problem of how moral knowledge can have a basis independent of ecclesiastical authority. It was thus that various liberalisms became comprehensive theories and, moreover, became theories no less comprehensive than the ones they sought to replace.

The problem, then, is that liberalism is both a comprehensive theory and a political practice. On the first score liberalism tends to divide even its own adherents, for there are many liberalisms, on the second, liberalism seeks a practical political consensus and not just acceptance of its overarching theories about tolerance, human progress, and autonomy. The various (philosophical) liberalisms, including the one worked out in *Theory*, must now be considered conspicuous elements of the "background culture" rather than theories which command consensus about, and work justifications for, political institutions. In short, they cannot count as "public reason."<sup>11</sup>

If citizens were to try to escape, overcome, or transform the dissensus over comprehensive views by direct political means, they would jeopardize the political order. Rawls writes, "If we think of political society as a community united in affirming one and the same comprehensive doctrine, then the oppressive use of state power is necessary for political community" (p. 37). The principal lesson learned from efforts to impose religious unity must now be turned against the comprehensive doctrines of liberalism as well.<sup>12</sup> Rawls contends that for any foreseeable future the divisive character of comprehensive doctrines is a permanent condition and its resolution a "practical impossibility" (p. 63).

Interestingly, although the citizens of a liberal polity do not typically view the social order as a "fixed natural order" (p. 15) they must, on Rawls's account, regard the burden imposed by history as a fixed limit upon their common deliberation. Reasonable pluralism of comprehensive doctrines is not just a "fact," but a "natural outcome" and an "inevitable long term result" of human reason at work within free institutions.<sup>13</sup> Throughout *Political Liberalism*, this history (rather vaguely reported by Rawls himself) stands not merely as a condition of political stability but as an irreversible achievement.

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<sup>11</sup> At least, they cannot do so directly. Comprehensive views may be introduced for the purpose of "supporting" public reason, however (pp. 152–3, 212–54).

<sup>12</sup> *Political Liberalism*, 37, 138, 199.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, xvii, xxiv, 4.

Although Rawls drops the claims of a comprehensive theory and continues to reject (for purposes of an account of justice) teleology, he loads in to the new account certain suppositions about the historical direction of society. Not surprisingly, he manages to reach approximately the same result argued for in *Theory*. That is, once we begin with a set of historical and social facts—namely, the facts of a liberal culture—we are apt to reach the same practical results as if we had proceeded from a liberal comprehensive theory. By modeling the account on a certain strand of historical experience, which then is regarded as an irreversible achievement, the theorist indirectly avails himself of the theories implicit in what is being modeled. For example, if the theorist were to select the social facts of feudal Europe, and go on to grant these facts a certain historical finality, he ought to be able to develop a doctrine of “public reason” that looks very much like a medieval comprehensive theory.

In *Political Liberalism* Rawls’s definition of political society is historically conditioned. Political society is democratically ordered, complete, closed, self-sufficient for all the main purposes of human life, and maintained from one generation to the next.<sup>14</sup> It differs from other associations chiefly, but not only, by the fact that it has no constitutionally specified final end(s). Political society is an “artifice of reason,” designed to achieve fair terms of reciprocity among citizens who are free and equal (p. 73). Rawls does not, however, pretend to define “the political” in general, normative terms. Rather, his case is modeled on the modern, democratic polity. As he puts it, “Political liberalism sees its form of political philosophy as having its own subject matter: how is a just and free society possible under conditions of deep doctrinal conflict with no prospect of resolution?” (p. xxviii).

Having put in place certain historical and social conditions for his definition, Rawls then insists that the “political conception is to be, so to speak, political and not metaphysical” (p. 10). Political liberalism seeks to identify and affirm principles of the political order sufficient, first for just institutions, and second for an “overlapping consensus.”

A distinguishing feature of a political conception is that it is presented as freestanding and expounded apart from, or without reference to, any such wider background. To use a current phrase, the political conception is a module, an essential constituent part, that fits into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure

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<sup>14</sup> *Political Liberalism*, 40–1, 301

in the society regulated by it. This means that it can be presented without saying, or knowing, or hazarding a conjecture about, what such doctrines it may belong to, or be supported by (pp 12–13)

Carefully and repeatedly, Rawls reminds the reader of what this “freestanding” method does *not* mean. To say that political principles must be as free as possible of opposing and conflicting comprehensive doctrines (whether religious or secular) does not mean that there are not other, even more important values, that “public reason” is discontinuous with these values, that the public “self” is ontologically prior to the “self” who is a member of nonpolitical associations (p 27), that political arrangements must remain indifferent to the truth or to virtue, including those truths and virtues which tend to support institutions of justice (p 151), that the artifice of politics “constructs” all of the moral and social material of human life (pp 121–3), that the autonomy of political principles necessarily implies or entails the belief that human agents are autonomous in the sense proposed by various secular comprehensive doctrines. Indeed, Rawls forcefully states that notions of “constitutive autonomy” (for instance, in Kant) are comprehensive doctrines incompatible with the practical bounds of public reason (p. 100).

In sum, the “political conception” must accomplish two things. The political institutions must be conceived and designed so that they not only meet the requirements of justice but also satisfy the need for political stability and unity of a liberal society. An abstract notion of justice by itself will not do the trick. Principles and institutions must also be conceived in a way that permits an overlapping consensus for a political society marked by a “reasonable pluralism” (p. 133). Reasonable pluralism is not a mere fact, but the achievement of a people who have prospered and developed within the context of free institutions. Therefore, overlapping consensus also is not just a limit placed upon the employment of “public reason” but an end of political institutions. Whatever the abstract scheme of justice, it must provide for the citizens’ ability to connect the scheme to their own respective comprehensive doctrines.

### III

Rawls answers some of the objections to *Theory* by delimiting his claims to the political sphere, and by delimiting the political sphere to

a certain historical strand of experience. There is no space here to track all of the different problems of *Theory* through the new account. It may be useful, however, to take up one particular problem, namely, On what grounds does Rawls eliminate perfectionism in politics? Have these grounds changed in his transition from a general moral theory to a political theory of justice? Can perfectionism be ruled out in principle without the support of a comprehensive doctrine, or is perfectionism ruled out on the basis of a prudential judgment concerning the historical and sociological features of modern democratic polities?

We will take up these questions in two stages. First, we need to look at the new account of the original position, in which rational contractors, deliberating behind a veil of ignorance, supply the polity with principles. We want to examine what they know, and whether they know enough to rule out perfectionism. Second, we will look at different arguments Rawls makes, and assess each in the light of his new theory.

Just how "freestanding" is the political conception? *Theory* was criticized, among other reasons, because Rawls seemed to slip into the original position a plethora of assumptions, which, if not metaphysical, were at least more substantive than what his position allowed. In *Political Liberalism* Rawls has taken some of this criticism to heart. The rubric "political not metaphysical" represents his effort to reduce the profile, and to specify more clearly, the knowledge, deliberation, and purposes of the contractors in the original position. However, because the contractors must now do two things—develop principles of political justice, and provide principles which inform a polity of overlapping consensus—Rawls may well have made the issue more complicated for both himself and his reader.<sup>15</sup>

In the original position, the contractors are symmetrically situated with respect to one another. In their deliberations they are not required to apply, or to be guided by, any antecedent principles of right and justice. They do not know the social position, the conception of

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<sup>15</sup> Answering this question of what the contractors know and need to know is made difficult by the fact that Rawls does not give a complete picture at any one place in *Political Liberalism*. Different lectures treat the original position somewhat differently, not only in terms of content of what the parties know, but also in terms of the stages or phases of their deliberation. The reader must move back and forth between the chapters in order to form an overall picture.

the good, or the realized abilities of the persons they represent. When they arrive at agreement about principles of justice, they are to be guided by what they think is the determinate good of the persons they represent. Given these constraints, more or less identical to those given in *Theory*, what else do they know?

Gathering together remarks from various places, we can conclude that the contractors know at least this much:

- Concerning the prospective citizens they represent, the contractors know that citizens possess two powers of moral personality: the capacity to conceive of the good, and to form, revise, and pursue such a conception, and the capacity not only for a sense of justice, but also the ability to honor its terms.<sup>16</sup>
- They know the beliefs held by the citizens generally, but must not factor in any knowledge or opinion concerning the truth of those beliefs, nor how the political principles might be grounded (by private parties) in one or another comprehensive doctrine.<sup>17</sup>
- They know at least a “short list” of alternative schemes of justice provided by the tradition of moral and political philosophy.<sup>18</sup> Moreover, they know that “the two principles of justice provide a better understanding of the claims of freedom and equality in a democratic society” than do utilitarianism and perfectionism.<sup>19</sup> The parties know enough to rule out perfectionism as a political principle.
- They know that there is a pluralism of reasonable, or at least not unreasonable, comprehensive doctrines. That is, they know that there is dissensus, but also that overlapping consensus is feasible.<sup>20</sup> They do not, however, know which doctrine they privately hold, nor which doctrines are held by those they represent (p. 310)

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<sup>16</sup> *Political Liberalism*, 293, 305

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, xx, 70–71, 94

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 305. Interestingly, while the contractors know the short list of options provided by the history of moral philosophy, they are not supposed to know the particular historical options provided by constitutional history (pp. 293, 308). Yet the practical and political bent of the book would favor knowing the institutional rather than the philosophical history. Just as the architects of the American constitution surveyed the history of republics, the institutional history would be a handy thing to know, given the fact that the contractors must make some estimation of the extent and depth of dissensus. It would certainly be useful for reaching the judgment that an overlapping consensus is possible.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 292, 295

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 65, 133, 140–2

While the original position is hypothetical and ahistorical, and its rationale “freestanding,” the contractors nevertheless know a fair amount about the historical and social conditions of the citizens they represent. In particular, they know the history of dissensus, the menu of options available from the tradition of moral philosophy, and the resources and limits of reasonable pluralism in the social order. This information is crucial. In *Political Liberalism* the contractors not only must reach agreement about abstract principles of justice but also provide principles for an overlapping consensus. Because various comprehensive liberalism cannot be the ground of the polity, but must instead remain part of the background culture, the theoretical agreement will have to have one eye cocked toward the practical or “political” end. The contractors must supply those who frame the concrete institutions with principles that are not only just, but also suitable to a particular kind of regime.

Thus, while *Theory* rules out certain information in order to facilitate theoretical consensus about moral principles, *Political Liberalism* brings in, and differently emphasizes, other information in order to facilitate judgment about political institutions capable of governing within an overlapping consensus. In this respect *Political Liberalism* provides a needed correction to the aprioricism of *Theory*. The contractors in the original position are interested from the outset in the specifically political and not just the moral dimension of justice. Therefore, when Rawls goes on to outline the successive phases by which a polity is created and administered—from the principles developed in the original position, to the making of constitutional institutions, to the ordinary legislative action of lawmaking, to the adjudication of law, to the development of policies—the various stages and spheres are well knit and properly complicated.<sup>21</sup> To use Rawls’s term, they “model” the familiar institutions and processes of a real polity.

#### IV

Our question is whether the contractors have grounds other than the rather loose considerations of prudence for removing perfectionism from the principles of “public reason.” Let us first take a brief

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<sup>21</sup> *Political Liberalism*, lecture 8, pp. 289–371.

look at what Rawls said about this problem in *Theory*. Then we can consider how he handles it in *Political Liberalism*.

What is perfectionism? In *Theory*, Rawls notes that the idea has a range of meanings.<sup>22</sup> On the one hand, perfectionism can denote the position that the chief principle guiding institutions of government is the maximization of human excellence. Perfectionism can also denote the position that excellence and telic achievement are but one standard among others. Unfortunately, the genre and species of perfectionism are not very thoroughly delineated in *Theory*. We can roughly generalize, however, and stipulate that a perfectionist holds that government may act to promote what it deems to be morally excellent choices and to discourage empty or base ones. Prescinding from the question of how extensively the principle is to be applied in public matters, a perfectionist will hold that (some) claims of liberty can be limited or subordinated to standards of moral excellence.

Rawls never contends that perfectionism lacks a rational basis "from the standpoint of everyday life." An agent who acts for the end of excellence does not necessarily act irrationally.<sup>23</sup> If it is not an inherently irrational standard, why must it be rejected? In *Theory* he contends that it violates the principle of equal liberty.<sup>24</sup> Rawls gives three reasons, all of which are probabilistic. First, he observes that criteria for ranking and summing values are "imprecise," and therefore provide insufficient directions for the purpose of reaching consensus about political principles.<sup>25</sup> Second, the contractors in the original position must not tailor principles to their own advantage. The main point of the device of veil of ignorance is to prevent individuals from using the coercive apparatus of the state to win for themselves greater liberty or larger distributive shares. The position that some activities are of greater intrinsic value "put[s] in jeopardy" the deliberation.<sup>26</sup> Third, the contractors cannot put the prospective citizens' interests at risk. Rawls writes, "To acknowledge any such standard would be, in effect, to accept a principle that *might* lead to a lesser religious or other liberty, if not to a loss of freedom altogether to advance many

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<sup>22</sup> *Theory*, 325–7

<sup>23</sup> He does suggest, however, that one who acts for a dominant final end (for instance, Ignatius of Loyola) is likely to act fanatically, *Theory*, 553–4. This judgment is dropped in *Political Liberalism*.

<sup>24</sup> *Theory*, 328

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 327, 330 (emphasis added)

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 139, 329 (emphasis added)

of one's spiritual ends."<sup>27</sup> To summarize, *Theory* rules out perfectionism because (i) it is imprecise, (ii) it puts in jeopardy the fairness of deliberations in the original position, and (iii) it is liable to engender suppression of liberty.

In *The Morality of Freedom* (1986), Joseph Raz criticizes Rawls for having drawn, in *Theory*, a stronger conclusion than his own premises allowed.<sup>28</sup> From the fact of dissensus (and this would have to be a very complicated set of facts) we can conclude that a society (represented by the contractors) is not immediately prepared to conduct its common business as though it agrees on one or another perfectionist standard. That is all that follows, however. It does not entail the conclusion that a society is improperly ordered, much less that it perpetrates injustice, if it subscribes to institutions most apt to facilitate the quest for common agreement about what is noble and true.

In particular, Raz points out that the "veil of ignorance" does not exclude the possibility that parties in the original position will agree to "establish a constitutional framework most likely to lead to the pursuit of well-founded ideals, given the information available at any given time."<sup>29</sup> Raz asks why the contractors should not accept "a 'natural duty' to pursue the best-founded political ideal." In other words, the contractors do not necessarily have to agree to defer permanently the possibility of a political society well-ordered by perfectionistic principles. A permanent deferral would mean that government abandons the goal of enabling individuals to pursue valid conceptions of the good and of discouraging them from pursuing evil or empty ones. Clearly, this must be a decision of no small importance. It would have to be taken after a careful weighing not only of the arguments, but also of the resources of a people at different stages of development.

In *Political Liberalism* Rawls remarks that the original position models what we regard as acceptable restrictions on reasons available for adopting a conception of justice that we regard "here and now" as fair and supported by the best reasons (p. 26). It is important that the principles reached "here and now" be suitable to the public culture of a democratic society. Again, the deliberation must yield the constitutional essentials (p. 227). These principles will inform the work

<sup>27</sup> *Theory*, 327 (emphasis added)

<sup>28</sup> Joseph Raz, *The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 126

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid*



of those who design the concrete institutions (a work modeled on the deliberations of a constitutional convention). If perfectionism is ruled out in the first deliberation then it will be ruled out also in the successive phases, as public reason is given more determinate institutional form. Therefore, it is important that the contractors get things right, for a mistake will infect the entire scheme. As Raz points out with respect to *Theory*, new information could come to light. If the contractors do not provide for this eventuality, the procedure could "sanction non-adaptable constitutions"<sup>30</sup>

As we mentioned in the previous section, the contractors know the "short list of alternatives given by the tradition of moral and political philosophy." One would like to know more about this "short list." But whatever it might include, the menu of theoretical options would seem irrelevant to the problem at hand, for Rawls insists that the "general problems of moral philosophy are not the concern of political liberalism" (p. xxviii). Indeed, he states that the "dualism" between comprehensive doctrines and the specific demands of politics does not originate in philosophy. It rather originates "in the special nature of democratic political culture as marked by reasonable pluralism" (p. xxi). In a similar vein, he maintains that "profound and long-lasting controversies set the stage for the idea of reasonable justification as a practical and not as an epistemological or metaphysical problem" (p. 44).

Must the constitutional essentials be yielded despite the fact of incommensurable and conflicting comprehensive doctrines, or rather despite the social and historical embodiments of these doctrines? It seems that perfectionist standards are to be ruled out because of the social fact of conflicting comprehensive doctrines, not on the basis of their philosophical merit or demerit. Rawls writes that

given the conflicting comprehensive conceptions of the good, how is it possible to reach such a political understanding of what are to count as appropriate claims? The difficulty is that the government can no more act to maximize the fulfillment of citizens' rational preferences, or wants (as in utilitarianism), or to advance human excellence, or the values of perfection (as in perfectionism), than it can act to advance Catholicism or Protestantism, or any other religion. None of these views of the meaning, value, and purpose of human life, *as specified by* the corresponding comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrines, is affirmed by citizens generally, and so the pursuit of any one of them through basic institutions gives political society a sectarian character.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Raz, *The Morality of Freedom*, 126

<sup>31</sup> *Political Liberalism*, 179–80 (emphasis added)

If perfectionism is to be jettisoned, we need to know precisely which reason is decisive. From the passage above, three different reasons come to mind: (1) dissensus over perfectionist standards themselves, (2) dissensus over comprehensive theories which, as he says, "specify" the standards, (3) concern over the likely political effects of allowing perfectionist standards into the sphere of "public reason."

In *Political Liberalism* Rawls emphasizes the third reason. He says, for example, that communitarian values "lead to" a systematic denial of liberty, and that it "may . . . happen" that liberties are unjustly suppressed.<sup>32</sup> The contractors are not permitted to "take chances" or "gamble" with the liberties of those they represent. Knowing what they do about the history of dissensus, as well as the need to supply principles for a polity marked by reasonable pluralism, the contractors must take care not to introduce perfectionist standards. Were the facts different, however, we might conclude that the contractors might be bound not to introduce antiperfectionist standards. While there is nothing odd about this line of reasoning, it must be said that it represents a prudential judgment. Can such a judgment so decisively lock the polity into antiperfectionist principles?

If a polity is "here and now" divided over perfectionist standards, then of course a polity ruled by such standards is not practically feasible. An Aristotelian could reach the same judgment. But this judgment certainly does not imply that perfectionism is necessarily unjust, or that a perfectionist regime of justice must necessarily treat citizens arbitrarily. Nor does it imply that a liberal regime, consisting of citizens who place a high premium on liberty, must be antiperfectionist. Therefore, Rawls is correct only if he means to assert that for contingent social reasons, perfectionist discourse, once conjoined with certain types of governmental institutions in a certain sort of political culture, is likely to engender further division and resentment which jeopardize the peace and justice needed for the stability of a political order. As a prudential judgment, this conclusion is available to the perfectionist and to the antiperfectionist alike.<sup>33</sup> Furthermore, it does not impeach the "reasons" of those who propose

<sup>32</sup> *Political Liberalism*, 146, 311.

<sup>33</sup> On the role of political prudence in a perfectionist conception of political order see Robert P. George, *Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).

perfectionist principles, rather it would defeat only the "reason" for their application, here and now. The prudential "reason" that defeats the application of a perfectionist principle does not imply that perfectionist values are, as such, "nonpolitical." If they are deemed "nonpolitical," it is due to a prudential judgment, not to the ontological status of the principle independent of the prudence of its application here and now.

With respect to the reason for ruling out perfectionist principles, Rawls also writes that "the fact that we affirm a particular religious, philosophical, or moral comprehensive doctrine with its associated conception of the good is not a reason for us to propose, or to expect others to accept, a conception of justice that favors those of that persuasion" (p. 24). The key words here are "is not a reason." To make sense of this remark, it is necessary to insert "not a [political] reason." Without this proviso, the position would be nonsensical. The fact that one has reason to believe that monogamous marriage is more excellent than polygamy is precisely the reason one has for advocating it and for expecting others to see its good sense. The issue then is whether one lacks a political reason for legislatively favoring monogamous marriage. A perfectionist can say that it depends upon a number of factors. Given particular circumstances—for instance, a civil society resembling Las Vegas—right reason could dictate that the perfectionist standard concerning marriage cannot be legislated. It could turn out that these circumstances indefinitely require that the principle not be legislated.

Rawls, however, makes a stronger claim. Perfectionism is ruled out not merely at the retail but also at the wholesale level. The question is whether Rawls has grounds for this drastic limit upon public reason other than by pointing to the persistent but nonetheless contingent social facts.

Rawls might respond that we must attend to the second reason outlined above, namely, that society is marked by a pluralism of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. He could point out that the rejection of perfectionism as a political principle does not rest simply or exclusively upon the need to head off, in advance, the (likely) bad consequences of introducing perfectionist standards. Perfectionism is to be ruled out because it is antithetical to the achievement of reasonable pluralism, which must count as a value in itself. Thus formulated, the question is whether perfectionism thwarts reasonable pluralism.

It is important to note that, on Rawls's account, the reasonable pluralism is not a pluralism of perfectionist standards themselves but of comprehensive doctrines *about* perfectionist standards. He does not argue that the object(s) of the theories are incommensurable. Such argument would involve settling the truth of the matter on philosophical terms. That is not allowed by his scheme. What, then, comes into conflict? If it is only the theories, one would have a very weak case for removing perfectionism from "public reason." Theological debate between Catholics and Protestants does not necessarily imply incommensurate positions on the value of religion, the value of a certain order of family life, or any number of moral virtues deemed crucial to a well-ordered civil society. The history upon which political liberalism is modeled is replete with examples of citizens upholding perfectionistic standards even in the face of theoretical disagreement.

Granting to Rawls the premise that reasonable pluralism is an ordinary, even a desirable feature of political liberty, such pluralism might, in a given case, concern means rather than ends. Morally worthy ends can be pursued in different yet morally reasonable ways. A society might agree that monogamous marriage is to be favored at law for perfectionist reasons without having to say that marriage must be religiously sacramental or non-sacramental. Why should a political society abjure, as a matter of the highest principle, legislation according to common (perfectionist) ends, if their differences chiefly concern means and modes of instantiation? For one hundred fifty years the First Amendment was interpreted to permit governmental promotion of religion, so long as it respected denominational differences, and so long as the offices and monies of government (prior to 1947, the United States government) did not prefer one denomination over the other. This was hardly an antiperfectionist constitutional principle. It did, however, prudently steer clear of dictating doctrines and modes of worship. Nor did this interpretation of the First Amendment suppose that the constitutional order should ever envisage, much less encourage, a consensus about the "true" church. The religious history of the United States indicates that a limited perfectionism comports with, even facilitates, reasonable pluralism. Of course, one could invoke recent Supreme Court doctrines against this historical and social fact. For the purposes of Rawls's scheme, however, that would beg the question. Perfectionism is to be ruled out on the basis of principles antecedent to the constructions of case law.

Rawls needs to give a stronger case for his antiperfectionism. In favor of his position we can think of a situation in which two or more parties have similar perfectionist standards and seemingly incommensurable comprehensive doctrines, but also have a history of intractable feuding. For example, Islamic and Jewish fundamentalists have not just different and rival theologies, but also a history (in some places) of severe political dispute. If they are to co-exist in the same political regime, it would be imprudent not only to favor one over the other, but also imprudent to design political institutions which favor an eventual theological *rapprochement*. Whatever else they might have in common with respect to standards of excellence, for any number of historical and sociological reasons, these theological communities are politically allergic to one another.

Are all conflicts between comprehensive views entrenched at this level? If so, then the contractors in the original position would certainly act prudentially when they rule out governmental endorsement of perfectionistic standards as specified by the comprehensive doctrines at issue. The order and stability of the body politic are at stake. This, however, involves a properly detailed estimation of the resources of the prospective polity. That is, until we take a more detailed view of the matter, we cannot know whether (some) perfectionist ideals facilitate or thwart "reasonable" pluralism.

Historically speaking, the polity on which political liberalism is modeled has not been divided as deeply as what Rawls asserts. Rawls himself insists that "overlapping consensus" is feasible, among other reasons because the institutions of the polity can be independently supported by the theoretical and moral resources of different comprehensive doctrines. But this might also provide overlapping consensus about *some* perfectionist political standards. How can we know one way or the other? The scheme does not permit us to settle the philosophical or theological ground of truth of the doctrines which specify perfectionist standards. Even supposing that reasonable pluralism is an irreversible achievement, or as Rawls says, a "natural outcome" of a certain history, the stricture against perfectionism does not necessarily follow. As we have argued, the strong conclusion would have to suppose that perfectionist standards are equated with theories which specify them, as well as to suppose that the adoption of a perfectionist standard necessarily thwarts pluralism. Rawls himself denies the first supposition. While he insinuates the second supposition, no argument is provided for it.

## V

Rawls takes for granted a certain historical view of the liberal experiment, according to which we can reach a prudential ground for affirming the philosophical conclusions of *Theory*. By frontloading a story, and by granting it a certain finality, the Rawls narrative does the work of moral theory.<sup>34</sup> It is not evident that the story is true, however; nor is it evident that it necessarily requires the results advocated by *Political Liberalism* if it is true. Rawls admits that there are many liberalisms. Because the new account emphasizes the historically conditioned nature of justice, a different reading of the history might engender a quite different liberal conception of “public reason.”

Setting to one side questions of internal logic and coherence, one must ask what a liberal polity would look like were it to approximate Rawls’s new scheme. It would be a polity that devotes itself to maintaining justice “here and now” according to one particular interpretation of the historical conditions favoring political stability. “Public reason” would maintain the status quo against any alternatives from the past or future. It would be a polity that has no political winners or losers with respect to visions of the good. The social movements which bear potentially revolutionary ideas, including movements of the sort that made political liberalism itself possible, would gain access to “public reason” only insofar as they advocate a “balance” of those political goods already in place. For purposes of politics, the reasonable and the unreasonable, the good and the bad, would be locked into a conception of the status quo. Political liberalism would be static.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Note that Rawls would allow the Supreme Court, in the name of public reason, to invalidate an amendment that repeals the First Amendment. Granting that Article V of the Constitution gives the people such power, Rawls nevertheless contends that the Court must find this motion contradictory to historical tradition, not just to a legal text or to a body of legal precedent (p. 239). Setting to one side Rawls’s left-liberal conception of constitutional jurisprudence, the point here is that he takes certain historical patterns to be decisive for public reason—more decisive in fact than the written contract.

<sup>35</sup> I wish to thank Michael Zuckert, who made helpful criticisms of this review essay.

## BOOKS RECEIVED

### SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS\*

IAN BELL AND STAFF

BENSON, Hugh H., ed. *Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. 261 pp. \$15.95—The sixteen essays of this book attempt to make recent scholarly conclusions on Socrates readily available. In his introduction the editor gives a survey of the Socratic problem. The next essay examines the precise meaning of the charges leveled against Socrates, not accepting the traditional gods comes foremost. Charles H. Kahn argues in favor of moving the *Laches*, *Charmides*, *Lysis* and *Euthrypho* from their traditional place before the *Gorgias* to the group of later dialogues because of their Platonic content—J. Beversluis proves the obvious, namely, that Socrates makes use of examples in his search of definitions. Socrates' critique of his interlocutors' answers to the "what-is-F-ness?" questions is examined by Hugh Benson. *Laches* and others failed to grasp that there is only one universal essence corresponding to each question. Gregory Vlastos argues that Plato was the first to assume that the movement of the planets could be explained by a number of homocentric circular revolutions into different directions. Plato would have advanced from a dialectical examination of problems to a more mathematical method. According to T. H. Irwin, Socrates upheld the view that to be happy requires that one adapt his desires and be flexible. K. McTighe thinks that Plato understood the Socratic paradox in this way: wrongdoers are always ignorant of the harm their actions cause or of the fact that their actions are unjust.

Most essays move in the area of logic and analysis, they make challenging reading, but sometimes one gets the impression of being back in late medieval formalism, or of "Socrates' method being invested with a Wittgensteinian twist" (p. 112). —Leo J. Elders, *Institut voor Wysbegeerte en Theologie*

BLYTHE, James M. *Ideal Government and the Mixed Constitution in the Middle Ages*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. xvi + 343.

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\* Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

*Review of Metaphysics* 47 (March 1994): 603–651. Copyright © 1994 by the Review of Metaphysics.

pp \$45 00—This ambitious book, written by a former student of Brian Tierney, has two goals. The first is to show that the recovery of Aristotle's *Politics* by Latin authors of the thirteenth century, especially Thomas Aquinas, resulted in the view that a mixed constitution of some sort is the best political regime. The second is to show that the ideas of Thomas and his disciples decisively influenced the views of the later Middle Ages and also the early republicans of the Renaissance. Blythe thus wants to show that, in fact, medieval political theory was not characterized by a monolithic defense of absolute monarchy, but that it advocated a certain tempering or balancing of kingly rule through mixed constitutions, he also wants to show that those medieval views were much more influential in the early modern period than is usually thought.

Blythe divides his book into three main parts. The first is the longest and the most thoroughly argued. In this part, he attempts to show how Thomas Aquinas's reading of Aristotle established the doctrine of the mixed regime within the medieval discussion. While granting that some parts of Thomas's works may be interpreted as a defense of monarchy, Blythe argues that the mixed constitution, as discussed especially in *Summa theologiae* Ia-IIae, q 105, a 1, best represents Thomas's viewpoint. Blythe goes on to argue that this advocacy of mixed constitutionalism is reflected especially in the thought of Ptolemy of Lucca and Engelbert of Admont, and to a lesser extent in that of Giles of Rome, Peter of Auvergne, and John of Paris.

In the second section of his work, Blythe indicates how this theory of the mixed constitution influenced thinkers of the fourteenth century. William of Ockham and Marsilius of Padua are considered here, as are Walter Burley and Jean Buridan. In this division of the book, however, Blythe devotes his most extended and serious considerations to Nicole Oresme. As might be expected, Dante, the great advocate of monarchy, receives very brief treatment.

In the last major division of the work Blythe turns to the influence of medieval mixed constitutionalism on thinkers such as the conciliarists, the Englishman John Fortescue, and the early republicans of Northern Italy, such as Contarini, Bruni, and Savonarola. His goal throughout is to stress that the early modern authors did not learn of the mixed regime from the sixth book of the *Histories* of Polybius, which did not become available until the early sixteenth century, but from Aristotle and his thirteenth-century interpreters.

Blythe seems to attain his first goal completely. Some might perhaps be inclined to argue that he overemphasizes the role of the mixed constitution in the thought of one particular theorist or another, even if such comments should prove to be true, however, they do not seriously weaken Blythe's premise. Clearly he is correct in asserting that the thirteenth-century authors knew of the mixed regime and considered it seriously. Blythe properly emphasizes Aristotle as the source of this knowledge, though one wonders if he ought not have given more credit to the influence of the Old Testament, especially since it played an important role in Thomas's own thought on the matter. Also, Blythe's case might have been bolstered by discussing to greater advantage how the presence of identifiable and powerful religious authorities in the Middle Ages might have influenced the development of the idea of a tempered



monarchical rule which does not take its foundation immediately from God. Theories supporting papal supremacy seem closer to absolute monarchical rule than to a mixed constitution with a tempered monarch, but the very presence of a supreme religious authority tended to undermine the authority of the kings.

Blythe's second premise is, of course, the more controversial one. If it should prove to be true, then the standard interpretations of early modern political thought would have to be reconsidered. Unfortunately, this part of the work is not as complete and thorough as it might be. Blythe does not deny that there are differences between Scholasticism and the Italian humanists, but he certainly stresses the continuities rather than the discontinuities. One would hope that the author might in the future expand his remarks on the early republicans of Northern Italy, especially Machiavelli (pp 292–5). At present, the view that early modern political thought inherited some of its most cherished views from the thirteenth century remains controversial.—Douglas Kries, *Gonzaga University*

CRITCHLEY, Simon. *The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992. xiv + 256 pp. \$19.95.—Two waves mark the appropriation of Derrida in English: an earlier, literary and a later, philosophical reception. Both readings neglect the relation between deconstruction and ethics, leaving unanswered the question, “why bother with deconstruction?” (p 1). Critchley's book, written in an elegant, concise, clear and yet—despite its scholarly rigor—pleasant style, admittedly locates itself at the origin of a third way of reception, “one in which ethical—not to mention political—questions are uppermost” (p 3).

Critchley makes the novel and audacious claim that “Derridian deconstruction has a horizon of responsibility or ethical significance, provided that ethics is understood in the Levinasian sense” (p 236). Having identified the import of Levinas's ethics in its method of reduction, that is, in its “exploring the ways in which the Said can be unsaid, or *reduced*, thereby letting the Saying reside as a residue, or interruption, within the Said” (p 8), Critchley boldly extends this notion to the reading of texts exemplified in Derrida's work. Ethics becomes a matter of textuality, of what Critchley calls a “*clôtural* reading,” a double reading in which the path of repetition (the commentary) “inevitably crosses the path of something wholly other” (p 27). The insights, interruptions, or alterities retraced within the text constitute moments of ethical transcendence, they are the unconditioned that gives deconstruction its spur, the injunction that *produces* deconstruction and commands its respectful reading of the irreducible moments of otherness.

Critchley offers two extensive examples of *clôtural* reading. The first is “Bois,” Derrida's final work on and for Levinas, which opens up the space of the relation between sexual and ethical differences. The second is “Wholly Otherwise,” in which Levinas faces Derrida's work on

the one hand as a completion of Kant's critique of metaphysics, on the other as a dislocation of the philosophical Said that opens to an ethical Saying. The reason why one should bother with deconstruction is thus found in its generating a reading that opens moments of alterity or transcendence from which to disrupt traditional philosophy. In this generation, deconstruction is ethical. The implication is not that ethics can be derived from deconstruction, but that deconstruction has an ethical structure.

As "a philosophy of hesitation" (p. 236), however, deconstruction is unable to move "from undecidability to the decision, from responsibility to questioning, from deconstruction to critique, from ethics to politics" (p. 236). In the last chapter, Critchley tries to overcome this impasse by exercising on deconstruction that same *clôtural* reading by which he has characterized deconstruction in the preceding chapters: the ethical opening is retraced in the issue of the political and in the praise of democracy as the future of deconstruction.

Although the subtitle places Derrida and Levinas side by side, the book is primarily dedicated to Derrida, while the reading of Levinas is instrumental for the possibility of retracing an ethical structure (but is thus sufficient to allow us to speak of ethics?) in deconstruction. Despite and because of this moment of ingratitude—which includes the translation from acting to reading—Critchley's understanding of ethics avers to be faithful to Levinas. The conversion of Levinas's ethics to textuality is part of Critchley's claim that moments of "ingratitude, faultiness, and violence are the necessary conditions of a fidelity to Levinas' work" (p. 112). But the ingratitude that Levinas himself evokes is the violence that the Other does to us, not the violence we (that is, Critchley) do to the Other. Although cleverly construed, the book seems at times fragmentary, probably because of the independent conception of its parts. But the fragments may signify the interstices in need of exploration for an ethical opening of Critchley's own work, and his attempt to retrace an ethical command within the text, and to avoid reducing deconstruction to mere edification certainly deserves praise and reading.—Silvia Benso, *University Park, Pa.*

DASCAL, Marcelo, ed. *Cultural Relativism and Philosophy: North and Latin American Perspectives*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991. xii + 316 pp. n.p.—In the introduction and acknowledgments of this book Marcelo Dascal informs the reader as to the peculiar history behind the book and to the vision which inspired it. In particular, the dominance of Western Culture, evidenced by the presence of Coca-Cola, the dream of democratic freedom, and aspirations to the wonders of the market economy in all but the most remote parts of the world has created a tension between North America and Latin America in many, perhaps all, facets of life (p. 1). This tension has developed because the values present in North America are at odds with the values present, at least historically, in Latin America. This tension can result in one set of values being declared

dominant, or better than the others, or it can result in a sort of relativism where the two or more sets of values are held to be, perhaps with some qualifications, equally good. It is the latter position with respect to the tension between North and Latin America which is the focus of this book (pp. 3-4).

The collection, consisting of fifteen articles, is divided up into four sections. Part 1, "Relativism: Transformation or Death?" includes "Relativism and the Lebenswelt" by Joseph Margolis, "Contradictions and Paradigms: A Paraconsistent Approach" by Lorenzo Peña, "Conceptual Relativism and Philosophy in the Americas" by León Olivé, and "Six Dogmas of Relativism" by Lenn E. Goodman. Part 2, "A Glimpse of Variety: Philosophical Experiences and Worldviews in Latin America," includes "Time and World in Mayan and Nahuatl Thought" by Mercedes de la Garza, "Trique's Grammatico-Lexical Characteristics: A World-view?" by Robert E. Longrace, "Historicism and Universalism in Philosophy" by Francisco Miró Quesada, and "The Limits of Cultural Relativism: Metaphysics in Latin America" by Mauricio Beuchot. Part 3, "Nature, Culture and Art," includes "Evolution and the Naked Truth" by Gonzalo Munévar, "Cultural Relativism and Critical Rationalism" by Harvey B. Sarles, and "Aesthetics and Ethnocentrism" by David Sobrevilla. Part 4, "Crossing Conceptual Frameworks," includes "Crossing Cultures: Two Universalisms and Two Relativisms" by Michael Krausz, "Understanding Conflicts between North and South" by Hugh Lacey, "Cross-Cultural Translation: Problems and Possibilities" by Eugene J. Meehan, and "The Ecology of Cultural Space" by Marcelo Dascal.

The articles collected here are quite varied in both their approach to the overall topic of the book and the positions they take. The contributors themselves come from around the world and from several different disciplines, while most of them are philosophers, there are also representatives from political science, linguistics, history, and comparative literature. The upshot of so much diversity is a book which seems to miss its declared goal. Many of the articles take up issues of Latin America only in a cursory way, if at all. One article, that is, in contrast, concerned with conceptions of time and world in Mayan and Nahuatl thought does not engage issues of relativism in any obvious way. In all, there are only a few articles which deal directly with what one might expect to find in a volume devoted to a study of cultural relativism in North and Latin America.

The lack of unity and organization in the book is made up for in part by the quality of several of the articles. Indeed, there are some very good philosophical discussions of relativism included in this volume, and it is in these discussions that the true value of this book can be found. Particularly worthy of mention are the articles by León Olivé, Lenn E. Goodman, Francisco Miró Quesada, and Gonzalo Munévar. Each of these articles offers the reader interesting discussions of relativism and to a limited extent, novel insights into the application of relativism to cultural issues. Of these four articles, however, only two deal with Latin America in any explicit way. The remaining articles, where written by philosophers, deal with relativism directly and with Latin America indirectly, if at all again, adding to the lack of unity and direction in this volume.

Some of the articles included in the volume seem concerned with changing public attitudes and policy regarding cultural differences more than with the philosophical problems involving relativism. Of note in this regard is the contribution by Marcelo Dascal himself in which an attempt is made to undermine the principal assumption underlying universalism, "invidious comparison" (pp 279–81). Dascal treats the issue of relativism, but only as a means of opening lines of communication where he perceives none. In the four articles contributed by nonphilosophers the reader is hard put to find any clear connection to relativism. The single exception is the article written by Harvey B. Sarles which deals with the roles that nature and culture play in one's life and argues that we must look beyond cultural relativism for a full understanding of humans and the reality they inhabit.

Despite a certain lack of cohesiveness, *Cultural Relativism and Philosophy: North and Latin American Perspectives* offers the reader some stimulating discussions of relativism and Latin America. Those interested in one or the other of these topics should find this volume a good starting point for further research and a good introduction to the issues discussed. —Richard Beatch, *State University at Buffalo*

DERRIDA, Jacques. *Given Time I: Counterfeit Money*. Translated by Peggy Kamuf. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. x + 177 pp. \$22.50.—The publication of this volume, which should presage the appearance of a second, given the subtitle, is mentioned to have grown out of a seminar, taught by the author at the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris during the academic year, 1977–78. The content concerns the concept of the gift, whose aporia of reason constitutes the bulk of the four essays. For those interested in such matters the author includes a three-page foldout of Baudelaire's *Counterfeit Money*, on a facing page of the original text in French. After that text has been deconstructed in the final two essays, one might, after all, be interested in Baudelaire's original thoughts on the nature of gifts and counter-gifts (if such are possible).

They aren't, of course, but the reader will have to have understood Heidegger and the supposed relation between giving, being, and self-temporalizing to grasp the idea. To make sure the reader does, the author considers the gift of time to a lover at the expense of the same to a series of charitable activities by Mme de Maintenon. She was writing to a friend (if there are any such), one Mme Brinon. Derrida deconstructs this letter to show the aporia contained in the very concept of the gift.

So runs the first essay.

The second essay takes apart the same concept in the sociological work of Marcel Mauss before applying that deconstruction to Baudelaire's ironic thoughts on the matter. Essays three and four begin and end with Baudelaire, and here our author's subtitle magically subdivides into two subtitles, as *Counterfeit Money* now takes two parts: first,

the Poetics of Tobacco, which considers Baudelaire a Painter of Modern Life, and secondly, Gift and Countergift, neither of which is an ontical possibility, although excuse and forgiveness, on the other hand, may both become ontically and ontologically attached to the same impossibilities, as Baudelaire intimates in the ironic conclusion of his tale—or so Derrida has argued. But so, for the most part, had Heidegger.

This very irony may explain Baudelaire's difficulty in composing a dedication for his story. What kind of gift would that be? A present of something long past? Or the poison Germans have always claimed any *Gift* to be. One merely pays one's money and takes one's choice—or consults the rest of the Derridean corpus, as *delicti* as any living body may be.—E. F. Kaelin, *The Florida State University*

DESMOND, William. *Beyond Hegel and Dialectic Speculation, Cult, and Comedy*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. 365 pp. Cloth, \$57.50, paper, \$18.95—This is William Desmond's fourth book on Hegel and topics Hegelian. In the aftermath of this impressive scholarly productivity, one can easily see why Desmond might be interested, as the title of this work suggests, in getting "beyond Hegel and dialectic." Other scholars, similarly smitten, have suffered comparable afflictions. Hence the most obvious task initially confronting the reader of this impressive book has to do with determining precisely what Desmond means by the metaxological and whether such a notion can convincingly lead one beyond Hegel and dialectic, presuming one feels compelled by the need to do so, and where one finds oneself on arrival.

At first glance, one might be inclined to identify discourse regarding the metaxy with Eric Voegelin—a philosopher who, like Karl Popper, was vehemently anti-Hegelian. In his article, "Wisdom and the Magic of the Extreme" (*The Southern Review* 17 [April 1981]), for example, Voegelin characterizes Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* as driven by the illusory quest for the *Zauberkräft* whereby "consciousness might be raised to perfection" (p. 243). Against the Apollonian hubris of Hegel, therefore, as well as its Dionysian counterpart in Nietzsche as the other point of "extremity" (*das Außersichsein*), Voegelin offers the metaxy as the proper context of philosophical thinking, that is, the quasi-neo-Kantian refuge of finitude or what Findlay calls "cave philosophy" and the requisite "discipline" of recognizing and acknowledging the limits of reason. What then, if anything, do such concerns have to do with Desmond's metaxological route "beyond" Hegel? Does not the notion of "getting beyond" Hegel conjure up the impression of a philosophical hubris even greater than Hegel's? Or does it mean that Desmond proposes a strategy similar to Heidegger's, namely, that to get beyond Hegel, one must get "behind" and "under" Hegel—"thinking through" and "thinking better," as Gadamer put it, "everything that Hegel thought." Can it be that Desmond here is offering up a qualified rejection of Hegel?

The answers to these questions and others are somewhat equivocal, that is, both no and yes, and it is a form of equivocation logically consistent with Desmond's social, cultural, and religious conception of the metaxological "doubling" of dialectical "intermediation" (p 165) Desmond's notion of doubling is designed to subvert the univocal, monological tendencies implicit in Hegel's dialectic of self-consciousness where, he argues in a quasi-Levinasian way, "counting to three" really amounts, in effect, to "counting to one" (pp 11–12) Desmond devises this strategy, at least in part, because he "takes seriously the ideas of otherness and difference that post-Hegelian thinkers press on us" (p 13) Nevertheless, he takes Hegel far more seriously than Hegel's detractors, whether the "old" Hegel-left, or the "new" postmodern, poststructural left What emerges is one of the best Hegel-inspired critiques of deconstruction in print, and certainly one of the wittiest, richly textured by a host of voices including, in addition to Hegel, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Pascal, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Levinas, Bataille, and Derrida, among others Here is a sample

Deconstruction is a [historicist] hermeneutics intoxicated with the virtuosity of its own textual and philological excess Its debunking negativity will merely swallow itself up and be dissolved in the temporality it cannot transcend The blush of its first fashionableness is now fading fast, and the cannibalizing avant-garde spits it out as *passe* (p 270)

Far from being merely the hermeneutical extension of his more recent work, Desmond here wants to make a case for the ontological space of transcendence beyond meanings confined to dialectical considerations of the self's immanent transcendence—whether prospects of closure be understood from a Hegelian or an anti-Hegelian perspective What emerges is an engaging philosophical meditation, as Desmond makes his case for the "agapeic other" and "time's other" (or the Eternal) as onto-eschatological limiting principles of difference outstripping even Hegel's conception of the true infinite While it is impossible to present here an accurate synopsis of the full range of Desmond's arguments in this impressive book, and to proffer judgments regarding their success, a summary of the book's contents will provide some clues regarding his overall trajectory The first of his six lengthy chapters is on "Speculation and Historicism," the second on "Speculation and Cult," the third on "Speculation and Representation," the fourth on "Dialectic and Evil," the fifth on "Comedy and the Failure of Logos" (the conjunction "and" being, in each instance, not a disguised infinitive but a synonym for "the between" of the metaxy), with the sixth chapter posing the question, "Can Philosophy Laugh at Itself?" Not surprisingly, Desmond provides an unequivocal yes to his final query, indeed, his notion of metaxology depends upon this affirmation as "the final breakthrough" (p 292)—providing that the laughter elicited "on coming to nothing" is analogous to Hegel's treatment of Aristophanes "With a Bow to Plato" (pp 292ff)

Whether Hegel can be saved from his detractors, so to speak, by such a stratagem is quite a different matter—not only because it presupposes

that he in some sense needs saving, but also, granting this, that it is possible to do so. Interpreters like Klaus Hartmann, who have argued that Hegel is best understood as a category theorist, do not believe that Hegel requires any external justification. Other commentators who, like most readers, find it difficult if not impossible to separate Hegel's *Logic* from his *Realphilosophie*, will be soteriologically inclined—providing they have affinities for what Hegel asserts regarding the world—and utterly disinclined if they do not. After all, what would a deconstructionist do without Hegel as “other”? Desmond clearly falls into the metaxy between such extremes, as his excellent book bears ample witness —Alan M. Olson, *Boston University*

ERASMUS, Desiderius *Collected Works of Erasmus Volume 61 Patristic Scholarship The Edition of St Jerome* Edited, translated and annotated by James F. Brady and John C. Olin. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992. xxxvii + 293 pp. \$85.00—This volume in the series is dedicated to Erasmus's work on Jerome, whom Erasmus esteemed above all other Church Fathers and used as a model for his own reform program. Erasmus was impressed by “the greatness of the saintly man who of all Christians was by common consent the best scholar and best writer—the supreme champion and expositor and ornament of our faith” (p. xv). Erasmus's work was part of a nine-volume Complete Edition of Jerome published by Johann Froben in Basel in 1516. Erasmus had responsibility for the first four volumes, which contained Jerome's letters and other writings. Erasmus commented on the letters and included as well a dedicatory letter and a Life of Jerome. The present volume contains the latter, Erasmus's various prefaces to the second volume, six of Jerome's letters with Erasmus's annotations, the Amerbachs' prefaces to the fifth volume, notes, and an Index. It is beautifully translated primarily, we are told, by James F. Brady, while John C. Olin prepared the twenty-four-page Introduction and the annotations. This volume replaces all earlier editions in English and sets new standards of accuracy and beauty in both its translation and production.

Erasmus had admired Jerome from his earliest days. While a young canon at Steyn, he had read and copied all the letters of Jerome and had drawn lessons from them that explain both his attachments to their author and his early formation as a humanist. Erasmus detested the late scholastic theology of his time, with its dry logical nitpicking and disdain for eloquence; he complained of “Occam, Durandus, Capreolus, Lyra, Burgensis, and even poorer stuff than that.” At the same time he was put off by the avarice of the clergy of his day, the extent to which they had drifted from the simple lifestyle proclaimed by the gospels and which the earlier Church Fathers, as he believed, had observed more successfully. This seems another instance of the “Myth of Christian Beginnings,” as Robert L. Wilken calls it in his book of the same title, or the recurrent belief that Christianity was much simpler and better-lived

in earlier times Erasmus joined the general call for reform characteristic of his era, and hoped for a revision in theology to accompany and invigorate this reform in Church life. As the authors make clear, theology in Erasmus's eyes was "essentially practical, a guide to life rather than a subject for debate, a matter of transformation rather than of speculation" (p. xxxiii). The Amerbachs intended to publish new editions of the four great Doctors of the western Church (Ambrose, Augustine, Jerome, Gregory) in hope that "if the splendid theology of ancient times should come to life again, that prickly and frigid kind of sophistical theology would have less influence, and our christians would be more generous and genuine" (p. xix). Erasmus's intention was to reform theology by returning it to its scriptural and patristic sources, to replace the Ockhamist and Scotist dialecticians with the *vetus ac vera theologia*, a more "rhetorical theology", and he put forward Jerome as an example of this ideal.

While the call for reform in Church life was valid, the attempt at a reform in theology by simply returning to a more rhetorical, less technical style was more difficult, further, the choice of Jerome as an example on which to model this is somewhat problematic. There had been an evolution in the style or *genre* in which theology was carried out, from the public oratorical letter addressed to a worthy patron typical of the classical era, to the more specialized treatise on a narrow topic intended for an academic or theological audience. Erasmus was perhaps projecting his own concerns and idealized traits anachronistically back into Jerome's situation and personality. During Jerome's time at Trier, for example, when he "converted" from being a civil servant advancing his career toward someone more enamored of the ascetic life, the very first work Jerome transcribed was Hilary of Poitiers' *On the Synods*, a survey of the creeds published in the East, whose object was to reconcile the Western upholders of the Nicene dogma that the Son is "of the same substance as the Father" with the Eastern anti-Arian group who preferred the formula "of like substance," as doing better justice to the distinction of the Trinitarian persons. In other words, Jerome was familiar with and not necessarily adverse to theological "nutpicking." While initially exasperated, during his time in the desert, by the "three hypostases" theology of the Trinity foisted upon him by the Meletians and the Syrian monks, his later meeting in Constantinople with Gregory of Nazianzus moved him toward insight into its essential orthodoxy. The situation is little better with Jerome as a scholar and translator. In his biography of Jerome, J. N. D. Kelly notes that in Jerome's translations of Origen's homilies, "side by side with drastic periphrases, abbreviations, and interpolations designed to help the reader's understanding, we come across traces of [Jerome's] incorrigible tendency to heighten or intensify the colour of an expression, to give rein to his personal opinions or prejudices, or to show off his learning" (p. 77)—precisely the traits Erasmus railed against in his own attempts to restore the uncorrupted texts of the Fathers! Erasmus constructed a "Jerome" for his own program, while this construction was an advance over the Jerome then known, it had more to do with Erasmus's critique and ideal for his own era than with the difficult and demanding historical personality.—Patrick Madigan, *St John's University*



FOLEY, Richard *Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology* New York Oxford University Press, 1993 x + 214 pp \$35.00—

To say that *S*'s belief or action is rational is to say, according to Foley, that from a certain belief perspective it appears to satisfy certain of *S*'s goals. This approach is firmly teleological in character, and does not take "rules" or "virtues" of rationality to be fundamental. Precisely which belief perspective, and which of *S*'s goals, are relevant here? We should acknowledge many notions of rationality, says Foley, depending on how we fix these parameters. We might take all of *S*'s goals to be relevant (practical rationality), or perhaps only *S*'s desire to have accurate and comprehensive beliefs (epistemic rationality). And we might take as relevant the belief perspective of experts in *S*'s community, or that of an objectively knowledgeable observer, or that of *S* alone were *S* to be deeply reflective.

To evaluate an epistemological theory we must search for a specification of the belief perspective and goals that yields an interesting conception of rationality. Descartes' epistemology suffers from trying to combine two strands: the subjectively persuasive, and the objectively reliable. The former, however, presupposes the belief perspective of the individual, while the latter presupposes the belief perspective of the objective observer. No introspectively available method can guarantee true or even objectively probable beliefs. Therefore, we should divorce the "internalist" theory of egocentric rationality from "externalist" theories of reliable belief.

Contemporary epistemology is still Cartesian in thinking that rational true belief is at least "in the vicinity" of knowledge. But any notion of rationality relevant to egocentric evaluation cannot guarantee reliability or likelihood, and hence is ill-suited to serve as a condition of knowledge. From the egocentric perspective there can be no antiskeptical assurances. Like the highwire artist, each of us is "working without a net."

Foley's theoretical anchor is the idea that it is epistemically rational for *S* to believe that *p* just in case *S* would think the belief that *p* defensible, if *S* were to be adequately reflective given his abilities and resources, free of superficial distractions such as drowsiness or drunkenness, and his only goal was to now have comprehensive and accurate beliefs. Derivative notions follow. For example, action *A* is rational for *S* just in case it is egocentrically rational for *S* to believe that *A* would be an acceptably effective means to his goals.

The last and most interesting chapter argues that we cannot dispense with an epistemology of dyadic belief in favor of degrees of belief. Two notorious puzzles for the dyadic conception, the preface and lottery, are handled by denying that rational belief is closed under logical conjunction, and by arguing that a rational believer may sometimes be knowingly logically inconsistent and probabilistically incoherent, Dutch book arguments to the contrary notwithstanding. Like Descartes' demon-driven epistemology, contemporary probabilism is designed to meet a worst-case scenario, that of the malevolent and logically omniscient Dutch bookie. Thus probabilism, like Cartesianism, is too defensive, not in trying to guarantee an error-free result, but in trying to avoid a guarantee of error. Our attitude toward the risk, even the surety, of

error is itself properly subject to egocentric reflection, Foley recommends an attitude of insolence

Foley's book displays much masterful interlacing of broad-brush theory with close and powerful argumentation. I think, however, that the central notion of egocentric epistemic rationality is sterile and misguided. Foley acknowledges that it supplies the believer with no fundamental epistemic guidance, but this, he argues, is no part of the epistemologist's business. Here I can only briefly suggest a line of criticism. If "adequate egocentric reflection" is to be conducted in private, without extensive research and discussion with others, then sufficiently long and distraction-free reflection will not adequately reflect the believer's deepest epistemic commitments, which will typically include allegiance to socially distributed norms and a commitment to being swayed by others in certain ways. But if egocentric reflection is allowed to include research and discussion, then there seems little point in sharply distinguishing Foley's egocentric conception of rationality from a conception that presupposes a communal perspective — Bernard W. Kobes, *Arizona State University*

HALL, Ronald L. *Word and Spirit: A Kierkegaardian Critique of the Modern Age*. Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993. xiii + 218 pp. \$27.95—This book is at once a critique of modernity and postmodernism as well as an interpretation of Kierkegaard's conception of the self. The novelty of Hall's approach consists in his claim that spirit or the self is intimately connected with the first person speech act, which is represented by the Hebrew idea of *dabhar*. As Yahweh's word, *dabhar* "brings the world into existence and his fidelity sustains it" (p. 32). In this respect, God's primordial speech act, which is both word and deed, serves as the paradigm of human existence itself. Hence, while speaking is regarded as the defining characteristic of human beings, owning and owning up to one's words—covenantal speech or reflexive integrity—alone determines what it is to be fully human. From this new point of view, Hall reads the first volume of Kierkegaard's *Either/Or*, where Don Giovanni and Faust are featured, within the context of modern philosophy of language by using insights derived from Austin, Wittgenstein, Polanyi and Poteat.

To reinforce his arguments against the ills of the modern age and the crisis of postmodernity, Hall focuses on the contrast Kierkegaard makes between the psychically qualified world picture of paganism and the pneumatically qualified *Weltanschauung* of Christianity. According to Hall, this distinction is crucial for the way modernity understands itself, a self-understanding which is predicated, in Kierkegaardian terms, as *demonic*. For purposes of clarity, spirit should be understood as reflective consciousness in its capacity as the original source of personal freedom.

Hall maintains that Kierkegaard characterizes spirit as both psychic and pneumatic. In its form as psyche spirit discloses itself within a cosmos, where the world, animated by an eternal and impersonal principle called logos, is conceived as a closed, fixed, static, and limited structure of order (p. 19). So construed, the cosmos has no beginning and no end, and as such, allows for neither genuine novelty nor contingency. Pointing out that vision is, for Plato and Greek culture in general, the dominant sense, the "sensuous" or what is given to the senses becomes the metaphor for the real. In this way, "both idea (soul) and medium (sensuous) get visually/spatially qualified. This means that idea gets transformed into a visual, spatial *surface* that endures through time in a static eternity" (p. 25). As a result, the soul and its sensuous expressions are so intimately associated that they form a relation of harmony and accord. In this world picture, spirit is conceived as the natural order of the cosmos.

On Hall's accounting, the advent of Christianity disrupts this harmonious existence or innocence. Christianity inherits its viewpoint from its Hebraic ancestry, which places the spoken word (*dabhar*) of Yahweh as the highest good, the center of reality. It differs, however, from its religious forbear by shifting the latter's preoccupation with the collective "we are," as a *people* before God, to the "I am," as an individual who speaks "before God as God himself speaks, that is, in the first person" (p. 30). The temporal character of speech, which qualifies it as historical, engenders a reality that is not closed and static, but open and dynamic, one that unfolds in the future, bringing with it both hope and dread. Spirit now manifests itself as *pneuma*, the height of self-awareness. Here the individual, engaged in speech, freely binds himself to another by owning and owning up to his words. This faithfulness to the word—reflexive integrity—entitles the practitioner to be qualified as being really human.

Hall maintains that the modern age and its postmodern variant, deconstruction, are indeed pneumatically imbued. Whereas, however, the Christian/Kierkegaardian attitude encourages fidelity to one's word, the modern age perverts this tendency by disengaging itself from its word, thereby sundering any vital relation to the other or the world (p. 189). According to Hall, this unwillingness on the part of the modern age to own and own up to its word renders it essentially demonic—Roy Martinez, *Spelman College*.

HARPHAM, Edward J., ed. *John Locke's Two Treatises of Government: New Interpretations*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992. xii + 239 pp. \$29.95.—The last thirty years has witnessed an explosion of scholarly books and articles on Locke which, claims Harpham, has "recast our most basic understanding of Locke as a historical actor and political theorist, the *Two Treatises* as a document, and liberalism as a coherent tradition of political discourse" (p. 1). The seven articles

in this volume attempt to assess this "new scholarship," which is described as revisionist and historicist. This volume is now probably the best introduction to the "new scholarship." The introduction by Edward Harpham, "Locke's Two Treatises in Perspective," and the bibliography provide a nice summary of key ideas, books, and articles. The essence of the new perspective is best stated by Richard Ashcraft in "The Politics of Locke's Two Treatises of Government": "Locke's thought is thus both philosophically more conservative and politically more radical than we have hitherto supposed. In short, Locke is at once closer to Aristotle and Hooker and to the levelers and Sidney than the prevailing interpretations of his political thought maintain" (p. 18). Ashcraft attempts to separate Locke from the philosophy of Hobbes on such issues as resistance, toleration, justice and natural law, obligation, he directs his argument against Macpherson and Strauss, whose presences haunt the borders of the new scholarship. Eldon Eisenach, in his "Religion and Locke's Two Treatises of Government," interprets Locke's philosophy as marked by a deep skepticism regarding the reach of natural reason and informed by a "deep faith in the efficacy of biblical revelation" as the source of our moral and political duties. Eisenach comes close to dissenting from the new scholarship by wondering whether "Dunn and Ashcraft" are whistling in the dark concerning the coherence of Locke's "worldview," but he closes ranks with the assertion that the *Essay* lays out a path to salvation. Eisenach concludes that Locke is not antireligious and secular, but a defender of biblical Christianity. The new scholarship must emphasize all the more a "spiritualist and assertively evangelical Locke" (p. 79). David Resnick, in "Rationality and the Two Treatises," attempts to recover the portrait of Locke as an antitraditionalist, committed to a critical rationalism. Resnick uses Weber's theory of rationality to render a consistent account of Locke's social analysis. Yet Resnick also insists that Locke's political philosophy is not self-interested and atomistic but is rooted in a fully Christian worldview. "Locke's deeply held theological convictions about the existence, benevolence and rationality of God ground his reasoning in a metaphysically stable framework" (p. 89, cf. pp. 85, 115). This religious assumption provides a basis for Locke's "rationality." But a new inconsistency is opened up by this resolution—a rationalism rooted in religious faith, by a philosopher who continually urged their distinction. Karen Iversen Vaughn, in "The Economic Background to Locke's Two Treatises of Government," attempts to correct the new scholarship's neglect of the economic premises of Locke's political philosophy, this neglect is part of an overreaction to Macpherson, but Vaughn offers a moderate economic interpretation of Locke. Vaughn shows the importance of rational self-interest in economic behavior, the necessity of political society to set conditions for economic pursuit. Limit on sovereign power is an example of self-interest and evidence that "economic aspects of man's behavior permeated all aspects of life" (p. 142). Further, "civil society requires enforceable rules to contain the self-seeking actions of all men, so that life, liberty and property can be protected" (p. 142). Vaughn's essay opens the back door to the "self-interested" Locke of the "old scholarship." Ronald Hamowy, in "Cato's Letters, John Locke, and the Republican Paradigm," also seeks to redress the imbalance of the new schol-

arship, arguing that Locke's philosophy was not displaced by the civic humanist tradition and republican virtue. He offers a detailed analysis of *Cato's Letters* by John Tenchard and Thomas Gordon. Like Locke, "Cato" defines political authority in terms of inalienable rights. His analysis of liberty is strikingly Lockean, and not republican (p. 157). Pocock's assessment of Locke's irrelevance to Whiggism and the American founding must be rejected. In the final essay, "Locke's Two Treatises and Contemporary Thought: Freedom, Community and the Liberal Tradition," Stephen L. Newman compares contemporary American libertarian and communitarian alternatives to the liberal welfare state. Newman offers a very trenchant criticism of libertarianism as decidedly non-Lockean by dint of its utter depoliticization of all behavior and its tendency to restore the execution of natural law to the private citizen and private groups. On the other hand, communitarianism fails to provide a sufficiently specific and robust notion of the common good, and more consistent writers like Walzer and Barber fall back not upon a teleological community, but autonomy mixed with participation. Locke's distinction of politics from economics, family, and social groups still provides the most workable and realistic account of politics available in the modern world, hence Newman concludes that libertarianism and communitarianism offer "impoverished" political theories.

This volume is but one more sign of the vitality of Lockean philosophy and the vexing difficulties in interpretation. For all of the heralding of the new scholarship and the new Locke, the old Locke remains—enigmatic, inconsistent, and provocative.—John P. Hittinger, *College of St Francis*

HARRIS, David A. *The Manifestation of Analogous Being in the Dialectic of the Space-Time Continuum: A Philosophical Study in Freedom*. New York: Peter Lang, 1992. xxxiv + 130 pp. \$39.95.—This book is a study of the categoriality presumed by a coherent account of nature. It is a "speculative" philosophy of nature in the Hegelian sense. Harris argues that the standpoint of "mechanism," an empirical realism which "regards the objective world as a system of external relations" (p. xiii), is both incoherent and pernicious. Mechanism is incoherent because its attempts to conceptualize the order of nature have the characteristic of Kantian antinomies: they constantly pass over into counterpositions. It is pernicious because it suggests that we are related to nature as to a force hostile to our freedom.

Harris's Foreword begins with the admission that "this book was written with difficulty and will most likely be read with difficulty too" (p. xiii). The kind of difficulty in question is that which characterizes all Hegelian-style dialectical arguments. That is, the argument's real beginning is its end, the viewpoint that emerges as the truth implicitly contained in the necessarily inadequate formulations of the starting point. Thus Harris tells us on the first page that his "surpassing the standpoint of Mechanism" is accomplished not only as a result

but in principle at the very outset" (p. xiii). His last words are, "The circle closes. The end is the beginning is the end" (p. 116).

How then is the reader to find a jumping-in point? The typical Hegelian strategy employed in handling the difficulty of finding an entry point into the closed circle of dialectical argumentation is the employment of a preface that, while external to the demonstration, gives the reader a sense of the whole. Harris employs this strategy with a Fichtean vengeance: the text has a Prologue by George McLean, a Foreword, a Preface, and an Introduction. Each sheds valuable light on the argument. Each should be read twice: in the first place as an orientation to and then as a summary of the metaphysical categoriality of nature. Also, some of Harris's most interesting and cogent arguments are found in the endnotes, which should be studied carefully in order to bring clarity to the text's compressed and elliptical style of presentation.

The heart of the argument lies in establishing that the metaphysical conception of Being is neither univocal nor equivocal, but rather is analogous, and in showing that the space-time continuum can only be adequately conceptualized as a manifestation of analogous Being. While acknowledging in several places that he is following Hegel's critique of mechanism, Harris notes that "there is no allusion to analogy in [Hegel's] exposition" (p. 99). He introduces the discussion of analogy through a reflection on d. 19, q. 5, a. 2 ad 1 of St. Thomas's *Commentary on the Sentences*. Following Cajetan's ordering of the text, Harris distinguishes three kinds of analogous predication: *secundum esse sed non secundum intentionem* (in cases where a term such as "body" is predicated univocally of realities—the incorruptible and the corruptible, for instance—whose being is not the same), *secundum intentionem sed non secundum esse* (as in the example of "health" predicated both of "animal" and "diet" in the analogy of attribution), and *secundum intentionem et secundum esse*. The example which Thomas uses to illustrate this third kind of predication is Being and its transcendental categories of "truth" and "goodness." Harris's exegesis of the text shows that Being can only be conceptualized as analogous because Being truly is analogous. True thought and real being are identical. This is the viewpoint of metaphysical idealism from which the discussion of the space-time continuum proceeds. Harris is careful, however, to distinguish his notion of idealism based on the Thomistic conception of Being as analogous from forms of subjective idealism. Their defect, he argues, lies in their understanding of the identity of thought and being in a univocal way. Harris contends, on the contrary, that the metaphysical concept of identity can only be conceptualized adequately if it is an *analogous* identity—an identity that includes difference within it. Failure to conceive of the metaphysics of Being analogously, Harris argues, leads to viewpoints such as Parmenides' monism, which cannot coherently account for difference.

Employing arguments akin to Hegel's analysis of the category of "Being" passing over into "Nothing," "one" into "many," and "Same" into "Other," Harris shows that the attempt to conceptualize Being as univocal leads to the noematic standpoint of atoms and the void, and eventually to the noetic counterpositions of sophism and skepticism. The book's final chapter employs the conception of Being as analogous and

the critique of mechanistic "atoms and the void" style metaphysics to deduce (in the transcendental sense) the categories of modern physical science: space, time, place, motion, universal gravitation, and Kepler's laws.

This is a demanding but very rewarding book that might be seen as adjudicating the "quarrel of the ancients and moderns." Harris shows the relevance of the ancient metaphysics of nature and the mediaeval metaphysics of analogous Being for a coherent comprehension of the categoriality of modern science.—John Donovan, *Mount Saint Mary's College*

HARRIS, James F. *Against Relativism: A Philosophical Defense of Method*. LaSalle: Open Court Publishing Company, 1992. xvi + 228 pp. Cloth, \$54.95, paper, \$19.95.—In an age that has made a merit of nonrational relativism and the methodological Dadaism of "anything goes," Harris's book offers a much needed perspective. It is one voice in defense of human reason when very few voices are being raised. As he says at the outset, "this book represents something of a 'rear-guard action' for modernists who will hopefully gather their forces and mount some kind of counterattack in defense of reason and rationality and against the on-rushing tide of pernicious relativists" (p. 1). Harris's suggestion is that we must return to the rationality established by the Age of the Enlightenment. The relativist creed dominating academe and general culture under the guise of postmodernism has exercised a stranglehold on the contemporary mind, but as Harris argues throughout this work, the basis upon which relativism is advanced is either incoherent or presupposes the very rationality it attacks.

Harris identifies three major influences that have contributed to the rise of relativism in the twentieth century: the failure of the program of logical positivism, the move away from a single evolutionary model in cultural anthropology, and the rise of different cultures to the level of international respectability. He then proceeds with a more in-depth critical analysis of philosophers within the analytic and continental schools of philosophy. In this endeavor, he attempts to show how thinkers such as Quine, Rorty, Goodman, Kuhn, Gadamer, Habermas, Lyotard, and more recently feminist philosophers of science, have contributed to the epistemological morass.

On the analytic side, whether Quine can be rightly said to have contributed to the current wave of relativism is a question that Harris does not appropriately address. In fact it seems to me that Quine would be one of the first to applaud Harris's defense of rationality. Quine would reject pragmatist and relativist characterizations of his thought. As he himself is eager to point out, fallibilism, not relativism, follows from his naturalism. Quine's realistic stance on the ontology of physics is the key to avoiding relativism. Although the choice of the scientific framework is determined pragmatically, naturalism commits him to a definite grounding in current science. Of course, there have been those who

have argued that Quine's thought leads to relativism or implies relativism. On this score, there is some basis for the general picture Harris presents.

Harris defines radical relativism as the view according to which "basic epistemological notions such as truth, evidence, reason, rationality, and perhaps most importantly, the *method* of inquiry are relative to a context, frame of reference, paradigm, or cognitive scheme" (p. xv). For radical relativists, the modernist is simply insensitive, closed-minded, and intolerant of other cultures, hence the conception of some universal notion of rationality or human understanding is caricatured as the sexist, bigoted, ethnocentricism of dead, white males. In the current overwhelming assent to relativism, however, the attempt to be more culturally sensitive has the unfortunate consequence of depicting reason and scientific method as the tools of the oppressor, instead of the vital instruments of human progress.

In the book's penultimate chapter, "A Nineteenth-Century Reply to Post-Modernism," Harris turns to Charles Peirce for the avenue of response to the relativist. Although Peirce would agree with the relativist who contends that reason and rationality are conventional, he would say the habits, conventions, and principles we adopt are not merely subjective. Peirce's pragmatism (as opposed to James's pragmatism) preserves the place of scientific and epistemological methodology by emphasizing the role of a "community" that will always continue to reaffirm the nature of reality. As opposed to the private and individual conception of method in the foundationalism of Descartes, Peirce's view is essentially public and social. What stands in the long run is that conception of reality that finally emerges from the community of inquirers given enough information and reasoning. As Harris says, "Cognition and inference—thought and reason—are thus essentially grounded in habits, rules and principles" (p. 150). This does not mean, however, that our knowledge claims are infallible. Continual self-correction and adjustment are always sought by the community. The rules of inquiry (method) are not relative since they must operate on a reality that does not allow for just any whims of a society.

This idea vindicates the scientific realism and the importance of method Harris develops in his first chapter, "A Reprieve for Galileo." As the champion of scientific method and the precursor of Enlightenment rationality, Galileo's stance against the Church exemplifies scientific reason as the only method with the built-in mechanism for identifying and hence correcting mistakes. Science is not just one ideology among many, it is rather the *method* by which reason itself is grounded. To make this case even stronger, Harris argues that scientific methodology is the only methodology in which the possibility of fraud makes real sense. As he says, "It is of the very nature of the scientific method to question the results of its own method, and it is of the very nature of the scientific community to question the findings of its own members" (p. 155). Hence Peirce's view of the community of inquirers central to scientific method closely parallels Popper's minimal methodology of falsifiability in science. With the method of science (as opposed to other methods of fixing belief) one is not at will "to think as one is inclined



to think" Harris's positive case for rationality hinges on this claim because it provides the crucial point for rejecting radical relativism and distinguishes a *method* that is not based solely on custom and convention

Anyone caught in the postmodern labyrinth with little clue as to a way out will find Harris's book enlightening. For those ensconced in the postmodern ideology, Harris's work should provoke a riposte that will require careful attention to his formidable arguments.—Leemon B. McHenry, *Wittenberg University*

HIRSCH, Eli *The Concept of Identity* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992 (paper) x + 318 pp \$16.95—Professor Hirsch's monograph on identity, which was first published in 1982, is now available (unaltered) in paperback. As the blurbs on the back cover of the paperback edition indicate, the book was widely (and favorably) reviewed at its first appearance. The work is an impressive one, usable in upper-division undergraduate or graduate seminars but with serious philosophical contributions to make. Hence, its republication in the less expensive paperback format is welcome.

From a "logistic" viewpoint, it may initially seem that identity is a relatively uninteresting relation—that relation which each thing bears to itself but not to anything else—that is, what Hume (in the *Treatise*) calls "unity." Of course, what such a perspective presupposes is that the "things in the domain of the relation" are already individuated or "identified." Here is the locus of philosophers' usual interest in identity. In particular, Hirsch is concerned with the identity or persistence of things through time. Like any other philosophical enterprise, Hirsch's has its basic presuppositions; his most important one is that to account for the "career" of a thing—in particular, a physical object—we begin with "object-stages" or temporal slices and proceed to an analysis of the "unity-making relationship which binds the successive stages of the career of a single persisting object" (p. 7). An assumption of such an approach seems to be that "identifying" an object-stage or demarcating it from its environment is relatively unproblematic—or, at least, not a matter of central concern for the present philosophical enterprise. Hirsch's position with respect to object-stages and objects seems to be fundamentally operational rather than epistemic or metaphysical (but for more on the epistemic issue, see Chapter 6). In discussing the adequacy of what he calls "persistence-free languages," he comments that the primary interest of such a "language is that it affords a vantage point which is outside our ordinary identity scheme, and from which, therefore, we can gain a deeper insight into the character of that scheme" (p. 150).

With respect to current philosophical discussions of identity, the sortalism-nonsortalism distinction seems to be constitutive of something like party lines. A sortalist maintains that the identity/persistence conditions of something must be relativized to what kind of thing it is, a

nonsortalist eschews such relativization. Hirsch, in a sense, bridges this gap. He is a sortalist insofar as he holds that an adequate account of the grouping of object-stages into the career of a single, persisting "normal object" depends on reference to a sort or kind into which those object-stages fall. Moreover, what linguistic items are to count as sortals is not "independently" specifiable in syntactic or grammatical terms; it depends on whether the item in question in fact allows us "to trace a career" using it (to group a collection of object-stages into the "career of a single persisting object"). Hirsch does believe, however, that it is possible to specify some general features shared by sortals. He further believes that it is possible to get at our "most basic idea of the persistence of an object" (p. 80) by means of a sortal-neutral account of when a collection of object-stages constitute a career of a single persisting object. This account appeals to spatiotemporal and qualitative continuity and what Hirsch terms "minimization of change." The upshot is that Hirsch rejects what he terms the extreme position of Wiggins *et al.*, according to which "our concept of persistence is at its very roots dependent upon sortal differentiations" (p. 73). Finally, Hirsch finds compelling a view according to which, in the case of matter, as opposed to "familiar articulated objects," there is some ultimate and unobservable relationship ("genidentity") "which binds the successive stages into a bit of matter" (p. 121).

Part 1 of the book is largely devoted to a careful analysis of the persistence of objects in the terms that I have discussed. In part 2 Hirsch discusses related issues, including personal identity, in largely self-contained chapters. One of many suggestions in Part Two is that "our minds are innately determined to synthesize the stages" constitutive of "ordinary objects" into those objects (p. 179). As earlier reviewers correctly indicated, Hirsch's book is marked by its clarity and carefulness of argumentation and its general sensibleness. Now that it is available in paperback, it is a book that philosophers will want to consider for use in mid-level and advanced courses. —Michael J. White, *Arizona State University*

HODGES, Michael P. *Transcendence and Wittgenstein's Tractatus*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990. xii + 205 pp. \$39.95.—Michael Hodges offers a clear and insightful discussion of the *Tractatus* as an essentially unified work with the logical and ethical dimensions being aspects of a single ethical inquiry. His lengthy analysis of the Tractarian understanding of "transcendence," supplemented by comments from the *Notebooks 1914–16*, the "Lecture on Ethics," and correspondence, provides a key to understanding the early positions and the necessity of the shift to his later thought.

Hodges's lengthy analysis of the notion of transcendence delivers a careful exposition of the central doctrines of the *Tractatus* consistent with Wittgenstein's own characterization of the work, and discloses the ambiguity at the very center of the inquiry. The project of thinking and

willing from a transcendental perspective is unavoidably problematic, for the subject is at one and the same time both individual and situated within the world *and* transcendent and situated outside the world. The *Tractatus* itself reveals the ambiguity of its own logical project in its attempt to say what cannot be said. So too, the very achievement of the ethical viewpoint must be a stance toward the world taken by some situated individual within the world. But the *Tractatus* maintains that what happens to particular wills in the world is without any ethical value. Hodges argues that the shift to the later works is necessitated by the realization of the incoherence at the very core of the Tractarian concept of transcendence. The *Tractatus* author situated within a world cannot assume the external perspective required by the work itself, the transcendental viewpoint from the limit of the world. The key to understanding the shift to the later works lies in the very failure of transcendence and the required shift from a transcendental subject to a situated community of language users. The ambiguity within the *Tractatus* discloses the necessity of rejecting the transcendental subject and the very possibility of seeing the world as a totality of facts. All inquiry, thought, and language are already situated within a field of activities, a shared form of life within the world. The metaphysical subject at the limit of the world is replaced by a community of language users which creates contexts in which questions of meaning, evidence and truth arise (p. 190). Hodges contends that the later works "relativize ethical transcendence" by treating it as a particular attitude of a situated empirical subject (p. 92). Herein the limits of the world become the limits of one among many ways of representing the world. Rather than "the totality of facts," there exist various totalities, understood against a backdrop of shared interests and activities open to revision (p. 117). Rather than the a priori limits of all thought and reality, one finds the *de facto* limits of a multiplicity of language games serving local needs and purposes and presupposing facts about our lives in a particular world (p. 166). The failed project of the *Tractatus* in its logical and ethical dimensions originates in the attempted denial of such situatedness. Yet, according to Hodges, the central question of the *Tractatus* regarding the relation of language and the world can only then be answered in the later works in a "mundane and certainly philosophically unsatisfying way" (p. 189). One is left wondering whether this announces the end of philosophy or the inadequacy of positions developed by the later Wittgenstein.

Hodges ends this convincing, clearly executed account with two queries regrettably left briefly handled. The first concerns the form ethical inquiry must assume subsequent to the abandonment of the Tractarian project. Hodges does not develop his intimation of such an ethical vision based on an acceptance of one's situatedness, bidding the reader to turn to James C. Edwards's *Ethics Without Philosophy* for its development. His other query focuses the important issue of the very status of philosophical claims in the later works. All claims, including those of the *Philosophical Investigations* regarding human-centered language and meaning, are seen as situated truths. The desire to assert their "truth" seems to paradoxically resurrect the Tractarian transcendental ideal and the ambiguity of its project. The self-referential status of the claim that all propositions are perspectively determined necessarily

brings Wittgenstein to avoid asserting any such claims in his effort to stay clear of philosophical nonsense (p. 196)

Hodges's work provides an account which allows not only for a unified interpretation of the early Wittgenstein, but an understanding of the dynamic unity of all the works in their shifts, disagreements, and paradoxes. His persuasive interpretation occasions a careful rethinking of the *Tractatus* and leaves one anticipating an equally insightful extended discussion of the problematic issues he so briefly considers in his concluding comments — Gertrude D. Conway, *Mount Saint Mary's College*

KANT, Immanuel. *Lectures on Logic*. Translated and Edited by J. Michael Young. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. xxxii + 695 pp. \$85.00— Until this volume was published, only the *Jäsche Logic* was available in English, translated by Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz and published in 1974. That work was originally compiled at Kant's request by his student, Jäsche, probably from Kant's lecture notes, and published in 1900.

Jäsche admitted in his Preface that he was responsible for the order and presentation of the material in the *Logic* book. While he was able to decipher many of Kant's written notes, Jäsche did not always explain his procedure for using them in his compilation. As the translator of the present volume says, "One cannot simply assume, then, that Jäsche's manual is a reliable statement of Kant's views" (p. xviii).

The present edition makes available a new translation of that *Logic* together with three transcripts of Kant's lectures on Logic: The Blumberg Logic (1770s), the Vienna Logic (1780s), and the Dohna-Wundlacken Logic (1790s). In addition, the volume contains glossaries of terms in German and English and a concordance of Meier's *Excerpts from the Doctrine of Reason*. The latter was the published text Kant used as the basis of his lectures on logic, on his own copy of which he wrote extensive notes.

By associating these transcripts the present volume avoids some of the uncertainty resulting from possible extrapolations and changes of emphases in Jäsche's version. While the lectures do not contain *only* Kant's own conception of logic, they present his account of what various writers had to say about the subject, thus making clear crucial parts of the background from which he developed his epistemological and other theories, and they do also contain his own thinking about the subject. Because of this content—the translations of transcripts from different periods, the scholarly apparatus, and its concordance—this volume moves scholarship well beyond the previous dearth of material in English on Kant's dealings with logic.

Logic was clearly crucial to Kant's critical work, obviously entering into his distinction of general from transcendental logic and of logic from mathematics, his basis for identifying the categories of experience, and the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. These show

that he was far from unsophisticated about the subject. In the lectures Kant explores numerous other issues that are also of importance to him, such as the distinction between hypothetical and categorical reasoning and the nature of induction and reasoning by analogy. There are many other interesting reflections: he provides a surprisingly sympathetic (if short) account of the dialogic variety of erotematic method (p. 420), and some knockabout humor in the sections on sophistry.

The lectures seem as much concerned to teach students how to philosophize as to relay conclusions about philosophical issues relating to logic. Among the topics he addresses, whose development relates these lectures to his other writings, Kant seems to be working up a conception of the activity of judging that goes beyond a concern with the analytic-synthetic distinction or the mechanics of cognition. Through his discussions of judgment as a source of error that occur in all the transcripts, he moves in the *Jäsche Logic* to propose that the "Universal rules for avoiding error in general are 1) to think for oneself, 2) to think oneself in the position of someone else, and 3) always to think in agreement with oneself" (p. 563-4). These maxims of the enlightened, extended, and consequent or coherent modes of thought may have been introduced into this text by Jäsche, but they correspond very closely with what Kant says of the sources of error, with the maxims of the *sensus communis* that Kant sets out in section 40 of the *Critique of Judgment* as the maxims of unprejudiced, broadened, and consistent thought, and with the account of wisdom he puts forward in "Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View" (section 43). Since they are also homologous in structure with the form of moral maxims presented in the *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (p. 436), and with the a priori characteristics of civil society and the principles of the republican state that Kant presents in "On the Common Saying: That May be True in Theory, but it does not apply in Practice" (section II) and in *Perpetual Peace*, and seemingly relate to issues of method through the notion of orientation (*Lectures on Logic* [p. 511], and "What is Orientation?"), they suggest a complex set of relations centering on judgment that run through Kant's works and that could reward further study. The latter would serve to explore the relation between Kant's conception of logic and other aspects of his thought.

Perhaps ultimately Kant remained bound to a version of Aristotelian logic, he was able to use that basis brilliantly, however, and study of these lectures shows just how far he pushed beyond that limitation. By making available these lectures in English in one volume, with all its scholarly apparatus, the translator and the series editors have provided an important service, making Kant accessible to a wider audience for more serious study. Cambridge University Press has produced a very handsome volume —Salm Kemal, *The Pennsylvania State University*

"is a theory about the nature of the values whose realization makes lives good" (p. 9). It holds, unsurprisingly enough, that there are a number of these values, and that at least some of them are incommensurable and/or incompatible with each other. Some of these values are moral values—values which are "humanly caused" and which "affect primarily others." Others are nonmoral values—values which are "naturally caused" or which "both the causes and the recipients are primarily ourselves" (p. 18). Thus, a theory of pluralism will be broader than a moral theory, and one of its functions will be to show how moral and nonmoral values interact. The aims of this book include the construction of such a theory, the comparison of pluralism with its principle alternatives, monism and relativism, and the tracing of some of the implications of pluralism. The book is organized around "six theses," each of which is explained and defended in its own chapter.

The first of these chapters explores the plurality and conditionality of values. In it, Kekes divides values into a number of classes. One particularly important division is between "primary" and "secondary" values. For Kekes, primary values are universal values which humans share as a result of sharing common physiological, psychological, and social natures. These values are not just universal, they are also basic in that they "constitute the minimum requirements of a good life" (p. 42). All other values are secondary. Although primary values are basic, according to pluralists, they are not "overriding," in that they do not take precedence over all other conflicting values. That pluralism instead holds that all values are "conditional" distinguishes it from "monism."

Pluralism's denial of the overridingness of any value, even a primary value such as life, implies that the conflict of values must be unavoidable, and Kekes argues that, in fact, many values are incommensurable and incompatible. In so arguing, Kekes distinguishes pluralism from monism, seemingly at the cost of assimilating it to relativism. To avoid that outcome he argues for a "pluralist approach to conflict-resolution" (pp. 76–80). This approach shows, *pace* relativism, that some values can be given "context independent justifications." These justifications depend on the idea that, because primary values are universal, their justification is not context-dependent. Kekes also argues that, because some secondary values specify the ways in which primary values are to be satisfied, they too can be given a context-independent justification cast in terms of efficiency. However, Kekes argues that other secondary values can only be justified relatively, in terms of the contribution that they make to a tradition or a conception of a good life.

This argument allows Kekes to distinguish his brand of pluralism from cruder forms of relativism, but he also wants to avoid more sophisticated forms of relativism. He does this through a discussion of moral progress that focuses on the concept of "shame" (pp. 142–52). The discussion of this concept, along with a discussion of a ritual involving the live burial of a "spear-master" (pp. 125–7), demonstrates how a pluralist would undertake the evaluation of practices and values both within and outside our tradition. Regardless of one's views on pluralism, these discussions are worth reading.

The last three chapters discuss the implications of pluralism. Two of these chapters contain a discussion of the relation between moral and nonmoral values in which Kekes argues that it can be reasonable to act immorally to further a nonmoral value. The final chapter contains a discussion of the political implications of pluralism in which Kekes argues against the view that liberalism is related to pluralism through the idea of political neutrality, and instead offers his own pluralistic defence of many liberal ideas. This is a well-argued and ambitious book that touches on many of the important debates in modern ethical theory. It never fails to be provocative. — Roger Paden, *George Mason University*

LANGIULLI, Nino. *Possibility, Necessity, and Existence: Abbagnano and his Predecessors*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993. xiii + 205 pp. \$44.95. — Unlike his frequently provocative review essays for *Interpretation*, Nino Langiulli's study of the Italian philosopher and historian of philosophy Nicola Abbagnano is more celebratory than critical. Abbagnano, who taught at the University of Turin from 1936 until 1973 and who influenced the novelist and semiotacist Umberto Eco, acquired international esteem almost entirely for his work as an encyclopedist. Langiulli, who was his student in the early sixties, does not disparage Abbagnano's *Dizionario della Filosofia*, which he helped to translate. Rather he tries to show that Abbagnano did productive work as a formal philosopher, particularly on modalities, which has still not received suitable recognition outside of Italy.

Langiulli observes that Abbagnano's nonrecognition abroad may have resulted from his rejection of the Hegelianism once dominant in Italian academic philosophy. Throughout his career he kept his distance from the dialectic theories of consciousness identified with Croce, Gentile, and other esteemed Italian Hegelians. Abbagnano simply did not fit into what was perceived as characteristically Italian philosophy and, moreover, was too broadly eclectic to represent any school. He was inclined to borrow from different thinkers at different points in his evolution, be it from the empiricism of his professor at Naples, Antonio Aliotta, or the ontological insights of William of Ockham and Kierkegaard. Abbagnano did live long enough, however, to gain the admiration of younger Italian thinkers who were not Hegelians. Indeed he served as a bridge to Italian postmodernism and engaged in fruitful exchanges with Eco and with the nonfoundationalist philosopher Gianni Vattimo.

While Langiulli notes Abbagnano's resonance among postmodernists, he also stresses the rather traditional character of his major studies, on the relationship of existence to possibility and necessity. Abbagnano drew heavily and repeatedly on Kierkegaard's *Philosophical Fragments* in criticizing Aristotle for not distinguishing sufficiently between what is possible and what must exist. Possibility, Abbagnano and Kierkegaard insisted, is not really the opposite of what is impossible, as might be inferred from Aristotle. It is something existentially more open than necessity, a situation Aristotle did not come to grasp fully in his modal

writings. At the same time, possibility as conceptualized by Abbagnano remained circumscribed by its own context. It thus suggested its opposite, necessity, without having to surrender its own independent identity or the vision of openness which Abbagnano associated with possibility. Langiulli's analysis of these arguments indicates the breadth of his reading as well as that of Abbagnano. All of the sources Abbagnano consulted in doing his work are equally familiar to his commentator.

This exposition could have been organized more clearly as an intellectual biography, nonetheless, it is engagingly written and full of stimulating insights. It also reveals the nutritive sources not only of Abbagnano but likewise of other modern thinkers who absorbed his perceptions, including Richard Rorty. One trusts that the author will do even more on the same subject—Paul Gottfried, *Elizabethtown College*.

MADDY, Penelope. *Realism in Mathematics*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. ix + 204 pp. \$18.95—Maddy has written a concise and lucid book which covers not only her own ideas on set-theoretic realism and the “reality” of mathematics, but also provides a useful summary of the old and continuing debates surrounding mathematical ontology. This feature makes the book ideal as a classroom text. A basic familiarity with elementary set theory and number theory is obviously helpful, particularly in her technical discussions towards the end of the book, but the mathematics should not present a barrier to most advanced students of philosophy.

The book is constructed systematically. Maddy grounds her discussion of set-theoretic realism by first explaining commonsense realism as a philosophical school of thought, thus leads to a comparison with other philosophical schools, including phenomenalism, nominalism, and instrumentalism. Eventually she discusses Platonism, which brings her to the genesis of her thesis: scientific realism and Quine's naturalized epistemology.

Maddy's mathematical realism is comprised of two parts which are related. First, she identifies mathematics as a science, in philosophy if not in method. As such, Maddy finds the formalist description of mathematics—an empty formalism of meaningless symbols—unacceptably duplicitous, for this is not how in fact mathematicians themselves work, although they may offer such an explanation in the absence of a more simplistic and coherent philosophical grounding. Mathematicians, she says, work with things, not useful fictions. Second, and analogously to physics, which also often operates with unobservables, she believes that the “best explanation for our stubborn belief in objects is that they exist”—hence “common-sense” realism with regard to both physical and mathematical objects. The reasons for realism's leap of faith are twofold: its psychological inevitability, and the fact that the “existence of ordinary things provides the best account of our experiences of the world” (p. 7).



This pragmatic approach explains rather conveniently the connection between physics and mathematics it utilizes, without reducing mathematics to the "useful fiction" that merely simplifies the language of the sciences. On the other hand, those who are looking for a rock-hard justification for mathematical ontology will not find it, for this is a problem that physics is not capable of addressing. With mathematics naturalized, mathematics is subject to the same self-explanatory limitations as physics. By accepting the scientific method as the "best explanation of the world" we are not allowed to question further its justification, to engage in prescientific meta-physical enquiry.

Unlike the mathematical Platonist, Maddy feels compelled to offer an account of our perception of mathematical objects, using our "familiar cognitive apparatus" (p. 48). This entails a "compromise platonism," for while she emphatically maintains that sets are perceivable, she also freely admits that mathematical objects present certain obstacles to the common causal theory of knowledge. Although Maddy consistently describes her beliefs as a form of Platonism, her epistemology is in fact the reverse of Plato's, for she sees mathematical knowledge as perceptual rather than conceptual. Therefore, she spends much of the book dealing with questions of how we "intuit" abstract objects from their concrete representations.

Maddy's compromise Platonism allows for the discovery of mathematical objects both through intuition and through external or "theoretical" verification common to the physical sciences; for example, "verifiable consequences, lack of disconfirmation, breadth and explanatory power, intertheoretic connections, simplicity, elegance," and so forth (p. 75). The inclusion of theoretical verification, which contains elements of formalism, combined with Platonism's method of intuition aims to please everyone and to include much of the mathematics which has already been developed. Unfortunately, the compromise often feels uncomfortably like a marriage of convenience because it allows for two often conflicting methods of mathematical justification. Despite the fact that this tension is left unresolved, this book makes a valuable contribution to the literature simply by providing the language of set-theoretic realism with which to discuss this problem.—Lilianne Rivka Kfia, *New York, N.Y.*

- MAY, Keith M. *Nietzsche on the Struggle between Knowledge and Wisdom*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993. xv + 193 pp. \$49.95.—May's monograph concerns one aspect of the quarrel between the ancients and the moderns. He presents six meditations on the relation between wisdom and knowledge, taking his bearings from a free interpretation of Nietzsche's *Nachlaß*. In an early notebook entry, Nietzsche remarks that science (*Wissenschaft*) struggled with wisdom in the ancient Greek philosophers. That is, there was an agon between the salubrious but false

Homeric myths and the "true" but toxic products of the drive toward knowledge. May attempts to resurrect this agon by reappraising knowledge and the soul.

May begins with an interpretation of Nietzsche's early, unpublished essay, "Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks," which discusses Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, and Anaxagoras. Each excelled in the "subtle art of subordinating knowledge [to wisdom] while retaining respect for it, an art which we have lost" (p. 1). The advances made by the pre-Socratics, however, initiated the dissolution of the agon. By the time of Socrates, wisdom had begun to overpower knowledge, as Socrates' adherence to the Delphic oracle's pronouncement illustrates. Whereas Heraclitean wisdom is the reliance on "one's own uncorrupted vision" (p. 11), Platonic wisdom is the state in which the soul is most divine. Aristotle further separates wisdom from the mundane by defining wisdom as the drive toward metaphysics. The wise, those who intuit universals, have little use for knowledge, which concerns particulars. In the midst of this deification of wisdom emerged Euripides, who is "'knowledgeable' (observant) but not normally wise" (p. 80). Far from being an anomaly, Euripides prefigures modern individuals who privilege knowing over wisdom, and beings over Being.

The site of the contest between knowledge and wisdom is the soul, which has been led astray by post-Socratic philosophers. May interprets Ariadne as "the human soul [for] Nietzsche" (p. 132), more specifically, as "the soul in our epoch" (p. 140). As demigod, Ariadne sits between Euripides' all-too-human emphasis on knowledge and the divine wisdom of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. By symbolizing the modern soul as Ariadne, "Nietzsche is, of course, saying that the soul must now accept itself as the creator of all it has hitherto deemed unapproachably divine, or otherwise unapproachable" (p. 149). Nietzsche apparently "begins to overcome the Greeks" because he has the wisdom to retain and seek life-affirming knowledge even though "it is untrue and unwise" (p. 171). Thus, Nietzsche neither unwisely worships knowledge as moderns do, nor ignorantly strives toward wisdom. Nietzsche, May hopes, will assist us in resurrecting wisdom to its former agonal relation with knowledge.

Perhaps because of his desire to avoid the modern malaise of overvaluing knowledge, May provides few textual citations and almost no references to secondary literature. Without such evidence, his provocative claims, such as "Nietzsche recognizes that good and bad are the same" (p. 26), "Socrates talks *pointlessly*" (p. 52), and "The god of gods is Zeus, and Plato would not dream of questioning that religious datum" (p. 57), seem mistaken. More fundamentally, May's imperative for modernity presupposes that we possess sufficient volitional resources to adopt the Heraclitean-Nietzschean *Weltanschauung*, yet in the works of 1888, Nietzsche argues that we are *décadent* and lack the strength to improve. Unfortunately, such omissions render May's highly suggestive work more impressionistic than scholarly — Brian Domino, *University Park, Pa*

OLSON, Alan M *Hegel and the Spirit Philosophy as Pneumatology* Princeton Princeton University Press, 1992 xiv + 223 pp \$24 95—

The author's claim is that Hegel was the first to develop a fully comprehensive theology of Spirit Prior to Luther there was no clear appreciation of the way spirit fulfills and completes Christian life While Luther's formulations remain at the level of exhortation and practical instruction, pietism recognized that immediate experience was a grounding authority not only for personal conviction but also for the life of the community

Circumstantial evidence and speculative hypotheses are used to "argue" that Hegel came from a strongly pietistic family and was trained in Luther's *Shorter Catechism* While he remained true to this basic insight, it was singularly modified by Hegel's interaction with Holderlin during the Frankfurt years When Holderlin became embroiled in a love affair with the mistress of the house where he was tutor, Hegel advocated a "renunciation grounded in love whereby Spirit brings about a reconciliation of opposites" (p 64) In response, Holderlin's poetry at first explores a dialectic of renunciation, but then turns to a renunciation of dialectic that anticipates his mental decline Hegel's discussion of madness in the *Encyclopaedia* is then read as an explicit response to Holderlin's fate, suggesting that madness occurs when feeling gains control, and that it is in some way consciously chosen A full spiritual life must, through renunciation, transcend the standpoint of immediate feeling that pietism shares with the romantics

The ultimate achievement of Spirit, according to Olson, is Absolute Consciousness, an Enlightenment beyond Enlightenment Hegel is thereby echoing Eckhart's mystical insight that the highest freedom is the ability to renounce everything (p 127) and so "rise to a vision of unity so complete and sublime that all temple images are left behind" (p 54) This all-encompassing vision of truth that emerges from Absolute Negation (or renunciation) finds expression in Hegel's *Logic*, particularly the logic of Being, Nothing, and Becoming (The latter concept carries with it Vedantic images of restless undulation) The logical core of spiritual life transforms the simple dogma of spirit into a pneumatology, or *theology* of spirit Hegel can thereby demonstrate "through the logic of the concept, how it is the case that Spirit has the power to 'bind together feeling's emotion' and 'memory's reflective recollection' in thought to 'be with one's actions'" (pp 156-7)

For all that Olson says that he is "arguing" his case, he offers very little solid demonstration for many of his more interesting claims Hegel's silence about his mother and about Holderlin is converted, by using the Freudian language of repression, into positive evidence that he is in fact preoccupied with both Circumstantial evidence frequently justifies little more than the observation that "it may very well be the case" So many of Olson's theories are speculative, not in Hegel's technical sense, but in the more colloquial meaning of a hypothetical and imaginative proposal This method of exposition is probably deliberate, for it is designed to complement Olson's main thesis from the standpoint of Absolute Consciousness we can see how many unconnected details fit together, we leave behind the temple of images and feel the unity, while at the same time we renounce the immediate and the compelling

Olson's essay is thus not itself to be read as theology—a reasoned discourse—but as a kind of poetic evocation

Unfortunately this volume offers too much evidence of sloppy editing and careless writing. A particularly noteworthy example is found on page 100, where Hegel's lecture comment that "big men with black hair" are particularly susceptible to frenzy is taken to be a precise description of Holderlin, who was not only a big muscular man of six feet, but also a brunette —John W. Burbidge, *Trent University*

PREUS, Anthony, and ANTON, John P., eds. *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy V. Aristotle's Ontology*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. ix + 352 pp. Cloth, \$49.50, paper \$16.95—This carefully edited book, complete with notes, a bibliography, and indexes, contains fourteen papers selected from those read at the yearly meeting of the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy. The essays are divided into three groups dealing (roughly) with logic, metaphysics, and the soul. John P. Anton argues that the categories do not mean predicates but fundamental types of attribution formulated in accordance with the ontology of first substance. D. Morrison points out that they stand for classes of being in the universe. The question of why Plotinus dispensed with some of the categories is the subject of C. Evangelou's paper. Plotinus tended to reduce even quantity and quality to relations and made action and passion species of motion, whereas Aristotle never referred to motion as a category. A. Urbanas presents a valuable study of the meaning of ὅπερ (the attribution of a predicate in the sense of indeterminate identity).

In Part 2 W. Wians recalls that *phainomena* in Aristotle signify not only the observed facts but also common opinions in conformity with facts. I would suggest that Nussbaum's claim to the effect that Aristotle limits philosophical speculation to *phainomena*, community based opinions, applies at best to ethics and politics. According to E. Harper the *aporiai* in *Metaphysics* 3 all concern the question of how form is one. This does not seem quite correct, however. T. Scaltsas believes quite surprisingly that Aristotle's arguments do not oblige him to resort to a characterless substratum in substance, but this does not quite seem to render the ontological situation. The last four essays (Part 3) concern problems of soul and nature.

In their introduction the editors stress the value and privilege of dealing with Aristotle's thought. The fruitfulness of such endeavors is once more proven by the high level of acute philosophical arguments in most papers of this well-edited book —Leo J. Elders, *Instituut voor Wysbegeerte en Theologie*

RAHE, Paul A. *Republics Ancient and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina

Press, 1992 xiv + 1201 pp \$49.95—No one can fail to be impressed by Paul Rahe's magnificent contribution to the history of political theory. With almost eight hundred pages of text and over four hundred pages of notes and elaborate index, it is an indispensable reference for scholars concerned with classical political philosophy and its ramifications for the West, particularly in America. The volume's three books—"The Ancien Regime," "New Modes and Orders" (the longest section), and "Inventions of Prudence"—present reflective accounts of ancient republicanism, early modern political philosophers (especially Locke), and the American *novus ordo seclorum*, respectively. A historian by training, Rahe displays an impressive command of the scholarship in both political philosophy and political history. It is a rare scholar who would not profit from this book.

One must take Rahe's subtitle seriously, for he concludes his book urging a Lincolnian "new birth of freedom." "But that can only happen if Americans pause from time to time to seriously ponder just what their first principles are and what they entail. It is with this possibility in mind that I have written this book" (p. 782). Rahe advocates a political understanding of this most scholarly work, and we will respect the author's intentions in this brief review.

On one level, Rahe tells a familiar story. Ancient republicans practiced virtue. The modern theorists replaced virtue with lower goals such as comfortable self-preservation, thus redefining man and his ends. Finally, the American founders accepted the modern theorists' fundamental principles—"the restricted, Lockean character of the American understanding of 'justice and the public good'" (p. 1064)—while resisting the more grotesque conclusions of the modern project.

The broad reservation this reviewer has about Rahe's work is that he misleadingly identifies the core of ancient republicanism with Greek political practice. He thereby underrates ancient philosophy's emphasis on the best regime and natural right as the standard for judging political life. In his informative discussion of political friendship (*homonoria*) we see the extent to which ancient practice sought political unity: "pederasty was one of the means by which martial communities of ancient Hellas sought 'to remove the causes of faction' and to promote civil courage 'by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests'" (p. 133, quoting James Madison from *Federalist* 10). From the beginning of the book, Rahe presents what he takes to be Madison's challenge to ancient practice: controlling the effects rather than the causes of faction. Should our American abhorrence of some Greek practices limit our willingness to learn from Greek political philosophy, which was certainly at odds with all conventions, not just Greek ones? Moreover, do not *The Federalist Papers* as a whole—see Madison's number 14, as well as parts of *Federalist* 49, 55, and 57—and the other founding documents present a teaching about republican self-government that deals with the causes of faction, and thus requires the fostering of virtue?

Rahe emphasizes a narrow span of modern philosophy (basically limited to that of Hobbes and Locke) which defined the founders' horizons. He thus gives short shrift to Spinoza, the first philosopher to praise democracy. One might contrast Spinoza's rereading of Scripture and

understanding of nature with those of Hobbes and Locke. Though Rahe does note Shakespeare's influence on the English-speaking peoples (p 144), he does not include him as a source of ancient wisdom in modern times. One hopes that Rahe will supplement his tome with what would doubtless be illuminating studies of these figures' significance for America.

Thus, in understanding the American Founding, Rahe brings out the tensions between modern "civic humanism," with its break from ancient republicanism, and magnanimous practice in the American character. Compare, for instance, his statement that "by lowering their sights, [the American Founders] hoped to discover firmer ground on which to erect the edifice of republican liberty" (p 587) with his contention that "what the Greeks meant when they singled a gentleman out as noble, beautiful, fine and good" was to be found in the leaders of the American Revolution (p 566). Despite the author's immense erudition and sophistication, he does not properly relate America, this most philosophically indebted and therefore theoretical of all nations, to the philosophical bases of republicanism and, moreover, of the West itself. (Incidentally, would not Roman practice make a better comparison than Greek?) Whether the American debt to Aristotle, for example, is direct, as was the case for eighteenth-century European republicans (see Manfred Riedel's *Metaphysik und Metapolitik*), is of less importance than the crucial role of republican theory and practice in the American Founding and in any effort to perpetuate the virtue of self-government in the modern world. Regardless of these problems it is clear that all future scholarship on the American Founding and its themes of republican self-government must master the themes of Rahe's book — Ken Masugi, *The Claremont Institute for the Study of Statesmanship and Political Philosophy*

RESCHER, Nicholas. *A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Volume II The Validity of Values*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. xui + 259 pp. \$39.50. — "Not just in commerce but in the world of ideas," wrote Kierkegaard, "our age is putting on a veritable clearance sale." The life of reasoned evaluation, he said, is being sold "dirt cheap." Everyone wants "to go further." So also argues Nicholas Rescher in *The Validity of Values*, the second volume of *A System of Pragmatic Idealism*. Like Kierkegaard, Rescher sees the theory and practice of rational evaluation being put "on sale." He finds influences similar to those seen by Kierkegaard at work behind the sale's scene: a pervasive prudential, marketplace mentality, a philosophical vogue, cultivated by what Rescher calls our "civilized sophisticates" (p 199), in which the normative role of reason is disdained (for Rescher, disdained in favor of a postmodern, poetic style).

*The Validity of Values* is not, it should be noted, a reactionary book, wary of postmodern thought though it may be. Rescher works through rather than against those positions with which he has a disagreement. Although he offers an objectivist alternative to the moral theories of

prudentialists, relativists, subjectivists, and indifferentists, he does so in a way that makes constructive use of the core of their concerns: self-interest, plurality, perspective and context, and irreducible gaps between value and fact. While the book hinges on ontological distinctions, these are forged in a pragmatic press. Gone are any hints of an all-embracing good, of an idealism of a monistic sort. That kind of idealism, says Rescher, is "an oversimplification, a heritage of the monolithic summum bonum thinking of bygone days" (p. 34). What is put in its place is an idealism built on a contingent ground, one in which universal values and ontological obligations are posited, but are derived immanently and are shown to be consonant with pluralism and relativism at the level of particular cases.

The appropriate description of this book is that it is conservative retrospective in its vision, but for prospective ends. What the book aims to provide is an updated but traditional "evaluative metaphysics of morals" (p. 221). What Rescher feels that we need is a revival of the classical Western "rationality project" (p. 21), the construction of a "cognitive home" (p. 12), and the avowal of human endeavor as the "intelligent pursuit of appropriate ends" (p. 19). Finally, what Rescher wants to affirm in his book is the human defined in the traditional, modern, individualizing way. For Rescher, we need to see ourselves as persons more significantly than as a people, as autonomous, self-appreciative agents. We need to recall that we are capable of transcending the limits of our concrete conditions, that the human person is an "amphibious being, a creature of two realms, the material and the mental" (p. 99).

What makes Rescher's book compelling is not so much the representation of traditional ideas but rather the logic at work behind their assertion. Better put, what compels the reader is the story in which those ideas are cast, a Darwinian narrative of human being through which the "key thesis" of the book is played out, namely, "that rationality as such and in general is bound up with the theory and practice of rational evaluation" (p. xiii). The heart of the story as Rescher tells it is fairly simple: we are a species who have evolved into a niche of intelligence; through us "purposeful action and rational evaluation came to be possible in a heretofore purposeless and value-free cosmos" (p. 149). To be sure, all of this is accidental, but having occurred, human existence is stained with an "indelibly moral dimension" (p. 114). As Rescher puts it, the fact of our evolution leaves us with not just an *ex officio* but an *ex condicione* obligation to realize our natures, to be the rational agents that we are, to optimize our niche in life. The human task, Rescher concludes, is not about poetic self-creation, about doing what we want. "Our purpose, our mission in life is not elective—it lies not in our will but in our nature" (p. 117).

There is much to be said in response to Rescher's book, not the least of which is that some of what humans are is left undiscussed. Above all, perhaps, the fact of our unconsciousness is omitted, our status as imaginal as well as rational, our being as creatures of idiosyncratic fantasy, made up of what Pascal called "reasons of the heart." In turn, Rescher underplays to some extent the depth of the postmodern impulse that it arises not just in rebellion against a normative rationality and morality but as a witness to the complexity of our makeup, that, at

its best, it sees more that is valuable in human being rather than less. Despite the partial vision of the book, however, *The Validity of Values* is telling in its critique of our contemporary philosophical situation. Rescher renders a story of the Western tradition of self-understanding that shows it to be a tradition of great dignity, worthy of being retained and of being passed on — Bennett Ramsey, *University of North Carolina at Greensboro*

RICOEUR, Paul *Oneself as Another* Translated by Kathleen Blamey Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992 356 pp n p — This work comprises ten “studies” devoted to the ways in which the self, as distinguished from both the “I” who has or is the self and the human being considered as an instance of the species, reveals itself. This epistemological investigation leads to reflections on the ontology of the self in the last study.

Ricoeur’s method is hermeneutic. He relies on “reflective meditation” or “detours of reflection by way of analysis.” While he bases his claims on the self-evidence of reflective data in which the self shows itself to itself, his reflections are mediated by analyses of the complex phenomena of human speech, action, narrative and moral responsibility. In his analyses he appropriates and critically emends a wide range of reflections of other philosophers, historical and contemporary, analytic and phenomenological. The results are, as Ricoeur himself observes, fragmentary insights—in contrast to the unitary simplicity of the Cartesian *cogito* and the reductive identification of the self with the body, the acts which the self performs, or a collection of events in space and time. Thus in his last study Ricoeur suggests that basic terms for the description of the self such as “act” and “who” are irreducibly polysemic with only analogical unity, and one may be disappointed not to find a summative view of the structure of the self or a statement of its ultimate mode of being.

The hermeneutic spells out ramifications of two dialectics in which the self reveals itself, between it and the same and it and the other. The first dialectic reflects the interplay (in both disclosure and being) between the self as what it is at any time and its permanence through time (what Ricoeur calls the *ipso* and *idem* senses of identity). The second dialectic reflects the interplay between the self and the various others with which it is related, including its body (“flesh” or body lived subjectively), external objects, and other subjects or selves. Ricoeur traces the two dialectics through four contexts: speech as analyzed by various theories of semantics (studies 1 through 3), action, by action theories (4 through 6), narrative, principally by his own prior work, and morality, by ethical theories (7 through 9). He isolates and clarifies pregnant concepts in each context—for instance, attestation—in which the self reveals itself as speaker and encounters the other as listener in the process of referring to something, the “who” which forms an intention and carries it to consummation in an act, the character, whose persistence and



reversals through changes in a plot give unity to a narrative, and the moral agent, who responds to the call of conscience as both part of himself and the voice of another

It is not possible here to convey the richness of this work. It testifies to the importance of openness to the whole range of thought sedimented in the history of philosophy and accreting from contemporary work, of not shutting oneself into a single tradition or a narrow topic and thereby shutting oneself off from the insights available in alternative traditions and other topics. Ricoeur is meticulous, generous and fair in his treatment of the thought of others. This is appropriate to his topic (the self as another) and lends authority to both what he culls from other works and his criticisms of their limitations. His studies provide a multitude of details with which any synthetic theory of the self must come to terms. That he raises more questions than he answers may be just what is right given the current state of the topic that he has undertaken to explore, which is one of the most enigmatic that a philosopher inherits from the tradition — John Kultgen, *University of Missouri at Columbia*

RORTY, Amélie Oksenberg, ed. *Essays on Aristotle's Poetics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. 435 pp. Cloth, \$69.50, paper, \$19.95. — This is an important book. It consists of twenty-one essays, sixteen of which have not been published before, and sheds light on two of the most difficult points in the *Poetics*, imitation and catharsis. The order in which the papers are presented has been carefully chosen, so that the overall impression is that of a certain unity of interpretation. In this review we can only bring out a few of the more salient statements of the book.

Even if tragedy cannot be avoided, its end note is not despair, the major tragic figures emerge enlarged (Rorty). G. E. M. de Ste. Croix believes that the disparagement of history in the *Poetics* is not fully justified. In an illuminating essay Paul Woodruff argues that Aristotle's *mimesis* is light years away from modern concepts such as fiction or representation. Poetry aims at expressing what happens (or could happen) in general, it can be either dramatic or narrative. Everything said and done within a play must form one piece of meaningful activity (R. Bittner). D. H. Roberts recalls that the action of a tragedy must have a beginning which does not follow from anything else and from which nothing follows, but Aristotle allows for factors outside the plot (the gods, the irrational). Chance events ought to be excluded as much as possible, because the plot must be based on a certain type of character (Dorothea Frede). S. White raises the question whether Aristotle favors plays with a tragic ending or those with a happy ending. The pleasure of tragedy results from seeing people respond admirably to the challenges they are facing. A tragedy of which the protagonist is unworthy would not be considered good by Aristotle (Martha Nussbaum). Alexander Nehamas argues against Nussbaum's homeopathic interpretation of catharsis, he himself views it as the clarification of the solution of a

plot But Jonathan Lear raises some doubts about these interpretations W Booth observes that it is a most remarkable fact that a puzzling text of Aristotle did have so much influence on literary criticism According to S. Halliwell one of the difficulties in interpreting the *Poetics* is its mixture of the explicit and the implicit He sketches the place of the book in Renaissance, Classicist and Neoclassicist literary criticism Acquaintance with the traditional views and uses of the *Poetics* influences our interpretation —Leo J Elders, *Instituut voor Wysbegeerte en Theologie*

SOKOLOWSKI, Robert *Pictures, Quotations, and Distinctions Fourteen Essays in Phenomenology* Notre Dame University of Notre Dame Press, 1992 xii + 325 pp \$32.95 —In this book the author collects a number of "phenomenological studies of various kinds of intentionality" written over the years since the appearance of his *Presence and Absence A Philosophical Investigation of Language and Being* (Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1978) He thinks of that book as a very formal one, and hopes to show in this one how Husserl's style of philosophical thinking illuminates "a range of diverse and more concrete phenomena" (p ix) Although the book is thus frankly about appearances, the author makes the important reservation that "the things that are can also seem to be as they are", in that sense he conceives of the project as "a venture into the question of being and a clarification of what we are" (p xiii) Sokolowski sets out to "describe a form of appearance" in each essay, but he supposes that being is the "origin of these forms", that they are "forms through which being is diffracted at some distance from itself" (p xiv) One wonders, in the case of things that are and "seem to be as they are," whether this diffraction does not take place at all or takes place very close to being Where the category of appearance plays so dominant a role as it does in phenomenology, the relation between appearance and being is always troublesome where everything is in some sense appearance, how shall we sort out the things that are what they seem from the things that are seemings and nothing but seemings?

Since description is central to the phenomenological method, and since the author's descriptions are lively and concrete, we can bracket the difficulty just mentioned and still learn a great deal from his concrete approach to many important issues The essays are grouped in pairs or triplets the first group deals with representation in image and speech, the second with distinctions and explanations; the third, a triplet consisting of "Timing," "Measurement," and "Exact Science and the World in Which We Live," deals with philosophy of science (the last named essay draws heavily on Husserl's doctrine of exact, or ideal, essences), the fourth and fifth may be grouped together, for both deal with language, with especial reference to the doctrines of Frege, Husserl, and Tarski (there is a return to the theme of representation in the Tarski essay), the sixth, a triplet, discusses moral thinking, moral action, and natural law I found the first two essays of this last group a powerful

reminder of how neo-Kantian a doctrine phenomenology is, when all is said and done. Sokolowski takes the term "categoriality" from Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and gives it a moral interpretation. He does this by establishing a moral parallel to Husserl's distinction between the categorial form of predication and the more basic categorial form upon which it depends—that of identification, or recognition. In the moral sphere, he claims, the two categorial forms of moral judgment (deontological and axiological theories) and moral relation (teleological, utilitarian, and consequentialist theories) depend upon the more basic categorial form of moral identification. This most basic categoriality is that by virtue of which the raw material of morality is informed by "the categorial form of taking what is good or bad for you, as such, as being good or bad for me" (p. 255), only when this constitutive, intentional, formative act has taken place can the more dependent categorial forms of judgment and relation come into play. The suggestion is of great interest, but it does make it difficult to give phenomenology the realist interpretation the author wishes to give it.

From this rich assortment, I single out for further discussion the two Frege pieces from group four. The first, "Exorcising Concepts," is an attack on the notion of mental entities as the significations of our words; such entities, Sokolowski says, are known by many titles: "*concepts, mental words, interior words, intelligible species, ideas, notions, cognitive contents, and abstract entities*" (p. 174). His exorcism consists in "a philosophical description of words that will not force us to posit ideas or concepts as mental entities" (p. 175). Four factors suffice for this description: the speaker, the sound, the thing spoken about, and the hearer. There is no problem when the thing spoken about is present: the meaning (sense) *persimmon*, spoken by someone, adds no concept but merely the meaning by which a persimmon is presented by the speaker. "meanings are precisely things as presented" (p. 181). But what about the presentation of the persimmon, by the same meaning, in the absence of the persimmon? Is the meaning *persimmon* present to the listener in that case? If so, it seems tantamount to a concept. At one point (p. 177) Sokolowski says that when John utters the sound *persimmons* this makes Mary think of persimmons. Is she then thinking of that meaning, or is she thinking precisely of persimmons—perhaps imagined ones? In that case we seem to have mental entities again, even though they are not concepts. As for concepts, Sokolowski says that they are simply reified meanings (p. 185), but it seems consistent with the spirit of phenomenology to think of them as meanings *constituted* as absent presences. They would not then be entirely mental entities, since they would have been constituted on the basis of meanings originally uttered in the presence of the target entity, but they would be concepts of a kind (present) artifacts, or *extra rationis*, to which the mind could attend in the absence of the persimmon.

The interpretation Sokolowski gives of Frege's doctrine of meaning (sense) and reference in the second essay from group four, "Referring," is not inconsistent with this suggestion. He stresses the fusion of sense and reference (in natural language as distinct from the language of formal logic). "All references, whether names or descriptions, are blends of sense" (p. 201). He discusses the component of sense with the help

of such terms as "predicates," "characterization," "description," "features," "disclosure," and "display." But the components of sense, as universals, are not properly referents themselves: "features do not exist in an independent way", their reference is parasitic on the (particular) referent (p. 203). On the other hand, the whole business of referring is not to be understood as the calling attention to something that is objective in the sense of being independent of subjectivity, reference is not an "'objective' relation, independent of the 'subjectivities' of speaker and listener" (p. 194). As a phenomenologist, Sokolowski takes reference to be "an intentional form that requires words, object, and interlocutors" (p. 195), it is a "presentational achievement between speaker and addressee" (p. 196). Reference is thus something *constituted*, and the sense in which the referent is an object must be consistent with the sense in which two persons are "engaged constitutors of reference and referent" (p. 195). So why not (to return to "Exorcising Concepts") think of a concept (in the sense of a *legitimately* reified meaning) as part of that constituted complex we call reference? Why should so formative a thing as consciousness must be for phenomenologists not form concepts as well?—Edward Pols, *Bowdoin College*

STAMBAUGH, Joan *The Finitude of Being* Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992 vii + 200 pp. \$14.95—In what is undoubtedly the most thorough and most sympathetic examination of Heidegger's later thought, Joan Stambaugh guides the reader through the density of multiple approaches to a postmetaphysical, poetic expression of the finitude of Being. Sifting her way through difficult and obscure formulations of the "open," "the strife between concealing and unconcealing," the distinction between what may be called relative nihilism and absolute nihilism, Heidegger's quarrel with Rilke's image of "the open" as infinite, and the theme of the "presencing of the clearing for self-concealing" in the as yet untranslated work *Beiträge*, Stambaugh offers running commentary, exposition, and interpretation on texts that are both unique and strange. Throughout, Heidegger's suggestion that *Ereignis* should properly be rendered as "appropriation" is followed and the "need" that Being has for *Dasein*'s response to its "presencing" is emphasized.

As Stambaugh says, from time to time, Heidegger's later exploration of the finitude of Being amounts to a *via negativa*. In his scrupulous attempt to avoid echoes of Christian metaphysics (to say nothing of the metaphysical errors in the history of Western philosophy), to prescind from representational thinking, to avoid objectification, to undermine transcendentalism and any hint of transcendentals, Heidegger is shown to be at his best in delineating what he does *not* want to say or what Being is not. Heidegger's by now familiar critique of the orientation and practice of "framing" (*Gestell*) is lucidly discussed. The ordering, objectification, and manipulation of objects in technicity is entangled with the forgetfulness of Being, the erasure of the mystery of "revealing" of the truth of Being.

While many of Heidegger's sometimes tortured, sometimes poetic attempts to probe and express what is clearly ineffable practically defy interpretation because of his unusual language, the author gives us illuminating insights into what he is seeking to express. Thus, Heidegger's insight is said to be Greek—he wants to avoid the extremes of permanence and nihilism (p. 119). Like Heraclitus's nature, Being loves to hide, it is unique and strange—it conceals and withdraws itself (p. 134). The ambiguity in Heidegger's formulations is accurately pointed out (p. 141). The folding in of Heidegger's later thought is shown. Being, appropriation, and the "clearing of self-concealing" are virtually synonymous and the exotic image of "the Fourfold" (earth, heaven, the gods, and man) is said to be a name for Being (p. 145).

This conscientious and painstaking study of an unusual series of texts in the later writings of Heidegger will be welcomed by those who have sought to follow his pathway into a "clearing" in which Being may be, if *Dasein* is truly "there," experientially appropriated. Others who will find this mode of discourse ambiguous, strange, and obscure may come to think that Heidegger has led them onto a *Holzweg* in the figurative sense a "wrong track"—George J. Stack, *State University of New York at Brockport*.

STEWART, John B. *Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy*. Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1992. 325 pp. \$45.00—

Stewart's purpose is to show that Hume is not a political conservative, but is better understood as a liberal. The author is reacting against several recent works on Hume: David Miller's *Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), Donald W. Livingston's *Hume's Philosophy of Common Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), and Frederick G. Whelan's *Order and Artifice in Hume's Political Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985). These "all share, with variations, the nineteenth-century view that Hume's epistemology led him to conservatism" (p. 3). Stewart acknowledges that the term "conservative" is used in different ways by these authors, but not so differently that they cannot be collectively refuted by showing Hume to be a liberal, that is, one "who thought that major reforms were highly desirable in the United Kingdom in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries" (p. 6). Stewart is referring here to substantial "economic and political reforms," but not to "socialist, Marxist, or neoliberal reforms."

There are two main components to Stewart's argument. He argues that Hume is not limited to a conservative position by his epistemology, but rather that his epistemology supports the sort of liberalism that Stewart attributes to Hume. Stewart also demonstrates that Hume in fact thought that there was a need for a great many significant economic and political reforms in the United Kingdom, and, though Stewart does not address this explicitly, that Hume came to these beliefs in a manner consistent with his epistemology.

Stewart reminds his readers that, although Hume is a skeptic who denies that truths about reality can be revealed by mere demonstration and that requirements of morality can be learned by the analysis of abstract ideas, he is a moderate skeptic whose epistemology also has a "positive, constructive side" (see pp 196–8). Hume believes, as the title of his *Treatise* implies, that one can attain true beliefs on moral subjects if only one "introduce the experimental method of reasoning." These true beliefs are arrived at through a process that relies on "reason and reflection." Thus, at the same time as he revealed that the passions are not inferior reason, that reason alone ought not to govern all aspects of human conduct, and, accordingly, that "the pretenses of the rationalists are hollow," he also denied that one has "no choice but to rely upon unexamined beliefs" (p 204). Hume's epistemology does not lead to a straightforward conservatism, rather, "the purpose of improving our beliefs [through the experimental method of reasoning] is to liberate politicians from merely customary opinions and values" (p 213). Although Hume's reliance on experience could have made him a very cautious reformer, perhaps sufficiently cautious to be considered a conservative rather than a true liberal, Stewart belies this speculation by discussing at length in the last and longest chapter of the book a great many significant economic and political reforms that Hume thought would be in the interest of the United Kingdom.

Above I have described the main argument of Stewart's book, as presented in the Introduction and developed in chapters 5 and 6, the last two chapters of the work. The first four chapters are meant to lay the foundation for Stewart's most important claims. In the first two chapters Stewart presents the views of a variety of authors whose ideas Hume either reacts against or further develops, including Grotius, Hobbes, Pufendorf, Clarke, and Wollaston in chapter 1, and Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler in chapter 2. Although these discussions are interesting in their own right, Stewart neither uses them to foreshadow what is to come, nor systematically refers back to them, as would be desirable. Chapters 3 and 4 are devoted respectively to Hume's moral and political philosophy. Stewart again makes many interesting and valuable points, but does not here seek to unify these points into an integrated whole. Although the discussion of the first four chapters is informative, the real value of the work is more narrowly contained in the explicit argument that Hume is a political liberal, not a conservative — Donald Becker, *The University of Texas at Austin*

WALICKI, Andrzej *Legal Philosophies of Russian Liberalism*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992. x + 477 pp. \$19.95—  
When this volume was first published by Oxford University Press in 1967, it was hailed as a superb historical study of an intellectual current that died in Russia with the defeat of the Constitutional Democratic (Cadet) Party and the ascendancy of the Bolsheviks, namely, the later

nineteenth- and early twentieth-century thinking of those Russian philosophers who championed the liberal values of democracy, individual rights, and a state based on the rule of law (a *Rechtsstaat*). Now re-issued in a changed world by the University of Notre Dame (where Walicki, a native of Poland, is the O'Neil Professor of History), the book takes on additional, highly contemporary significance: the destruction of Soviet totalitarianism has given new life to liberal values, and the ideas of these forgotten thinkers are now relevant to the most burning political issues of the day in Russia. Not surprisingly, a Center for the Study of Russian Liberalism has been established within the Russian Academy of Sciences, and a Russian translation of Walicki's book is in preparation.

Because the notion of the rule of law was central to the concept of liberalism advanced by the Russian thinkers, Walicki focuses on their legal philosophies, effectively countering the widespread belief that Russian thought is uniformly antilegalistic. He devotes a chapter to each of six major thinkers who represent successive stages in the evolution of liberal legal thinking in Russia. Boris Chicherin (1828–1904), a classical liberal who defended property rights and was an implacable opponent of socialism, Vladimir Soloviev (1853–1900), the great Russian religious philosopher whom Walicki views as inaugurating a new, more socially conscious liberalism in Russia, Leon Petrażycki (1867–1931), a Russian legal philosopher and Cadet leader, of Polish origin, who emigrated to Poland in 1921, Pavel Novgorodtsev (1866–1924), one of Russia's foremost theorists of natural law, Bogdan Kistiakovsky (1868–1920), the first Russian liberal theorist to advocate a form of socialism based on the rule of law, and Sergius Hessen (1887–1950), who went still further in the attempt to meld liberal and socialist principles in a law-governed state.

It may come as a surprise to find Vladimir Soloviev numbered among liberal legal thinkers, given that philosopher's reputation as a religious seer and speculative metaphysician. But Walicki points out that all the Russian liberal thinkers approached the study of law from the perspective of a broader, often metaphysically grounded axiology and philosophy of man, and that most of them accepted Soloviev's view that liberal values are compatible with a religious orientation. Walicki argues convincingly that Soloviev was a true proponent of civil liberties and the rule of law, and that he made an original contribution to Russian liberalism by including "the right to a dignified existence" among the individual rights that must be respected by the state. Walicki sees the proclamation of this new right as the transition from the classical liberalism of Chicherin, based on negative freedom, to the "new liberalism" of the later figures, whose devotion to the *Rechtsstaat* was combined with an interest in the principles of social democracy.

The ideas analyzed in this book give evidence that present-day Russian liberals, seeking to build a *Rechtsstaat* on the ruins of the Communist system, are not entirely dependent on Western sources for insight into the values and principles of humane democracy. Those values and principles were explored sensitively and in considerable depth by the very Russian thinkers who opposed the Marxist models before those models were implemented, and who were defeated not by force of argument but

by the Bolshevik seizure of power. The lively attention to those thinkers in Russia today raises the hope that their ideas will be more effective the second time around. —James P. Scanlan, *The Ohio State University*

WERHANE, Patricia H. *Adam Smith and His Legacy for Modern Capitalism*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991. xiv + 219 pp. \$29.95.—This clearly argued, well-structured work may be seen by some as very revisionist in regards to Adam Smith, and by others as wholly noncontroversial. Werhane's central argument is that Adam Smith cannot be categorized as an advocate of pure "self-interest," in the sense it is interpreted today to defend a certain type of untrammelled capitalism. Rather, Smith's definition of "self-interest" is distinct from unabashed "selfishness." Werhane argues that the free-market system, according to Smith, can only operate optimally and successfully in the context of a prior framework of rights and justice, to be provided by society. His arguments are also seen to be most relevant to a social context which embraces prudential self-restraint, small proprietorship, and theistic religion.

There is a short preface to the work similar to an abstract. The endnotes (21 pages) are generally referential rather than discursive. There is an entries-only, but quite extensive, bibliography, and short name and subject indexes. The approach of the book is laid out in the Introduction, where the existence of an "Adam Smith problem," regarding the apparent inconsistencies between his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (*TMS*), and *The Wealth of Nations* (*WN*), is pointed out. By using the *Lectures on Jurisprudence* (*LJ*) (which are actually two sets of Smith's students' careful lecture notes, one of these discovered only in 1958), Werhane sets out to bridge the perceived gap between the two works, by establishing the context of rights and justice as the background of both *TMS* and *WN*. Werhane informs the reader of, but does not further speculate on, the fact that Smith had requested the destruction of all his personal papers upon his death (p. 56).

The first chapter examines "the moral psychology" of *TMS*, pointing out the nuanced approach contained therein, with the division into social, unsocial, and selfish passions, and the attention paid to "sympathy" in Smith's system. Smith's view of overall human nature and the bases for right conduct is, according to Werhane, rather sophisticated, embracing neither selfishness nor benevolence exclusively. The second chapter looks at Smith's conception of "natural rights, liberty, and natural jurisprudence," arguing that *WN* has to be understood in the context of the theory of rights elucidated in *LJ*. A good schema is provided of Smith's system of rights. The third chapter, on "self-interest, the social passions and 'the invisible hand'" in *WN* argues that the role of the latter is not as some overall arbiter of society, but is to be understood as relating only to political economy, *within* the social and moral context laid out in *TMS* and *LJ*. The fourth chapter, on "individualism, the social order, and institutions in Smith's political economy" rejects the



more revisionist claims of some theorists—based primarily on *TMS*—that Smith was quite strongly “collectivist.” The fifth chapter, on “labor, the division of labor, and the labor theory of value,” shows where Smith had foreshadowed Marx in this regard, and suggests Smith’s counterargument to the critique of “commodification of labour” would simply be that it is a necessary stepping stone to the society of “universal opulence” for workers and proprietors alike. The sixth chapter argues that Smith’s political economy was not utopian. It shows where Smith expressed doubts and reservations about the full practicability of his system. Smith’s central idea in political economy is summed up in the dictum that “wealth can be created” (p. 159). Werhane also seems to argue that Smith’s ideas are relevant to political economy only in an eighteenth-century context of “‘mom and pop’ stores, small manufacturers, large landholders with tenant farmers, and entrepreneurial merchants” (p. 164). She points up, for example, Smith’s strong reservations about “joint-stock companies” or corporations.

The short Conclusion sums up the point of the book by stating that Smith’s analyses “are in the spirit of twentieth-century economic liberalism rather than libertarianism” (p. 180). A possible criticism of the book is that it often makes contemporary-sounding arguments that seem to aspire to apply Smith’s views directly into the present-day concerns (for example, Smith’s strong support of public education or of the necessity of public works), but then, in the space of a few pages, the argument is made that his ideas are relevant only to his own period. If Smith’s ideas can only be understood in that context, he can in no way “be seen as an alternative to both Marxism and the radical individualism of the nineteenth-century social Darwinists” (p. 175). Werhane surely wants Smith’s ideas considered as such an alternative (which she somewhat confusingly calls “economic liberalism”), extending her utmost efforts to undermine their common role today as an ideological prop for hard, radical capitalism. After two hundred years, it is clearly an uphill battle —Mark Wegierski, *Canadian-Polish Research Institute*

WESSON, Robert. *Beyond Natural Selection*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. xv + 353 pp. \$14.95—The primary aim of this book is to show that evolutionary theory is incapable of solving an incredibly large number of problems in an incredibly broad range of areas. It has ostensibly a second aim as well, which is to suggest that new developments and especially those in chaos theory open possibilities for new types of explanations. These explanations should go beyond the boundaries set by the research program of evolutionary theory, which, the author is convinced, will never be able to solve the many and varied problems raised by the development of life from its chemical beginnings to contemporary man. The text is primarily devoted, however, to demonstrating the limitations of evolutionary theory.

The book begins with two chapters which might be deemed a rather rudimentary and somewhat diffuse philosophy of science. The author

seeks here to make the case for pluralism in biology. We need, he argues, alternative accounts of the development of man, at least alternative research programs (chapter 1). Not only is reductionism philosophically inadequate, it is now clear due to developments in science—above all, in chaos theory—that other approaches are needed (chapter 2). The author proceeds to explain the problems which evolutionary theory has not yet been able to solve.

The author's technique is to present example after example of unsolved problems. This method could very well lead to a very boring text or to very uneven quality. Although one may occasionally lose the forest for the trees, the author manages by and large to avoid the first danger with a lively style and interesting examples. He also by and large manages to avoid the second danger by presenting well a wide variety of problems which he has culled from a large literature. Although the author makes little effort to explore the strength of evolutionary theory to cope with the cases he discusses, the feeling that standards slip to increase the quantity of difficulties raised may arise only seldom.

The problems pointed to concern the incompleteness of the fossil record (chapter 3), the wonderful complexity of the solutions to the problems of survival which plants and animals have invented (chapter 4), the inconsistency of evolutionary developments, developments which at times do not even seem designed for promoting survival (chapter 5), the development of seemingly useless sexual traits (chapter 6), the existence of social characteristics harmful to individuals (chapter 7), the dynamics of evolution or the genetic processes by which evolution is made possible (chapter 8), the existence of parallel developments which indicate the attractiveness of a goal (chapter 9), the development of species (chapter 10), the difficulty of explaining Lamarckism away (chapter 11) and the difficulties of explaining the traits of humans (chapter 12). The book ends with a chapter entitled "Conclusions and Perspectives." A long bibliography and a good index are provided.

The moral of the book, which is that alternative research programs should be tried out in order to explain the myriad of unsolved problems concerning the development of life, can hardly be called into question by anyone infected by a desire to know and a healthy recognition of the limits of our knowledge. The desire to explain man and the attributes which make him unique rather than to explain them away is one that may be shared by those friendly to the quest for scientific explanations of man. Furthermore, many problems of explaining life are presented in an appealing way.

One might still be disappointed, since no real alternative program is offered, nor is there any theory about the effective competition between various research programs. A well-documented catchall of problems has some value as an introduction to limitations of evolutionary theory, even if no particularly new arguments are offered. But in the end it will not do to simply multiply unexplained instances, however effectively that may be done, in order to weaken the hold of a reigning paradigm and to give a new fashion a boost, as the author seems to want to do. In place of this rather Kuhnian approach to science we need more focus and wherever we choose to focus, a clear competition between alternatives. New analyses of problems and opportunities for progress from

various perspectives are needed. It is no criticism to say that the author did not do this. But the weakness of this theoretical aspect of the book limits its value for those seeking alternatives. —John Wettersten, *Universität Mannheim*

WHITE, David A. *Rhetoric and Reality in Plato's Phaedrus*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993. xv + 340 pp. Cloth, \$54.50, paper \$17.95.—Recent years have seen the publication of several full-length studies of Plato's *Phaedrus* (by Burger, Griswold, and Ferrari) as well as the appearance of influential shorter treatments (by Derrida and Nussbaum, for instance) but the *Phaedrus* still has much to offer and David White's book is a very welcome contribution to the literature.

*Rhetoric and Reality in Plato's Phaedrus* is an exposition of the dialogue as a whole, demonstrating its unity despite its apparently separate themes of "love" and "rhetoric." The unity of the *Phaedrus* is best seen, White maintains, when one is oriented by the dialogue's "metaphysics," a term he acknowledges to be non-Platonic but which he nonetheless seems to use as a convenient way to refer to Plato's conception of soul, nature, and Forms. The specific unifying link in the *Phaedrus* investigated by White is "nature." In holding that the dialogue is "a concentrated discourse on metaphysical considerations" (p. 3), White differs from other commentators who have held, for example, that the *Phaedrus* should be read as Plato's defense of a philosophic art of writing or as Plato's deconstruction of the very views about speaking usually attributed to him. White's aim is to draw out and coordinate the explicit discussions and implicit indications about soul, nature, and Forms in this dialogue. His directing his interpretation by the dialogue's metaphysics, then, becomes an imitation of the approach he shows to be at work in the *Phaedrus*: Socrates' revealing to Phaedrus that love and speeches have their reality, and hence must be understood, in relation to the Forms and ultimately to the Good.

White's procedure is to move through the dialogue, examining each passage in its narrative order for its own sense and with an eye to its role in the overall meaning. He begins the book with a short Introduction entitled "Principles of Interpretation," in which he makes a suggestive literary connection between the *Phaedrus* and the *Parmenides* as a way of initiating his contention about the centrality of metaphysics in the *Phaedrus*. He divides the exposition into nine chapters conforming, as he says, to "the dialogue's 'natural joints'" (p. 9), a reference to Socrates' discussion of collection and division (about which White makes some valuable points [pp. 215ff.]). Each of the book's chapters is thematically subdivided. White concludes with an Epilogue, "Method and Metaphysics in the *Phaedrus*," which summarizes his interpretation and pursues the technicalities of the concepts and philosophical method he finds in the *Phaedrus*. His discussion relies primarily upon paraphrase, but the translations that do appear—usually of phrases and single terms—are his own and are accurate. White's commentary is focused

on the Platonic text, although he occasionally introduces points from Hackforth's analysis with which he takes issue, he cites and sometimes debates other contemporary *Phaedrus* commentators, Nussbaum most notably, in the endnotes

The process of slowly and methodically following the course of the Platonic conversation, as White does in this work, has decided advantages. The importance of the drama and the two personae of the *Phaedrus* is highlighted in this approach, as is the importance of interpretive decisions about these aspects of the dialogue. For example, White takes a generous view of Phaedrus's character and abilities, compared to Griswold and Ferrari, and so his interpretation of the conversation and interaction between Socrates and Phaedrus differs considerably in tone from theirs. In this decision he evidently takes instruction from Socrates who counsels against severity and in favor of gentleness in the treatment of beginners in an art (pp 231–2). The heightened level of attention to details together with the metaphysical emphasis provides an opportunity for White to develop a range of insights into the whole and the parts of the dialogue. For example, he offers a precise analysis of the horses-and-driver imagery of the parts of soul and the attributes of these parts. He also is able to clarify some crucial features of the presentation. Thus he shows why the philosophical lovers of Socrates' palinode refrain from sexual intimacy, that is, they remain chaste not, as it has been asserted, in order to attain their philosophical vision, but rather their desire and ability to do so depends upon a prior experience of "the realities." This subtle but important distinction expresses an ordering pattern White identifies throughout the *Phaedrus*: everything derives its reality from the Forms and finally from the Good, according to Socrates, and these underlie and shape all experience.

Some of the shortcomings inherent in a self-contained reading of a Platonic dialogue are evident in this book, however. The consideration of soul, nature, Forms, and collection and division might be enhanced by means of comparison with these concepts in other dialogues. If such comparisons are not apt, a discussion of the self-sufficiency of the dialogue would be in order. Also, and to his credit, White is committed to a serious approach to what happens and is said in this dialogue. The potential liability of this commitment, though, is that innuendo and instances of Socratic humor are sometimes overlooked or overworked in the interpretation. But these are limited reservations in light of the thoughtful reflections White provides on the rich meaning of Plato's *Phaedrus*. —Daryl McGowan Tress, *Trinity College*

WHITE, Michael J. *The Continuous and the Discrete: Ancient Physical Theories from a Contemporary Perspective*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992. xiv + 345 pp. \$72.00.—White presents an analysis of three ancient conceptions of spatial magnitude, time, and motion, namely, Aristotle's, the Stoics', and the quantum views. The greater part of the book

deals with Aristotle, according to whom one cannot get magnitude from points. The alleged mistakes in his theory of motion melt away if one agrees with his ontology. In the second chapter White discusses Aristotle's conception of time and "a time" (time as a unity of measurement). Despite the lack of adequate mathematical tools Aristotle had an amazing intuitive grasp of the concept of continuous motion. White sees a contrast between Aristotle and modern mathematics insofar as in the latter the concept of infinity is extended and magnitudes are sets of points (p. 180). This difference of view has metaphysical roots.

In Part 2 White examines Hellenistic alternatives to Aristotle's view of motion and time. Quantum theory is an attempt to attenuate the Aristotelian concept of potentiality (I would rather say that it is a reaction to Parmenides). In his analysis of Epicurean atomism White suggests that it does not necessarily exclude Euclidean geometry. If magnitudes are composed of minimal quanta, Aristotle's theory of motion is no longer possible. The last section of the book is devoted to the Stoic model.

This is an important book. The upshot of many arguments is that Aristotle's views come close to what is held now and that they are an obligatory reference. A disadvantage is that White does not treat the subject in the context of Aristotle's philosophy as a whole. This difficult study is intended for specialists in kinematics, it is well argued and White displays good knowledge of modern literature on the matter — Leo J. Elders, *Instituut voor Wysbegeerte en Theologie*

YOLTON, John W. *Locke and French Materialism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. 239 pp. \$55.00. — This book is the continuation of a project begun by the author in his *Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). In that work Yolton showed that Locke's suggestion that God might have given the power of thought to matter itself (*Essay* 4.3.6) had significant effects in Britain. The present work makes clear that Locke's passing comment also had significant and quite varied effects in France. Yolton himself characterizes this book as telling the story of "the adventures of Locke's suggestion in France." These adventures are for him "picaresque because of the way this suggestion appears, reappears, is attacked and defended in so many places and in such different contexts" (p. 208).

Yolton's story is highly interesting, and it is well told. However, it does not necessarily show that Locke influenced French philosophy in important ways, or that he had a major impact on the development of French Materialism. Perhaps it should not be understood as having attempted to show this. It delivers precisely what it promises: a *historical* sketch of the discussion of "Locke's suggestion" in France, not an argument for the *philosophical* importance of this discussion.

Yolton's sketch begins with the characterization of the so-called three hypotheses, namely the systems of physical influx, occasionalism, and

preestablished harmony Yolton shows that during the first half of the eighteenth century (or roughly from 1730 to 1750) Locke's *Essay* came to be viewed as being based on the doctrine of physical influx. More importantly, Locke also came to be perceived as having given this doctrine a definite tendency towards materialism. Locke's views became associated with the views of the "free" thinkers in France. Accordingly, he also came to be viewed as presenting a danger to religion. While it appears that it was especially Voltaire's discussion of Locke's suggestion that played a role in reinforcing this association, Yolton shows that Voltaire was far from alone in making this connection. Indeed, Yolton's survey of the discussion in philosophical journals shows how pervasive this view became in eighteenth-century France. Locke's so-called disciples in France were not only called "materialists" and "radicals" by more traditional thinkers, but they clearly also exhibited definite tendencies towards materialism. However, these writers were neither very well known nor philosophically important. Most of the critics of Locke and Voltaire on thinking matter were "obscure followers of Malebranche" (p. 182). Most of the supposed followers of Locke were not much better known adherents of the doctrine of physical influx. Accordingly, this part of Yolton's story does not go to show that Locke had any significant influence on the development of French Materialism.

Though the French "philosophes"—and especially Diderot and d'Alembert, who appealed to Locke as a witness for their own materialistic view of man during the second half of the eighteenth century—might be thought to have been influenced in significant ways by Locke, Yolton's account shows that their view was really quite different from Locke's. Their materialism differed in significant ways from what Locke might have had in mind. Diderot's "physiological materialism" was based on biological matter, which consists of muscle tissue, of flesh and bone. This matter possesses the properties of sensibility and irritability and is "essentially active" (p. 193). Locke's matter has—at best—the natural properties of attraction and repulsion, and is essentially passive. "British thinking matter is not the same as French '*matière pensante*'" (p. 194). Therefore, the *philosophes'* positive references to Locke must not be construed as indicating a debt to Locke. Rather, Diderot and d'Alembert used Locke's reputation as an honest and serious thinker simply "to illustrate and convince their readers of the new view of man that was emerging" (p. 206).

Thus, though Yolton's story is interesting—even fascinating—it is ultimately disappointing to see how little of philosophical significance came from Locke's suggestion in France. Though it played a large role in the discussion of materialism, it does not appear to have made much of a difference to the philosophical discussion. It would be wrong, however, to conclude from this that Locke's philosophy as a whole was not important in France. Yolton makes no attempt to survey all of Locke's influences in France, but he looks only at one of its many aspects. In doing so he provides—at the very least—the promise of a corrective to the standard view, which sees Locke's influence in France almost exclusively in terms of his effects on Condillac. According to the standard view, Locke was important in France mainly because of his sensationalism or sensualism. Yolton clearly rejects this view as being based on

a one-sided reading of Locke. While he does not argue against it here, he clearly wants to show that there are other facets to his influence in France. Yet, one might wonder whether the part of the story he tells can go very far in correcting the traditional view. One might still argue that Locke's effects on Condillac were both philosophically more important and historically more influential than anything having to do with Locke's suggestion. Be that as it may. If nothing else, Yolton's account can serve to whet our appetites for the "more important project" that he proposes, namely to "trace the reception of Locke's doctrines and books in France, and not only in France" (p. 210) —Manfred Kuehn, *Purdue University*.

## CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES

### PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS\*

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY  
Vol 67, No 3, Summer 1993

#### *Truth Without Methodologism Gadamer and James,* PAUL FAIRFIELD

Methodological questions have been far from central to philosophical hermeneutics, Gadamer has stated that his project is not primarily to devise criteria by which to adjudicate between conflicting interpretations but to describe what understanding itself is. It remains, however, that the search for such criteria is a legitimate hermeneutical enterprise and must be carried out in order for adjudication to be possible. The pragmatism of William James provides us with methodological criteria while steering clear of methodologism. James's theory may be incorporated into Gadamerian hermeneutics without running afoul of the basic tenets of the latter.

#### *The Notion of Paideia in De Partibus Animalium,* MARIE I. GEORGE

With his characteristic conciseness, Aristotle outlines one of the key notions concerning the nature of liberal education in the opening lines of *De Partibus Animalium*. The meaning of the passage is elusive, and substantial disagreement of interpretation exists among the relatively few commentators who recognize the text's importance. Matters of dispute include: The nature of particular *paideia*, the nature of general *paideia*, the relation of *paideia* and logic (and particularly, one part of logic, dialectic), the value of *paideia* (that is, whether it amounts to something more than superficial culture), and the English word which best conveys the general notion of *paideia*. Taking as our starting point the various opposed views of the commentators, we intend to show how the text in its entirety must be read.

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\* Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.



*An Argument for Leibnizian Metaphysics*, THOMAS HUFFMAN

This article identifies those elements of Leibniz's philosophy that are most central to his metaphysics and the most controversial. In so doing, it offers an account of his deductive system in which many of his controversial doctrines follow from, or are special instances of, the principle of sufficient reason and Leibniz's methodological focus upon the existence of a substantial self that persists through time. The author sympathetically interprets Leibniz's arguments for these claims in an effort to show that his idiosyncratic, even sometimes bizarre metaphysics, is supported by arguments that are rather difficult to refute. He concludes by revealing a little-noticed connection between Leibniz's account of substance and Descartes' Leibniz's account, though more radical, is also a more honest and developed conclusion derived from premises that both he and Descartes accept. The difference is explained by the fact that Leibniz paid greater attention to the principle of individuation.

*A Note on Contraries and the Incorruptibility of the Human Soul in St Thomas Aquinas*, FREDERICK WILHELMSSEN

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AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY  
Vol. 31, No. 1, January 1994

*A New Objection to A Priori Arguments for Dualism*, TRENTON MERRICKS

That persons are not identical with any physical thing, and therefore identical with a nonphysical thing, follows, according to the "a priori argument for dualism," from (1) possibly, one can exist and no physical thing exist. The "old objection" to such arguments is that (1) is false. The "new objection" is that even if (1) is true, dualism does not follow. It would be irrational, the author contends, to give up the belief that one is a physical thing on the basis of (1). Rather, one must conclude that one is physical, but *being a physical thing* is a property one exemplifies contingently.

*Teleology and the Nature of Mental States*, SCOTT R. SEHON

A developing orthodoxy in the philosophy of mind makes two fundamental claims: that ordinary explanation of action is causal and that mental states are causally individuated states of the agent. The article argues that this approach is wrong on both counts. First, it is claimed that a teleological account of action explanation provides a plausible alternative to the causal theory offered in favor of the causal view. Second, it is shown that the teleological alternative provides strong grounds for rejecting the orthodox, functionalist account of the nature of mental states.

*The Individuality of Art and The Collapse of Metaphysical Aesthetics*, RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD

Metaphysical aesthetics, pioneered by Plato and Aristotle, seeks to establish aesthetic worth by appeal to privileged givens. In so doing, it ends up employing categories of embodied form to construe the creation, reality, and reception of art, resulting in a mimetic theory in which art has its aesthetic validity as an edifying artifact. Although such categories may suit the conception of craft activity and its productions, they fail to lay hold of the individuality constitutive of each dimension of aesthetic phenomena. Moreover, metaphysical aesthetics' own efforts to capture what is specific to beauty in terms of categories of embodied form lead to aporias. These aporias point to a different approach that must be employed to give the category of individuality its proper due in the conception and reality of fine art.

*Recent Work in Feminist Discussions of Reason*, PHYLLIS ROONEY

This article first presents some false dilemmas that might be seen to restrict the full exploration of a feminist analysis of philosophical conceptions of reason and rationality. Without overlooking the diversity in philosophical approaches to reason and the diversity in recent feminist theoretical perspectives, it then examines the different issues that have been raised (or can be raised) concerning the "maleness" of reason. This involves distinguishing among the physical, metaphorical, and literal exclusions of women or "the feminine" from domains and ideals of reason. Instrumental, naturalized, and communicative models of rationality can be seen to provide important analytic resources for addressing the feminist question. Yet many of these models are also challenged at important critical junctures by feminist insights into the persistent practical and theoretical assumptions and configurations that still so effectively constrain the experience of many who do not belong to traditionally privileged groups.

*On Practicing What We Preach*, SAUL SMILANSKY

Claims that one's opponents are not practicing what they preach are widespread. The article explores one prominent argument which appears in such discussions, namely, that one is perfectly willing to abide by certain principles if others will, but need not do so until they do. This argument depends on the strong distinction between (1) not practicing what one preaches while pretending to conform to the preaching, that is, hypocrisy, and (2) opting for a principled reason, for a different social arrangement, with the provision that one's subscription to the new system depends on the other's joining in. It is argued that, with limited exceptions, this distinction is unreal. If this case is convincing, the author concludes, many of us would need to change either our practice or our preaching in radical ways in order to avoid the charge of hypocrisy.

*The Incoherence of Hobbesian Justifications of the State,*  
THOMAS CHRISTIANO

*Experiencing God's Infinity,* JEROME I GELLMAN

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AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY  
Vol 71, No 4, December 1993

*Beyond A Pragmatic Critique of Reason,* RAE LANGTON

Some feminist philosophers say reason is gendered following a certain norm of reasoning serves the interests of men, and hurts the interests of women. Thus stated, this critique of reason is pragmatic, and has two shortcomings: it fails to explain why men would pursue such a norm, and it fails to entirely damn that pursuit. Since beliefs aim to fit the world, mere self-interest is not a possible motive for following a norm of reasoning. And since beliefs ought to fit the world, a critique needs to show not only that a norm has bad consequences, but that it yields beliefs that do not fit the world. MacKinnon shows that there is a norm of reasoning that hurts the interests of women. Haslanger's analysis of her argument can be used to address the twin tasks of explanation and damnation, thus enabling us to go beyond a merely pragmatic critique.

*Reason and Feeling: Resisting the Dichotomy,* KAREN GREEN

Feminists have suggested that the masculine epistemological standpoint is objectivist and emphasizes fairness and rights, while the feminine epistemological standpoint is subjectivist, emphasizing care and responsibility. The differing psychosexual development of males and females suggests that these epistemological stances are grounded in different ways of experiencing the self. At the same time, feminist liberals have been criticized for having adopted a masculine standpoint. Here it is pointed out that a conflict exists between psychoanalytic explanations of the genesis of the standpoints and these accusations. The claim that Wollstonecraft's egalitarian liberalism expresses a masculine consciousness is reconsidered, and it is argued that her moral theorizing constitutes a paradigm of feminine ethics. The limitation of the masculine voice is not that it deals with rights and justice, but that it deals with nothing else. Wollstonecraft sees no conflict between justice and care, reason and passion, or virtue and sympathy. She is both egalitarian and "feminine."

*Silence and Reason. Woman's Voice in Philosophy,*  
MICHELLE WALKER

The paper charts the possible (spatial) relations between women and reason, challenging a simple logic that locates woman as outside or exterior to philosophy. Via a discussion of silence and voice, it demonstrates that woman is ironically constructed (in Plato's texts and elsewhere) as the necessary, yet repressed and unacknowledged, inferiority of philosophical discourse. The work of two philosophers currently working in France, Michèle Le Doeuff and Luce Irigaray, serve to focus discussion around possible strategies for enabling women to voice their subjectivity in relation to reason. "Speaking with" and "speaking against" philosophy are investigated as possible speaking positions vis-à-vis rationality.

*Michele Le Doeuff. Reconsidering Rationality,* KERRY SANDERS

This paper is concerned to show that Le Doeuff is engaged in a complex "double sided" project. She wants both to destabilize those concepts of rationality which have been disadvantageous to women through the history of philosophy, and at the same time to find a way of using a concept of rationality for the benefit of feminism. One strategy which she uses toward this end is to split the concept of rationality into different kinds of entities. By making this move she hopes to be able to reject what she has termed "total rationality," without rejecting the possibility of the usefulness to feminism of *all* concepts of rationality.

*The Politics of Reason Towards A Feminist Logic,*  
VAL PLUMWOOD

From Plato and Aristotle to Kant and beyond, the philosophical tradition of the West has delineated a concept of reason which is exclusive of women and other oppressed groups and is most fully represented by privileged social groups. As feminists have argued, these are not merely "abuses" of a basically neutral concept of reason, but have structured the dominant forms of reason and logic. This paper argues that although logic is usually considered a paradigm of neutrality, this politics of reason has shaped our dominant logical theories. The author sketches some features of a logic of dualism, and shows that classical propositional logic, the dominant logical system of modernity, is a close approximation to the dualistic structure outlined. The negation of classical logic can be interpreted as giving an account of the other as a receptacle or residue of desire, and has various other features associated with dualism and domination. Classical propositional logic can also be considered a logical expression of instrumental reason. However, logic offers alternative and contested accounts of reason and otherness, and it is neither necessary nor helpful to reject all forms of logic in the way feminist antilogicians such as Andrea Nye and Valerie Walkerdine have suggested.

*Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology*, WILLIAM GREY

A predominant theme in environmental philosophy is the claim that we need to correct an anthropocentric bias in our attitudes to the nonhuman world, and in particular to extend moral concern across time and across species. This is the central claim of "deep ecology," which maintains that the uncritical acceptance of anthropocentric values has abetted reprehensible practices with respect to the nonhuman world. This paper argues that this central claim of "deep ecology" is mistaken and provides a defense of qualified anthropocentrism.

*Money-Pumps, Self-Torturers and the Demons of Real Life*, SVEN OVE HANSSON

Several arguments in preference theory, including money-pumps and Quinn's self-torturer, are shown to depend on the same method of composition of independent value-dimensions. The underlying assumptions of this construction are analyzed. It is concluded that most of its uses in preference logic are unfounded. It can be used, however, to show how agenda-shifts can drive a subject to irrational behaviour even if the logical structure of her preferences is rational.

*Modest Skepticism About Rule Following*, TOMOJI SHOGENJI

This article examines "Kripkenstein's" skeptical paradox of rule-following. It is argued that there are three forms of skepticism to distinguish—modest skepticism, radical skepticism, and metaskepticism—and that confusion between the first two in particular has obscured the discussion of rule-following. This distinction is based on the understanding that a *semantic theory* maps facts about the speaker to interpretation schemes, while an *interpretation scheme* maps linguistic expressions to semantic values. Modest skepticism argues that no semantic theory can exclude nonstandard interpretation schemes, while radical skepticism maintains that there is no good reason to favor one semantic theory over others. Focusing on modest skepticism, the article delineates three adequacy conditions for a solution. A "trivial solution" is proposed which builds the recursiveness of rule-application into the semantic theory. This theory satisfies the adequacy conditions, and the problem of modest skepticism is solved.

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INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY  
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*A Dialectical Encounter Between MacIntyre and Lonergan on the Thomistic Understanding of Rationality*, MICHAEL P. MAXWELL, JR.

Alasdair MacIntyre and Bernard Lonergan agree that the Thomistic tradition recognizes the tradition-constituted nature of human rationality. They

disagree, however, in the conclusions they draw from this recognition. MacIntyre argues that the norms expressive of the Thomistic understanding of reason are open to revision through the dialectical advancement of the Thomistic tradition. Lonergan argues that these norms express the immanent principles constitutive of the rationality of all traditions of inquiry and, therefore, are not subject to dialectical revision. In other words, although these norms are tradition-constituted, they are also in an important sense trans-traditionally normative. Lonergan's position is more adequate, for MacIntyre's involves latent contradictions that make questionable its ultimate coherence. Moreover, Lonergan's position resolves the contradictions in MacIntyre's position in a manner consonant with MacIntyre's overall project.

*Schopenhauer's Style*, JAMES SNOW

Arthur Schopenhauer is a perplexing figure in the history of Western philosophy insofar as his major work, *The World as Will and Representation*, is not easily assigned to one of the more canonical forms of philosophical expression. This article explores the relationship between Schopenhauer's method of presenting his ideas and those ideas themselves, and how attention to form facilitates our understanding of content. Given Schopenhauer's philosophy of language, and his oft-repeated insistence on the originality of his thought, he is especially sensitive to how best to communicate his ideas. It is argued that Schopenhauer's major work is best read as an extended meditation, as a rumination on a philosophical insight. Rather than a presentation of a philosophical system, the work is a meditation that among other things, invites the reader to engage in an act of co-meditation.

*The Ends of Metaphysics*, ROBERT KANE

This paper is a much revised version of an invited address to the Metaphysical Society of America on the "end-of-metaphysics" debate. It is an assessment of how the traditional "ends" of metaphysics fare in the light of postmodernist and other modern critiques of metaphysics. These traditional ends are said to be two in number: determination of (1) what is reasonable to believe about the nature of things (objective explanation) and of (2) what is reasonable to strive for in the nature of things (objective worth). Novel interpretations of both ends are presented. It is argued that contemporary critiques require reinterpretation of the traditional ends of metaphysics, but not their abandonment.

*Why "Cantorian" Arguments Against the Existence of God Do Not Work*, GARY R. MAR

Recent philosophers have proposed "Cantorian" arguments against omniscience. There are two variations. The quantificational variation asserts that God's omniscience implies that God knows *all* truths but that there can be no set of all truths by Cantor's theorem. This variation is shown to be

invalid using a defensive strategy due to Plantinga. The set-theoretical variation asserts that God's omniscience implies that God knows a *set* of all truths. This variation begs the question since Cantor's theorem fails within mathematical systems such as Quine's New Foundations. Unrestrained "Cantorian" arguments lead to a philosophical position which is self-reflexively inconsistent: if successful, the arguments would undermine the possibility of asserting the very conclusions the arguments were supposed to establish. It is historically misleading to call the arguments "Cantorian" since answers to them are contained in Cantor's own writings, which comport particularly well with justifications for adopting large cardinal axioms in contemporary set theory.

*A Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Without the Categories*, JOHN ROSENTHAL

What exactly are the Kantian "pure concepts of the understanding" or, in other words, the "categories"? The overt course of Kant's "transcendental deduction" of our right to employ such "categories" in empirical judgments starts from the assumption that we are at least already "in possession" of them. The validity of this assumption is in turn supposed to have been demonstrated in a previous and notoriously shaky "metaphysical" deduction. In this article, the author proposes to reconstruct Kant's "transcendental deduction" without in any way making use of the results of the "metaphysical" one: hence to reconstruct a "transcendental deduction of the categories *without the categories*." His suggestion is that what Kant baptizes "pure concepts" are in fact not "concepts" at all, strictly speaking, but rather the very forms of judgment from which these "concepts" were supposed to have been derived in the "metaphysical deduction."

*Kierkegaard's Individual*, ANTHONY IMBROSCIANO

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JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY  
Vol 90, No 10, October 1993

*Evaluative Compatibilism and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities*, JAMES W. LAMB

What may be called *Evaluative Compatibilism* is the view that the kind of free will that incompatibilists have held to be incompatible with determinism—the counterfactual ability to do otherwise—is not worth having. It is an essential element of the Evaluative Compatibilist's strategy that the Principle of Alternate Possibilities—the principle that a person is morally responsible for something he has done only if he could have done otherwise—be shown false. If the Principle is true, the counterfactual ability to do otherwise is worth having at least insofar as moral responsibility is worth

having The article defends a version of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities against three kinds of counterexample and thus undermines the thesis of Evaluative Compatibilism In the course of the discussion it is argued that Harry Frankfurt's celebrated "counterfactual intervener" counterexample fails because of something akin to a modal fallacy

*The Evolution of Human Altruism*, PHILIP KITCHER

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JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY  
Vol 90, No 11, November 1993

*Impersonality, Character, and Moral Expressivism*,  
RICHARD MORAN

The paper concerns certain complexities in the proper understanding of the demand for impersonality in moral thinking, with specific attention to moral thought about one's own character Certain forms of self-assessment, modeled on the judgement of others, threaten to undermine the very trait that is the basis of one's assessment A notion of "self-objectification" is sketched out, which combines a kind of impersonality with a characteristic form of moral evasion

*The Liar and Sorites Paradoxes. Toward a Unified Treatment*,  
JAMES TAPPENDEN

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JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY  
Vol 90, No 12, December 1993

*Putnam's Pragmatic Realism*, ERNEST SOSA

Of the four Putnamian arguments for pragmatic realism—the model-theoretic argument, the argument from the perspectival character of causation, reference, and truth, the argument from agnosticism regarding scientific convergence upon a finished science, and the argument for conceptual relativity—the author discusses the latter three, and concludes that the last of these is the most powerful and persuasive It raises a threefold issue—the choice between eliminativism, absolutism, and relativism—still wide open on the philosophical agenda, and a most exciting issue before us today



*Is An Agreement an Exchange of Promises?* MARGARET GILBERT

This paper rebuts the common assumption that an agreement is an exchange of promises. It proposes that the performance obligations of some typical agreements are simultaneous, interdependent, and unconditional, and argues that no exchange of promises has this structure of obligations. In addition to offering general considerations in support of this claim, it considers a variety of types of promise exchange, some symmetrical and others asymmetrical in form, and shows that none satisfy the criteria for agreements. Some of these exchanges involve conditional promises. Two forms of conditional promise are distinguished and promise exchanges involving both forms are discussed. A rough positive account of agreements as joint decisions founded in a "joint commitment" is proposed. Assuming the theory that joint commitment is the foundation of social union, the example agreements represent in an especially clearcut way the normative structure of such union.

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JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY  
Vol. 32, No. 1, January 1994

*Socrates on the Immortality of the Soul*, MARK L. MCPHERRAN

Both the *Crito* (54a–c) and the *Gorgias* (522c–527e) appear to testify to a positive Socratic *faith* in the immortality of the soul, a faith bolstered by Socrates' view that the soul is a precious gift of the gods (*Memorabilia* 1.4.13–14) and by his conviction that death holds nothing bad for a good person (*Apology* 41c–d). Not surprisingly, then, there is almost unanimous agreement that Socrates believed continued conscious life is the most likely post-mortem fate of the soul. Notwithstanding Socrates' *hopes* on this issue, this paper contends that this scholarly consensus is unwarranted by the evidence. Rather, the paper contends that a reasonable account of Socrates' view of the nature of the soul—together with a careful reading of the *Apology's* argument for death's goodness (40c–41d)—shows that if we must credit some sort of eschatological stance to Socrates, a qualified agnosticism is our best bet.

*Dynamics and Transubstantiation in Leibniz's Systema Theologicum*, DANIEL C. FOUKE

The author argues that Leibniz's early attempts to demonstrate the metaphysical possibility of transubstantiation led to the development of principles which were important to his mature metaphysics. Once Leibniz achieves his mature metaphysical system, however, his later discussions of the Eucharist are flawed by an incompatibility between his own dynamical system and the requirements of transubstantiation. The source of this difficulty is traced to Neoplatonic modes of causation and the character of substance in Leibniz's

mature writings, which make it impossible for him to detach substantial presence from perceptual acts and to maintain more than a co-presence of Christ and the substances underlying the bread and wine

*Intuition and Construction in Berkeley's Account of Visual Space,*  
LORNE FALKENSTEIN

This paper examines Berkeley's attitude toward our perception of spatial relations on the two-dimensional visual field. This is a topic on which there has been some controversy. Historians of visual theory have tended to suppose that Berkeley took our knowledge of *all* spatial relations to be derived in the way our knowledge of depth is from association of more primitive sensations which are themselves in no way spatial. But many philosophers commenting on Berkeley have supposed that he takes our awareness of two-dimensional visual layout to be directly perceived. It is argued that Berkeley's position on this issue is deeply ambivalent and that neither alternative sits well with the rest of his philosophy.

*Nietzsche, Spir, and Time,* ROBIN SMALL

Nietzsche's commitment to a doctrine of becoming is expressed in many places in his writings. He acknowledges Heraclitus as a precursor, but a closer influence is the Russian-born philosopher African Spir (1837–90). Spir's metaphysical standpoint is uncompromisingly Parmenidean: starting from the absolute status of logical truth, he argues that reality can contain neither plurality nor change. For Nietzsche, this metaphysical *reductio ad absurdum* is a prelude to his own philosophy, which takes the world of appearance as the only one. When Nietzsche approaches aspects of time, however, he can often be seen to follow Spir's analyses in a more direct way. The article spells this out with reference to two themes: the infinite divisibility of time, and the characterization of absolute becoming.

*The Unique Role of Logic in the Development of Heidegger's  
Dialogue with Kant,* FRANK SCHALOW

This paper attempts to show that Heidegger's overthrow of the priority of reason within Kant's transcendental philosophy does not exclude the role of logic, but instead requires recovering its roots in a deeper way. To substantiate this claim, the paper turns to the beginnings of Heidegger's exchange with transcendental philosophy in his 1925–26 lecture course on logic. It is shown that these lectures reshape the landscape of logic by recovering the prereflective origin of the Kantian categories, and showing their dependence on the development of meaning through a hermeneutic mode of understanding. In this way, the key step is taken toward relocating logic in relation to ontology and to the broader question of the essence of truth as disclosedness. Thus, it is seen that in his radical reinterpretation of Kant's thought in the

late 1920s Heidegger can disavow traditional logic only because he has already widened its parameters in relation to the question of being. A more balanced and complete view of the development of Heidegger's dialogue with Kant is thereby provided.

*An Image for the Unity of the Will in Duns Scotus*, JOHN BOLER

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MIND

Vol 102, No 407, July 1993

*Modality and Ontology*, STEWART SHAPIRO

This paper concerns the relationship between ideology and ontology. The starting point is a series of recent programs whose strategy is to reduce ontology in mathematics by invoking some ideology, typically a modal operator. In each case there are straightforward, often trivial, translations from the set-theoretic language of the realist to the proposed language with added ideology, and vice-versa. The contention is that, because of these translations, neither system can claim a major epistemological advantage over the other. The *prima facie* intractability of knowledge of abstract objects indicates an intractability concerning knowledge of the "new" notions. The prevailing criterion of ontological commitment, due to Quine, is that the ontology of a theory is the range of its bound variables, but recall that Quine insists on a fixed and very austere ideology. It is proposed here that when this constraint is relaxed the Quinean criterion is flawed, and an alternative, in structuralist terms, is developed.

*Probability Theory and the Doomsday Argument*,  
WILLIAM ECKHARDT

John Leslie has published an argument that our own birth rank among all who have lived can be used to make inferences about all who will ever live, and hence about the expected survival time for the human race. This was found to be shorter than usually supposed. The presuppositions underpinning the argument are criticized, its conclusion is shown to depend critically on the assumption that the argument's sampling is equiprobable from among all who ever live. A mathematical derivation shows that Leslie's argument is correct only if there exists a correlation of our birth rank to the event of doomsday. There is no reason to believe such a correlation exists.

*Doom and Probabilities*, JOHN LESLIE

If the human race survived many more centuries, even at just its present size, the humans of today would have been in a minuscule minority. Carter's

doomsday argument, an application of the anthropic principle and of Bayesian thought, seeks to treat our observed temporal position as nothing very special. It concludes that humanity's imminent extinction is more probable than we should otherwise have thought. The article defends the argument against two objections: (i) that we could not find ourselves in the future, because future humans are not alive yet, and (ii) that the reference class, humans, is specified too arbitrarily.

*Interpretation and Objectivity*, GREGORY CURRIE

*Content and Context: The Paratctic Theory Revisited and Revised*,  
IAN RUMFIT

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*MIND*

Vol. 102, No. 408, October 1993

*Minimal Rationalism*, ANDY CLARK

Enquiries into the possible nature and scope of innate knowledge never proceed in an empirical vacuum. Instead, such conjectures are informed by a theory (perhaps only tacitly endorsed) concerning probable representational form. Classical approaches to the nativism debate often assume a quasi-linguistic form of knowledge representation and delineate a space of options (concerning the nature and extent of innate knowledge) accordingly. Recent connectionist theorizing posits a different kind of representational form, and thus determines a different picture of the space of possible nativisms. The paper displays this space and focuses on an especially interesting sub-region labeled "Minimal Rationalism." The philosophical significance of the minimal rationalist option is explored. Two consequences which emerge are, first, that the apparently clear distinction between innately specified knowledge and innately specified structure is shown to be unproductive, second, that there may exist tracts of innate knowledge whose content is not propositionally specifiable.

*From Supervenience to Superdupervenience. Meeting the Demands of a Material World*, TERENCE HORGAN

This paper, in *Mind*'s "State of the Art" series, overviews the uses of the concept of supervenience in recent philosophy, with emphasis on its role in articulating a broadly materialistic position in philosophy of mind and in metaphysics. It first considers the history of this concept in twentieth-century philosophy, stressing certain ironies and lessons. Also discussed are British emergentism, Moore and metaethical nonnaturalism, Hare and metaethical

noncognitivism, and Davidson and the materialist appropriation of supervenience. The principal moral is that supervenience relations, in order to figure in a broadly materialistic worldview, must be explainable rather than *sur generis*. The author then takes up some issues that have figured prominently in recent philosophical discussions: how to formulate supervenience theses, supervenience and the causal/explanatory efficacy of nonphysical properties, and supervenience and intertheoretic reduction. He concludes with some remarks on the underappreciated issue of the explainability of supervenience relations.

*Mediated Reference and Proper Names*, IGAL KVART

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MIND

Vol. 103, No. 409, January 1994

*Moore's Paradox: A Wittgensteinian Approach*, JANE HEAL

Why is it so strange to self-ascribe a particular belief while recognizing its falsehood, for instance, by saying "I believe that *p* but not *p*"? Some conditions on a satisfactory answer are proposed and it is argued that any functionalist account of belief (upon which belief is a state we discover in ourselves or others and which we see to produce behavior of certain kinds) is bound to have serious difficulties of principle in satisfying them. Another approach is canvassed, on which the first-person authority of psychological utterances is seen as constitutive rather than epistemological and on which, consequently, it is possible to see "I believe that *p*" as, in some respects, having the same role as "*p*".

*Why Higher-Order Vagueness is a Pseudo-Problem*, DOMINIC HYDE

Difficulties in arriving at an adequate conception of vagueness have led many philosophers to describe a phenomenon that has come to be known as "higher-order vagueness"—the vagueness of a term cannot consist merely in its possessing border cases, it must also possess border border cases, border border border cases, and so forth. Almost as many philosophers have found it to be problematic, it appears to preclude any finite characterization of the concept of vagueness. In what follows the author argues that, while we must acknowledge its presence, it is a pseudo-problem. Given that "vague" is vague, we can show that an adequate characterization must itself be vague. As a consequence, the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness can be seen to be real enough, though unproblematic since it is already entailed by the simple border-case conception of vagueness and need not be explicitly stated.

*The Structure of the Paradoxes of Self-Reference*, GRAHAM PRIEST

Russell held that all paradoxes of self-reference have a common underlying structure. Modern orthodoxy, following Ramsey, holds that the paradoxes fall into two distinct classes, the semantic and the set-theoretic, generated by different mechanisms and requiring different solutions. The paper demonstrates that Russell was right and Ramsey was wrong. All the paradoxes instantiate the following structure. There is a property  $\phi$  and a function  $\delta$  such that if  $\forall y(y \in \chi \rightarrow \phi(y))$  then  $\delta(\chi) \notin \chi$  and  $\phi(\delta(\chi))$ . The paradox arises when we apply  $\delta$  to  $\omega = \{y \mid \phi(y)\}$ . For then we have both  $\delta(\omega) \notin \omega$  and  $\delta(\omega) \in \omega$ . There is a brief discussion of the implications of this fact.

*A Thousand Clones*, ROY A. SORENSON

Imagine that Mr. Original has a growing clone Mr. Copy who starts life ten years later. Mr. Original grows tall first, as he would if his lead were one year or one day or one minute. Thus "tall" is sensitive to arbitrarily small differences. This thought experiment provides novel and distinctively positive evidence for epistemicism, a view about vagueness traditionally maligned for its lack of intuitive support. Epistemicists believe that the uncertainty provoked by borderline cases is merely a kind of ignorance. Although we cannot know where the non-tall men end and the tall begin, there is a fact of the matter. Hence, epistemicists believe that vague predicates are intolerant: that is, these rough and ready terms have unlimited sensitivity. This runs contrary to a tenacious intuition that vague predicates are tolerant—that some differences are so small that they cannot make a difference to the application of the predicate.

*Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem Explained in Word of One Syllable*, GEORGE BOOLOS*Intolerant Clones*, KEITH HOSSACK*Why the Vague Need Not Be Higher-Order Vague*, MICHAEL TYE

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THE MONIST  
Vol. 76, No. 3, July 1993

*Ethical Reflectionism*, ROBERT AUDI

The appeal to intuitions is a pervasive strategy in philosophical discourse. Ethical theory is no exception. Why, then, do so many ethical theorists resist any form of intuitionism? This paper attempts to answer that

question by providing a clearer conception of ethical intuitionism, an account of its relation to ethical intuitions, and a theory of how both are related to the distinction between rationalism and empiricism in moral epistemology. The aim is to provide the raw materials of a framework for moral theory—ethical reflectionism—that overcomes many of the difficulties of intuitionism, accounts for the role of intuitions in moral reasoning, and supplies the outline of a moral epistemology.

*What Basis for Morality? A Minimalist Approach*, SISSELA BOK

This article is a sequel to the author's "The Search for a Shared Ethics" (*Common Knowledge* 1 [Winter 1992] 12–25). It considers the tension found throughout Isaiah Berlin's work between thorough skepticism regarding the existence of permanent, objective, and universal moral values and a conviction that at least some actions and practices must still be judged as just or unjust, humane or inhumane, wherever they occur. The article analyzes the presuppositions of the antifoundationalist challenge to the possibility of a common basis for morality, and proposes a more plausible, minimalist approach to asking about such a possibility—one that acknowledges at least limited common ground for moral debate and for the critique of clearly inhumane practices, a common ground that Berlin wishes to retain no matter how pluralist his view of ethics.

*Moral Justification in Context*, MARK TIMMONS

Traditionally, work in epistemology has been dominated by two general approaches, foundationalism and coherentism. *Epistemological contextualism*, which has its roots in the writings of the pragmatists like Dewey and in the later Wittgenstein, represents an alternative to the dominant views—an alternative that is typically ignored. The central aim of this paper is to put a version of contextualism with regard to moral belief into serious contention by developing, at least in outline, a plausible version of the view—something missing from the current philosophical landscape. The version of ethical contextualism that the author presents combines contextualism proper (a view about the nature of doxastic justification according to which doxastic justification is a matter of one's beliefs' conforming to one's epistemic norms), with structural contextualism—a view about the structure of justified moral belief according to which (roughly) inferentially justified moral belief ultimately depends on moral beliefs which, in the normal context of moral thought and discussion, do not need justification. It is argued that this combination of views, what the author calls package deal contextualism, is preferable to its foundationalist and coherentist rivals.

*Pleasure in Practical Reasoning*, ELLJAH MILLGRAM

Pleasure plays a role in practical reasoning analogous to that of the feeling of conviction in theoretical reasoning. It follows from this that hedonism is misguided: pleasure is not normally a goal. Pleasure and conviction are disanalogous in that pleasure is tied to experience in a way that

conviction is not, but pleasure's tie to experience allows us to make sense of a notion of *practical observation* that can underwrite practical forms of empirical reasoning. This has as a consequence that instrumentalism (the view that all practical reasoning is means-end reasoning) is false.

*Relativism and Wide Reflective Equilibrium*, KAI NIELSEN

*Ethical Individualism and Presentism*, JON ELSTER

*Skepticism and Moral Justification*, RONALD MILO

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NOUS

Vol. 27, No. 4, December 1993

*Motive and Obligation in Hume's Ethics*, STEPHEN DARWALL

This article attempts to work out a coherent account of Hume's complex views about the obligation to be just. It is argued that a significant role is played by a complex motivational state, rule-following, that cannot be reduced to the desire for any good to the agent or to others.

*Empty Names*, DAVID BRAUN

According to the Theory of Direct Reference, a proper name has no semantic function other than referring to an individual. *Empty names* (proper names that fail to refer) raise several apparent problems for this theory. For instance, this theory seems to imply that sentences containing empty names are meaningless and have no truth value. But sentences such as "Atlantis does not exist" seem to be both meaningful and true. This paper presents two theories of empty names, both of which are consistent with Direct Reference and both of which avoid at least some of these apparent problems. The first theory maintains that sentences that contain empty names fail to express propositions; it makes heavy appeal to pragmatics and psychology to explain away the apparent problems. The second theory says that sentences containing empty names express structured propositions containing unfilled positions.

*Logic Purified*, TAKASHI YAGISAWA

According to the classical model-theoretical first-order semantics, truth is defined relative to an ordered triple  $\langle D, O, R \rangle$ , where  $D$  is a non-empty set of objects,  $O$  is a function from individual constants to objects in  $D$ , and  $R$  is



a function from  $n$ -place predicates to  $n$ -tuples of objects in  $D$ . The author claims that a single domain will not do for a general definition of truth for quantified sentences. In addition, those domains are to be among the elements determined by contexts of utterance. This amounts to regarding quantifiers as something very much like indexicals. One consequence of this proposal is that many sentences which are classically judged logically true are no longer so judged. Another consequence that is no less unsettling is that many arguments which are classically judged valid are no longer so judged.

*Numbers Can Be Just What They Have To*, COLIN McLARTY

Structuralists have said numbers cannot be sets since numbers have only arithmetic properties and sets have other irrelevant ones. This is true of Zermelo Frankel set theory, but false for categorical set theory. The article gives a simple categorical set theory and proves models of arithmetic have no properties but that of modelling arithmetic. Numbers can be these sets. The article is written as a parable of educating two children, to show that categorical set theory relates at least as naturally to naive finitary arithmetic as Zermelo Frankel does.

*Partial Denotations of Theoretical Terms*, KATHERINE A. BEDARD

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW  
Vol 103, No 1, January 1994

*Names Without Bearers*, JERROLD J. KATZ

Neo-Millians, who take an extensionalist position on names, have made their best showing in the case of names with unique bearers. But an adequate account of names must also treat names with no bearer and names with multiple bearers. In the latter cases, reference does a less adequate job of tracking sense, and, accordingly, neo-Millians have made a less impressive showing there. Problems with negative existence sentences like "Santa Claus does not exist" are notorious, but, in spite of them, philosophers stick with the neo-Millian account because they think there is no viable descriptivist alternative. The present paper argues that those problems are a good deal worse than has been thought, that a viable descriptive alternative exists, and that the problems can all be handled on its intensionalist account of names.

*Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism*, KEVIN FALVEY and  
JOSEPH OWENS

Psychological externalism is the thesis that the contents of an individual's propositional states are not determined by properties of the individual considered in isolation from her environment. Many have thought that this metaphysical thesis has implausible implications for the epistemology of the mental. On the one hand, some have argued that externalism undermines self-knowledge: if the contents of my thoughts are determined by features of my environment, then surely I must know that my environment has these features in order to know the contents of my thoughts. On the other hand, it has been argued that not only is externalism compatible with self-knowledge, the two ideas can be combined to yield a powerful argument against the skeptic: if our thoughts have the contents they do only in virtue of the relations they bear to the external world, then introspective knowledge of our thoughts should afford us knowledge of the external world. We argue that both contentions are mistaken: externalism does not undermine self-knowledge, nor does it provide for an easy refutation of skepticism.

*Vagueness Without Paradox*, DIANA RAFFMAN

*The Expression of Feeling in Imagination*, RICHARD MORAN

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PHILOSOPHY

Vol. 69, No. 267, January 1994

*The Demography of the Kingdom of Ends*, D. N. ROBINSON  
and R. HARRE

Kant's metaphysics of morals depends upon the principle that moral maxims cannot be inductively derived from matters of fact. Action is moral only if the will is determined in such a way as to realize the nature of the rational actor. It seems that a rational being needs no other similar being to fulfill this requirement. If so the Kingdom of Ends needs a population of one. It is also clear that for Kant moral action is action with respect to another being of the same nature. Only if such a being exists do the two leading versions of the categorical imperative make sense. If so the Kingdom of Ends must include at least two subjects. One can try to resolve this impasse either by arguing that the reflexive ordinance "Perfect thyself" can meet the demands of the categorical imperative or by arguing that the transcendental conditions for rational discourse include moral requirements. The question whether the Kantian metaphysics of morals is collectivist or individualist remains unresolved.

*Anti-Social Determinism*, ANTHONY FLEW

This article attacks the demoralization more or less unintentionally encouraged by the welfare state, it aims to bring back blame. Because, by Murray's Law of Unintended Rewards, any social transfer increases the net value of being in the condition that prompted the transfer, it becomes grossly imprudent thus to reduce the moral or, if you must, the moralistic inhibitions against (as far as humanly possible) getting into or failing to escape from those conditions while simultaneously expanding the variety and quantity of such transfers. A main encouragement to this imprudence is the assumption of antisocial determinism, that the explanations of the psychological and social sciences constitute completely sufficient excuses for all the behavior so explained. This assumption is attacked by contending that we could not even understand the notions of acting and being able to act otherwise than we do if we were not ourselves agents.

*Causation and Intelligibility*, DAVID H. SANFORD

Hume, in *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, holds (1) that all causal reasoning is based on experience and (2) that causal reasoning is based on nothing but experience. (1) does not imply (2), and Hume's good reasons for (1) are not good reasons for (2). This essay accepts (1) and argues against (2). A priori reasoning plays a role in causal inference. Familiar examples from Hume and from the classroom of sudden disappearances and radical changes do not show otherwise. A priori causal reasoning is closely related to understanding causal mechanisms. One uncovers the intelligibility of a causal process by understanding its mechanism.

*Morality and Codes of Honour*, STEVE GERRARD

What are the boundaries of the domain of morality? The article attempts to answer that question by comparing morality with one of its cousins: codes of honor. The method is one of differential diagnosis. The article uses one particular code, that of the Southern slaveholding gentleman, and concentrates on dueling rules. He first shows that a standard list of criteria for the concept of morality fails to distinguish between morality and Southern honor, and then argues that there is no theory-independent way of drawing the line between the moral and the nonmoral, and that the point of asking the question in the first place is also theory-dependent. Reconstructing an article from Foot, the author challenges how Kant draws the moral-nonmoral line, concluding with an examination of the question within virtue theory.

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PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH  
Vol. 53, No. 4, December 1993

*Sense, Subject and Horizon*, CARLETON B. CHRISTENSEN

The paper seeks to interpret Husserl's concept of (inner) horizon so as to isolate certain non-Cartesian elements in Husserl's thought. This concept

is interpreted as containing an intriguing conception of perceptual experience in which "concepts," abilities to act, and capacities of imagination mesh with one another. As such, it implies a non-Cartesian picture of the subject, object and act of perceptual experience. Because the interpretation draws upon Husserl's theory of intentionality and because two objections to it turn on the precise point of Husserl's transcendental reduction, both this theory and this method are first sketched. Then Husserl's concept of horizon is interpreted and its implications for the concepts of sense and perceptual experience are drawn. Two powerful objections to the interpretation are dealt with and the conception of perceptual experience implicit in it is defended. The paper concludes by indicating a criticism Husserl can rightly make of Frege.

*Indeterminacy of Translation—Theory and Practice,*  
DORIT BAR-ON

The experience of a translator is often frustrating: perfect translations, even just good ones, are not easy to come by. To an ordinary translator, the idea that there are too many perfect translation schemes between any two languages would come as a great surprise. Yet, a venerable, though much debated philosophical thesis expresses just this idea. It is the thesis of the indeterminacy of translation, originally propounded by Quine and endorsed by other philosophers. The thesis implies that most of the "implicit canons" ordinary translators use in selecting and assessing translations lack objective status. This implied claim is the primary concern of this article. The author takes up the following issue, which has been largely neglected in the ever growing literature on indeterminacy: If the indeterminacy thesis is right, then our pretheoretic understanding of ordinary translation practices reflects a serious misconception. Given how prevalent and persistent this misconception is, a proponent of the thesis ought to either account for it, or tell us how to replace it. This burden, the author contends, cannot be satisfactorily assumed by the champion of indeterminacy.

*Representation and Style,* JAMES D. CARNEY

In the last decade or so the consensus developed among aestheticians is that pictorial depiction requires a visual experience of some sort and that seeing-in is the kind of visual experience that occurs when someone sees a picture of so-and-so. The explanation proposed in the paper for seeing-in is recognizing a resemblance between features of the picture and so-and-so. The style appropriate for the visual artwork directs the attention of the viewer to the salient features. In the case of abstract representation additional help typically comes from titles.

*How Fast Does Time Pass?* NED MARKOSIAN

There is a certain well-known but little-discussed argument that is supposed to show that time does not really pass. The argument, in brief, is thus:

If time passes, then time must pass at some particular rate, but it makes no sense to talk about time's passing at any particular rate, hence time doesn't pass. This paper has two main aims. The first is to shed some light on the controversy over whether time really passes. Toward this end the author identifies four distinct but related issues that bear on the question of whether time really passes, and tries to show that, once these four issues have been spelled out, there are no less than five main packages of views that one may hold in response to the controversy over whether time passes. There is one package, the 4D view, to the effect that time does not pass, and there are four distinct packages, the 3D views, each of which constitutes a way of maintaining that time does pass. The second main aim of this paper is to consider whether some version of the rate of passage argument constitutes a telling argument against any of the four passage views. It is concluded that for each such view, and for each version of the argument, there is at least one very plausible response to that argument available to anyone who holds that view.

*Mind/Consciousness Dualism in Sāṅkhya-Yoga Philosophy,*  
PAUL SCHWEIZER

The goal of the paper is to contrast the familiar Cartesian dualism of mind and matter with an alternative division advocated in the Sāṅkhya-Yoga branch of classical Indian philosophy. This contrast serves several purposes. First, it illustrates the fact that there are other ways of conceptualizing the problem, and that in an important sense, the Cartesian division constitutes a specific choice among viable options. This is philosophically instructive, especially given the far reaching impact of Descartes' picture of the mind. Second, the ancient Indian division between mind and consciousness possesses several theoretical advantages over the traditional western approach. In particular, the article focuses on the attendant separation between conscious presentation and representational content, and discusses this separation in the context of functionalism, qualia, and Searle's Chinese room argument.

*God, Schmod and Gratuitous Evil,* JOHN O'LEARY-HAWTHORNE  
and DANIEL HOWARD-SNYDER

This article explores an instructive analogy between the physicist who believes that there are no causally sufficient reasons for some events and the atheist who believes that there are no morally sufficient reasons for some evils (gratuitous evils). In Part 1, this analogy is used to show defective three objections to justified belief in gratuitous evils, penned by Yandell, Wykstra, Plantinga, and Alston. In Part 2, the analogy is again employed along with the basic idea underlying Glymour's "bootstrapping strategy" for confirmation, to explore three related but very different questions. (1) Can the atheist provide the theist with a convincing argument that concludes that atheism is more likely than theism, given certain facts about evil which both parties

accept? (2) Can someone be justified in believing in gratuitous evil? and (3) Can facts about evil form the rational basis for atheism?

*The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant's "Refutation of Idealism,"*  
JONATHAN VOGEL

Kant's important argument in the "Refutation of Idealism" section of *The Critique of Pure Reason* seems to fail because Kant apparently ignores the possibility that the self might be the "permanent" object, knowledge of which is necessary for "time-determination." The author critically examines attempts by Henry Allison and Paul Guyer to explain how Kant might have closed this gap in his reasoning. He then offers an interpretation of his own, according to which the very immediacy of self-knowledge makes it incapable of providing knowledge of a "permanent" as required.

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PHRONESIS  
Vol 38, No 3, 1993

*Anaximander's Conception of the Apeiron,* ARYEH FINKELBERG

The article disputes the conventional view of Anaximander's *Apeiron* as a qualitatively indeterminate material principle. In examining the doxographic testimony and Anaximander's fragment the author comes to the conclusion that Anaximander's idea of the *Apeiron* combines two different notions, that of the material *archē* inexplicitly conceived of as air, and that of the unchangeable "whole" indefinable in terms of material qualities. The author argues that in conceiving of the *Apeiron* as the unchangeable "whole" Anaximander touched the idea of conceptual unity of the manifold, but in the absence of a positive definition of this unity he failed to draw a clear-cut distinction between the higher nature of the *Apeiron* and its primary material condition.

*The Structure and Subject of Metaphysics A,* HELEN LANG

*Metaphysics A* is an investigation of substance, immediately divided into first sensible and then nonsensible. The investigation of sensible substance is complete at the close of A 5 and that of nonsensible substance at the close of A 8, when Aristotle declares that the first unmoved mover is one in definition and number. Two related issues have been raised that must be considered if the investigation of substance is to be complete, however. So A 9 opens "There are some problems concerning mind" and A 10 begins by raising the problem of "in which of two ways the nature of the universe contains the good or the highest good." These two problems are different from that of substance and so their examination must be postponed until after that of

substance is complete, but they are so intimately bound up with substance as to be required by a full investigation of it

*Epicurus on the Telos*, JEFFREY S. PURINTON

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RATIO

Vol 6, No 2, December 1993

*Freedom of the Will and Mental Content*, GRANT GILLET

The idea of freedom of the will seems to conflict with the principle of causal efficacy implicit in many theories of mind. This conflict normally motivates a compatibilist view whereby the desires and beliefs of the agent, replete with their causal pedigrees, are taken to be the basis of individual freedom. The present view locates mental content within a framework of rule-following and then argues that rule-following is conceptually distinct from causally produced activity in that the normative aspect of rule-following defies reduction to descriptive or dispositional terms. The theory is neo-Kantian in that it identifies rules or conceptions of laws as essential to human thought. It follows Wittgenstein's treatment of rule-following and yields a plausible (but noncausal) account of mental explanation and weakness of the will.

*The Numbering System of the Tractatus*, VERENA MAYER

The significance of the complicated numbering of the propositions in the *Tractatus* has occasioned much speculation. Wittgenstein's own explanation has, following Stenius, been generally regarded as misleading. An examination of the *Prototractatus*, however, reveals that the numbering system was for Wittgenstein principally an aid in the composition of his work. It allowed him to mark out certain propositions which required further work or supplementation, without disturbing the basic structure of the treatise. The reworking of the *Prototractatus* to form the *Tractatus* considerably changed the original order in which the ideas were connected, and thus made it more difficult to understand the *Tractatus*. Several specific examples make it clear that it is essential to look back at the context of the *Prototractatus* in order to achieve a correct interpretation of many of the propositions in the *Tractatus*.

*Directed Action and Animal Communication*, DAISIE RADNER

Human action theory, with its emphasis on intentions and reasons, does little to enhance our understanding of the actions of nonhuman animals.

Many animal (and human) actions are directed to objects in the world, including other animals. The notion of directedness can be analyzed without attributing intentions or reasons to the agent. An action is directed to object *X* if and only if (1) the agent singles out *X*, either by orientation or by selective performance of the action in the presence of *X*; (2) the agent recognizes *X* as a suitable object, and (3) the goal of the action is that *X* should be in a certain relation to the agent or to some other object. The goal of an action is not necessarily attributable to the agent as the agent's goal in acting. Moreover, an agent can have a goal in acting without understanding how the action achieves the goal. The usefulness of the concept of directed action in the study of animal communication is illustrated with examples from the recent ethological literature.

*Slote's Satisficing Consequentialism*, TIM MULGAN

The article discusses Michael Slote's Satisficing Consequentialism, on which moral agents are not required to maximize the good, but merely to produce a sufficient amount of good. It is argued that Satisficing Consequentialism is not an acceptable alternative to Maximizing Consequentialism. In particular, Satisficing Consequentialism cannot be less demanding in practice than Maximizing Consequentialism without also endorsing a wide range of clearly unacceptable actions. It is then argued that Slote's inability to provide reasons for moral satisficing stems from a mistaken analogy between rationality and morals. The sense of "good enough" which is relevant to morality is one which focuses on the effort an agent puts in, rather than the outcome she produces. Replacing outcome with effort would undermine Slote's Consequentialist project. Finally, it is suggested that similar problems will be faced by others who seek to construct broadly Consequentialist theories which are not unduly demanding.

*Humanism and the Meaning of Life*, JENNY TEICHMAN

The paper asks two questions: Does human life have a purpose? and Is human life intrinsically valuable? Human beings have personal, communal and common purposes but we cannot know whether there are any purposes in addition to these. The argument that mundane purposes are meaningless without transcendent purpose, though valid, rests on a false premise. There are at least four ways of thinking about the value of life. Pantheism implies that human life is sacred because everything is sacred. The thesis that mankind is made in the image of God implies that life is sacred because something else is. A third opinion is that human life lacks value because only gods can be sacred. A fourth, humanistic, idea is that human life has intrinsic value. Several reasons in support of this fourth view are listed.

*Do I Have to Be Here Now?* C. J. F. WILLIAMS

David Kaplan has claimed that "I am here now" is analytic but not necessary. This requires that this sentence is a proposition, since only what is



## ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Metaphysical Society of America announces a call for papers to be presented at its forty-sixth annual meeting, to be held at Loyola College in Maryland on March 10–12, 1995. The program will consist of invited and contributed papers on the topic “Being and Dialectics.” The theme is meant to invite contributions bearing upon the role of metaphysics as a cultural presence. Submissions will be judged by a program committee consisting of Joseph Grange, Brian Martine, and Aldo Tassi. Draft papers of not longer than fifteen pages may be submitted to the Program Chair, Professor Joseph Grange, Department of Philosophy, University of Southern Maine, Portland, Maine 04103. The deadline for submissions is May 1, 1994.

*Auslegung*, a philosophy journal edited and published by the Graduate Association of Students in Philosophy at the University of Kansas, invites submissions of philosophical papers from graduate students and nontenured Ph.D.s for possible publication. Papers may be on any topic in philosophy, and should not exceed thirty typed, double-spaced pages. Authors should submit three manuscripts, all prepared for blind review. Deadlines for submissions are September 1 (Winter issue) and March 1 (Summer issue). Address all correspondence to *Auslegung*, Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045.

Saint Louis University announces the first Henle Conference on the History of Philosophy, to be held April 8–9, 1994, at Saint Louis University. The theme for the conference will be “Recent Work in Medieval Philosophy.” The speakers will be Marilyn M. Adams (UCLA), Stephen Dumont (Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto), Sten Ennesen (Institute for Middle-latterfilologi, Copenhagen), Norman Kretzmann (Cornell), Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (Freie-Universität Berlin), and John F. Wippel (Catholic University of America). For additional information contact Professor Eleonore Stump, Robert J. Henle Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, 221 North Grand Boulevard, St. Louis, Missouri 63103-2097.

The National Committee for Philosophy of the Royal Irish Academy is pleased to announce that its 1994 Conference will be held May 19–20, 1994, at the Royal Irish Academy, Dublin. The subject will be “Language and Translation.” For additional information contact Dr. Rachel Finnegan, Administrative Officer, Royal Irish Academy, 19 Dawson Street, Dublin 2, Ireland.

The Sixth Annual Southeastern Graduate Philosophy Conference will be held at the University of Georgia in Athens, Georgia on April 8–9, 1994. For further information write to David Keller, Philosophy Department, 107 Peabody Hall, The University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia 30602, telephone 706-543-5122.

The Boston University Institute for Philosophy and Religion announces its 1993-94 lecture series, "In Pursuit of Happiness." Lectures take place during the year from October 27 to March 30. Speakers in the Spring semester include Michael Fishbane (Chicago), Huston Smith (Syracuse), and William M. Sullivan (LaSalle). For additional information write to the Boston University Institute for Philosophy of Religion, 745 Commonwealth Avenue, Room 523, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.

The Center for Voegelin Studies at the University of Manchester announces an international conference, "Voegelin's Vision of Order and the Crisis of Civilization in the Twentieth Century," to be held July 8-10, 1994, at the University of Manchester. The conference will consist of discussion of papers precirculated to all participants, including papers by Paul Carngella (Hoover Institution), Reinhold Knoll (Universitat Wien), Stephen McKnight (University of Florida), and Klaus Vondung (Universitat Gesamthochschule Siegen). For more information contact Dr. Geoffrey L. Price, Center for Voegelin Studies, Department of Religions and Theology, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, United Kingdom.

The Center for Voegelin Studies at the University of Manchester announces the establishment of a Documentation Center to provide support for research on the work of Eric Voegelin and on questions developing from it. Material available for consultation includes a complete microfilm collection of the Voegelin archive, primary published books, selected secondary works, and a dissertation collection. For more information contact Dr. Geoffrey L. Price, Center for Voegelin Studies, Department of Religions and Theology, University of Manchester, Manchester M13 9PL, United Kingdom.

*Research in Philosophy and Technology* is under a new editorship beginning with volume 15. All manuscripts submitted for review should be addressed to Carl Mitcham, Editor, *Research in Philosophy and Technology*, Pennsylvania State University, 133 Willard Building, University Park, Pennsylvania 16802.

The Jacques Maritain Center, in conjunction with the Department of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame, announces the James B. Mooney Visiting Scholarship. The St. Gerard Foundation, donor of the scholarship, promotes the study and teaching of Thomism. The scholarship is designed to bring to Notre Dame someone with a research project bearing on the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Funding could provide a one semester stay or supplement sabbatical leave. Applications for the 1994-95 award are now being accepted. The deadline for applications is May 1, 1994. The scholarship will be awarded June 1, 1994. Send letters of application to Ralph McInerney, James B. Mooney Scholarship, Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556.

The Department of Philosophy of The Pennsylvania State University is pleased to announce the appointment of Charles Scott as Sparks Professor of Philosophy. He takes the professorship in January 1994.

The Peer Review Committee of the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation has selected Michael DePaul (Notre Dame), Max Pensky (SUNY), David Rowe (Johannes Gutenberg Universität) and Kenneth Westphal (New Hampshire) for a Research Fellowship for a long-term collaborative project in Germany. Peter Baumann has been awarded a postdoctoral fellowship under the Foundation's Feodor-Lynen program to study at Stanford University. Further information about the foundation and applications for its programs may be obtained from The Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, 1350 Connecticut Avenue N W, Suite 903, Washington, D C 20036.

Robert E. Santoni, Maria Theresa Barney Professor of Philosophy at Denison University, and currently Visiting Fellow in Philosophy at Yale University, has been appointed Visiting Scholar at the University of Cambridge, U K., for the Lent and Easter terms, 1994.

## **IN MEMORIAM**

### **NATHAN ROTENSTREICH 1914–1993**

Nathan Rotenstreich, a frequent contributor to this review, died October 12, 1993, in Jerusalem

Born in Sambor, Poland in 1914, Rotenstreich immigrated to Palestine in 1932 and began his studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he received a Ph D in 1938

Rotenstreich worked with the Jewish Agency and Youth Aliya beginning in 1944, and was principal of the Youth Aliya Teachers' College in Jerusalem

He joined the Hebrew University in 1949, becoming professor of philosophy in 1955. He served as university rector from 1965 until 1969

Rotenstreich was the recipient of the 1963 Israel Prize for Humanities for his two books: *Spirit and Man*, and *Problems of Philosophy in Modern Times*


A member of the Israeli Academy of Sciences and Humanities and the International Institute of Philosophy, his scholarship moved along two parallel vectors: a critical examination of modern Continental philosophy and an analysis of modern Jewish thought. To both fields he contributed historical and original works. Rotenstreich translated the works of Kant into Hebrew, and also published dozens of books in Hebrew, English, and German, and hundreds of academic articles on different philosophical topics

Following his retirement, Rotenstreich continued to write and actively participate in public life. He was the recipient of honorary degrees from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Hebrew Union College and the Jewish Theological Seminary of America.

Rotenstreich is survived by his wife, two daughters and grandchildren

J P D


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**Thomas Aquinas and His Legacy**


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**Recapitulations**

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KNOWING ESSENTIALS

ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI

WE OFTEN USE PHRASES like, “knowing the essence of a thing” or “getting to the essence of a thing,” but such expressions may be misleading and may provoke unfortunate epistemological problems. They suggest that we somehow extract an essence from the thing and make it, like a new thing, the target of our knowledge. They suggest a kind of vision, acquisition, or possession of the essence itself. If we have such a picture in mind when we speak of knowing an essence, many problems ensue that make us skeptical about ever having such knowledge. We begin to ask how we manage to extract this essence, what sort of intuition or vision is involved, whether the grasp of the essence is sudden or gradual, how the essence exists and how it is related to the things that have it. The problem with the picture is that the essence seems to be taken as a rather substantial object in its own right, a new object toward which we turn, something that we can pull out from other objects, from the individuals that contain the essence. The picture makes us formulate the philosophical problem of essences in the wrong way.

To avoid these difficulties, it would be helpful to do two things first, to speak of “knowing essentials” instead of knowing an essence, and, second, to study the phenomenon of knowing essentials in a more concrete and less formal way.

I

Let us begin with an example. Something is going wrong with my car. It seems occasionally to go soft when I try to accelerate; it seems not to engage smoothly when I try to go forward. I know nothing about automotive engineering, so I try putting some additive into the gas tank (I had just heard an advertisement for that product), I check the tire pressure, I lift the hood and look around at the motor.

I finally bring the car to a mechanic, who checks the transmission oil, finds bits of shiny metal in it, and tells me that the transmission is worn out and needs to be replaced. He knows the essentials of the situation, I do not; instead of knowing essentials, I am immersed in accidentals, even though I do not recognize them as such. What is "in itself" in this situation appears to the mechanic but not to me. Let us look more carefully at this example.

The first thing to notice is that the crucial distinction is not between knowing the essentials and being totally ignorant of the thing in question; the crucial distinction is between knowing essentials and being lost in accidentals. The alternative to knowing essentials is not sheer ignorance, but a special kind of familiarity with the object in question: a familiarity in which we can recognize the object but come short of grasping it in regard to what it is in itself. Thus, it would not be appropriate to say that Julius Caesar failed to know the essentials of the automobile; he did not know the automobile at all, and neither its essentials nor its accidentals appeared to him. The distinction did not arise in his regard. Only if one is acquainted with something can one be lost in its accidentals and fail to get to the essentials. The distinction between the essential and the accidental, and between their respective manifestations, is made only within a setting or a genus with which we are acquainted.

Also, we should not think that there are essentials only for discrete substances, such as trees, horses, and human beings. There are also essentials for things like dangerous situations (in which the courageous person is best able to appraise them), bodily health, political campaigns (President Bush seemed to miss the essentials of the 1992 American presidential campaign), academic lectures, gasoline stations, firearms, lyrical poetry, drama, and the writing of history. Furthermore, we cannot provide the essentials of something simply by formulating a catalogue of features belonging to the thing; the essentials are not mere items to be listed. Sometimes they cannot even be fully expressed in words, not even by someone who is capable of distinguishing between the essential and the accidental in practice. A grasp of essentials is sometimes best expressed by what a person does rather than by what he says, although some verbal expression would almost always be a normal accompaniment of what is being done.

What we have been calling the essentials is what Aristotle calls *ta kath' hauta*, that which things are "according to themselves," while the accidentals are what he calls *ta sumbebēkota*, that which things

are “by coincidence,” that which they only “happen” to be. In Latin we speak of what things are *per se* and what they are *per accidens*. However we may phrase it, it is the distinction between essentials and accidentals that is the main point, not the sheer grasp of essentials. We could not receive the *per se* just by itself, without playing it off against the *per accidens*. Whenever Aristotle speaks of something as being *kath’ hauto*, he implies that it is precisely not *kata sumbebēkos*.

Thus, in our involvement with things, we begin with an issue, with something given and identifiable, something with which we are acquainted: this curious animal, this bodily condition (aches and fever), this puzzling political situation, this recalcitrant automobile. The issue is the matrix, the genus. It is already differentiated from the whole of things. We act and we speak in regard to the issue, and as we do so, the essentials differentiate themselves for us from the accidentals. What is relevant differentiates itself from what is irrelevant. In the case of an inadequate response, in the case of a person who is not up to the issue, the distinction between the relevant and the irrelevant does not come through. Such a person is caught up, say, with the fact that the animal is cuddly, and he does not see that this characteristic does not matter (since what we want is an animal that will guard the house); or the person gets caught up with the showmanship and does not see that he is losing votes. Both the competent and the incompetent persons are actively engaged with the issue, but the mist of the accidental is too thick for the incompetent person to penetrate. Aspects that are alien to the issue and irrelevant to it are taken as essential: personal feelings or interests, say, are allowed to smother deliberations about policy, and the essentials of the policy issue are not allowed to sort themselves out.

The distinction between the essential and the accidental can display itself only to a dative who is able to receive it, just as the “middle” in a situation calling for action can display itself, by distinguishing itself from the excess and defect, only to an agent and a dative who has the virtue required by the situation.<sup>1</sup> The *per se* and the *per accidens* belong to the being of things, but they also display themselves, and the display calls for an appropriate audience. There is a

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<sup>1</sup> Aristotle observes that there are many ways of failing in what we do, but few or only one way of being good, see *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.6 1106b28–31. Virtuous or self-controlled agents are those who can bring out the essentials of a situation calling for action, while the weak and the vicious are those who let the situation fall apart into its accidentalities.



*spoudaios* for recognizing the essentials of a thing, just as there is a virtuous agent for sizing up a situation calling for action. Philosophically, we should not speak about the essential and the accidental as though they just belonged to things and had nothing to do with display. Being always involves display, and our philosophical task is to speak about the display proper to the matter at hand, which in this case is the distinction that emerges between the essential and the accidental.

When we get involved in philosophical arguments about whether or not there are essences in things, the speakers who wish to deny the being of essences will very often claim that the meanings of words are all relative to human societies, that there are no transcultural universals that are given as the same to everyone, that there are no natures or essences in things, there are only things as they are differently understood by different people. In response, the speakers who wish to claim that there are essences will argue that there are indeed cultural invariants, that some features are the same everywhere, that, say, the differences between men and animals, or between responsible and nonresponsible conduct, are recognized by everyone. The controversy continues. Such a way of approaching the problem of essences is too abstract and it leads nowhere. Rather than ask whether there are certain natures that are recognized everywhere as the same, it would be better to ask whether we can really deny that we see a difference between a person who is lost in accidentals and one who gets the point, who sees what is relevant, who is able to grasp the essentials of a certain situation or speech. To take a rather simple example, the very ability to get the point of a joke is an example of a grasp of essentials. No philosopher could deny that there is a difference between someone who does and someone who does not get the point of a situation or a speech, and this very phenomenon, this distinction, is the most concrete illustration of the recognition of essentials. To miss the point of a situation or a speech is to be lost in accidentals. Could anyone really say there is no difference between someone who is totally at a loss in regard, say, to a disabled automobile, and someone who knows how to set about doing something about it?

The person who can thoughtfully set about doing something about this disabled automobile would also know what to do in another situation when another car is disabled in another way. Hence, there is something universal about his knowledge; but the primary emergence of the essential is not in its universality but in the differentiation, in a concrete case, between the accidental and the essential. Thus, to

prove that there are essences, it is not necessary to trot out examples of transcultural universals, of features that belong to certain things always and everywhere, it is enough to look to a concrete instance and to see a difference between one person who gets to the core of an issue and another who cannot do so. The difference in the persons, between the knower and the one who is nonplussed, reflects a difference in what is manifested. Something has appeared to the one who knows, and failed to appear to the one who cannot cope, and that something is the essence, the point of the thing, situation, speech, or issue.

To deal with essences philosophically, therefore, we must deal not with a new kind of object that we are supposed to grasp, but with a distinction between the accidental and the essential, and with the dative for that distinction. We as philosophers begin to speak about essences only after the distinction between the essential and the accidental has manifested itself to prephilosophical agents and knowers. *Essences are not things that appear only to philosophers, they differentiate themselves for those people who are experienced and insightful in regard to the issue in question.* Philosophy comes only afterward and it draws our attention to what has already appeared. It reflects on a disclosure that has already occurred.

## II

Let us return to the controversy between nature and convention, to the question whether there really are essences in things or only diverse cultural appreciations of them. We have said that the question about essences can be best treated philosophically by analyzing the distinction between a person who gets the point of a situation or thing and one who does not. The examples we have given so far may seem insufficient, however. We have spoken about things like automobiles, political campaigns, dangerous situations, and even jokes, but such things are highly conventional. They have been made or arranged by men, and to get to the essentials of such things could still be compatible with a kind of cultural relativism. If a person were able to recognize, in practice and in speech, the essentials of, say, Chinese mandarin formalities, his ability would merely show that he is a clever mandarin. It would show that he has mastered a convention, but not that he has grasped the natural essentials of a being. Even a relativist

could admit that there are essential and accidental dimensions within human conventions and human products. Such human things have essentials precisely because we have put them there; we have stipulated that certain things are to be considered essential. The person who recognizes the essential and the accidental would, in this relativistic view, merely be responding to the intelligence that had been embodied by some other human being in the custom or the product and not to an intelligibility in the thing itself. The same would be true of the joke: the intelligence of the listener is challenged not by any natural necessity but by the intelligence of the one who formulated the joke. The cultural relativist could acknowledge conventional essences without being forced to concede that there are natural essences.

Then the question is: if there is a point to a joke, is there not also something like a point to natural things? Is there not something like a point to a tree or a spider or a cat? Is there not something to be known as what the tree or the spider or the cat is in itself? Are there not people who can grasp better than others the point of the tree and the spider and the cat? Such people are not just those who have had more experience with such things, even though sufficient experience is a necessary condition for what we are getting at; they must also have what we call insight or intelligence, the ability to get the point of the thing, to see the thing as one and as a whole, to shake out its parts, and to see its parts in relation to the whole and its activity. Aristotle would call the point of a thing its *energeia* or its *ergon*, its being-at-work, its manner of most actively being itself and displaying itself for what it is in itself, and we can serve as datives for such a display if we are up to the thing in question, in both our experience and our insight. Things display a logos, the ability to be a whole articulated into parts; it is not only human convention and making and language that introduce such wholes and articulations.

It is true, however, that natural wholes are displayed to us in the thick of human custom, making, and culture. There is therefore a ticklish interaction between the conventional and the natural. There may be a point to a cat, but if people in one society consider some cats to share in divine powers, and if people in another society use cats extensively for their own purposes, say in medical research or for food, the essentials of the cat in itself will be blended almost inextricably with what the beliefs and purposes of such people bring to the animal.

The point is that we never have sheer nature without convention, or sheer convention without nature, the two are always tangled. Nature is displayed to us only as refracted through custom, and custom always mixes with the natural. The interweaving of the two is what makes it so apparently plausible to say that there is no nature but only convention. But the deepest insights in a cultural tradition are those that tease out the difference between nature and convention, those that make it clear that in projecting a necessity that is very much colored by the style in which we live, we are also overhearing something that *has* to be the way it is presented as being. Without this touch of natural necessity the conventional achievement—the joke, the legend, the epic, the ritual formality—would lack importance and depth. It is hard to disentangle the natural from the conventional, but it is only the inexperienced and those who cannot manage the issue intellectually who cannot do so. There are those who cannot make the distinction in particular cases, but the fact that they cannot make it does not mean that it is not there. To grasp the distinction is not a matter of extracting an essence pure and simple, but of getting a sense of the source of the necessity, of glimpsing what is essential because we say it will be so, and what is essential because that is the way things have to be. Sagacity is the ability to achieve this distinction as a matter of course.

Let us, for example, consider jokes. Jokes about parents-in-law, about the boss at work, about dogs and cats, about various professions, all clearly engage social conventions, but they also disclose something about the nature of the things involved in them: familial relationships, human subordination, animal cunning, human foibles. The story about the French grammarian Bonheurs provides an example.<sup>2</sup> As Bonheurs lay dying, at the close of a long lifetime spent in the study of language and in the prescription of correct usage, he looked around at those who were gathered about his bed and he said: "I am about to—or I am going to—die, either expression is used." The story engages convention because not all cultures have grammarians, nor do all people die in bed, but it also engages nature by bringing out something about human death as such, about human persistence and pedantry, about the painful and the comic. One would have to be rather simpleminded to see no refraction of nature in such an episode,

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<sup>2</sup> See Bill Bryson, *The Mother Tongue: English and How It Got That Way* (New York: Avon Books, 1990), 146.

and it is precisely this refraction that makes the story to be more than an anecdote

What is true of the joke is also true of more substantial expressions of the nature of things. Shakespeare's plays may be set in Venice, Denmark, Scotland, or Verona, and they may reflect the conventions of Elizabethan England, but human nature and the natures of things are certainly refracted in them. When working out our tax forms, we may try to grasp the essentials of this or that rule or deduction, but through it all we may also glimpse something of what social and political life are, for better or worse. It is never a matter of having the culture here and the nature there, but of distinguishing the two within a context, and of distinguishing the essential and the accidental in regard to each. It is a matter of achieving two different distinctions: between the natural and the conventional, and between the essential and the accidental, and of seeing how all four elements work together in the concrete.

Another interesting interplay of essentials on two levels occurs in painting. Painting, unless it is purely abstract, involves a representation of some theme: a human figure, a pastoral scene, a pitcher and some pieces of fruit. There are essentials that belong to the theme as such; the point of a face, a tree, a bunch of grapes, must be maintained. However, blended with these thematic necessities, there are also compositional necessities in the painting: colors, lines, and shapes have to be balanced. These compositional essentials sometimes override the thematic ones, and the top of a table in a Cézanne still life may be tilted at such an angle that the apples on it could not possibly keep from rolling off, or a human figure may have proportions that could not possibly occur in a real body. Such thematic impossibilities are accepted, however, because the composition of the painting demands them as adjustments to the theme. The artist is not only representing but also composing. We would not get the point of the painting if we took it merely on its thematic terms ("Why does he make people look like that?" "Why does he make the bottle bulge out that way?"). We have to see that the compositional terms override the thematic, and then we get the point of the painting as a whole. Similar tensions between the thematic and the compositional occur in ballet, poetry, and fiction.

It is one thing to recognize something essential, the statesman, the expert, the insightful agent does that. It is another thing to try to formulate the essential as such, to bring out in words what things are

in themselves and what they have to be. Such an effort of formulation is a philosophical activity. As such, it is reflective and parasitic. It assumes that those who are good at the issue in question have done their work and brought out the essentials; the philosopher comes afterward and tries to pull together, clarify, and clean up what has been brought out. Aristotle's *Politics*, for example, presupposes the fact that political life has already been led, perhaps in a somewhat confused way, and it tries to formulate in more precise terms what such a life is. His *Rhetoric* assumes that people have tried to persuade one another through speeches, and it tries to formulate what goes on when they do so. There can be argument and struggle within such philosophical discussion. Hobbes, in his political writings, gives us a formulation of political life radically different from that proposed by Aristotle. We from our point of view, in our present study of what it is to know essentials, need not take sides in the controversy between Aristotle and Hobbes, but we can point out what the controversy is about. Both writers are trying to distill the essentials of political life and to state what political life is "in itself" as opposed to what it happens to be. In trying to get to the essentials, they are also trying to get to the nature of political life as opposed to the various cultural forms it takes on, even though the nature is never realized except in one or another of these forms.

### III

There is another distinction that we must examine in our discussion of what it is to know essentials. We have been working with the contrast between the essential and the accidental. We have insisted that the essential is always played off against the accidental, the *per se* against the *per accidens*, the *kath' hauto* against the *kata sumbebēkos*. This distinction manifests itself to people who are both experienced and insightful regarding a given issue.

A different distinction is often made between what we could call the thing in itself, or the thing as it is determined by science, and the thing as it merely appears to us. This modern distinction, between true, scientific reality and mere appearance, is not the same as the ancient distinction between what a thing is "in itself" (*kath' hauto*) and what it is "for us" (*pros hēmas*). In the ancient distinction, the "in itself" could also become "for us" if we were to become the

appropriate datives for the thing in question. For example, the goal of ethical education, according to Aristotle, is to bring it about that the good in itself should become good for us, and also that the pleasant in itself should become pleasant for us. In the modern understanding, however, in the Cartesian-Kantian tradition, there is a strong separation between the what the thing is and how the thing appears: the phenomenal is *only* phenomenal, and the thing in itself is *only* the object of scientific thinking, not the object of our direct, impressional experience. The thing is that which is thought, not that which is perceived, the phenomenal is that which is given only to perception, not to thought. To adapt terminology introduced by Wilfrid Sellars, the "scientific image" and the "manifest image" of the world are radically distinguished from one another.<sup>3</sup> This distinction between the objective world of science and the subjective world of ordinary experience has become embedded in the general opinion of the West. It accounts for, among other things, our tendency to prefer the results of sociological surveys or opinion polls to the moral judgments of people, and for the bias toward cultural relativism among our intellectual elites.

How is the distinction between the thing in itself and the mere appearance to be related to the distinction between the essential and the accidental? It is important for us to face this issue, because the widespread acceptance of the split between how things "really" are and how they "only" seem to be constitutes perhaps the greatest impediment to the understanding of what it is to grasp the essentials of things. The modern split between the real and the apparent is related to the modern rejection of the forms of things, the denial that the world is articulated into natural kinds. Only if beings have forms can some features be presented as essential and others as accidental. The recognition of essentials is precisely the recognition of what a particular kind of being is in itself. In our discussion of essentials we must, therefore, examine the contrast between the thing in itself and the mere phenomenon.

The merely phenomenal is external and accidental to the things themselves. Phenomena, in the modern understanding, are simply the impressions things make on us, and such impacts are accidental

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<sup>3</sup> See Wilfrid Sellars, "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man," in *Science, Perception, and Reality* (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), 1–40. Sellars speaks of the manifest and scientific images of man, but we have applied the terms to the two ways in which the world and the things in it can be presented to us.

and contingent to the things, the impacts show how we are affected by things and how we react to them, but they do not show how the things themselves are. Thus, if we accept this modern distinction, we become deprived of the setting in which the classical distinction between the essential and the accidental can take place. The essential and the accidental, instead of being perpetually played off against one another in an "open forum," are consigned to two different domains, the phenomenal is sheer accidentality and the real is sheer necessity, reached only through the rigorous procedures of natural science and its mathematics. The ancient interplay of essential and accidental becomes lost from view. It no longer seems possible for us to ask how the essential can differentiate itself, in a context and in regard to definite issues, from the accidental. The phenomenal is shunted off into the psychological or the cultural, into the relative, while the thing itself is considered to be the purely objective and scientific.

Even the distinction between confusion and insight becomes lost from view. According to the modern viewpoint we are describing, knowledge of the objective world is reached by a scientific method, by a procedure that can be followed and evaluated by anyone who is willing to learn it. Thus Descartes makes a point of saying that reason is distributed equally among men, and that no one's reason is very much better than anyone else's, he also claims that the method he introduces can be followed by anybody.<sup>4</sup> Whoever learns and follows the technique will come to the same results, and each step of the method is simple and easy to learn. Such methods allow us to reach beyond the phenomena and to get to the things themselves. They are our best way for getting at the truth. Intelligence then consists not in recognizing essentials, but in being able to devise clever experiments and formulate useful hypotheses. Intelligence is inventive rather than insightful. We articulate the method rather than the thing. In the classical viewpoint, however, procedures and techniques do not provide us with the ability to

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<sup>4</sup> René Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1:111–12. According to Descartes, although everyone shares in the same reason, not all use it in the proper way, hence the need for a method that all can follow. Descartes goes so far as to observe that a child can find out all there is to know about a certain sum if he follows the rules of arithmetic (p. 121).



distinguish between the essential and the accidental. The grasp of essentials does not result from a method that anyone can follow. There is no method or criterion to which we can appeal outside of the insight into essentials itself.

#### IV

Our reference to the insight into essentials, and our claim that such insight is unique and irreducible, may make it seem that we are appealing to some sort of mysterious intuition. This is not the case, and one way of responding to such a suspicion, one way of confirming our claim that we can in fact attain the essentials of things, is to turn to the various errors that are possible in the attainment of essentials. Mistakes do occur when we think we have gotten to something essential. We may fail to achieve an insight, and we may think we have an insight when we do not. The fact that we can recognize such failures or errors indicates that there is such a thing as true insight: the illusory shows up for us precisely as not being the genuine. To shore up our understanding of insight into essentials, therefore, we will distinguish the major kinds of mistakes that are possible in regard to knowing essentials. By analyzing the ways in which we can go wrong, we will help show that insight does exist, that it is not based on an appeal to inexplicable intuitions.

(1) At the extreme, complete *unfamiliarity* with the issue at hand precludes any possibility of insight into essentials. Such deficiency, as we have said earlier, ought not even to be considered as error or ignorance regarding essentials, because it does not allow the question of essentials to arise at all. Julius Caesar, as we remarked, cannot be said to have been ignorant of the essentials of the automobile or to have been mistaken about them.

(2) Once granted familiarity with the thing in question, we must develop sufficient experience of it to permit an emergence of the essentials. If we rush to judgment despite inexperience, we run the risk of falling into error through *haste*. We know enough to recognize the object, but not enough to discriminate what really counts in it. A brief visit to a foreign country, for example, would hardly be enough to support insight into the point of the local customs.

(3) Once granted familiarity and sufficient experience, we still need the intellectual ability to discriminate between the essential and

the coincidental. Not everyone can speak and act with awareness of this difference, many people cannot extricate themselves from the mist of the accidental. They never get to the point and cannot get the point. Mere association replaces thoughtfulness, what "they" say replaces one's own responsible speech. The source of failure in this case is not haste but *debility*. Averroes refers to this kind of failing when he criticizes thinkers who try to examine issues that are beyond their intellectual powers.<sup>5</sup>

(4) Once granted familiarity, experience, and ability, we can still fail through distortions introduced through passion or interest. Let us call this distorting factor *emotive bias*. We may be capable in principle of knowing what is essential in the issue at hand, but our personal involvement in it slants the appearance. We make it seem to be something other than it really is. Our friendship with certain persons may blind us to wrongs they might have done, so we judge the essentials of their actions in a distorted way, our interest in a promotion may make us deny the talents and achievements of our competitors, and we may make ourselves incapable of getting the true point of what they are doing. The accidentalities of our interests are imposed upon the thing in question as though they were essential to it, the thing itself is not allowed to stand forth. In some cases of emotive bias, our reason is quite completely overcome and things do appear to us falsely; we become spoiled datives. Often enough, however, our own reason is able to let the truth emerge, but because of our emotion or interest we may not want to acknowledge it, and in such cases we may act and speak mendaciously.

(5) Still another form of distortion is introduced by what we could call *cultural bias*, in which it is not our personal emotions or interests that cloud the issue but the conventions under which we live. We are not able to allow the natural essentials to come forward; our intelligence is only capable of operating with the customs that have shaped us. We are not able to appreciate that some other way of doing things could manifest the same nature that we refract in our way, and we cannot imagine that our way of doing things could ever be deficient, ever fail in presenting the essentials of the thing. Such bias does exist, but it

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<sup>5</sup> See Averroes, "The Decisive Treatise Determining the Nature of the Connection between Religion and Philosophy," trans. G. F. Hourani, in *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, ed. Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 290–91, 297.

can also be recognized as such by those who can let the essentials of things differentiate themselves from their conventional tone.

It should be noted that we transcend our cultural viewpoint not by just being exposed to other cultures and customs. Such exposure may serve as an occasion for getting beyond our own background, but the true transcendence is not the introduction of the distinction between my culture and another; it is the introduction of the distinction between my convention and the natural, and this distinction may be made even without exposure to another culture. It may arise when we sense a deficiency in the way our culture refracts something essential, or it may arise simply because we are able to grasp the distinction, to see that the thing we legitimately do in our way could in principle be done in some other way without ceasing to be respected for what it is.

The fact that we can recognize various ways in which we fail to grasp essentials—through haste, intellectual debility, emotive bias, and cultural bias—is an indication that we can also recognize situations in which these deviations do not occur, in which we succeed in getting the point of a thing.

## V

To close our study of essentials and their display, we will recapitulate some of the things we have said and add a few final details.

(1) To get to essentials is to get the point of a thing. Consider, for example, getting the point of a boat. We get the point of a boat when we see it floating as a boat should float. Everything falls in place for us around the boat when such insight happens: the water, the materials the boat is made of, the motion of the boat, the possibility of steering it, being a passenger in the boat, and so on. All the parts are seen concretely in relation to the whole. Furthermore, we get the point of a boat not when we just see the thing we call a boat, but when we see the boat "at work," when we see it floating and moving and keeping the things in it intact, and when its being at work is registered for us. We get the point of things when we see them in action. Still furthermore, we get the point of a thing best of all not when we just see the thing in action, but when we see it working at its best. An effective boat in action shows the essentials of a boat better than a decrepit, leaky, unsteerable one. Deficient instances are not without possibilities, however, it is possible for an intelligent viewer or agent to

get the point of a boat even from a poor example. His intelligence can make it possible for him to see "the best boat" even in the flimsy one. That is what intelligence, the ability to have insight into the essentials of things, is. Because intelligence can see the best even in the deficient, it is possible for art to bring out the best potentials of nature.

What is true of a boat and its essentials is also true of political society, human action, families, industries, stores, and schools. It is also true of sequoia trees, ivy, azaleas, dogs, cats, giant pandas, lemmings, cows, and deer. It is also true of dangerous situations, meals, theatrical performances, jobs, and bodily health. Everything has a *per se* and *per accidens*, and getting the point of the thing or situation or activity is grasping its essentials. We must demystify the insight into essentials, such insight is not a rare and exalted process, but something we do all the time, and the colloquial phrase "getting the point" serves well to turn our attention toward the way essentials are disclosed to us both in our everyday and in our more important moments. The demystification is not intended to make the grasp of essentials seem unimportant; there is nothing more important than appreciating what is essential and what is accidental, especially in weighty matters (such as the liturgy of the Church, familial relationships, education, or questions of human life and death). The demystification is meant to help us see that getting to essentials is not an arcane activity that only philosophers or scholars are involved in, something that needs an artificial vocabulary to be expressed, the grasp of essentials happens all the time, and it is essential to the human condition in all its variegated possibilities. Only because we can get the point of issues can we also fail to do so and hence mess up a situation, only because we can get the point can we introduce art to modify nature, only because we can get the point of things can we also be distressed in situations in which we can do nothing to help ourselves. These and other aspects of the human condition are only possible because we can and do let the distinction between the essential and the accidental emerge.

(2) Another advantage in using the colloquial expression, "getting the point," instead of more solemn philosophical terms like "the intuition of essences," is the fact that this expression makes us look to the concrete, particular situation and not to an abstract essence or an abstract definition. The primary and governing way in which we intuit essentials is not by grasping universal definitions but by discriminating, in the thick of a situation, what *this* has to be, what it cannot be,

and what it could not not be. We get the point of a boat most vividly when we see the boat in action, we get the point of human illness when we are involved in someone's sickness, we get the point of danger when we face a dangerous predicament.<sup>6</sup> To use Aristotelian terminology, we get the most vivid presentation of a form, an *eidos*, when we experience the individual substance, the *ousia* and the *tode ti*, in a revealing situation. The strongest presence of the form is not given to us when we formulate the abstract definition of the thing in question, but when we, seeing the thing in action, get the point of the thing. Once we have made these concrete insights, we can go on to abstract definitions, and then the definitions will mean something to us, they will not be given only in words, as they would be if we began with the abstraction. It is best to move from the individual substance to the definition, from the particular to the general, but even in the particular the form is given to us when we get the point of the thing, when the essentials are differentiated from the accidentals. Philosophical treatments of essence tend to stay with the general and the abstract, which is the mode of being that an essence takes on when we talk about it, usually in the absence of the thing itself. The original presence of the essence, however, is in the "thus here," the *tode*, which reveals to us its "what," its *ti*, what it must be as opposed to what it just happens to be but could possibly not be.

(3) Our present reflections on the grasp of essentials is an attempt to recover the ancient understanding of essences, the understanding expressed by Plato and Aristotle. It is an attempt to get beyond the epistemology of modernity, with its contrast between the scientific object and the mere appearance, and to restore an understanding that allows the mind to accept essentials from the world, to recognize forms, when it distinguishes such essentials from accidentals. Our task is not an epistemological one: we are not concerned with proving that we do in fact reach the essentials of things. Rather, the task is phenomenological, to show how the essentials manifest themselves, how they distinguish themselves from the accidental.

However, we do not want simply to return to the ancient understanding, to opt for the ancients against the moderns. We wish to recover the ancient in the context of the modern, which means that

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<sup>6</sup> Something like an illness may be accidental as regards human life, but dealing courageously and patiently with the illness introduces a *per se* into the situation. Virtue can turn what is bodily accidental into something essential and noble on the level of human action.

we recover it anew, with a new hermeneutical slant. The new element that we introduce is an explicit concern with the manifestation of the essence. Plato and Aristotle were concerned with pointing out that we do indeed grasp essentials or forms, that we do have a knowledge that is not just the perception of individuals. The rejection of forms and essences by modernity forces us to do more than to merely restate Plato and Aristotle; we must also show how the essence manifests itself, and it is our claim that this manifestation occurs when the essential distinguishes itself from the accidental. We provide a phenomenological description as an appropriate "demonstration," as a showing that is meant to counter the claim that we only have subjective viewpoints, never a grasp of what the thing necessarily is in itself.

One of the things that keeps us from philosophically recognizing that there is such a thing as the grasp of essentials is unclarity about the being of the accidental. We tend to overlook the fact that the accidental does truly exist. It is a weak being, it is close to nothing, as Aristotle says, but it does exist.<sup>7</sup> In particular, the accidental is not merely an illusion. We would tend to take it as a mere illusion if we were to be trapped by the distinction between the thing in itself and the mere phenomenon, we would then tend to see the accidental as just the way we happen to take things or just the way things happen to seem to us. If we escape the grip of this modern distinction, however, we can come to recognize that the accidental is a true way of being, in fact, there are billions of accidentals in any situation or any thing. As Henry James has Madame Grandon, in *The Princess Casamassima*, declare, "The world's full of accidents."<sup>8</sup> The accidentals truly are and truly present themselves; we can take notice of them, and when we recognize them as accidental we see that the point of their being is that there is no point, that it would be futile to try to find a necessity in the accidental conjunction that is given to us.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> In *Metaphysics* 6.2, the accidental is said to be "only, as it were, a name" (1026b13) and "something close to nonbeing" (1026b21). It is interesting that when Aristotle treats the four senses of being in *Metaphysics* 6.2, he discusses the accidental first. It is as though he needed the weakest kind of being, the accidental, as an extreme parameter against which he could treat the other kinds, just as he takes the brutish as an ultimate negative parameter in treating the various kinds of character in *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.1. In the lexicon of *Metaphysics* 5, however, the accidental is treated at the end, in chapter 30.

<sup>8</sup> Henry James, *The Princess Casamassima* (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), 150.

<sup>9</sup> It is difficult to disentangle the accidentals from what belongs to a thing

(4) There is a difference between explicitly stating something essential and not stating it but acting or speaking in the light of the essential. Most of the time we do not, and do not need to, formulate the required essential; the way we act and speak indicates that the essential has been recognized. A good auto mechanic may not be able to state the essentials of the automobile, but what he does is done with respect to them. Another person may act and speak in such a way that it is clear that something essential is missing: he acts and speaks as in a haze.

At other times and in other situations, the essential itself may need to come to the fore: we are talking about someone, trying to figure out his behavior, and someone says, "George is a dogmatic man." Everything falls in place around this statement of the *eidōs*. All the phenomena, all the facts, receive their explanation, their "why." The statement, "George is a dogmatic man," does not merely express one more fact about George, it expresses what George is in himself and why his behavior is the way it is.<sup>10</sup> The essential itself has come to light, it is no longer something unspoken in the light of which other things make sense. To be able to state the essential in such a way is a rare ability and it is somewhat philosophical. Stating the essential is best done in a few words, if the insightful speaker takes too long to say something, the accidentals will usually crowd out the point of the thing.

Philosophical writing (and speaking) succeeds in stating the point of things and bad philosophical writing wanders in the mist of the

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in itself. It is not the case that accidentals are rare, or that we can easily determine them by having the thing in question given without the accidentals. In fact, there are many accidentals that almost always accompany the thing in question, philosophy and sophistry, political rule and despotic rule, nationalism and imperialism, almost always are found together. If accidental conjunctions were very rare it would not be hard to distinguish between the accidental and the essential, anyone could do so. It may take great insight to see that two things that are constantly found together really are not joined in themselves, that they are only coincidentally joined.

<sup>10</sup> It might seem that "being a dogmatic man" is not part of the essence of George because it is not part of the essence of man. However, as Pierre Aubenque says, it is possible that some features may become essential to certain individuals and become part of what they are. See Pierre Aubenque, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1962), 463–4. The example Aubenque gives is Socrates' being wise (*sage*). Perhaps "being a philosopher" would be a better example, being a philosopher is not merely a fact about Socrates but essential to what he is. If you knew Socrates, or if you knew George, then, when the one's being a philosopher and the other's being a dogmatic man were stated, you would seek no further explanations. The features would show up as essential to those who know the men in question.

accidental. Bad philosophical writing is not so much incorrect as slack. Nothing happens in it. Words abound, but no point is made. It is hard to criticize inept philosophical prose precisely because it has no point at which the criticism can strike, the critic has to bring the position to a point, he has to bring to distinctness the essentials that the original writer or speaker failed to condense, and only then can he comment on it. Vagueness, more than error, is the characteristic failure that makes poor philosophy to be what it is.<sup>11</sup>

(5) The final point to be discussed is the accidental mind, the mind that constitutionally fails to get the point. What is exasperating about the accidental mind is that one never knows when or how it will go wrong; it is impossible to foresee its divagations and to guard against them, precisely because such a mind lives in the accidental mist and the accidental as such has no point. Instead of curling around the essentials of the thing and being governed by them, the accidental mind is always shooting off on tangents, tangents that take their source from coincidences and from the kind of accidentals that association, emotion, and self-interest impose. The accidental mind will not let the essentials of the thing show up. The accidental mind is marvelously unpredictable; it constantly astonishes us in the way it can invent new ways of wandering from the issue and bringing havoc into a situation. The accidental mind is complacent and thinks it is following up on promising leads, in its accidentality it is invisible to itself. It is visible for what it is only to an essential mind, to a mind that is capable of getting the point of things. It is to such an essential mind that accidental thinking and the accidental mind are so upsetting.

It is the task of reflective philosophical thinking to distinguish not only between the accidental and the essential as such, but also between the two kinds of minds that are rendered possible by these two forms of being, the accidental mind and the essential mind. In bringing all these dimensions of being and minding to light, philosophical reflection discloses both the inevitability of accidental thinking and the excellence of knowing the essentials of things.

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<sup>11</sup> See Robert Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), chap. 9.



# CAN THERE BE TEXTS WITHOUT AUDIENCES? THE IDENTITY AND FUNCTION OF AUDIENCES

JORGE J. E. GRACIA

**T**HE AUDIENCE IS THE REAL or imaginary group of persons who are in fact acquainted, could be acquainted, or are meant to be acquainted with a given text. Etymologically, the term "audience" refers to a group of listeners. This meaning of the term goes back to a time when the primary form of acquaintance with the work of an author was through the spoken word. From the invention of the printing press, however, until the time when the use of the radio became widespread, written texts were the primary way of learning about an author's work. Although contemporary media have changed this to a certain extent, in science and the humanities it is still true that the audience for an author's work consists largely of readers. For my present purposes, the distinction between readers and listeners is immaterial and, hence, I often refer to an audience as a group of readers, although what I say about it will apply, *mutatis mutandis*, to listeners as well.

The notion of audience raises all sorts of interesting philosophical issues. Perhaps the most obvious of these is whether texts must have audiences at all. Some authors claim that they need not, because the authors themselves have no audience in mind when they compose a text. If texts are intended to convey meaning, however, it would appear that they must at least be intended for audiences. How is this conflict to be resolved? It appears that in order to do so we must first settle the issue of the audience's identity, but this is not easy. Is the audience whoever is intended, by the author, to understand the text? Is the audience whoever actually comes into contact with the text? Or is the audience whoever potentially could come into contact with the text? I shall begin, then, by discussing the identity and function of the audience. Once these issues are settled I shall take up the question of whether there can be texts without audiences.

## I

*The Identity of the Audience* In order to clarify the identity of the audience I shall discuss, first, the different types of audiences that

a text may have and, second, the number of persons that may compose them. There are at least five different types of audiences for a text. In order to facilitate their discussion I have named them as follows: author as audience, intended audience, contemporaneous audience, intermediary audience, and contemporary audience.<sup>1</sup>

*The Author as Audience.* From the moment an author has put something down in writing, has said something, or even has thought about the parts of the text he is composing that are already established, even if only provisionally, and goes back to what he has written, said, or thought, he becomes an audience. If the text is written, it acquires a status more independent from the author than if it is spoken or thought. Even a spoken text or a thought text, however, can be examined by an author as an audience examines it when it is recorded on a tape or (in this case) on the author's memory. In all cases, the author who approaches the text he has composed may function as audience insofar as he goes to the text with the aim of understanding it. Indeed, the whole process of composing a text involves a person in a continuous switching back and forth between the roles of author and audience, whether as writer and reader, speaker and listener, or thinker and rememberer. In order to see the effect of what he says and how he says it, he needs to look at it as an observer rather than as a composer.<sup>2</sup>

In many ways, the effectiveness of authors depends on their dexterity at this switching of roles and on understanding the needs of an audience. Good writers, for example, say only what needs to be said in order to convey a certain meaning; they use what the audience already knows to determine what to write; they are economical and effective. Bad writers, on the other hand, repeat material the audience already knows and fail to say what is necessary for understanding—they are thus boring or unclear. The ability of the author, then, to become audience and see his own work as an audience would, is vital to making his writing effective. There is nothing paradoxical or odd in considering the author as the audience, although he cannot be

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<sup>1</sup> I first introduced the distinction among these different types of audiences in my "Texts and Their Interpretation," *Review of Metaphysics* 43 (1990) 529–33. Although a few paragraphs from that article are reproduced here, the discussion goes well beyond what was published in it.

<sup>2</sup> The need for a real distinction between "speaker" and "listener" is often denied by philosophers. See, for example, Thomas Compton Carleton, *Logica* 42, 4.

the audience precisely insofar as he plays the role of author. Only insofar as an acquaintance and identification with the needs of the audience help him in his role of author can the author, properly speaking, be the audience

Even in cases where the author does not compose a text with an audience in mind—as is the case of the practitioners of the *nouveau roman*, for example—the process of composition, revision, and correction force upon him the role of audience. The difference is that in such cases the author does not seek to impersonate someone other than himself whom he, consciously or unconsciously, identifies as the audience of the work. The critical stance that leads him to make changes in the text indicates, however, that he has distanced himself from the text and adopted the role of audience.

What of the case of an author who produces a text in a stream of consciousness, mechanically, without ever going back to it? Can it still be argued that the author functions as audience in this case? The answer is affirmative, for even in this unusual case the production of a text involves additions of signs to previous signs and thus changes of overall arrangement in previous sign arrangements, implying an understanding of those previous signs and sign arrangements. This assumes, of course, that what is being produced is a text. If what is being produced are disconnected signs and there is no resulting text, then we might be tempted to conclude that the author does not function as audience. Even in this circumstance, although not an audience of a text, the author would in most cases still function as audience of signs or parts of signs. The reason is that most signs are composites of sounds or symbols and thus their completion involves some awareness and memory in the process of production of their components.

Consider, for example, the case of someone who is producing a sentence such as the following: "Having arrived at this point in my deliberations, I need to reflect further on the problem in order to find new ways of solving it that will not only satisfy my craving for clarity and adequacy but also . . . ." Let us suppose that the person who got as far as the "also" that marks the end of the sentence as we have it is the author of the text. It stands to reason that, in order to complete the sentence, the author will have to have present in his mind in some sense the first part of the sentence, understanding what it means and thus acting as an audience with respect to it. How could he otherwise complete the sentence? Indeed, since in most cases texts are composed of natural languages whose use prescribes the use of certain

signs in determinate arrangements, it is necessary for users of those languages to be aware of the signs and the arrangements they have produced in order to add to them further signs and produce different overall arrangements. This procedure entails a role of audience even for those who are engaged in the production of texts and are, therefore, authors. The point, then, is that to be an author entails also playing the role of audience. The reverse is not true, however, for the active role audiences have to play in the understanding of texts does not generally entail authorship, unless we are speaking of audiences as interpreters.<sup>3</sup>

It is not only in the process of composition, however, that an author can function as audience. After a text has been completed, an author often goes back to it, interpreting and judging it, thus assuming the role of an audience in still another sense. The classic case in contemporary philosophy is Wittgenstein, who seems to have been concerned in his later career with attacking some of the theses he had defended in his earlier writings.<sup>4</sup> A more common example is that of an author who, after writing a book, spends some of his time clarifying or defending what he said in it.

Knowledge of the historical author of a text can be both helpful and harmful to those who seek an accurate understanding of a historical text. It can be harmful insofar as a distorted picture of that author, or an accurate but partial picture of the author, can be misleading. In some cases, however, it can also be helpful. Naturally, since the author also may function as audience, knowledge of the author as audience may be likewise helpful or harmful to other audiences who seek to understand a text.

*The Intended Audience.* The intended audience is the person or group of persons for whom the author composes the text.<sup>5</sup> The author may sometimes ostensibly dedicate a work to someone. In that case he probably intends that person to read it, if we are dealing with a

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<sup>3</sup> Cf. my "Texts and Their Interpretation," 526-7.

<sup>4</sup> There are other cases in which the author in question is conscious of the situation. For example, Edwin B. Allaire talks about the author of a paper he wrote years before and about the paper itself as if he were not the author of it. See Edwin B. Allaire, "Berkeley's Idealism Revisited," in *Berkeley Critical and Interpretative Essays*, ed. Colin M. Turbayne (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 197.

<sup>5</sup> Umberto Eco has proposed the view that it is the text, rather than the author, that determines its audience. See Umberto Eco, *The Limits of Interpretation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 55.

written text, and either profit by it or do something for the author. Many famous books, and not a few infamous ones, were dedicated to powerful figures from whom the authors intended to seek fortune, protection, and other favors. Many others were intended for the edification of those to whom they were dedicated.

Apart from persons to whom a work may be explicitly dedicated, authors often have in mind specific groups of persons as audience. Philosophers usually write for other philosophers, scientists for scientists, and so on, and frequently even for small groups within those classes. It is only literary authors who generally aim to a wider audience, but even then there are audience restrictions that have to do with education, culture, and language, among others.

Notice that it is not necessarily the case that the intended audience of a text is the person or persons to whom the text is addressed. Authors often say and write things for persons other than the ones to whom they speak and for whom they ostensibly write them.<sup>6</sup> When the president of the United States, for example, speaks to a group of farmers in Iowa and says something threatening about subsidized farming in Europe, his intended audience is probably composed of the political leaders of the nations who subsidize farming in Europe, and is not necessarily the farmers to whom he is speaking.

What distinguishes the intended audience from the other three that still remain to be discussed is that the intended audience does not have to become acquainted with the text in question or even exist at all. The intended audience may never come into contact with the text and may in fact be no more than a figment of the author's imagination. There may not be any persons of the sort intended as audience by the author, and if there are there is no assurance they will ever encounter the text.

An understanding of the intended audience helps other audiences in the understanding of a text, for it presents them with the person or group of persons that the author thought would be most affected by it. In that sense, the intended audience indirectly reveals some of the author's intentions and how the text should be approached. If, for example, we know that a text is intended for professional philosophers who work within a certain philosophical tradition and who share certain assumptions about method, we are in a better position to under-

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<sup>6</sup> W. E. Tolhurst, "On What a Text Is and How It Means," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 19 (1979) 12.

stand and evaluate it than if we do not. In this case it is easier for us to supply those methodological assumptions that the author took for granted the audience would supply

*The Contemporaneous Audience.* The contemporaneous audience is composed of all those persons who are contemporaneous with the historical author and have become or could become acquainted with the text. They share with the author much that other, later audiences do not share with him. Living during the same time period, even if in a different country and culture, would seem to entail some basic and common elements, although this may not always be the case. *Qua* audience, an illiterate tribesman, for example, will have very little in common with a Nobel laureate in literature even if they are contemporaries, and it is probably true that, conceptually, a contemporary Aristotelian will have more in common with Aristotle than with an illiterate tribesman.

By the contemporaneous audience, then, I do not mean to refer to persons who are culturally and educationally far removed from the historical author. I mean members of his and similar social groups who have the basic educational and cultural tools to be in principle capable of understanding the text in question and who are roughly contemporaneous with the author.<sup>7</sup> Under these conditions, this audience is better prepared to understand the text than are subsequent audiences.

Note that the contemporaneous audience may be the intended audience in cases in which the author of a text identifies his cultural, educational, and temporal contemporaries with the audience of the text. It need not be so, however. The intended audience may be only one of the members of the contemporaneous audience or only a subgroup of that audience. It may turn out that the author intends as audience a future person or group of persons.

Obviously, knowledge of the contemporaneous audience of a text can be very helpful to those who seek to understand the text, provided such knowledge is accurate. It is reasonable to suppose that the common cultural and social context shared by the author and the contemporaneous audience determines to a great extent the

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<sup>7</sup> Stanley Fish refers to this audience as the "intended reader." Apart from the fact that this narrows the audience to readers, it also does not take into account that the author may have intended someone in particular for the text. See Stanley Fish, *Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 160.

rules and procedures for the composition and understanding of texts under which both the author and the audience operate. The language used by the author, for example, is also in most cases the language of the contemporaneous audience. We can learn a lot about Plato's dialogues if we know something about Athens at the time he wrote them and the kind of Greek spoken and written at the time, as well as about the cultural and social mores of the period. If the knowledge one has of the contemporaneous audience of a text is not accurate, however, it may mislead rather than help in the determination of a text's meaning

*The Intermediary Audience.* The intermediary audience consists of the group of persons who have or may have become acquainted with the text, but who are neither contemporaneous with the author nor contemporaries of those who are trying to understand the text. They are thus separated from the author not only by individual idiosyncrasies but also by time. Living at a different time and under different conditions, the context within which they would approach the text is different from that of the historical author's contemporaneous audience and it is also different from the context in which the interpreter's contemporaries will read it. How different the context is will vary not only with the temporal separation between the intermediary audience and the moment at which the historical text was produced, but also with the degree to which the ideological assumptions and climate of the age have changed. Temporal distance is not directly proportional to conceptual distance. Some temporally very distant ages may be closer together conceptually than other ages which are temporally closer

Knowledge of this audience is helpful to interpreters only in cases where intermediary audiences have produced interpretations of the historical text and such interpretations survive. In these cases, knowledge of the intermediary audience may help in the understanding of the interpretations of the historical text they produced and thus indirectly help in the understanding of the historical text. This is made possible, of course, because they are contextually closer to interpreters than to the author and the contemporaneous audience. If the intermediary audiences did not produce interpretations or such interpretations have not survived, then there is nothing that knowledge of them can contribute to later understandings of the text. The role of intermediary audiences is very important in the process of transmission and understanding of texts

from ages far removed from the time when an interpreter is seeking to understand those texts

*The Contemporary Audience.* The contemporary audience is composed of the group of persons who have or may become acquainted with the text and are not the author, his contemporaries, or the intermediary audience. In some cases, it will consist simply in the generation of persons that comes after the contemporaneous generation. If that is the case, then there will not be an intermediary audience between the contemporaneous and the contemporary audiences. In all other cases, however, there will be at least one generation of persons that may be acquainted with the text between the contemporaneous audience and the contemporary audience, allowing for an intermediary audience.

The difficulty for the contemporary audience to understand a historical text is not only one of temporal or ideological distance between the text and itself, but also the fact that it may have at its disposal interpretations of the text provided by both the contemporaneous and the intermediary audiences, and sometimes even by the author himself. The number of interpretations tends to increase as time passes. These interpretations can be both helpful and unhelpful to the contemporary audience in developing understandings of the text. They can help insofar as they establish bridges between the contemporary audience and the historical text, but they can also be obstacles insofar as they may be mistaken and may lead the contemporary audience in directions which take it farther from rather than nearer to the meaning of the historical text.

Before I turn to the composition of the audience, it should be made clear that the distinctions among the various audiences identified here are not to be considered hard; there is some degree of overlap. For example, the contemporaneous audience may be composed of persons of different ages, some of whom, one could argue, could also become part of the intermediary audience or even the contemporary audience. This possibility underscores the artificial character of these categories, and therefore the possibility of grouping audiences in other ways or of adding other categories to the ones I have presented. For example, in addition to the categories suggested, one could add that of historical audience, which would comprise the categories of author as audience and of contemporaneous audience. Others are also possible. The artificial character of these categories, however, does not undermine the points I have made or the hermeneutical usefulness of the categories.



So far I have been speaking about the audience as if it always were plural, except for the case of the author (who could also be plural but about whom I have generally been speaking in singular terms). Yet the plurality of most audiences discussed could be understood in two ways. distributively, as a plurality composed of single persons who become or may become acquainted with a text in their individual privacy, or collectively as a group which understands a text. The latter suggests that a plurality of individual persons can come together as a whole and act collectively as audience. These considerations raise interesting questions concerning the relation between audiences and texts.

A text is like a piece of a puzzle that makes sense only as an element of a larger whole, and the audience supplies an important part of that larger whole. However, that the audience can be single or plural may entail that what is supplied by the one might be different from what is supplied by the other and, therefore, that the understanding of a text by an individual person may be different from its understanding by a group. In one way this does not seem alarming. We may agree that the understanding I have of the text of the American Declaration of Independence is different in some ways from the collective understanding the American people have of it, but we may not regard this as alarming because the differences in question are not significant. On the other hand, this fact may become alarming if those differences are such that there is no hope of bringing them together in some way. After all, it is no good to me to understand a text differently than society at large understands it. If I understand a "No Parking" sign as meaning "no parking for everyone else but myself" I will most likely get a parking ticket and will have to pay a fine.

The undesirable inference that the individual person and the group have different understandings of texts is predicated on the assumption that the individual person and the group are somehow totally unconnected, or at least that their connection is irrelevant or too tenuous to affect their respective understanding of texts. There is no question that there are grounds on which to defend this assumption. After all, the understanding by the individual person appears to take place in her own mind, separate and unconnected from that of others. Understanding seems to be a private affair that can be described as acts of an individual person's mind. Thus, the understanding I have of the text of the American Declaration of Independence is mine and mine alone, known only to myself in the privacy of my consciousness.

By contrast, what a group understands appears to be something public, shared by all members of the group. Hence, what the text of the American Declaration of Independence means for Americans considered as a group, so the argument goes, is something public and different from what it means to me.

One way in which one might try to object to this conclusion is to argue that the fact that an understanding is public is not sufficient to make it different from a so-called private understanding. The public understanding of " $2 + 2 = 4$ " is that two plus two equal four, and that is also my private understanding of it.

This reply does not appear effective, for it might be retorted that the difference in context represented by the individual person in contrast with the group will insure that understanding will be different. Most texts are elliptical and the context in which they are found affects their meaning as much as do the signs of which they are composed and the arrangement of those signs. The context involved in the case where it is an individual person who understands a text is radically different from the context which the group brings to bear on the understanding of a text. The individual person has a very particular set of assumptions, beliefs, and so on that are the result of that person's past and experience. This contrasts with the assumptions and beliefs commonly shared by the group. Since the understanding of texts depends in significant ways on the context of assumptions and beliefs within which they are placed, it stands to reason that the understanding of a text by an individual person will differ from the understanding of the same text by a group.

Those who do not wish to accept this conclusion have only two courses of action. The first (1) is to argue that there are no significant differences between an individual person and a group, the second (2) is to argue that, although there are significant differences between them, their relations are such that they make possible a community of understanding.

Let me begin with (1). This view can take two forms. One (a) reduces the group to the individual persons that compose it, the other (b) reduces the individual persons to the group to which the persons belong. The first reduction (a), the reduction of groups of persons to the persons that compose them, can be accomplished by pointing out that the group is nothing other than the persons that compose it. There is no common mind to a group over and above the minds of the persons that compose the group. Thus, whatever understanding of a

text a group has is nothing other than the distributive understandings of a text the members of the group have. The difference between the understanding by an individual person and the understanding by a group of persons is simply the difference between one understanding and several understandings.

The problem with this sort of reasoning is, first, that it does not accomplish what it sets out to do. By reducing the group to the individuals of which it is composed, it does not eliminate differences of understanding among individual members of the group. Second, it fails to distinguish between understanding and the object of understanding. If understanding is an act of the mind and the object of understanding in the case of texts is their meaning, it is possible to have numerically different understandings of the same meaning. For this it is not necessary to reduce groups to individuals.

The other reductionist approach (b) tries to reduce individual persons to the group to which they belong in order to show that persons and groups can have the same understanding. This may be done by noting that what is relevant in terms of context for the understanding of texts are assumptions and beliefs, and the assumptions and beliefs of individual persons are socially derived, that is, they are the same as the common assumptions and beliefs of the group to which the persons in question belong. Thus, for the purpose of understanding texts, groups and their individual members are the same, since they share common assumptions and beliefs.

The obvious mistake of this position is not that it holds the social origin of our concepts. In that it may be right, provided "origin" is understood correctly, although I am not prepared to defend this view here. The mistake is rather that this position rules out the possibility of having those concepts combine in the minds of individual persons in different ways from those in which they appear in the society at large or in other members of the society. Indeed, for this view to be correct, all members of the group would have to think alike and the mere possibility of a different way of thinking would have to be ruled out. But none of this accords with our experience, for we do think differently from the way other members of the groups to which we belong think, as the existence of the various arguments we have been discussing here clearly indicates. Moreover, individual persons often also disagree with views generally held by the society at large.

The reduction of individual persons to the group or of the group to the individual persons that compose it in order to preserve

common understandings between individual persons and the group is, then, undesirable. The position I would like to defend (position [2]) holds a middle ground between these two extreme views. It accepts that there are differences between individual persons and groups that are significant when it comes to the understanding of texts, but at the same time it holds that there are important relations between these persons and groups which are also significant for such an understanding. It is those relations that make possible common understandings of texts.

On the one hand, I am prepared to accept that an individual person engages in acts of understanding that are separate and private and, therefore, cannot be shared by other persons or by a group. The group in fact has no acts of understanding such as those the individual person has. What is usually referred to as the "understanding of a text by a group" is some agreed-upon text which is added to the original text which is what, together with it, I call an interpretation.<sup>8</sup> Moreover, it is also true that an individual person has experiences that are unique and which result often in views and beliefs that are idiosyncratic. These experiences are retained in the individual person's memory (or subconscious if one is willing to accept such a notion). The group, on the other hand, has no memory of the sort individuals have, where common experiences could be stored. Society's memory consists of archives and libraries, that is, collections of texts and records, and is therefore generally different from a person's memory (or subconscious), which is not primarily textual. For example, the memory I have of my college graduation consists of a series of images and experiences which do not function as signs for anything else. By contrast, the collective memory of that event consists primarily of a series of texts—newspaper articles, records, and so forth—kept in various archives and libraries, although there may also be some photographs, paintings, and even films.

All this seems largely uncontroversial, but no less evident is the fact that a person's beliefs depend to a great extent on a conceptual framework inherited from society. Nor is it less evident that society depends on its members for the concepts and views it develops. The interdependence between person and group occurs at various levels. Human beings differ genetically from each other, and individual sur-

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<sup>8</sup> See my *Philosophy and Its History: Issues in Philosophical Historiography* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 211.

vival is also connected to other members of the group. These and other similar relationships are not significant when it comes to the understanding of texts, however. For the latter what is important is that persons are socially dependent for many of the signs they use and the rules they employ to arrange them, as well as for the meanings they convey through them. In turn society depends on individual persons for the preservation of the meanings which signs are supposed to express, for the entities that make up texts are not by themselves capable of producing understanding, nor do they contain or imply meanings. The individual person, therefore, is not a semantic island isolated from the mainland of social meaning, nor is the group semantically separate from the individual persons that compose it. It is the relations between the group and its members that make possible a community of understanding. The way this functions can be illustrated by the way a group arrives at an understanding of a text.

Let us take a philosophy class as a group, composed of say ten students and a faculty member. The group is trying to understand Anselm's notorious argument for the existence of God. The class begins after all its members have read the text of chapters 1-4 of the *Proslogion*. Consequently we can assume that each member of the class has an understanding, which may or may not be different from the understandings of other members of the class, of Anselm's argument. Once the class assembles together and discussion begins it becomes clear that the understandings of the text by different members of the class do not always coincide. One person argues that faith is a necessary condition for the argument to work, and she bases her views on some statements at the end of chapter 1 of the *Proslogion*. Another person argues that faith is not a necessary condition for the argument to work based on Anselm's statements at the end of chapter 4, but grants that the argument is preceded by a statement of faith. Still another student points out that there seem to be two arguments rather than one, one given in chapter 2 and the other in chapter 3. And so on. What we have, then, is several understandings of the text that differ sometimes in minor and sometimes in major ways. We must not forget, however, that even those that differ in major ways have much in common. Indeed, it is because they have much in common that disagreement is possible, for disagreement implies communication and communication entails common ground. Thus common ground, of course, has to do with signs and their meaning and

arrangement, as well as with a context of presuppositions and beliefs that makes communication possible.

Let us further assume that, on the basis of the discussion, the class as a whole—that is, every one of its members—comes to accept the same understanding of, if not the whole text, at least some part of it. For example, let us assume that every one in class understands how Anselm's negative and comparative formulation is significantly different and stronger than Descartes' affirmative and superlative formulation of what God is. Let us assume further that this common understanding is the result of the give and take that has taken place in class. What does this common or group understanding amount to? If by understanding we mean an act whereby something is understood, then the common or group understanding amounts to the numerically different understandings—that is, the numerically different acts—of each member of the class. In this sense there is no one understanding, ontologically speaking, that is other than the individual acts of understanding of each person. On the other hand, if by understanding the object that is understood—that is, the object of the individual acts of understanding—is meant, then the understanding is common to all members of the group. Finally, it is also clear that the causes of both the individual and common understandings are the group's interaction. True, it is possible that understanding could have come about in a student's mind outside class and independently of the class discussion. In our example, however, it was as a result of that discussion that it happened. The point, then, is that a group does have an important causal effect on individual understandings, for it confronts the individual with views that he may not consider himself. This in turn is the result of the different conceptual contexts within which each person functions. The group makes accessible to its members contexts with which they may not be acquainted, thus expanding the semantic possibilities of a text for them.

## II

*The Function of the Audience* The general function of an audience is to understand a text; indeed, what characterizes an audience, *qua* audience, is that the audience is meant to understand a text. The author, by contrast, when acting as author, is related to a text as its

creator and therefore has as his aim to select and arrange the signs of which the text is composed in some way which will convey a specific meaning and thus produce understanding. Of course, the ultimate goal of an author in creating a text may be more than just to produce understanding. The author may be trying to cause some behavior or emotion in the audience, or he may just be trying to vent a feeling. In such cases, the primary function of a text may not be to produce understanding on the part of an audience. For example, the intended effect of an order to open the door is an action on the part of the person to whom the order is given. If that person is considered to be the audience of the text, then it would seem that the function of audiences is not necessarily to understand but rather that their function will depend very much on what the author of a text intends to accomplish with the text.

To this one might answer that even in these cases some understanding on the part of the audience is a prerequisite of the effective accomplishment of the author's goal. Understanding in some sense is necessary for the ulterior goal to be achieved even if that goal is not understanding. Moreover, since this understanding is meant to take place on the part of the audience, the function of the audience must include understanding after all.

This solution, however, is not altogether satisfactory for my purposes, since it would still undermine the view I wish to defend, namely, that the primary function of an audience of a text is to understand the text. Indeed, if we were to rest with this answer we would have to grant that there is no primary function of audiences *qua* audiences, since texts have many functions other than to produce understanding and thus affect audiences in many different ways.

A different and more effective answer involves making a distinction between the person or persons for whom a text is intended and the various roles that the person or persons in question are intended to play. Putting this distinction to use, we could claim that it is only when that person or persons function in a role in which they are primarily intended to understand a text that they function as audiences. When they play other roles, then they cannot be considered to be audiences properly speaking; under these circumstances they are whatever the role they are intended to play determines that they be. Thus, an audience's function is, indeed, to understand a text even if the aim of the text is to produce some other effect in the person or persons for whom it is intended.

Let me give an example. When person  $P_1$  says to person  $P_2$  "Clean the house in this way, etc.,"  $P_1$  intends  $P_2$  to function as a servant who carries out  $P_1$ 's orders. In that capacity,  $P_2$  is not an audience. However,  $P_1$ 's action of using a text to order  $P_2$  to carry out certain tasks implies also that  $P_1$  intends  $P_2$  to understand what  $P_1$  says. It is in this latter capacity that  $P_2$  is an audience. Thus,  $P_2$  is both a servant and an audience and there is no conflict between the two, although  $P_2$  is not a servant insofar as he is an audience or an audience insofar as he is a servant, and he can be a servant without being an audience and vice versa.

That the function of an audience is to understand does not mean that the audience must be considered passive, as some historiographers used to think.<sup>9</sup> On the contrary, the audience approaches the text actively, but its relation to the text and the aim it has, *qua* audience, are different from those that characterize authors.<sup>10</sup> The primary thrust of authors is to create something new, whereas that of audiences is to understand what has already been created. Both are engaged in connecting meaning to entities, but authors are freer than audiences insofar as they determine, with whatever materials they have at their disposal, the character of the text they compose. Audiences are less free because they are presented with a *fait accompli*; their challenge is not to produce a text but to understand already existing texts. Perhaps the differences between the function of authors and audiences will become clearer if we look at what is involved in the understanding of a text by an audience.

The active character of the roles audiences play in understanding texts is evident at several levels.<sup>11</sup> First, it is present at the level of

<sup>9</sup> The concern for freedom in the audience is what drives many post-modernists. See Roland Barthes, *S/Z* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970), 10.

<sup>10</sup> Kendall L. Walton has argued recently that too much emphasis is put on the differences between audience and author in the case of art objects and that their roles are closely analogous, see Kendall L. Walton, "Style and the Products and Processes of Art," in *The Concept of Style*, ed. Berel Lang (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 77. I sympathize with this point of view, as will become clear immediately, but nonetheless there are differences between these roles in the case of texts—differences that cannot be ignored. The features that apply to art objects cannot be extended to texts in this instance.

<sup>11</sup> Even prior to the levels mentioned here, the active role of the audience is evident in the selection of a text or parts of a text for observation and understanding. See Edwin Panofsky, "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline," in Edwin Panofsky, *Meaning in the Visual Arts: Papers in and on Art History* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1955), 8.



acquaintance with the text. If the text is physical, this acquaintance will take the form of perception, if the text is mental, then it will consist in some kind of nonphysical awareness. Most texts with which we are acquainted are physical, so we will, for the sake of simplicity, deal only with them. Apart from acquaintance with or perception of a text, the audience must, second, understand the meaning of the signs of which the text is composed. This involves connecting each sign to some meaning. Third, the audience must recognize the significance of the arrangement in which the signs appear. This does not mean that the audience must be aware of the rules according to which the signs that compose the text are arranged, in the sense that the person or persons who compose the audience could explicitly formulate these rules. Knowledge of English grammar in this sense, for example, is not required for the understanding of English texts—this is particularly evident in the case of oral texts. What is required is only the skill to derive semantic significance from syntactical arrangements. Finally, the audience must also fill in the *lacunae* present in the text. Most texts are elliptical. They contain gaps which are to be filled with materials supplied by the audience according to context. Texts are like maps, where only prominent landmarks are recorded and which, if taken by themselves, provide at best a general outline of the conceptual terrain they chart.<sup>12</sup> Some of these gaps are intentional and they may have rhetorical force, others are simply there because the author unconsciously takes for granted what is supposed to fill them up. In both cases an accurate understanding of a text requires that the audience supply appropriate materials to fill these gaps.

With respect to the *lacunae*, moreover, it is not always the case that there is one and only one way to fill them. Take the case of *lacunae* that are intentionally left by the author.<sup>13</sup> In some cases

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<sup>12</sup> Roman Ingarden speaks of them as "schematized structures," sort of skeletons in which the flesh is supplied by audiences. See Roman Ingarden, *The Literary Work of Art: An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic, and Theory of Literature*, trans. G. G. Grabonicz (Evanston Northwestern University Press, 1973), 264, and Eco, *Limits of Interpretation*, 47. The fillings that the audience has to provide are not of the sort that Fish suggests, however. For Fish, the fillings are open and thus can never be incorrect or misguided, for the audience "makes" the text. See Stanley Fish, "Interpreting the *Variorum*," *Critical Inquiry* 2 (1976): 482. For a discussion and criticism of this view, see M. H. Abrams, "How To Do Things with Texts," *Partisan Review* 46 (1979): 576–88.

<sup>13</sup> On textual gaps in general see Wolfgang Iser, *Prospecting From*

they are meant to be filled in one and only one way. This is the situation found in the case of certain gaps present in most medieval manuscripts, for example. Owing to the relative scarcity and high price of materials to be used for writing surfaces, medieval authors frequently left out the conclusions of syllogisms. They record the first two premises and had them followed by an *et caetera* and no conclusion. It is the job of the reader to fill in the blank, as it were. At the time these texts were written this task was probably easy, because the members of the audience for which the texts were meant were aware of the rules for filling in the blanks, of appropriate terminology, and so on. But, as anyone who has tried to do this today knows, it is by no means easy for a contemporary reader, even though the authors of the texts intended those blanks to be filled in one and only one way.

There is no reason, however, why authors should not intend to have the *lacunae* in their texts filled in different ways, some of which they may have thought as possibilities and others which did not occur to them in particular although they may have anticipated the possibility of their existence. There is no reason, for example, why an author may not leave unwritten the last chapter of a novel, letting the audience supply it according to the audience's imagination. Indeed, there are examples of this sort of procedure in contemporary literature. Much humor is based precisely on textual ambiguity owing to incompleteness.

What has been said concerning intentional *lacunae* would seem *prima facie* to apply also to unintentional *lacunae*. After all, one could argue that, if there is a gap, there may be one or more ways to fill it. But this may not be as it seems. Unintentional *lacunae* are due to the author's assumption that the text says something when in fact it does say it only because the author is unintentionally supplying in his mind (and frequently through context) some element which is missing in the text. In such cases, it would seem more sensible to surmise that the author is using only one context rather than several ones. Indeed, use of several contexts for the same gap would seem to presuppose consciousness of them and thus of the gap, which is precisely what the author does not have. Thus, it does not seem likely

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*Reader Response to Literary Anthropology* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 9, and Wolfgang Iser, "Interaction between Text and Reader," in *Reader Response Criticism*, ed. Jane P. Tompkins (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 31-41.

that unintended *lacunae* can be filled in more than one way by the audience while respecting the historical integrity of the text. One obvious exception to this rule occurs when there are several equivalent ways to fill the gap, for in such a case it does not matter much which one is chosen. But this is not the complete story, although it is all I need to say at this point about *lacunae* and audience understanding in this context.<sup>14</sup>

From what has been said it follows that the role of the audience in the understanding of texts is active insofar as it has to connect meaning with signs and their arrangement and to fill in intended and unintended gaps. Lest a lingering temptation remain to view these tasks passively, I would like to bring in another consideration which I hope will be sufficient to illustrate the active role that audiences play in understanding texts. This is the view for which I have argued at length elsewhere, that the understanding of at least some texts requires value judgments about the views that those texts present.<sup>15</sup> I argued for this position by noting that when we try to understand the past, we must engage in both reconstruction and evaluation. Reconstruction involves filling in what is unstated as well as the context, evaluation involves making value judgments of various sorts, including judgments concerning truth. This applies to texts as well. In order to understand a text in its historical dimension we must supply a context and make value judgments regarding what the text means based on what makes sense and what does not, what is true or not, and what is historically possible or not. All this indicates that the audience is engaged in a process which can hardly be described as passive.

To this must be added, finally, that at least three of the audiences identified earlier in this article have a causal role in the production of a text. In one case this role is direct, for when the author functions as audience during the process of the creation of a text, his understanding of the part of the text he has created affects what he will do subsequently in a direct way. Since the author and the audience are one and the same person, they share the knowledge that determines the ultimate shape of the text. In all other cases, however, the role of the audience is indirect, since the audience does not really

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<sup>14</sup> On the issue of definitive interpretations see Jorge J. E. Gracia, "Are There Definitive Interpretations?" in *European Philosophy and the American Academy*, ed. Barry Smith, The Monist Library of Philosophy (La Salle: Hegeler Institute, 1994), 41–51.

<sup>15</sup> Gracia, *Philosophy and Its History*, 72–88.

participate efficiently in the production of the text, only the author does that. The audience exercises an indirect causal influence on the text through the author. This may involve consciousness in the case of the intended audience, where an author explicitly considers an audience for whom he is producing a text and designs the text accordingly. It need not be conscious in the case of the contemporaneous audience, however, when an author does not explicitly consider an audience but his actions imply the existence of the audience. In this case, the presence and influence of the audience cannot be denied, since the author uses particular sets of signs belonging to natural languages and he must follow rules concordant with the uses of texts by particular groups of people.<sup>16</sup> Philosophers most often write for philosophers in a language they think can be understood by them even if they are not consciously writing for philosophers, as do sociologists, physicists, and so on. Thus, the influence of the audience on a text begins even before the audience is acquainted with it.

Not every audience, however, acts as partial cause of a text. Since the influence of an audience is carried out through an author, it is only the audience as a person who is also an author, or the audience as conceived by the author, whether consciously or unconsciously, that has this role; it is only the author as audience, or the intended and contemporaneous audiences that can be involved in this process.

In short, then, the role of the audience in the understanding of texts is active, but this does not entail that the role of the audience is to be confused with the role of the author. The sort of activity in which the audience, *qua* audience, engages is different from the sort of activity the author, *qua* author, performs. That audiences are not passive does not mean that their activity must be equated with that of authors, as some think.<sup>17</sup> If the role of audiences were not distinguishable from that of authors, there would be only authors, and the purpose of texts, the conveyance of meaning, would be frustrated. The pendulum of contemporary opinion seems to have swung too far in favor of an active role for the audience. An audience is active in the understanding of a text, but does not create it. The text is already

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<sup>16</sup> James Phelan, "Validity Redux: The Relation of Author, Reader, and Text in the Act of Interpretation," *Papers in Comparative Studies* 1 (1981): 105. The role of the audience is also indirect when an author consults with it, or observes its reaction, and as a result makes changes in a text.

<sup>17</sup> For Fish, the audience creates the text. See Fish, "Interpreting the *Variorum*," 482.

an existing reality—even if incomplete and subject to diverse understandings—before the audience encounters it, and the audience's role is not to change it but to grasp its meaning and significance, even if in some cases the meaning and significance are openended. In that sense, the role of an audience is like that of the historian who wishes to account for the past. Audiences are directed toward the past, whereas the role of authors is fundamentally antihistorical. The function of authors is directed toward the future.

Before we leave this section, I must raise the question as to whether the distinctions among the various audiences discussed in Section I above affect the conclusions we have reached concerning the function of audiences. We have seen that it does at least in the causal role audiences may indirectly play in the creation of texts, since it is only the author as audience and the intended and contemporaneous audiences that play such a role. However, when it comes to the primary function of audiences, that is, the understanding of texts, the type of audience seems to make no difference. Although the author as audience and the intended, contemporaneous, intermediary, and contemporary audiences may operate at different times and under different circumstances, their primary goal is still to understand the text. They may, as we have seen with the causal function exercised by the author as audience and the intended and contemporaneous audiences, have also other secondary functions. Indeed, knowledge of the author and of the intended, contemporaneous, and intermediary audiences on the part of the contemporary audience may help the contemporary audience to understand a text better, but that does not change the primary function of those audiences. In short, what has been said concerning various types of audiences does not affect the conclusions reached in this section concerning the primary function of an audience.

### III

*The Need for an Audience.* The view that texts are meant for audiences and thus that an audience, either actual or imagined, is a necessary condition of texts is one of those assumptions that, even if seldom explicitly stated, is generally implicitly accepted in the pertinent

literature<sup>18</sup> Recently this view has come under fire, however, from some authors who claim that their business is not with an audience at all. Practitioners of the *nouveau roman*, such as Alain Robbe-Grillet, believe that for a writer the aim is to write, and whether what the writer writes is read or not is actually unimportant<sup>19</sup> (Robbe-Grillet's third novel, *Jealousy*, sold only three hundred copies in the first year even though he was already famous at the time) From this point of view, an audience is neither necessary nor important for the author, and if that is so, then its consideration could neither be necessary nor important for the existence or understanding of a text

At first it does not seem easy to undermine this point of view. Indeed, if there are authors who claim in good faith that when they compose texts they do not intend to convey any kind of meaning to anyone, how can one argue that their aim is in fact to do so? To argue that way would imply either that we think they are lying or that we think they do not know what they intend. The first alternative does not make sense unless we can produce a reason why they would wish to lie. If we cannot, then we must assume they speak in good faith.

Further, adherents to this point of view can easily point to examples in which texts are used for purposes other than to convey meaning to audiences. They might cite, for instance, the case of expressions which are meant to vent emotion, as when someone utters a profanity while in a state of rage. Likewise they may note that sometimes the writing of a poem has a therapeutic purpose rather than the communication of meaning. Some persons experience a sense of release and contentment after they have written a poem, even if the poem is not meant for anyone and is kept private or is destroyed after it is written. Finally, an author who produces a text in a stream of consciousness, in a mechanical, nonreflective way, could hardly be

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<sup>18</sup> Barthes makes it explicit when, in his desire to do away with the author, he makes the audience (that is, for him, the reader) responsible for the unity of a text. See Roland Barthes, "The Death of the Author," in Roland Barthes, *Image, Music, Text*, trans. Stephen Heath (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977), 148. On the controversy about whether there can be texts without authors, see Jorge J. E. Gracia, "Are There Texts without Historical Authors?" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, forthcoming July 1994.

<sup>19</sup> As Eco points out, "in a structuralist framework, to take into account the role of the addressee looked like a disturbing intrusion", Eco, *The Limits of Interpretation*, 44. On this issue see also Louise M. Rosenblatt, *The Reader, the Text, the Poem: The Transactional Theory of the Literary Work* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1978), 48-70.

said to be working on something meant to be understood by someone else

In spite of the impressive case that may be built to support the view that audiences are not necessary for texts, there are some observations that can be used to undermine this position. The first of these is that texts are linguistic in nature and language is public rather than private. It is neither necessary nor pertinent to recount the many arguments that have been used in support of this view in this century. Let it suffice to say that the notion of a private language is seldom defended nowadays and I share the view that such a notion is untenable.<sup>20</sup> Thus, if language is public and texts are composed of language, they must themselves be public. An obvious question which comes up at this point is why someone whose aim is not to communicate with others would use a medium which is nonprivate. Does this make any sense? It would seem that the production of texts, like the use of language, carries with it the intent to communicate—regardless of the particular intention of the author. Whether or not there is an audience that actually receives that communication, or whether the author had an idea of a particular audience or of any audience in mind, does not matter; for the procedure that authors undertake, the signs that they use to compose a text, the rules that they follow in arranging them, and so on, entail not only an audience but a particular audience. For example, if an author uses English words in a text, this surely entails that the audience of the text is composed of persons who know English, if an author uses a symbolic language of logic, she surely intends the text for those who are used to such symbolism. Finally, there is the fact already noted earlier that authors function as audiences even in cases when they do not consciously go back to the texts they are producing in order to complete them. The role of author depends on the role of audience and thus it is not possible to engage in the production of a text without adopting in some sense the role of audience.

What of the examples given above? Do they not show that an audience is superfluous? The answer to this question is negative, for the examples show only that texts have multiple functions, not that texts are not meant for audiences. The utterance of a profanity may

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<sup>20</sup> On the notion of a private language and the arguments for and against its possibility, see J. T. Saunders and D. F. Henze, *The Private Language Problem* (New York: Random House, 1967). Even deconstructionists like Jacques Derrida reject the notion of a private language. See Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," *Glyph* 1 (1977): 180.

have the function of expressing anger—we might say that expressing anger is one of the illocutionary acts performed when the locutionary act is performed. The function of the profanity might also be to scare or shock someone in addition to venting emotion, however, and in that case we must assume that some communication is intended. The use of a language in the composition of a poem intended primarily as release likewise indicates a public dimension to the poem in addition to the author's aim of release. Perhaps the author is afraid of what the poem reveals about himself, and that is why he keeps it private or even destroys it, but the act of producing it is an act which entails a public aim of communication. The same could be said with respect to the practitioners of the *nouveau roman* and stream-of-consciousness texts. *Qua* texts, composed of language, they imply a public dimension that in turn implies an audience. Additionally, all of them have authors and, as noted earlier, the role of author presupposes the role of audience. Even in cases where no other audience is intended, the author fills that role in the composition of the text.

Let me finish by pointing out that claims to the effect that audiences are unnecessary for texts are often based on a conception of audience that exclude the contemporaneous audience and the author from being part of the audience of a text. Indeed, such claims usually take for granted that the audience of a text is the intended audience, that is, the audience consciously and explicitly intended by an author to understand the text he is producing. Indeed, if the audience is conceived exclusively thus, it is quite clear that not every text has an audience, for many authors do not intend any person or group of persons to understand the text they produce. That does not mean, however, that the text has no contemporaneous audience; for, as noted, if the text is composed in a natural language, that implies that it is understandable by those who understand and use that language. Indeed, the very composition of a text in a language implies a nonprivate character and thus an actual or at least possible audience. Finally, the narrow identification of an audience with the intended audience leaves out the audience that is absolutely indispensable to a text, namely, the author. Even the practitioners of the *nouveau roman* and those authors who compose texts in a stream-of-consciousness mode function as audiences while doing so. Hence, there is always an audience for a text, even when the author has no particular audience in mind at the time of composition.



## PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON COMA

A. A. HOWSEPIAN

**T**HE PRIMARY AIM OF THIS ESSAY IS to advance discussion on how best to treat comatose patients. Its principal conclusion will be

- (1) Some purportedly irreversibly comatose humans ought to be kept alive indefinitely.<sup>1</sup>

Of course, merely keeping such patients alive is not how best to treat them. How they are being treated while being kept alive is of paramount importance. Note that (1) is compatible with the truth of

- (2) All comatose humans ought to be kept alive indefinitely

I shall say nothing more about (2). It will serve my present purpose if I can adequately defend (1), where "some" is to be understood in the usual manner, namely, as "at least one." The term "indefinitely," as one might surmise, is meant to convey some unspecified period of time.

It is my specific hope that this essay will catalyze the revival of what is almost invariably perceived to be a moribund position with respect to the comatose. Presently, any suggestion to the effect that one ought not allow purportedly irreversibly comatose patients to die<sup>2</sup> (given that certain crucial conditions are met<sup>3</sup>) is typically met with incredulity, if not outright derision. Advocating the active killing of such patients is likewise not presently a popular position, but allowing them to die is generally viewed as being morally permissible, if not

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<sup>1</sup> Let us provisionally agree that *S* is *purportedly irreversibly comatose* if *S* is judged to be both alive and permanently unconscious by some relevant group of medical experts

<sup>2</sup> Of course, just what moral distinction there is, if any, between *killing* and *letting die* is a vexed issue. For a representative point of view which *ceteris paribus* denies that there is any such distinction, see James Rachels, "Active and Passive Euthanasia," *New England Journal of Medicine* 292, no 3 (1975) 78–80

<sup>3</sup> For example, many would object to allowing such patients to die if the *manner* of death involved the withholding of food or water. See, for example, Gilbert Meilander, "On Removing Food and Water Against the Stream," *Hastings Center Report* 14, no 6 (1984) 11–13

obligatory in many cases. I intend, in broad outline, to challenge this view.

# I

Let us begin by considering the relatively recent discussion concerning the moral status of discontinuing nutrition and hydration in the case of one Nancy Cruzan, who had been diagnosed as being in an irreversible state of coma. Her case focused national attention on that clinical entity known as "persistent vegetative state"<sup>4</sup>. Almost overnight the general public became aware of the fact that "coma" does not denote a monolithic nosological category; rather, there are varieties of coma. Attempting to ascertain what characteristics these varieties have in common will prove to be a valuable exercise in the context of our present inquiry. We shall proceed then by examining some putative essential properties of coma in the hope of accurately characterizing the nature of this variegated condition.

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<sup>4</sup> For a concise statement of this case (with accompanying commentary) see Bette-Jane Crigger, "The Court and Nancy Cruzan," *Hastings Center Report* 20, no. 1 (Jan-Feb 1990) 38-50. In June 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state of Missouri, successfully blocking the starvation/dehydration of Nancy Cruzan. But evidence subsequently brought to light catalyzed the state's compliance with Nancy's parents' wishes to stop gastrostomy-delivered nutrition and hydration. In light of this, food and fluids were discontinued and Nancy Cruzan died a short time thereafter.

First coined by Bryan Jennett and Fred Plum, the term "persistent vegetative state" (PVS) was intended to refer not to a state of coma *as typically understood*, for "in particular, it is not a continuation of the coma which characterizes the early stages of these particular patients' clinical course", Bryan Jennett and Fred Plum, "Persistent Vegetative State After Brain Damage: A Syndrome in Search of a Name," *Lancet* (1 April 1972) 735.

Although some contemporary investigators (for example Ronald Cranford) continue to insist that PVS is not a variety of coma (in virtue of the fact that PVS patients possess relatively intact brain stem arousal mechanisms and occasionally open their eyes while the eyes of those in what he calls "coma" remain closed, and in light of these conditions' differing prognoses), the alleged shared features which are most prominent in these conditions, namely, apparent unconsciousness and unarousability from this state of apparent unconsciousness by ordinary means, appear to warrant our treating them as the same kind of clinical entity. See Ronald E. Cranford, "The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight)," *Hastings Center Report* 18 (February-March 1988) 27-32.

The clinical diagnosis of coma is etiology neutral<sup>5</sup> It is largely based upon the perceived level of a patient's sensorium, which itself is routinely indirectly gauged by the assignment of numerical values to various behavioral outputs These scores have been standardized in the form of the Glasgow Coma Scale, an indispensable clinical and research tool developed by a team of investigators at the Institute of Neurological Sciences in Glasgow, Scotland<sup>6</sup> Roughly stated, the scale assigns increasing numerical values to increasingly complex behavioral outputs in each of the following three categories: eye opening (*E*), best motor response (*M*), and best verbal response (*V*). The "coma score" for an individual patient is simply the sum of (*E*) + (*M*) + (*V*) and can range from three to fifteen It is sometimes stated that patients who score less than eight overall are considered *prima facie* to be comatose<sup>7</sup>

Of course, not all individuals who score less than eight on the Glasgow scale are in a coma As with any other medical diagnosis, competing diagnoses must first be ruled out The list of competing or "differential" diagnoses for coma includes, among other nosological entities, the diagnosis of "locked-in" syndrome, an unfortunate neurological condition which is usually the result of a (typically vascular) lesion in the ventral pons<sup>8</sup> In severe cases, patients suffering from this syndrome are able only to move their eyelids, all other muscles are completely paralyzed<sup>9</sup> Yet, tragically, such patients may be fully

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<sup>5</sup> In saying that the diagnosis of coma is "etiology neutral" I mean to say that comatose states can have multiple etiologies Metabolic, traumatic, neoplastic, toxic, and infectious processes (among others) can all eventuate in coma

<sup>6</sup> Graham Teasdale and Bryan Jennett, "Assessment of Coma and Impaired Consciousness: A Practical Scale," *Lancet* (13 July 1974) 81-4 It appears that one of the primary motivations for developing this scale was to resist the commonly unresisted temptation to make dichotomous (coma-non-coma, wholly conscious-wholly unconscious) judgments in this domain

<sup>7</sup> More precisely, these total points must also be *appropriately distributed* in order for the provisional diagnosis of coma to be entertained Note that Teasdale and Jennett specified no such point at or below which one can legitimately make the diagnosis of coma partially *because* intersubjective judgments of patient (un)consciousness are notoriously unreliable, Teasdale and Jennett, "Assessment," 83

<sup>8</sup> The term "locked-in syndrome" was coined by Fred Plum and Jerome B. Posner in 1965 See their *The Diagnosis of Stupor and Coma*, 3d ed (Philadelphia: F. A. Davis, 1980) This syndrome had previously been given numerous other names including, appropriately, "pseudo-coma."

<sup>9</sup> Of course, I mean by this all other *voluntary* (or skeletal) muscles

conscious—able to hear, see, feel, and appropriately interpret much of what transpires around them. It is part of medical lore that in times gone by—and even presently in technologically less sophisticated societies—locked-in individuals have often been taken for dead and interred prematurely. The fear of this fate has haunted many. Edgar Allan Poe's chilling story "Premature Burial" gives graphic literary expression to this fear.

Burgeoning neurologists and neurosurgeons are frequently admonished to make repeated attempts at communication with all apparently comatose patients. These attempts must include a coded communication system specifically designed for interacting with locked-in patients, for example, "Blink once for 'yes' and blink twice for 'no'." Suppose your patient responds appropriately to this code. Then we have good reason to think both that he is not comatose and that we can know that he is not comatose. Now suppose that, as a result of an unfortunate extension of the underlying pathophysiological process, your patient's midbrain is affected in such a way that he is unable even to open and shut his eyelids. In such a case, although he remains noncomatose, we have no hint, short of an appeal to electroencephalography, of suspecting this. (The neurologically pure locked-in patient has a normal waking electroencephalogram alternating with periods during which there are the usual neuroelectrical changes associated with sleep.) It should, therefore, be clear that neither the Glasgow scale nor any other set of behavioral criteria (for example, any pattern of impaired motor responsivity) could be sufficient for accurately judging whether or not your patient is in a coma.

It appears that all comatose patients do exhibit impaired motor responsivity. Can we go so far as to say that impairment in motor responsivity is a necessary condition for coma?<sup>10</sup> If not, what might some necessary conditions be? It is often claimed that all comatose patients are (1) unconscious and (2) unarousable from this state of unconsciousness by ordinary means.<sup>11</sup> Condition (2) is meant to dif-

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Predictably, these patients are typically tetraplegic, aphonic, and anarthric. Involuntary (or smooth) muscles—for instance, those involved in the function of vital organs—are not affected by the specific neurological lesion(s) responsible for the locked-in state.

<sup>10</sup> I think not, for it seems clear to me that there *could* be beings (for example, human beings that, in the philosophical literature, are sometimes called "zombies") who are wholly unconscious and whom we might properly call comatose but who exhibit no impairment in motor responsivity.

<sup>11</sup> Compare this with the definition of "coma" given by David Chadwick,

ferentiate coma from (among other states) sleep. Although some comatose patients do sleep (and can be aroused from sleep; patients in persistent vegetative states, when aroused from sleep, are often described as being awake but not aware), it is often repeated that coma differs from sleep in at least two additional ways. First, sleep itself is a cyclical phenomenon while coma is not. Second, although a sleeping person can, at times, be properly described as being unconscious, there are times when this designation seems wholly inappropriate.

Consider, for example, those rather ordinary sleep experiences known, not surprisingly, as ordinary dreams. At fairly regular intervals during a typical night's sleep, all normal human sleepers experience numerous ordinary dreaming episodes, some of which are recalled on awakening and some of which are not.<sup>12</sup> Those individuals who deny having had any dream experiences at all are mistaken, rather, such individuals are simply amnesiac for those dream experiences that they have in fact had. Of course, the form of consciousness operative during periods of ordinary dreaming is altered in interesting ways compared to normal waking consciousness.<sup>13</sup> The nature of this alteration is such that some might hesitate even to call states of ordinary dreaming forms of consciousness at all.

It is at this juncture, then, that a prior question naturally presents itself, namely, What sort of phenomenon is consciousness? If ordinary dreamers are to be believed, their sleep experiences, like their waking experiences, have what Tolman<sup>14</sup> calls "raw feels" and what Jackson<sup>15</sup> and Shoemaker<sup>16</sup> (among numerous others) call "qualia"; that is, these experiences have qualitative, or subjective, characters

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Niall Cartlidge, and David Bates as "unarousable unresponsiveness" in their *Medical Neurology* (New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1989), 130.

I take "ordinary means" to be those means by which an ordinary sleeping person might be awakened. The intravenous administration of a chemical, for example, intravenous glucose administration to a patient in an insulin coma, would not be considered ordinary means regardless of the speed with which such a comatose patient might be revived.

<sup>12</sup> I shall ignore Norman Malcolm-style behavioristic analyses of dreaming in which it is claimed that any talk concerning dreams which have occurred but have been forgotten is utterly devoid of meaning. See Norman Malcolm, *Dreaming* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959).

<sup>13</sup> For an account of the nature of this alteration, see *Altered States of Consciousness*, ed. Charles T. Tart (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1969), esp. pp. 1-22, 113-44.

<sup>14</sup> Edward Chace Tolman, "Psychology Versus Immediate Experience," *Philosophy of Science* 2 (1935): 356-80.

<sup>15</sup> Frank Jackson, "Epiphenomenal Qualia," *Philosophical Quarterly* 32

Forcefully struck by the apparent relationship between consciousness and qualia, Thomas Nagel has gone so far as to commit himself to the following principle: *S* has conscious mental states just in case there is something it is like to *be S*.<sup>17</sup> Clearly there is something it is like for me to be dreaming ordinary dreams (Could I really be mistaken about this?), just as there is something it is like for me to be awake, something it was like for me to be a newborn (or a late term fetus, for that matter), and something it is like for a bat to *be* a bat

That there are various forms of consciousness (broadly construed) cannot plausibly be disputed. Surely Kenneth Sayre,<sup>18</sup> for example, is correct when he avers that *simply being conscious*, as is a neonate, differs significantly from the state of consciousness enjoyed by properly functioning human adults, that is, those beings who possess a robust awareness of self<sup>19</sup> either while they are awake or, I might add, during those relatively rare sleep experiences termed "lucid dreams"

Lucid dreams, as opposed to the ordinary dream variety discussed above, are characterized by a typically sudden realization by the dreamer that he is, in fact, dreaming. In such cases the dreamer experiences a robust consciousness both of self and of his intra-dream environment and, in some cases, is able even to communicate dream content (via eye movements) to those in his extra-dream environment (for example, to sleep researchers studying lucid dreams) who might be standing by to monitor ocular signals.<sup>20</sup>

So, both ordinary and, especially, lucid dreamers have taught us that sleep states need not be unconscious states. Might some comatose

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(1982) 127–36. Jackson here, unapologetically, refers to himself as a "qualia freak."

<sup>16</sup> Sydney Shoemaker, "Functionalism and Qualia," *Philosophical Studies* 27 (1975) 291–315.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas Nagel, "What is it Like to be a Bat?" *The Philosophical Review* 83 (1974) 435–51.

<sup>18</sup> Kenneth M. Sayre, *Consciousness: A Philosophical Study of Minds and Machines* (New York: Random House, 1969), 103–5. A similarly thoughtfully conceived taxonomy of consciousness is introduced by William G. Lycan, *Consciousness* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).

<sup>19</sup> It seems to me to be a mistake to divide the concept of consciousness so narrowly that "*S* is conscious" entails that "*S* is conscious of *S*." Such an analysis of consciousness can be found (as far as I understand it) in Julian Jaynes, *The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1976).

<sup>20</sup> See, for example, Keith M. T. Hearne, "A New Perspective on Dream Imagery," *Journal of Mental Imagery* 11, no. 2 (1987) 75–81.

states, which may at times be confused with sleep states, also not be unconscious states? Might unconsciousness not be a necessary condition for coma? Might there be something that it is like to be comatose? Do some comatose patients actually have a conscious mental life?<sup>21</sup> Although this possibility is tantalizing, the analogy between comatose states and sleep states seems much too weak to motivate such a thesis. A more promising analogue, though, is near at hand.

There is evidence that some patients in certain induced states which closely resemble, and thereby model, noninduced (or natural) coma—namely, states induced by way of general anesthesia—may experience some form of conscious mental life even when deeply and (apparently) adequately anesthetized. Such patients meet all the standard behavioral criteria for coma, yet there is provocative evidence which suggests that some of these patients remain receptive to, and possibly aware of, environmental stimuli. Hilgenberg,<sup>22</sup> Halfen,<sup>23</sup> Kumar,<sup>24</sup> and Saucier,<sup>25</sup> for example, have related clinical cases in which deeply anesthetized patients have postoperatively accurately reported verbatim intraoperative conversation. Such cases involving cognitive receptivity—if not outright awareness—under general anesthesia were initially dismissed as being the result of patently inadequate doses of anesthetic. However, the adequacy of the anesthesia appears in these cases to be insured, as far as anesthesiologists can tell, in light of the fact that these patients deny having experienced intraoperative pain. Clinical anecdotes aside, numerous investigators, including psychologist H. L. Bennett, seem also to have generated suggestive research data which would give one good reason to doubt the propriety of this dismissal.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>21</sup> I shall use the term “conscious mental life” to refer to any form of consciousness (broadly construed) no matter how rudimentary.

<sup>22</sup> John C. Hilgenberg, “Intraoperative Awareness During High-Dose Fentanyl-Oxygen Anesthesia,” *Anesthesiology* 54 (1981), 341–3. Studies such as this one suggest that John R. Searle may be mistaken when he states, “When I am put under a general anesthetic my conscious states cease,” John R. Searle, *The Rediscovery of the Mind* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 83.

<sup>23</sup> D. Halfen, “What Do ‘Anesthetized’ Patients Hear?” *Anesthesiology News* (12 March 1986), 12.

<sup>24</sup> Surendra M. Kumar, Sujit K. Pandit, and Peter F. Jackson, “Recall Following Ketamine Anesthesia for Open-Heart Surgery: Report of a Case,” *Anesthesia and Analgesia* 57, no. 2 (1978), 267–9.

<sup>25</sup> Naomi Saucier, Leonard F. Walts, and John R. Moreland, “Patient Awareness During Nitrous Oxide, Oxygen, and Halothane Anesthesia,” *Anesthesia and Analgesia* 62, no. 2 (1983), 239–40.

<sup>26</sup> H. L. Bennett, “Non-Verbal Response to Intraoperative Conversation,”

From person *S*'s accurately reporting events which transpired while under deep anesthesia it does not, of course, follow that *S* was actually experiencing anything at all while deeply anesthetized. Put differently (as, for instance, Nagel might put it) *S*'s accurately reporting the occurrence of intraoperative event *E* (which occurred while *S* was deeply anesthetized) does not entail that it was like anything at all to *be S* under deep anesthesia during the time at which *E* occurred. This does not follow for the simple reason that, as Bennett points out, it appears that there may be "tendencies of the nervous system to change response patterns on the basis of reinforcing information",<sup>27</sup> in other words, it appears physically possible for *S*'s nervous system to have stored perceptual, semantic, and affective qualia-laden information while deeply anesthetized and yet be unable at that time to experience the raw feels which would, under other circumstances, be coextensive with the acquisition of such information. Rather, it may be that the only manner in which *S* is able actually to experience events which transpired intraoperatively (while *S* was deeply anesthetized) is in the form of a postoperative experiencing, during which the stored information is brought into conscious awareness. Bennett himself favors just this sort of interpretation of the relevant research data.

Perception in the sense of *phenomenal experience* does not seem to occur during adequate anesthesia, but perception in the sense of the registration of sensory-neural events does.

These perceptual processes have been demonstrated by persistence into the postoperative period of the effects of presentations of language messages during general anesthesia in the presence of a nearly uniform postanesthetic amnesia. Therefore, though obtunded, patients appear to be influenced by verbal messages they are asked to remember.

The most potent claims for unconscious memory retention come from postsurgical recollections of some patients in hypnosis about events that occurred during surgery. Psychologists, in attempting to investigate such claims systematically, have come to the operating room

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*British Journal of Anaesthesia* 57 (1985) 174-9. See also his "Perception and Memory for Events During Adequate General Anesthesia for Surgical Operations," in *Hypnosis and Memory*, ed. Helen M. Pettinati (New York: Guilford Press, 1988), 193-231. Bennett sometimes appeals to the fact that auditory evoked responses (AERs) remain intact even under deep anesthesia as evidence for the retained capacity for auditory receptivity while one is deeply anesthetized. It is also curious to note that many *naturally* comatose patients similarly exhibit AERs. For empirical data to this effect, see Phuroze L. Hansotia, "Persistent Vegetative State: Review and Report of Electrodiagnostic Studies in Eight Cases," *Archives of Neurology* 42 (1985) 1048-52.

<sup>27</sup> Bennett, "Perception," 198.



with verbal recall and recognition tasks using word lists. Generally, their results have not added support for the retention of surgical events. However, standard memory tasks may not be appropriate in such an emotion-laden or meaningful setting.

A surgical patient's nervous system facing general anesthesia must be presumed to be oriented toward surviving the acute event, alert to sources of information relevant to that survival. Information of current status and future prognosis is highly pertinent and in stark contrast to the content of standardized memory tests. Throughout the peri-operative period—from before surgery until well into recovery from surgery—patients are concerned with their survival, and with assessments by the medical authorities of their condition and prognosis. Thus, less salient material (e.g., a word list) is not likely to be attended to, much less to be recalled later, while a patient's system may possibly be alert or overly sensitized to any remarks concerning his or her physical status. There is considerable evidence for this position.<sup>28</sup>

Two features of this corpus of evidence to which Bennett alludes are especially noteworthy. First, the methods chosen to measure the extent of information stored by those who are deeply anesthetized are of special interest. According to Bennett, "Verbal retrieval of what is learned (i.e., declarative memory) can be absent, while behavioral measures (i.e., procedural memory) can reflect that learning occurred."<sup>29</sup> Second, "When unexpected recall occurs after apparently adequate anesthesia, it is for *meaningful events*."<sup>30</sup>

Reflection on the former feature might provide an explanation for why there is a relative paucity of data supporting the continued operation of learning and memory processes in the formerly naturally deeply comatose. Of course, the fact that relatively few persons in a state of natural coma (as compared to those in induced coma) regain a normal form of consciousness<sup>31</sup> and the fact that one cannot control

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<sup>28</sup> Bennett, "Perception," 198–200 (emphasis added). For a thorough and careful analysis of this corpus of evidence see this article and R. Trustman, S. Dubovsky, and R. Titley, "Auditory Perception During General Anesthesia—Myth or Fact?" *International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis* 25, no. 2 (1977): 88–105.

<sup>29</sup> Bennett, "Perception," 225. Also see Larry R. Squire, "The Neuropsychology of Human Memory," *Annual Review of Neuroscience* 5 (1982): 241–73.

<sup>30</sup> Bennett, "Perception," 205 (emphasis added).

<sup>31</sup> Although there are numerous clinical reports of patients accurately reporting events which transpired while they were, apparently, in a state of natural coma, the uncontrolled conditions under which many of these reports have been made preclude my central reliance on that sort of evidence in defense of one of the main theses of this essay. Nevertheless, I do admit such reports as constituting a potentially important body of evidence for there

for the depth of coma in its natural state (as one typically can do when coma is induced) pose a distinctive set of epistemic difficulties for the comatologist.<sup>32</sup> Additional reflection on the latter feature might spawn a renewed curiosity in, and sensitivity to, the nature of those interpersonal dynamics which ought to govern our continued relationships with the comatose

In spite of the points raised in the above discussion, the question of whether or not some patients, while deeply anesthetized, actually possess an awareness of either themselves, dream imagery, or features of their environment, or whether or not such patients are "simply conscious" (or perhaps are in possession of some hitherto uncharacterized—or essentially uncharacterizable—sort of mental life)<sup>33</sup> is not a

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being something that it is like to be comatose. Thus, stories told by the caregivers and visitors of patients diagnosed as being comatose regarding episodes of consciousness for events which transpired while these patients were judged to be in a state of deep coma deserve our serious attention. In a recent story in *Life* magazine (June 1991), for example, actor Michael Landon relates (to Brad Darrach) how he continued to speak with his seventeen-year-old step-daughter who lay in what was thought to be a deep coma (as a result of injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident) against the advice of the nursing staff who told him that his efforts at communication were in vain. His persistence in the face of such counsel was apparently rewarded for, according to Landon, "When she came out of it she told me things I had said" (p. 32). Numerous other such anecdotes dot the clinical and popular literature and should not, in this context, be ignored.

<sup>32</sup> I would like to make perfectly clear that I am not here primarily relying on the fact that the diagnosis of coma might be *mistaken* in these cases. Rather I am suggesting that the *correct* diagnosis of coma may, itself, be compatible with some yet poorly characterized range of conscious experience. The parallel that I am attempting to draw is between naturally comatose patients and what are generally considered to be *adequately* deeply anesthetized patients, *not* between the naturally comatose and *inadequately* anesthetized patients (that is, those patients who experience what are classically referred to as "awareness episodes during general anesthesia"). These latter episodes, in their paradigmatic forms, are characterized by *both* consciousness of events that had transpired in the intraoperative environment in addition to consciousness of intraoperative *pain*.

One might, of course, object at this point by continuing to insist that *S's being conscious* entails *S's not being comatose*. If this entailment is retained, then it just may be the case that very few people are in genuine comas, since it is possible that only a very few persons who have been thought to be comatose are actually completely unconscious. I have no qualms about using the English language in this way. Still, it remains the case that, in many instances, there will be radical uncertainty about whether or not Jones, who is both unarousable and unresponsive, does or does not possess a conscious mental life.

<sup>33</sup> Although accurate reports of events that had taken place during a period of time that one had been judged to be deeply comatose constitutes

central concern for our present purposes. What is of more acute initial interest is the following psychological phenomenon. (*P*) Some rational persons believe that some comatose patients possess a conscious mental life. The above-outlined clinical anecdotes and empirical investigations are of interest mainly because they indicate that (i) (*P*) is true, and because (ii) this corpus of clinical and research data gives other rational persons both good reason to believe that some comatose patients may possess a conscious mental life and good reason to act toward such patients in accordance with this possibility.

It is now clear that the mother who daily bathes, caresses, and talks to her comatose son with the hope that, at some level, she is being heard, felt, and understood may not be acting irrationally. Yet what is most important for our purposes is not whether or not she is, in fact, acting *rationally* in this situation, but that she is *acting* in this manner at all (as are many others in similar situations). Why this is of fundamental importance for my defense of (1) will become evident in Part II.

Bennett and others provide us with a broad range of empirical evidence which is robustly compatible with the thesis that some comatose patients have a conscious mental life of some sort—maybe even a mental life which is richer than that of some sleeping persons, or maybe a mental life which has a quality unlike any with which we are presently acquainted. Many of those who were formerly comatose may be unable, in most instances, reliably to transmut the essence of such mentation, either because there is typically an amnesiac component which accompanies this state (as there typically is in anesthesia-induced coma) or because their experiences while comatose are ineffable.<sup>34</sup> These suggestions are not being advanced as being mere possibilities in the broadly logical sense, but as provocative physical

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some of the best evidence for one's having a conscious mental life while in a state of deep coma, having such memories is surely not *necessary* for one's having experienced such mentality

If the state of natural coma is, like the state induced by way of general anesthesia (which, as noted, is itself a state of coma), typically a densely *amnesiac* state, then we would not expect the patient to assist us in accessing its phenomenology. Knowing what it is like to have experiences while comatose may be as elusive as knowing what it is like to be a bat. But this does not, of course, imply that it is not like anything at all either to be a bat or to have experiences while comatose.

<sup>34</sup> I do not mean to imply by this that some comatose patients are in a state of *status mysticus*. Rather than something so sublime, I have in mind a variety of ineffability which is compatible with something much more primitive than ordinary waking human consciousness.

possibilities which are suggested by empirical observation and investigation

There are yet other important considerations (besides the experiential ones discussed above) which might force us to reexamine the foundations on which our decisions concerning the treatment of comatose humans are based. What I have in mind is prompted by the following provocative conjecture put forth by Nagel:

- (3) "The value of life and its contents does not attach to mere organic survival: almost everyone would be indifferent (other things being equal) between immediate death and immediate coma followed by death twenty years later without reawakening."<sup>35</sup>

Let us, for the sake of argument, grant Nagel this psychological point. Let us, in addition, go even further here and provisionally endorse the following universalized normative claim.

- (4) Everyone *ought* to be indifferent (*other things being equal*) between immediate death and immediate coma followed by death twenty years later without reawakening.

Although both (3) and (4) might appear, on their face, to express truths, that is not what is most striking about them. Rather, what is most noteworthy about (3), for example, is Nagel's use of the parenthetical *ceteris paribus* clause in that conjecture. The use of this clause obscures what I take to be a very important question in the domain of end-of-life ethics, namely, *Should* one be indifferent between immediate death and immediate coma followed by death twenty years later?

Keeping this question firmly in mind, consider next the following normative claim.

- (5) If offered the option, some persons ought to choose immediate coma followed by death twenty years later without reawakening rather than immediate death.

I shall here stipulate that the option noted in (5) is between death and a form of coma known to be without a conscious mental life. I

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<sup>35</sup> Thomas Nagel, *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1. Richard A. McCormick appears to believe that he has empirically confirmed a similar conjecture: "For several years I have asked audience after audience if they would want artificial nutrition and hydration were they irreversibly unconscious, with virtual unanimity the answer has been no", Richard A. McCormick, "Clear and Convincing Evidence: The Case of Nancy Cruzan," *Midwest Medical Ethics* (Fall 1990) 12.

shall next proceed to develop a defense of (5). It will soon become clear that the manner in which (5) is defended, if successful, will help establish the primary thesis of this paper, namely, that some allegedly permanently comatose humans ought to be kept alive indefinitely.

## II

When deliberating about how to evaluate any moral claim, one would do well to consult what is arguably the most insightful treatise on moral philosophy ever written, namely, the *Nichomachean Ethics* of Aristotle<sup>36</sup>. According to Aristotle, one's primary moral task is to become a person of a given sort, specifically, a virtuous person. For Aristotle, the virtuous person is one who is governed by *phronēsis*, or practical wisdom. No one is born thus practically wise; rather one must be trained in the proper manner, in the proper environment (for example, in the company of virtuous models) and (for maximal benefit) from an early age. It is crucial, for our purposes, initially to highlight Aristotle's emphases on training and on models of virtue. One's moral training must, according to Aristotle, at least in part consist in habitually acting in ways in which virtuous individuals (one's moral models) would act in similar circumstances in order to develop that contextual sensitivity, acuity of judgment, and organization of desire that constitutes the chief good for Man, namely, *eudaimonia*.

What specific types of actions did Aristotle have in mind? Courageous actions, temperate actions, and just actions, among others, fill that bill. In this vein, it is of no small importance to note that certain environments are more conducive than others to the performance of certain virtuous actions. In fact, there appear to be certain environments in which it is impossible to perform any virtuous actions at all.

Consider, for instance, the structure of some of those environments described by John Hick in his important paper, "The Problem of Evil."<sup>37</sup> One of Hick's main points in that well-known theodocian essay is that God's instantiation of laws of nature and His infrequent (miraculous) interference with these "regularities" (in spite of the amount of suffering which, in fact, obtains as a result of unbridled

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<sup>36</sup> See especially books 2 and 3

<sup>37</sup> See John Hick, "The Problem of Evil," in *Philosophy of Religion* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), 40–7

nature) is an essential part of God's ultimate will for the human race, namely, freely chosen conformation to the character of Jesus Christ.

According to Hick, in order to cultivate this sort of character one must be in a position to respond freely to the perceived needs of others<sup>38</sup> If there are no perceived needs, there can be no Christ-like character cultivation. Regardless of what one might think of the entirety of Hick's theodocian argument here, it is clear that the following general principle underlying his theodicy is a good one.

(GP) Some environments are more conducive to virtue cultivation than others.

I shall call an environment which is conducive to the cultivation of the moral virtues a "moral field." Consider two environments ( $E$  and  $E'$ ), one of which ( $E$ ) is a moral field and the other of which ( $E'$ ) is not. Suppose that  $E$  and  $E'$  are exactly similar except that  $E$  includes object (or situation)  $O$  and  $E'$  does not. We shall say, then, that  $O$  "sets up" moral field  $E$  and that  $O$  is a "nidus for virtue" (or, alternatively, that  $O$  "provides the occasion" for virtue) for agent  $S$  in  $E$ .

What sorts of environments might count as moral fields? and what sorts of objects (or situations) might be *nidi* for virtue? It is initially clear which environments could *not* be moral fields for  $S$ , namely, those environments containing a set of objects that includes  $S$  himself, none of which appear to  $S$  to have the capacity to benefit in any way from actions  $S$  believes to be within his power. Of course, *a fortiori*,  $S$ 's complete inability to perceive any objects in his environment at all (again, including  $S$  himself) would, it seems, preclude that environment from being a moral field for  $S$ . Given that  $S$  does perceive needs in his environment and given that  $S$  feels that he can meet some of those needs, the "strength" of the moral field with respect to person  $S$  will depend critically on the perceived nature of the *nidus* for virtue.

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<sup>38</sup> Hick illustrates this point in the following manner: "Courage and fortitude would have no point in an environment in which there is, by definition, no danger or difficulty. Generosity, kindness, the *agape* aspect of love, prudence, unselfishness, and all other ethical notions which presuppose life in a stable environment, could not even be formed. Consequently, such a world . . . would be very ill adapted for the development of the moral qualities of human personality. In relation to this purpose it would be the worst of all possible worlds", Hick, *Philosophy of Religion*, 44–5. Hick deals with people who are *actually* in need, not merely those who are perceived to be in need. I stress the perception of need here mainly because it is central to our present purpose.

in that field. An object perceived to be self-sufficient, for example, would not permit the extent of exercise of moral virtue that an object perceived to be wholly dependent would

What determines the strength of a moral field, then, is multifactorial. Both agent and object factors must be considered. Let me briefly suggest three specific factors along these lines:

- (i) sociogeographic proximity;
- (ii) perception of need,
- (iii) biopsychological identification with the object perceived to be in need.<sup>39</sup>

Hick emphasizes (ii). David Hume, on the other hand, helps us more deeply appreciate (i) and (iii). For Hume, the mechanism of *sympathy* is integral to our moral natures.<sup>40</sup> He says there is no more powerful situation capable of eliciting a sympathetic response than one in which an individual who is close to us (whether biologically, psychologically, or sociogeographically) is in apparent need. The closer one is in these respects to the agent and, similarly, the more strongly the agent believes that the object in question is a being like himself (and, hence, a being with whom the agent can identify) and (*via* Hick) the needier the object appears to be, the more conducive that environment is for virtue cultivation and, hence, the more powerful its moral field.<sup>41</sup>

How might any of this bear on the truth of (5)? The answer to this question is near at hand. *S* ought to choose an immediate irreversible coma followed (even years later) by death, over immediate death if *S* has good reason to believe that he might, while comatose, serve as a nidus for virtue which has the capacity for setting up an optimally efficacious moral field stronger than any other such field potentially available to *S*'s caregivers.

Suppose, for example, that Jones has good reasons to believe that his uncle or daughter or wife or doctor would respond to his utter dependence and general medical plight, were he to become (in the collective opinion of the experts) irreversibly comatose, by an

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<sup>39</sup> This list is not meant to be exhaustive. I have not, for example, mentioned *inter alia* the agent's perception of whether or not he has the power to meet that need.

<sup>40</sup> See David Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*, esp. bk. 2.

<sup>41</sup> Of course, I do not at all mean to suggest that Hume's conceptions of virtue and vice are isomorphic with Aristotle's.

exemplary display of courage, benevolence, and compassion which might have otherwise lain dormant and which, Jones believes, could not be actuated *to that degree* in any other foreseeable way. One can, I think, readily see how Jones might come to think this. It is not, for instance, at all uncommon to hear stories about dramatic moral development while in the midst of tragedy, especially in the midst of shared tragedies which involve those individuals for whom we care most deeply. It seems to me then that, under such circumstances, Jones ought to choose immediate coma over immediate death.

How all of this applies to (1) should now be apparent. (1) says that some purportedly irreversibly comatose humans ought to be kept alive indefinitely. The primary reason for this is that, in some cases, comatose individuals may act as *nidi* for virtue and, hence, be instrumental in setting up moral fields so powerful that, without them, certain members of the human community might not optimally flourish. It is not implausible to think that if objects perceived to be in need are essential elements in any moral field, then human beings who are perceived to be near maximally dependent and, hence, who are apparently unable to meet any of even their most basic human needs (for example, food, water, shelter, basic hygiene, clothing, and in some cases even air) would, for those who realize that they possess the ability to meet these needs, set up very strong moral fields, indeed.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Stanley Hauerwas has proposed arguments along similar lines (namely, arguments based on the facilitation of human flourishing) in defending the value of the mentally retarded. See Stanley Hauerwas, *Suffering Presence: Theological Reflections on Medicine, the Mentally Handicapped, and the Church* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), and Stanley Hauerwas, *A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Christian Social Ethic* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981). Additionally, a thesis similar to the one defended in this essay has been advanced by John La Puma, David L. Schuedermayer, Ann E. Gulyas, and Mark Siegler in their provocative paper, "Talking to Comatose Patients," *Archives of Neurology* 45 (January 1988): 20–2. Also see William May, Robert Barry, Orville Grisez, German Grisez, Brian Johnstone, Thomas J. Marzen, James T. McHugh, Gilbert Meilander, Mark Siegler, and William Smith, "Feeding and Hydrating the Permanently Unconscious and Other Vulnerable Persons," *Issues in Law and Medicine* 3, no. 3 (1987): 203–17. It is interesting to note that May and his colleagues state that "care for a helpless adult—family member, neighbor, or stranger—offers the possibility to the caregiver of nurturing such noble qualities as mercy and compassion" (pp. 210–11). It has never been clear, to my mind, why *this* point was made only in passing while the alleged benefit to the patient of merely *being alive* was the focus of their collective effort.



The more we learn about the nature and varieties of coma, the more reason we have to suspect that some comatose patients may be more like us than we had previously suspected. The closer it is examined, the more distorted the oft-repeated, typically rigidly interpreted coma–non-coma dichotomy is seen to be. Does it not seem more psychophysiologicaly plausible to believe that there is some sort of *continuum* of consciousness which extends from the full-blown self-consciousness of locked-in patients to the utter darkness of those comatose patients who lack any mental life at all?<sup>43</sup> If we really have reason to suspect this and if the comatose patient truly represents a kind of limiting case of human need, it appears that we may be shirking our moral responsibility by truncating the extent of our relationships with such patients and in the process both potentially undermining their characterological development (by depriving them of *models* of virtue) and undermining our own potential for maximal human flourishing (by avoiding the *practice* of the virtues in these potentially maximally efficacious character-structuring environments).

There is, I have argued, enough uncertainty about the quality of mental life experienced in comatose states that it is plausible to suspect that some comatose patients are, at some level, cognitively receptive to environmental stimuli. In those cases, the intimate interactions with caregivers who are acting virtuously may be consciously

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<sup>43</sup> Although Jennett and Plum “would not deny that a continuum must exist between this vegetative state and some of the others described,” they believe that “it seems wise to make an absolute distinction between patients who do make a consistently understandable response to those around them, whether by word or gesture, and those who never do”, Jennett and Plum, “Persistent Vegetative State,” 737. Given their own discussion of locked-in patients, one wonders why an appeal to “consistently understandable response[s] to those around them” by those who are allegedly comatose has been made in this context. What this “absolute distinction” to which they refer amounts to and what, if any, wisdom there is in making it are two of the central concerns of this essay.

In that same (1972) paper, Jennett and Plum readily admit (with regard to persistent vegetative patients) that, “Initially the E E G may be isoelectric, but considerable activity and even alpha rhythm may be found once the state has lasted many months” (p. 736). If appeals to E E G criteria may be relevant to the belief that *locked-in* patients are fully conscious, why are not electroencephalographic data also relevant to judgments concerning whether or not some alleged *persistent vegetative* patients possess some sort of conscious mental life? It is tempting to wonder whether or not some patients that are diagnosed as being in a persistent vegetative state and who have “considerable activity” (including alpha rhythms) on their electroencephalograms might, in actuality, be very much like *persistently locked-in* patients.

apparent to such patients, either at the time of their interactions or, if this should occur, after regaining normal waking consciousness. Such models of virtue are, according to Aristotle, essential for interpersonal transactions eventuating in virtue acquisition. If so, this all provides good reason to believe that some comatose individuals themselves may also be benefiting from such interactions.<sup>44</sup>

### III

I have, in this essay, attempted primarily to make two main points. First, I have tried to draw attention to the fact that some of those who are allegedly irreversibly comatose may possess a conscious mental life. That is, there actually may be something that it is like to be comatose. Clinical anecdotes involving both natural and induced coma and empirical investigations involving coma induced by way of deep general anesthesia appear to provide support for this conjecture. Even the set of data invoked in support of the information-processing models favored by those theorists who have expressed skepticism concerning the compatibility of deep coma with the presence of qualia—even *that* set of data—is *compatible* with the occurrence of phenomenal experience in those who are judged to be deeply comatose. The empirical evidence, in these cases as in all others, greatly underdetermines those theories which appeal to that data for their confirmation. The data can just as easily be interpreted in a manner consistent with the thesis that the possession of some form of con-

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<sup>44</sup> The belief that people can acquire dispositions to act in various ways after periods of exposure to the appropriate models, independent of their engaging in any *musculoskeletal* activity, has a (relatively) long history in the field of psychology. The theoretical emphasis on the early psychic mechanism known as "identification" so prominent in psychoanalysis, and the central concern of social learning theory, namely, the process of learning that occurs in the absence of either behavioral performance or (explicit) reinforcement contingencies, have focused segments of the psychological community on the character-shaping determinants of certain *mental activities*. Thus, given the appropriate models and the appropriate mental activities, it is quite plausible to infer that persons can, to a significant extent, learn to be good even if they are unable to animate their bodies. For some of the most interesting empirical evidence for the success of social learning theory as applied to the understanding of acquiring certain behavioral dispositions, see Albert Bandura and Richard H. Walter, *Social Learning and Personality Development* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1963).

sciousness (broadly construed) is compatible with one's being in a deeply comatose state.

Second, I have argued that the degree of uncertainty that we have about the mental life possessed by those who are comatose, and the confidence that many of us have concerning the broad outlines of the process of moral virtue acquisition, are jointly sufficient to defend proposition (1), namely, Some purportedly irreversibly comatose humans ought to be kept alive indefinitely. Although the acquisition of the moral virtues on behalf of those who are comatose might itself be a central concern for many (namely, those concerned about making *other* people good), I have tried, primarily, to shift the discussion in these cases to the dynamic *multilateral* nature of virtue transmission with a principal focus on the ethical benefits available to those members of the noncomatose moral community who avail themselves to relating to the comatose in caring ways. If, as I have suggested, comatose patients are capable of setting up powerful moral fields without which certain segments of the human community could not optimally flourish, then, primarily, those who share the concern of making *themselves* as good as they can be, need seriously to reconsider the nature of their relationships with the comatose.

The fact that many of us might be able to enter into meaningful interpersonal relationships with those who are deeply comatose will be difficult for some to accept. Our recent history has been one of excluding both developmentally immature human beings and many of those with the most profound physical and psychological handicaps from any significant participation in the life of the moral community. This exclusionary behavior is often justified in the cases of those in deep coma by mere repetition of the dogma that being comatose is coextensive with being unconscious. Thus E. J. Bayer, for example, makes the following assertions with an apparent sense of unimpeachable confidence:

The irreversibly comatose has ceased to engage in the most typically human activity, the one which clearly identifies us as human beings, namely, human intercommunication

But precisely this *capacity*—rooted in the physiology of the brain—to recognize at least minimally the presence and workings of other personal beings, divine or human, marks one as a human being. This capacity is dead in the irreversibly comatose patient, even though the patient still lives. Therefore, in a true sense the *person is fast dying*, and we are not obliged to prolong the process by artificial means.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> Edward J. Bayer, "Perspectives from Catholic Theology," in *By No*

Likewise, R. E. Cranford readily adds that "the [PVS] patient is . . . completely unconscious, that is, unaware of him or herself or the surrounding environment."<sup>46</sup> Similarly, J. Lynn and J. F. Childress confidently assert that

Some patients can be reliably diagnosed to have permanently lost consciousness. This unusual group of patients includes those with anencephaly, persistent vegetative state, and some preterminal comas. In these cases, it is very difficult to discern how any medical intervention can benefit or harm the patient. These patients cannot and never will be able to experience any of the events occurring in the world or in their bodies. When the diagnosis is exceedingly clear, we sustain their lives vigorously mainly for their loved ones and the community at large.<sup>47</sup>

Little did Lynn and Childress realize the *precise manner* in which the vigorous sustenance of the comatose might affect the life of the moral community and, as I have further suggested, the ethical implications this may have for our treatment of those in deep coma whether or not such patients have permanently lost consciousness.

Finally, this appears to be an opportune time to address the following three questions posed by Richard A. McCormick in light of the Cruzan case. I shall conclude this essay by answering his questions in light of our present inquiry: (1) Is a life like Cruzan's a value to the one in such a condition? (2) Is its preservation a benefit to the patient? (3) Is its preservation a state interest?<sup>48</sup>

By way of summary, I have argued that the answers to McCormick's questions are as follows: (1) I do not know if a life like Cruzan's is a value to the one in such a condition, for I do not know

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*Extraordinary Means: The Choice to Forgo Life-Sustaining Food and Water*, ed. Joanne Lynn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 92-3.

<sup>46</sup> Cranford, "Facts," 28. Undoubtedly, Cranford is correct about there being PVS patients who are permanently and completely unconscious, but the implicit categorical nature of his assertion is premature. It is curious to note that there is no justification for this assertion given by Cranford in the body of his paper. Rather, he simply refers the reader to Jennett and Plum's seminal (1972) article. Yet nowhere do Jennett and Plum display the confidence that Cranford displays toward questions concerning the mental life of the comatose. On the contrary, as I have noted, in that article Jennett and Plum exhibit substantial humility in the face of this difficult issue. Unfortunately, it now appears that at least Jennett presently holds a view on this matter that is identical with Cranford's. See Bryan Jennett, "The Case for Letting Vegetative Patients Die," *Ethics and Medicine* 93 (1993): 40-4.

<sup>47</sup> Joanne Lynn and James F. Childress, "Must Patients Always be Given Food and Water?" *Hastings Center Report* 13, no. 5 (October 1983), 17-21.

<sup>48</sup> McCormick, "Clear and Convincing Evidence," 12.

what it would be like to be in Cruzan's condition, although I do know something about what it might be like for others who would virtuously choose to respond to me while I remain in that condition. (2) Merely preserving a life like Cruzan's may, for all I know, be of no benefit at all to such a patient, but the manner in which that life is being preserved might constitute a great benefit indeed. Knowing, for example, that *meaningful information*, that is, information that the patient recognizes as being important to survival and conducive to overall personal well-being, is more readily stored by (or more easily accessible to) comatose patients, allows us to recognize the fact that involving the comatose in communities of virtue-minded caregivers, whether or not such patients ever regain full waking consciousness, is an integral feature of how best to preserve them. (3) If the optimal virtuous development of its citizens is a state interest, and if the appropriate preservation of some of these patients is the occasion for optimally efficacious virtuous development then, *contra* McCormick, it follows that the appropriate preservation of some of these patients is a state interest.<sup>49</sup>

*South Bend, Indiana*

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# THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF PERSONAL BECOMING

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## I

**P**ERSONAL DEVELOPMENT has two broad phases. the first is that of infancy, childhood, and adolescence, the second is that of our continuing development as adults. Without excluding the former, I wish to concentrate upon the latter in order to describe what I will argue is a spiritual form of life in the individual human being. Becoming in the order of human personhood arises out of a dynamic source that is not easy to name with accuracy. It has been called the "psyche," or "subjectivity," or "personality," and sometimes "the human spirit," though the latter term often remains rather too vague for philosophical purposes. Aristotle has said that the fruits of understanding come with getting the name right. What, then, is the proper name with which to designate the dynamic principle at the center of the movement of life that is appropriate to the human person?

Hegel insisted that the answer to such a question required an adequate concept of spirit (*Geist*), though he extended the notion of spirit to what he called the Absolute. Under the rubric of spirit he sought to integrate what he took to be the restriction of ancient philosophy with what he took to be the contribution of modern philosophy. He thought that ancient philosophy had understood being as objectivity, while modern philosophy had given primacy to consciousness as subjectivity. My aim is more modest and more traditional, but not less difficult. Is it possible that contemporary philosophies stand in need of a more or less traditional metaphysical concept of spirit? Is it possible that a closer look at such a notion might contribute to what I sense is a growing tendency to understand human reality less mechanistically and less materialistically?

When we speak of spirit, however, a certain ambiguity comes to the fore, an ambiguity that needs to be clarified before my present project can get off the ground. There is first the memory of the long Latin metaphysical tradition of *spiritus*, and second, the newer German postmetaphysical tradition of *Geist*. The terms are by no

means identical, even though translators think themselves forced to treat them as equivalent. In fact, however, the two terms draw about themselves curtains of differing connotation, including different resonances of meaning and assonances of sound. For that reason they function in semantically different ways. To be sure, both indicate an internal dynamic and both secure a certain unity, but the terminus of their efficacy is not the same, nor is the context within which they operate. At present, the Germanic sense of "spirit" dominates those discussions in which the notion of spirit plays a role. It will serve a purpose, then, to compare the Germanic with the Latin sense, and even to see whether the Latin notion has any relevance to a contemporary discussion of personal becoming.

At the center of the technical use of *spiritus* in the Latin philosophical traditions there is the Greek heritage proclaimed by the term *eidos*. The Greek is not incorrectly translated by, and thereby converted into, the Latin term *forma*. *Forma* functions in traditional metaphysics as an immanent *specifying* principle; it is the constituent factor within a complex entity that gives to the entity a unity of a certain kind.<sup>1</sup> *Geist*, on the other hand, tends to perform as a *totality* principle: it brings unity to an even wider context, to a system, horizon, or world. It is a kind of organizing form that brings diverse factors into a complex and more or less internally related arrangement; in a word, *Geist* provides systemic configuration (*Gestalt*).

To clarify the ambiguity in the use of the two terms, it is fair enough to reduce the consideration of the Latin *spiritus* to the principle of specificity, and to reduce the German *Geist* to the principle of totality.<sup>2</sup> In contrast to the specific unity of a metaphysical composite, the unity that results from the dynamism of *Geist* is an organized totality. If Aristotle gives a definitive meaning to form (*eidos*) as specifying the unity of a substance or entity ("this something of a certain kind," *tode ti*), Kant (though he uses the term *Vernunft*) gives defini-

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<sup>1</sup> When as with St. Thomas Aquinas, the formal principle is expanded to include nonspecific aspects of a being, the broader specific principle becomes known as the immanent formal principle, *essentia*. See *Summa contra gentiles* II, 52. The adjustment is made necessary by Thomas's recognition of God's pure act of existing (*esse*), and the consequent presence of the trans-formal principle of *actus essendi* within each creature, since that principle throws everything else (*praeter esse*) into the formal order.

<sup>2</sup> Whereas in the Latin tradition totality (world) tends to be reduced to the order among interrelated entities, in the German tradition entities tend to be reduced to items in a system, functions within a context, or the collectivity of "mere" beings (as in *das Seiende*).

tive meaning to the term *Geist* when he defines the architectonic system that crowns his philosophical undertaking.<sup>3</sup> Both Schelling and Hegel provide the notion of *Geist* with the content of the Absolute System. The architectonic sense survives even in the thought of thinkers who reject the classical modern notion of system, however. The systemic sense remains as the dynamic inner expression of unity in the configuration of a totality, and it takes shape as a dialectical movement or a symphonic orchestration or as the horizon of an open historicity.<sup>4</sup> This is not surprising, since, if spirit—whether understood as *Geist* or as *spiritus*—is in fact central to the human person, it must be found at work wherever persons are found, even under one or another assumed name.<sup>5</sup>

The upshot of the difference between spirit as *forma* and spirit as *Geist* is that two sets of subordinate onto-logic cluster about this semantic difference. It is important, however, to recognize that the Germanic sense of spirit did not arise in direct conflict with the Latin sense, and therefore that the two notions may prove to be complementary. An interval of two to three centuries has occurred in the mainline of European culture between the disappearance of the Latin sense in the late sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth century, and the philosophical appearance of the Germanic notion at the end of the eighteenth century and during the first quarter of the nineteenth century. What is even more important is to recall that this interval stretches from the emergence of the modern natural sciences (under the tutelage of mechanics) to the emergence of the newly empowered historical disciplines (ranging from the earth sciences to biblical exegesis). It is not

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<sup>3</sup> See the penultimate chapter of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (B860–79).

<sup>4</sup> I would say that this totality principle is at work unwittingly and against itself even in the deconstructed linguistic system of differential signs, and negatively in those postmoderns who wish to make war upon totality.

<sup>5</sup> It seems to me that this explains the attempt to include the effects of spirit within a concept of matter, such as the notion of dialectical or historical materialism. There have been other expansionist attempts to accommodate the effects of spirit within a materialistic analysis. Thus, the mechanistic notions of matter and energy have been opened up to include some of the features of spirit, but this seems to me to verge upon verbal magic, not unlike some of the more fine-spun measures of late mediaeval scholasticism. The attempt does, however, indicate a growing recognition of the need for a proper concept of spirit. On the other hand, personalist philosophies explicitly invoke the name of spirit, but often a reluctance on their part to endorse a more traditional metaphysical notion of spirit seems to leave the reality of spirit still in need of adequate metaphysical grounding.



unreasonable to suggest that the German sense of spirit came to prominence with the newer appreciation of historicity and in view of the insufficiency of the classical modern sense of interiority. Such a suggestion needs a word of explanation, however. Let me very briefly set out the process by which spirit as *forma* went to its death in the main intellectual currents of our culture, while spirit as *Geist* latterly arose to take its place.

## II

To tell that story we need to go back to the early modern era. The story is familiar enough that I can omit the more detailed citations to particular philosophers, in order to isolate a certain strain of main-line philosophical thought in the modern era, a strain which is central to the present issue. It is important to remark, however, that I do not pretend to describe the entire process of modernization, and that I distinguish the *process* of modernization with its bewildering plethora of factors from its various *interpretations*, such as Enlightenment liberalism or its partial reaction in dialectical materialism.

The well-known seventeenth century attack upon scholastic principles exhibits several pressure-points relevant to the notion of spirit. The most obvious target of that attack is the principle of finality, which was either reduced to human purpose (as in Francis Bacon) or abolished *tout court* (as in Spinoza). More than finality fell, however, with the fall of final causality. Thus, there are no metaphysical natures in Descartes, and for that matter in most influential philosophies to this day. Moreover, since the principle of *forma* played the constitutive role in the metaphysical concept of *natura*, one should not expect to find forms functioning as immanent constituent specifying principles. The notion of form did not lose its formality entirely, but it did lose its metaphysical energy (by which form was act in the order of essence), so that form resurfaced as figure, structure, or design.

The concept of matter as pure potentiality-to-form fared no better. Its residue crystallized into matter formed by the so-called primary qualities of mass, size, and dimension. This was what the Schoolmen had been wont to call "secondary matter." Indeed, the exploration of this secondary matter became the search for ultimate particles, the elements of modern physics and chemistry whose progressive isolation fuelled more than three centuries of intensive experimentation.

Finally, with the modern adoption of the postulate of the primacy of motion, motion assumed the role of explaining everything else without itself standing in need of explanation; supposedly, it needed only description.<sup>6</sup> As a result, the need for a source of motion gradually lost its meaning, so that efficient (that is, effecting) causality, and especially *creatio ex nihilo*, lost credibility in the proportion to which a transcendent cause of motion lost its *raison d'être*. What in traditional metaphysics had been the primary source for the communication of existence (God as *causa prima*) was replaced by the various forces that initiate motion and rest. Whereas in the metaphysical view motion received its intelligibility through our setting forth its causes, in early modern physics the intelligibility of causes gave way to the governance of general laws.

What may not be so easily noticed is that in the collapse of the famous four causes of Aristotelian philosophy, the traditional metaphysical sense of being was lost as well. With that loss a shift occurred in the distribution of explanatory terms. To see what the shift entailed we need only look at the transformation in the meaning and function of the terms *subject* and *object*.

In the metaphysics of the high Middle Ages, the term *object* stood for the way in which something other than the knower made itself present to the knower. The actual tree in the garden was not in itself an object; but it became an object insofar as it made its presence seen, heard, or understood by the conformation of the visual, auditory, or intellectual power to the tree's causal action. The actual tree as it stood there in the garden in its own being was not as such an object, on the contrary, it was a subject. So that the relation of knower to known was a relation of subject to subject, that is, a relation between two subjects of being. This observation places us at the great shift, one might even say the decisive reversal, that differentiates the modern outlook from the ancient and medieval understanding. The shift can be seen in the altered role of the term *subject*. According to the traditional metaphysics the tree in the garden was a subject of being

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<sup>6</sup> In the late Middle Ages the study of kinematics (motion *quo ad effectum*, by description) had been distinguished from the study of dynamics (motion *quo ad causam*) and was the forerunner to the new physics of the seventeenth century. Kinematics was furthered by nominalism in philosophy and developments in mechanics. Cf. Olaf Pedersen, *Early Physics and Astronomy*, rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), chaps. 16–17, esp. pp. 194, 203.

(*suppositum entis*), whereas in the modern outlook the term subject came to mean the subject of consciousness (*subjectum mentis*)<sup>7</sup>

Before we leave the story of the demise of the older metaphysics, a most important observation must be made. There is more to be noticed about that metaphysics than the lumber of the four causes and the entitative meaning of being. Metaphysical causes are not observable, this was the complaint against them. But it can be claimed on their behalf that they operate beneath the surface of things. Each constituent principle and cause—form, matter, finality, and agency—gave to each and every being an interiority and depth that wove the web of a certain natural mystery. Paradoxically, it was a mystery of intelligible light that shrouded each and every thing. What is more, at the very root of each being the mind was led to the originating cause of the existence of all created beings, and to the *communicatio entis* that made up the drama of that ontological mystery.

If in the traditional metaphysics each thing was a subject of being, in the modern outlook each thing became an object standing over against the inquisitiveness of consciousness. On the side of the known, the ideal of scientific objectivity spelled out the immediate aim of modern scientific enquiry. The key to the modern shift is to be found even more pronounced, however, in the changed meaning of the term *subject*, for that term came to be restricted to human consciousness. Consciousness has received various names and has been identified in various ways in the course of modern philosophy.<sup>8</sup> Insofar as it is the field of objects that is worthy of being known, however, it is consciousness alone under whatever name that is the subject facing that field.

Indeed, the term *subjectivity* condenses within it the history of modern consciousness as it faces what it dubs the world of objects. To see this more clearly, it helps to recall the origins of subjectivity in the early classical modern period. The success of mechanics in

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<sup>7</sup> The term "subject-matter" still retains the old meaning, but with the passivity associated with the notion of matter.

<sup>8</sup> To wit, the *ego cogito* of Descartes with its method and criteria, the *substantia sive natura sive Deus* of Spinoza with its adequate idea, the "self" of Locke and the sensory receptacle of Hume, or the transcendental unity of apperception and its outreach in Kant, or the finite ego of Fichte, or the absolute spirit of Schelling and Hegel. Even the reactions to idealism center about this meaning of subject—to wit, Marx's revolutionary proletariat, August Comte's Humanity-writ-large, or Nietzsche's Will-to-power, even Husserl's transcendental subjectivity—each of these move within the horizon of a sublimated consciousness.

the late sixteenth century and the seventeenth century led to a widespread conviction that nature must be read mechanistically as the domain of particles in collision with one another in accordance with the general laws of motion. Instead of the study of nature as the realm of *ens mobile*, science turned to the study of *motion as such*; it turned from the study of motion translated into the terms of being to the study of motion in its own terms. The older philosophy of nature had led motion back to being and its inner constituent principles and ultimately back to the originating cause of the being of motion. The new study of motion, on the other hand, looked for intelligibility, not in the intrinsic ontological constitution of motion, but rather in the general laws that describe its empirical and observable manifestations. Such an approach made no pretense at attributing a constituent and inobservable interiority to what it took to be the external objects standing before the mind in the world of nature.

The sense of natural interiority dried up within the operative sphere of scientific intelligence. To be sure, a certain metaphorical interiority was rescued and retained in some measure by poetry, but the latter tended to be reduced to fantasy, at least until the imagination received new philosophical power from Kant onward.<sup>9</sup> Of course, religion retains an ancient purchase upon interiority, but however effective it is in its own domain, theological speculation became more and more removed from the mainstream of the methodical study of the natural world. The sense of the sacramental character of the things of nature is tied to a recognition of transcendence, and that sense more and more seemed to lose intellectual relevance and respectability.

Despite the demuse of natural interiority—that is, the interiority that traditional metaphysics attributed to all things—nevertheless, interiority itself survived. Its survival, however, was not without cost, for the remnant interiority was reduced to the confines of human subjectivity. Interiority retreated from a natural world that had lost its own interiority and could no longer share a common though analogous

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<sup>9</sup> I see in Kant's third *Critique* a growing determination to rescue some kind of interiority from the blatant mechanism of the earlier modern period. Something similar might be said of the twentieth century efforts of certain theoretical physicists to overcome the inheritance of mechanism. While these indications are promising, they do not break out beyond the horizon of subjectivity in the modern sense. Nothing short of an intellectual *reprise* of genuine transcendence can break through that horizon.

interiority with the human person. To be sure, what I have called the reduction of interiority to merely human dimensions was hailed by Enlightenment protagonists as the new dawn of secular humanism. From the standpoint of the traditional metaphysics, however, a once generous interiority had been sent into exile: "By the waters of Babylon . . ." In losing its interiority, nature also lost its integrity. Indeed, it seems that integrity requires interiority.

Descartes is justifiably emblematic of modernity just because he found new power in the modern retreat within. The emphasis upon the control of and mastery over nature animates the early modern philosophers. If the restriction of subject-status and interiority to human consciousness may be called a retreat, it was nevertheless a calculated and methodical withdrawal that retained and confirmed its control over the natural world by reducing it to the status of objectivity. The natural world came to be viewed as a field for the deployment of technological power. Whereas the object stood over against consciousness, the newly fortified subject played a double role. On the one hand, it was a party to the new relation of subject and object, but, on the other hand, and much more importantly, the subject also underwrote the conditions that were to be satisfied if something other than the subject was to qualify as an object worthy of consideration. It is this turnabout that has given status to the concept of experience far beyond what ancient and medieval thought gave to it. Experience has become the common currency into which all meaning is to be exchanged.

This new and unprecedented power came to the subject not in the old form of a power to create being but as an authoritative warranty. It was no longer ontology but epistemology that was to legitimate the course of philosophy for two centuries and was to awaken the reactions to that self-warranty that continue to this day. If Descartes is emblematic of the modern primacy of consciousness, Kant provides its charter when he appoints Reason to the status of an active and suspicious judge vis-à-vis nature. He compels it to answer questions drawn up by reason beforehand according to a schema fashioned from its own transcendental needs. One may well ask postmodernists whether that modern horizon has undergone as fundamental a change as they claim, or whether instead one or another facet of human subjectivity still continues to set the rules of evidence and to appoint itself the final court of appeal, either as having epistemic authority (in the guise of rationality), decisive authority (in the guise of will), affective authority (in the guise of feel-

ing), or expressive authority (in the guise of the linguistic system of differential signs).<sup>10</sup>

Hegel quite rightly found the modern contribution to philosophy to consist in the inner exploration of human subjectivity. It is an exploration that has lasted even into our own day, and it has involved not only philosophers but also psychologists, novelists, and religionists.<sup>11</sup> There is no question of detracting from the value of this development, my only wish is to understand it more clearly and to situate it within a fuller and deeper context. The motive of the Cartesian withdrawal was to reach certitude, and the initial yet fundamental resting place to which all knowledge was to be brought was the human subject, *subjectum fundamentum inconcussum*. St. Augustine had used the argument, *si fallor sum*, to ward off dogmatic scepticism by an *argumentum ad hominem*, but he did not use it to construct an entire philosophy as Descartes did with his *dubito, cogito ergo sum*.

Nevertheless, withdrawal from the external world was not new. It is therefore important to distinguish the ancient religious path within, such as Augustine followed, from the modern epistemological path followed by Descartes and successors. Consider the religious interiority of someone, such as St. Bernard of Clairvaux, for whom the interior path led first to self-examination and purgation, then to prayer for forgiveness, and finally to the elevation of the soul beyond itself, so that under the power of grace it would be lifted into the broad uplands of the divine presence, placing itself before God in all humility and exaltation.

That path is not the route taken by what I have called modern subjectivity.<sup>12</sup> Modern subjectivity was initiated as the retreat from a

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<sup>10</sup> These alternatives are eminently understandable within the primacy of subjectivity in retreat from the externality of particles in motion. I have begun a reflection upon how we might break out of this circle through a reversal of what I have called epistemic and noetic discourse in my "Neither With Nor Without Foundations," *Review of Metaphysics* 42, no. 1 (September 1988) 3-25.

<sup>11</sup> No doubt the Lutheran emphasis upon the inward grace of salvation, as well as other developments of Reformation Protestantism such as Pietism, played a formative role in this exploration even before the philosophers took over. Hegel dubbed this modern inward turn "the Protestant Principle." On the Catholic side one also sees a certain exploitation of this modern turn in Ignatian spirituality. It remains only to add that the Reformation and Counter-Reformation contained a mix of other factors within them, such as properly religious concerns, as well as institutional issues in the economic and political spheres.

<sup>12</sup> The most interesting attempts to use modern interiority for religious

mechanistic world of objects with which it could not identify except through technological mastery. Criticism has been made of the biblical influence upon modern technology regarding the command to master the world. Much of the criticism is misplaced, since it is often forgotten that the biblical command was to a conditional stewardship under God and not to a technological assertion of absolute human power over nature. There is, however, a similarity—more equivocal perhaps than real—in point of departure: both the biblical mandate and the modern project originate out of the recognition of a certain insufficiency in the world. The religious retreat within seeks a greater good (communion with God) than the created world can supply, so that it is an absolute retreat that recovers the world within a relationship with God. The modern retreat, on the other hand, is a relative retreat that withdraws from the world as insufficient for certain human purposes, and from an objective world that—as the sphere of exteriority—has no room for interiority, either natural or human. Indeed, there was no interiority in that modern world of objects, nor was there any place for those aspects of human existence that were now classified as nonobjective.<sup>13</sup>

I have spent some time in describing the loss of a more general and more generous metaphysical interiority and the reduction of the residue of interiority to the confines of the human consciousness. It is time to link the interiority of natural things with the immateriality resident within them. As I have already remarked, the constituent factors touted by the traditional metaphysics were not perceptible. They were intelligible factors open to intellectual analysis, so that every caused being was comprised of perceptible surface and intelligible depth, of outer show and interior reality.

The story of lost interiority is intended, therefore, to reawaken consideration of the more general notion of *immateriality*, since I think that a better understanding of spirit must await the recovery of the broader notion of immateriality. This is so because interiority is not exclusively psychological. There is a certain immateriality that is to be found in all things, even physical things. The traditional metaphysics attributed a nonmateriality to physical things by virtue of their complex constitution, since, in addition to the passive and potential

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and philosophical purposes include those of Malebranche, Kierkegaard, and Blondel

<sup>13</sup> One has merely to look at the distinction between primary and secondary qualities as they functioned in the modern period, whereby the latter were driven from the world of objects to seek refuge at the fringes of subjective awareness

factor within them that was dubbed primary matter, there were the factors of form, finality, and participation in the cosmic web of existence. These nonmaterial factors were held to be the forms of immateriality proper to physical things, but they were also held to be the physical analogues of the immateriality that was held to be inseparable from the depth and interiority constitutive of every caused being. In sum, the traditional metaphysics held that some kind of immateriality was inseparable from every being by virtue of its being.<sup>14</sup>

To be sure, the interiority of natural things is not the same as the interiority of spirit. It is important, therefore, to distinguish the general notion of immateriality from the specific form of immateriality that is appropriate to spiritual being. It is also important to distinguish both the general and the specific notions of immateriality from the false modern notion that immateriality is opposed to physicality. If we oppose the immaterial to the physical we fall into some version of Cartesian dualism, a fate worth avoiding as the insoluble attendant problems show. If, on the contrary, by material is meant whatever in a thing is sub-formal<sup>15</sup>—that is, whatever in a thing is its fundamental capacity to undergo in-formation and transformation—then we can recognize that everything physical is constituted in part by formal factors that are neither material nor perceptible and that constitute a dimension of interiority within each physical individual. Considered in itself *qua* form, the very structure and design of a physical thing is immaterial yet physical. What is required is recognition of the physical as containing nonconscious modes of immateriality. In every physical thing these nonconscious immaterial modalities are received in the plasticity of the material principle, but they enter along with the material principle into the constitution of the physical thing itself.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> I have developed the general notion at more length in "Immateriality Past and Present," *Immateriality: Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 52 (1978) 1–15. The basis in St. Thomas for such general immateriality derives from the nature of being as indicated by the role of *separatio* in the science of metaphysics. See *Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 3, trans. Armand Maurer in *The Division and Methods of the Sciences*, 4th ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1986), 32–46. See also Maurer's Introduction, pp. xxvi–xxvii.

<sup>15</sup> I use the term "sub-formal" to indicate the plasticity present in mutable things, a plasticity that is the capacity within things to receive formation and re-formation, what the ancients termed primary matter. I say "sub-formal" in order to distinguish it both from the formal factors in things, as well as from the trans-formal factor of the act of existing (*esse*).

<sup>16</sup> Communications theory (by using the language of consciousness metaphorically, with such terms as "codification," "information," and



It is important to secure a notion of immateriality in physical things in order to come out from under the shadow of a contemporary analysis that draws all communication into the vortex of an objectivity that is the external projection of modern subjectivity. Once we have secured the recognition of immaterial factors within physical reality, we are in a better disposition to recognize the proper mode of immateriality that is constitutive of each human person. Such immateriality is spirit and is the principle of personal becoming.

### III

What, then, are the marks of spirit operative within each human person? Philosophers have usually pointed to two indicators, knowledge and love. The spiritual factor in the human person lives by its own law, and both its nature and its modality are disclosed by this law. Reflection upon these two relationships has led me to describe the movement of spirit as *communication without loss*. But it is in just such a formulation that we encounter a roadblock. Conventional wisdom holds that every action is transitive—that it brings about a reaction—and that every movement entails an exchange that must be understood as a material transfer or a mutual give and take of some form of mass or energy such that the contributors suffer a loss, though new energy may be acquired in the transaction from the other party or from some other source. The conventional wisdom has it that all communication consists in such traffic. Hegel remarks concerning the concept of utility that each hand washes the other. On the other hand, it is well known that conventional wisdom often acts as a blinder, obscuring the most obvious facts, setting them aside without due consideration. Such a conventional mind-set can even put aside an obvious aspect of experience in the interest of what Karol Wojtyla has called a “methodological reservation,” that is, the exclusion of obvious facts for the sake of the presuppositions of a method and its aims.<sup>17</sup>

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“message”) seems to grope towards the articulation of something like pre-conscious modes of immateriality. It is characteristic of the modern shift, however, to draw its vocabulary from within the primacy of consciousness, whereas the designation “nonconscious” does not impose the metaphor of consciousness upon things, but rather lets them be in their own way of being.

<sup>17</sup> It is worth noting, however, that postclassical physics has tended to move away from this mechanistic view in favor of more formal (and in my sense nonmaterial) concepts.

Inasmuch as the method that defines so much of modernity entails the primacy of motion, rest is taken to be a negative term, since it indicates the absence of what is primary. It is comparable to nonbeing in the traditional metaphysics. Rest is depreciated as merely static.<sup>18</sup> From the point of view of kinematics, rest is a privative condition, the lack of motion. The term "rest" is ambiguous, however. It indicates two very different conditions: they are, respectively, a *state* and a *modality*. To be sure, the Greeks also recognized rest as a state, as the absence of motion. Far more important to them, however, was the modality of rest that they identified with being at leisure. The essence of leisure is not the mere lack of physical motion, but rather the enjoyment of free activity. It is the emergence of activity that is not governed intrinsically by the laws that govern physical motion. It is in this domain that the human spirit lives at its peak, with a life more actual than that of the traffic of gain and loss.

Indeed, even in Aristotle's analysis of change the terminus is not rest as the simple lack of motion, but the possession of new actuality (form). When he spoke of properly human activity, he recognized within the human agent a realm of activity that is not governed by the laws of physical motion and yet that is not simply the absence of such motion. Far from being static, he thought this realm to be the most intense of living actuality, realized variously in the effort to understand, in the bliss of friendship, in the energy of artistic creation, and in the acknowledgement of the divine.<sup>19</sup>

It is among these activities that we need to look for the human spirit, and precisely in the activities that engage the human spirit so

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<sup>18</sup> I use the term here in its root sense and not in the sense of the science of statics, which is the study of the equilibrium of forces that sustain a body at rest. I should add that even the tendencies of postclassical physics to move away from mechanism do not question the primacy of motion.

<sup>19</sup> Several versions of process philosophy have recovered some of the features of spirit. Thus, for example, some process philosophers assign to God the role of preserver of genuine value. More generally, however, within process philosophy the only alternative category to becoming is the static. Aristotle's analysis of change (*Physics* 1–3) offers two further categories: those of permanence and actuality. Underlying change Aristotle saw what is neither process nor stasis but the permanent, that which abides throughout the change and that, without losing its fundamental identity, is yet permeated by the change. Kant (*Critique of Pure Reason*, first analogy of experience, A182–9/B224–32) saw the importance of the notion of permanence, but his critical idealism forbade him to attribute metaphysical significance to the notion. Second, the "rest" in which change terminates is for Aristotle actuality (*energeia/eidos*) which is neither *kinesis* nor stasis.

intensively those of enquiry and friendship. Consider enquiry. In the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Spirit* Hegel describes the movement of consciousness: it goes out to the object, identifies with it, loses itself in the object and yet returns to itself surviving in the result, knowledge. This going and coming that results in knowledge, this *exitus* and *reditus*, is no mere metaphor, it is a real movement. But it is not a natural movement in the sense of a physical transaction, it is the movement of the human spirit.

To be sure, physical transactions of light and sound and the mutations of the sensory organs are the necessary conditions within which the movement of consciousness occurs, but, precisely speaking, they are not that in which knowing as such consists. Knowing does not relate the world to us so much as it relates us to the world in an irreducibly distinctive way. All attempts to translate this distinctive relation into material or physical terms, and into transactions of loss and gain, at best catch at only the outer shell of the relationship. Knowing does not put the world inside us, if it did we would have no way of speaking of the reality of the world. Rather, knowing puts us in the world in a nonphysical immaterial way. I mean that precisely as knowing, consciousness does not disturb the world, though the world is constantly being disturbed on the basis of knowing. If we were to disturb the world in our knowing it, then we should have to get rid of the word "know" and substitute for it the word "construct." No matter how complex the physical conditions, no matter how perspectival the relationship, the discursus that is human knowing is the distinctive modality of the life of personal embodied spirit in the world.

What evidence do we have of communication without loss? A most obvious fact is that which many of us have at hand. It is the evidence of teaching, whether formally in a classroom setting or informally in a conversation among friends. For when we bring someone to understand what we have come to understand, or when they bring us to that point, neither we nor they lose the knowledge communicated. Yet there has been genuine sharing, an insight has been born in a receptive mind. While there has been the transfer of waves of sound or shapes of print, those account only for the physical means of transfer. They are the necessary conditions for a spirit that is embodied, but they are not the inner being and law of communication.

In this communication we meet another indicator of the human spirit and its proper law. In order to receive the communication

we must be properly disposed. We must listen to what is being said or be attentive to the printed page. Gabriel Marcel has remarked upon the need to distinguish the notion of receptivity from that of passivity. In receiving a guest or a gift, the recipient is not simply passive. It makes no sense to say that the host has been mutated. He or she is called to conform to the disposition of a certain gracious activity that transcends any merely physical mode of passivity or activity, though the entire performance contains elements of both. The climate of the Enlightenment is very much with us still, and so the notion of receptivity is not easy to understand in a nonpassive sense. The insistence upon the identification of human dignity with autonomy and choice understood as individual independence makes reception something less than a transcendental value that is compatible with and even ennobling to our humanity. Yet nonpassive receptivity is as much a mark of the human spirit as is its activity, and the laws of such receptivity and activity are the laws that govern scientific understanding, artistic creativity, social civility, moral respect, and religious life.

Something similar occurs in the deepest form of giving. True giving may mean a sharing that is not a losing, as in teaching, but it may also mean a certain giving up, as when one gives up something of great value to another, even perhaps one's own life. But ineradicable from the notion of the gift—I say, the gift, as distinct from the present, for we often give each other presents in a mutual transaction—there is the notion that all is not lost, that a great value has been originated in and through such giving. We recognize that a freely given gift—and there is none other—increases the value of both giver and receiver, so that we honor the increase of value and the person who has originated it.

To be sure, we must not look to the human person for an exhibition of pure spirit, for the obvious reason that, although the human person is spiritual, integral to the human person are the material and immaterial modalities of a physical being. Even when we speak of spiritual activities, such as knowing and loving, we must bear in mind that it is the whole human being who knows and who loves. It follows that in any actual exercise of knowing there will be found physical movements that are both the necessary conditions and the constant companions of what is the spiritual factor in such activities. The kind of becoming that is proper to the human person, then, is a becoming that is mixed with mutations to eye and ear and body, but the becoming is not to be identified simply with

those mutations. The human spirit gives evidence, rather, of a distinctive principle operating within an ever-changing physical totality.

#### IV

Once we have secured the sphere of spirit and its law as communication without physical loss, we must acknowledge a kind of movement, a "quasi-mutation" of the spirit. In the life of the human spirit we recognize instances of a distinctively nonphysical gain and loss. These are, however, properly spiritual mutations. There can be no doubt that we are changed personally in and through our spiritual modality. Thus, we can be increased in our being through the things we come to know, and enhanced in our being through what we love. There can be loss, too, for there can be distorted love, irresponsibility in our relationships, unwanted forgetfulness, repression in our knowing, and unrequited affection. The literature of the confessional, the poetry of the elegy, the music of the requiem, the tragedy of the stage, and the case-books of the psychiatrist's couch all speak of spiritual anguish. We need, then, to look more closely at what it means to communicate without loss.

There are three kinds of quasi-mutation that enter into the movement of the human spirit. The first is properly spiritual enhancement or gain, the second is loss brought about by nonspiritual conditions, and the third is properly spiritual loss. There is enhancement: Teaching has already been instanced as an example of enhancement or gain, since effective teaching usually leads the teacher to better understand what he or she has already understood in some measure but without the loss of the prior understanding. Again, the mutual love of friends can only be acknowledged as a gain without loss. Then, too, we speak of many challenges as opportunities for personal growth, thus implying a sort of change. Such growth in personal maturity follows its own path. It occurs in time, and yet the character of temporality for the human spirit is not simply identical with the time that measures bodily changes. The temporal measure of the human spirit is not identical with the measurement of physical motion. The prevalence of myths regarding the time of origins and of the end-time indicates a capacity for transcending ordinary time by gathering it up into a totality, well beyond any possible actual experience of the limits of time.

There are other evidences of transcendence of ordinary time through a modality of duration that is distinctive of the human spirit. Thus, the capacity for conceptual thought lies at the base of the ability to frame descriptive statements about the nature and condition of things, even to designating definite past times. Such conceptualization has been described as abstract, timeless, and static—as though it is merely derivative—but in truth such chronometry marks stages in the ongoing life of spirit. It lies beyond this modest paper to further articulate a kind of duration that is not the measure of spatio-temporal motion, a kind of duration that much of human culture witnesses to. There is a duration that is more appropriate to the measure of the movement of the human spirit as it projects forward into the unknown by way of expectation and backward through past times in order to understand them and its own situatedness better. Once again, such a spiritual duration operates within the broad course of the temporality of the whole human person and is carried along by the inevitable course of physical time, but the initiatives of the human spirit do not follow its inevitable course. Indeed, the spirit redirects the processes of ordinary time in many surprising ways. If it did not, neither technology, nor art, nor fiction, nor metaphor would be possible, nor would conceptual understanding.

The second quasi-mutation is brought about by physical loss. We are not pure spirits, and we require the bodily functions in order to live spiritually, if only because we require them to live at all. Aging, forgetfulness, brain damage, dreaded Alzheimer's, and other mental illnesses—all impact upon the fragility of the human spirit, and remind us that the spiritual factor in us operates in a most intimate involvement with our bodily existence. The spiritual factor both penetrates and is penetrated through and through by the bodily conditions of our existence as persons. It is neither the eye that sees nor the mind that knows but it is the entire human being who both sees and knows. This fusion does not necessarily point to confusion; rather it points to distinction within unity, so that the human person is a complex of differing factors, each bound to operate in accordance with its own specific nature. Among these factors—nay, what we most properly call human and personal among these factors—is that which operates in its own distinctive way: it is the modality of the spirit in the human individual.

Finally, there is the possibility of spiritual loss: indeed, the most disturbing of the quasi-mutations are those to which the spirit is prey. They are such as moral failures, the loss of the sense of meaning, indifference and apathy, and more mysterious than all, the enactment of evil.

It is the element of freedom at work in these forms of spiritual loss that differentiate these losses from the pitiable losses due to the physical conditions within which the spiritual factor operates. For these losses can be laid at the door of spirit itself. Perhaps we ought not to speak too quickly of deliberate choice as the only or even the deepest aspect of our freedom. We must speak also of a kind of lethargy that can arise within spirit and that allows the spirit to drift along lines that worsen it, even to a kind of self-abandonment of its calling.

We ought neither to think of that abandonment solely as submission to nonspiritual forces, to the line of least physical resistance, to the elevation of the pleasure principle, and the like. The gravest spiritual loss is the surrender, not to nonspiritual dis-values, but to anti-spiritual dis-values. Marcel pointed to these in his analysis of despair. He distinguished optimism and pessimism from hope and despair, on the grounds that the former couplet was predicated on the estimation of future outcomes. Thus, we might be optimistic about recovering from the present economic depression, or pessimistic that economic standards will ever revert to their former level. On the other hand, hope and despair do not depend upon such anticipated results. Perhaps you have tried to show someone in despair that the prospects are not so bleak as imagined, and yet have failed to change the painful disposition to nihilism. Despair gathers up the whole of reality, everywhere and at all times, and declares its bankruptcy. Hope is exactly the opposite outreach, it lends credit to reality, even to the reality that lies beyond our ken.

This realm of spiritual values and dis-values is a realm of contradictory possibilities that is given actuality by the self-determination of spiritual freedom. Personalist philosophies have recognized this realm and some have used the notion of spirit to describe it. I have tried to locate it within the context of reality by attempting to see the relevance of a more traditional metaphysical sense of spirit, so that the movement of the mature life of the human person is to be seen as centered in a spiritual factor that is primary within the life of the human person. Personal becoming, then, is the coming-to-be of spirit in the flesh.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> I should like to express my appreciation for the helpful comments made by James Felt (Santa Clara University).

# HEIDEGGER'S METHOD PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS AS FORMAL INDICATIONS

DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM

To give them as much credit as possible, words possess only sufficient efficacy to remind us in order that we may seek things, but not to exhibit the things that we know by them

Augustine, *De magistro* <sup>1</sup>

In 1929, after rejecting the suggestion that contemporary Christians may be expected to feel "threatened" by Kierkegaard's criticisms, the Protestant theologian Gerhard Kuhlmann remarks

But present-day Christianity perhaps *is terrified* instead about the fact that everything that the spokesmen of its theology put out as revelation, according to the original Christian and reformational understanding of the term, has been set forth by a philosopher devoid of mythologizing, that is to say, exactly and profanely <sup>2</sup>

One of the questions ultimately raised by the following paper is whether Heidegger in his analysis of existence does in fact, as Kuhlmann suggests, purge Kierkegaard's thought of every theological or mythological element <sup>3</sup> Kuhlmann's remark is part of a broader salvo launched against what he regards as his contemporaries' naive appropriation of an atheistic existential analysis that reduces the

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<sup>1</sup> "Hactenus verba valuerunt, quibus ut plurimum tribuam, admonent tantum ut quaeremus res, non exhibent ut noverimus", *S. Augustini Operum, Patrologiae Latinae Tomus 32* (Paris: Migne, 1841), 1215, *Concerning the Teacher and On the Immortality of the Soul*, trans. George G. Leckie (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1958), 46

<sup>2</sup> "Aber vielleicht *erschrickt* die heutige Christenheit vielmehr darüber, daß all das, was die Wortführer ihrer Theologie als Offenbarung nach urchristlichen und reformatorischen Verstandnis ausgeben, von einem Philosophen ohne Mythologisierung, also exakt und profan hergestellt wird", Gerhard Kuhlmann, "Zum theologischen Problem der Existenz (Frage an R. Bultmann)," *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* 10, no. 1 (1929) 51n. Unless a translation is indicated all translations are my own

<sup>3</sup> Kuhlmann, "Zum theologischen Problem," 49 and n. 1. Thus purging or "profane rendering" (*Profanisierung*), Kuhlmann argues, effectively—even if inadvertently—exposes "Kierkegaard's error" of confusing existential analysis with theology



phenomena of faith and revelation to the "projection" (*Entwurf*) of *Dasein* <sup>4</sup>

The following paper moves along a path similar to Kuhlmann's, but in an opposite direction. The paper is concerned, not with Christian theologians' appropriation of Heidegger's analysis, but rather with Heidegger's appropriation of Christian theology's method. In lectures delivered at Marburg and in others given both immediately before and afterwards in Freiburg, Heidegger specifically outlines a "formally indicative" method, that is to say, a philosophical method that proceeds by "formally indicating or signalling" certain phenomena. The purpose of the following paper is to reconstruct, principally in light of Heidegger's methodical reflections in his lectures, the genesis and nature of this method and to show, on the basis of that reconstruction, how it is appropriated from what he understands by Christian theology.

## I

Central to Heidegger's criticism of the Western philosophical tradition is his charge that it has repeatedly "passed over" the world as a phenomenon in favor of nature, conceived as a collection of substances or things present <sup>5</sup>. Dominating this prevailing conception, according to Heidegger, is meta-physics, loosely understood as the tendency to regard things as being only insofar as they are in some sense present and thus potentially available and accessible to human concerns. His contemporaries' arguments for the integrity of the humanities and historical studies (*Geisteswissenschaften*) in the face of the demand for the unity of a single method drawn from the sciences of nature (*Naturwissenschaften*), come up short in Heidegger's eyes. They come up short, as do the myriad attempts to refute psychologism, because they tacitly subscribe to the same ontological assumption as

<sup>4</sup> Kuhlmann, "Zum theologischen Problem," 50–1.

<sup>5</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (hereafter, "SZ") (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1972), 63–6; Martin Heidegger, *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffes* (hereafter, "PGZ"), 2d ed., ed. Petra Jaeger, vol. 20 of the *Gesamtausgabe* (Marburg lectures of the summer semester 1925) (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988), 231–51. The *Gesamtausgabe* is cited hereafter as GA followed by the volume number and by the year of its publication in parentheses; all volumes of the GA are published by Klostermann in Frankfurt am Main.

their opponents<sup>6</sup> On that assumption, whatever else something may be said to be, what it means for it "to be" is for it to be present or, in other words, to be a scientific object in the broadest sense of the term, namely, something capable of standing over against some knowing or researching subject (*gegenüberstehend, ein Gegenstand*)

Philosophical neglect of the world is thus in Heidegger's eyes the expression of the forgottenness of what "to be" means, which, despite the tradition, is not to be confused with the mere presence of any particular thing or being or collection of the same Nor can the retrieval of what "to be" means be the provenance of science, at least not a science that concerns itself with some object only insofar as the latter is or can be present In a muscular historical narrative, the sweep of which the philosophical community has not witnessed since the likes of Hegel or Nietzsche, Heidegger recounts the difficult infancy of this *Seinsvergessenheit* in the classical Greek idea of a science of being, its dreamy adolescence in the context of the medieval sciences of theology, its maturation in the unabashed subjectivism of the modern scientific project ("mastery of nature") and, finally, its domination as technology in the twentieth century.

There is a logical as well as historical dimension to Heidegger's critique. The tendency to regard everything as basically a more or less objectifiable presence is facilitated, he insists, by the *logical prejudice* of construing truth solely as the property of a certain class of judgments or assertions. The logical prejudice, in other words, is the proclivity to privilege assertions or judgments as the distinctive forms of logos capable of bearing truth (*Wahrheitsträger*).<sup>7</sup> Assertions, as Heidegger understands them, are communicable ways of pointing out and specifying something (specifying it by way of predication).<sup>8</sup> According to the logical prejudice mentioned above, "true" is paradigmatically the predicate of a sentence designating a judgment or

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<sup>6</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Logik Die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (hereafter, "Logik"), ed. Walter Biemel, Marburg lectures of the winter semester 1925/26, GA 21 (1976), 92

<sup>7</sup> Certainly one of the most controversial aspects of Heidegger's existential analysis is his appeal to a private logos, namely, the call of conscience as the privileged or authentic logos of the truth. This aspect of Heidegger's analysis of conscience and of public discourse's proclivities for deception can be fruitfully compared with Hegel's account of conscience and "the beautiful soul's" regard for language, see G. W. F. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, ed. Hans-Friedrich Wessels and Heinrich Clairmont (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1988), 428–42

<sup>8</sup> SZ, 154–8, *Logik*, 133–4.

assertion, and is legitimately predicated of such a sentence only if some thing or object is or is believed to be present in precisely the way that the respective judgment or assertion indicates and specifies. Heidegger labels assertions that purport to point out something insofar as it is present "thematic" or "theoretical" assertions.<sup>9</sup> Such assertions are central to the way that a science entertains and investigates its objects. It does not matter whether the science be mathematics or theology, physics or psychology, or whether it be theoretical or practical.

Of the many grounds on which Heidegger's critique might be challenged, perhaps the most obvious and most trenchant are self-referential. Is not the fundamental ontology undertaken in *Being and Time* itself a science? Does it not make use of thematic or theoretical assertions in order to indicate, specify, and communicate what "to be" means in the paradigmatic case of *Dasein*? Insofar as the truth of these assertions is presumed, is not that meaning of "to be" thereby systematically objectified? Or, to the extent that Heidegger does succeed in demonstrating that an interplay of presencing and absencing fundamentally constitutes what it respectively means for humans, the world, and even things ready-to-hand "to be," is the demonstration not committed to the *presence* of the interplay?<sup>10</sup> Why, indeed, should Heidegger's method of investigating what "to be" means be different from any other?

This self-referential challenge was by no means lost on Heidegger. In the summer semester of 1925, after repeating his charge that the Western philosophical tradition has passed over the phenomena of the world, he ponders.

Yet how, then, is the world to be determined in a positive way? How is something supposed to be said about the structure of the world, given

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<sup>9</sup> SZ, 158, in *Logik* (p. 156n.) Heidegger distinguishes three levels or modes of assertions according to which a theoretical assertion about something present-at-hand constitutes an "extreme."

<sup>10</sup> Subsequently, Heidegger attempts to articulate a clearing (*Lichtung*) that is neither present nor absent, and comes into its own (*ereignet sich*) in a way irreducible to the presence/absence and manifestness/hiddenness interplays, see, for example, Martin Heidegger, "Was heißt denken?" and Martin Heidegger, "Aletheia (Heraklit, Fragment 16)," in *Vorlesungen und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), 128–9, 136–7, 264, 268, Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), 20–5, 72–4, Martin Heidegger, *Was heißt Denken?* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1971), 97. For a useful resume of these efforts see Thomas Prüfer, "Glosses on Heidegger's Architectonic Word-Play," in Thomas Prüfer, *Recapitulations: Essays in Philosophy* (Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 107–9.

that above all, from the outset, we shun every theory and precisely this extreme objectification?<sup>11</sup>

These queries of 1925 are not the first or the last time that Heidegger entertained the self-referential challenge to his method. By his own account, Heidegger does not exactly have a methodology, but he certainly does have a method.<sup>12</sup> Lying somewhere between a full-blown methodology and his method are several "methodical reflections"<sup>13</sup> between 1919 and 1930, in the course of which he repeatedly attempts to respond to this challenge by invoking the "formally indicative" character of his method or way of conceiving things.<sup>14</sup>

In the summer semester of 1930, for example, he acknowledges that, as soon as philosophizing is committed to words, it is exposed to an "essential *misinterpretation of its content*." That essential misinterpretation is precisely the view that everything, insofar as it has been articulated, has to be taken for something present-at-hand. Heidegger sets for himself the goal of "being able, at least relatively, to

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<sup>11</sup> PGZ, 251. Heidegger also observes "Also für die Philosophie handelt es sich gerade um radikalste Erhellung—philosophisches kategorial-untheoretisches Aufbrechen", Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles, Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung* (hereafter, "PIA"), ed. Walter Brocker and Kate Brockwer-Oltmanns, Early Freiburg lectures of the winter semester 1921/22, GA 61 (1985), 198.

<sup>12</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizität)*, ed. Kate Brocker-Oltmanns, Early Freiburg lectures of the summer semester 1923, GA 63 (1988), 79.

<sup>13</sup> SZ, 27–8, 310–16, PIA, 157.

<sup>14</sup> PIA, 19–20, 61–2, Martin Heidegger, "Phänomenologie und Theologie," in Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, 2d ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983), 65–6. Heidegger's use of *formale Anzeige* has been discussed by Poggeler, Oudemans, and van Dyk; see Otto Poggeler, "Heideggers logische Untersuchungen," in *Martin Heidegger Innen- und Außenansichten*, ed. R. Blasche, W. Kohler, W. Kuhlmann, and P. Rohs (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), 75–100; Theodore C. W. Oudemans, "Heideggers 'logische Untersuchungen,'" *Heidegger Studies* 6 (1990): 85–105; R. J. A. van Dyk, "Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Zur formalanzeigenden Struktur der philosophischen Begriffe bei Heidegger," *Heidegger Studies* 7 (1991): 89–109. Gadamer refers to Heidegger's earlier, frequent use of the notion of a "formale Anzeige," see Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Die religiöse Dimension" (1981), in Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Heideggers Wege* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1983), 148. Gadamer also addresses the general issue of Heidegger's nonobjectifying language in his "Heidegger und die Sprache der Metaphysik," in Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Kleinere Schriften III* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1972), 212–30. There is also extensive discussion of the notion of a "formale Anzeige" in Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993), regrettably, a copy of Kisiel's dense and helpful study first came into my hands after completion of the present article.

elude" that misinterpretation; "to this end," he observes, "it is necessary to reflect on the general character of philosophical concepts, that they are all formally indicating or signalling [*formal anzeigend*]"<sup>15</sup>

At the beginning of the same period, in his critical remarks on the problematic preconceptions and observational method of Jaspers's *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, Heidegger refers to a "formal indication" as "a specific step of the method of phenomenological explication"; in the formal indication, he maintains, "a methodical . . . fundamental sense of all philosophical concepts and connections among concepts is to be seen"<sup>16</sup> Though Heidegger declines to explain the notion further in the context of the Jaspers essay, his use of the notion makes clear that he regards the "formal indication" as a revisable way of pointing to some phenomenon, fixing its preliminary sense and the corresponding manner of unpacking it, while at the same time deflecting any "uncritical lapse" into some specific conception that would foreclose pursuit of "a genuine sense" of the phenomenon.<sup>17</sup>

What Heidegger understands by a "formal indication" is extensively elaborated shortly thereafter in the winter semester of 1921/22<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik* (hereafter, "GM"), ed Friedrich Wilhelm von Herrmann, Freiburg lectures of the winter semester 1929/30, GA 29/30 (1983), 422, 430 One customary use of the expression "indication" is to characterize some sort of reference that provides the starting point for further examination and inference Along these lines, there is a specific use of the term in medicine paralleling a use of "Anzeige" (Oxford English Dictionary "A suggestion or direction as to the treatment of a disease, derived from the symptoms observed"), which according to this dictionary is apparently the first use of the term in English Nevertheless, "indication" in no way has the same rich array of uses as does "Anzeige" Some of the connotations attaching to "Anzeige" are captured by the term "signal," taken in a broad sense, hence, it is translated here sometimes as "indication," sometimes as "signal" More specifically, an "Anzeige" may designate a notice served or a warning, an announcement (for example, of a wedding or a death), an advertisement (including the "personals"), a public declaration (for example, of a stock offering or of a bankruptcy, typically appearing in a newspaper), or a prospectus At various times Heidegger appeals to one or more of these accents in his use of "formale Anzeige"

<sup>16</sup> *Wegmarken*, 9–11, 29 Heidegger's first refers to a "formally indicating meaning" (*formal anzeigende Bedeutung*) in regard to fixing the sense of the term "method," he then speaks of the object of the inquiry "fixed in a formal indication as *existence*" Cf also *PIA*, 141

<sup>17</sup> *Wegmarken*, 11

<sup>18</sup> These early Freiburg lectures (*PIA*) contain perhaps the most sustained self-reflexive deliberations by Heidegger, as far as his philosophical method is concerned They are obligatory reading for anyone trying to un-

These lectures make clear what Heidegger had in mind when he referred in the Jaspers essay to the formal indication as "a specific step of the method of phenomenological explication" and "a methodical . . . fundamental sense of all philosophical concepts." That "fundamental sense" of philosophical concepts insofar as they are "formal indications" is based upon the phenomenological insight that the object of an interpretation must be so articulated that the determination of the object (in what sense it *is*) must emerge from the manner in which one originally "has" it, that is to say, the manner in which it originally becomes accessible (*wie der Gegenstand ursprünglich zugänglich wird*).<sup>19</sup> The "object" of philosophy itself is "what 'to be' means" in the case of such "having"; in other words, philosophizing is nothing but a way of comporting oneself to an original, unreflected or unthematic (*unabgehobenen*) comportment, an attempt to "have" or "understand" the latter authentically.<sup>20</sup>

Heidegger chooses locutions such as "having" (*haben*), "comporting" (*verhalten*), or "understanding" (*verstehen*) in order to emphasize that that original, unthematic "having" or "comporting" is for the most part not some sort of deliberate, meditative act of knowing something. Instead those locutions signify any way—theoretical, practical, playful, devotional, tender, and so on—in which a human being might relate to something, whether himself, another, a natural object, an artifact, an artwork, a mathematical formula, a scientific hypothesis, a dream, and so on. The task of philosophy is to determine what "to be" means in the case of any of the latter and this determination is possible only by understanding or "retrieving" the precise and fundamental way in which a human being exists and relates to each of them respectively (where thus existing and relating are in an important sense logically equivalent). Thus, Heidegger concludes, philosophy's way of relating to its object is "utterly original and radical," indeed, such "that even and precisely through the grasping it *is* what it grasps and grasps what it *is*."<sup>21</sup> Since philosophy's

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derstand Heidegger's method during the first decade of his professional career and his attempts at that time to answer the self-referential challenges posed by his own critique of the Western philosophical tradition

<sup>19</sup> *PIA*, 18–19, 20, 23, *SZ*, 27.

<sup>20</sup> Later Heidegger associates that original "having" or "comportment" with what Aristotle in *Metaphysics* 9 10 describes as *thigēin* and *nous*, construed as the prepropositional having in which what cannot be differentiated (*asyntheta*) and thus is not subject to predication discloses itself (*alēthein*), see *Logik*, 179–90

<sup>21</sup> *PIA*, 60–1, cf. pp. 41–2, 51, 53–4

"object" is what "to be" means in the context of that original comportment, it cannot "have" (understand, retrieve) its object as it were from the outside. Instead philosophy must itself carry out or enact (or more exactly, reenact) that original, unthematic "having," so as to appropriate it explicitly.<sup>22</sup>

Precisely for this reason Heidegger characterizes philosophical concepts as formal indications or signals, concepts pointing respectively toward some original comportment, yet as "a concrete task to be completed or performed by [philosophizing] alone" (*eine eigene konkrete Vollzugsaufgabe*).<sup>23</sup> What is thereby indicated is not given "in any complete and actual sense" but only "in principle." A philosophical concept is accordingly "empty" in a certain sense and hence purely "formal"—"formal" because it points in the direction of something that must be performed or gone through and even fulfilled or perfected by the philosopher, a direction, moreover, that springs from the philosophical "object" or "theme" itself.<sup>24</sup> Thus, *Sein und Zeit* is not the depiction of some fact (*Sachverhalt*), but rather an indication of a way of approaching what "to be" means.<sup>25</sup>

## II

In Heidegger's use and characterization of the notion of a "formal indication" two principal, overlapping functions may be delineated. First, it points to a phenomenon in such a way that it enjoins against any preemptive or external characterization of it.

The formal indication prevents any drifting off into blindly dogmatic fixations of the categorial meaning for the intrinsic determinacies of a kind of object, while what 'to be' means in its case has not been discussed; fixations, in other words, that are independent and detached

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 60–1, 80, 169–71, see also note 1 above

<sup>23</sup> *PLA*, 34, 60–1; the German ear may well hear the notion of a prospect in this use of the "Anzeige", see note 15 above. In describing the philosophical act and, as discussed below, the act of believing, Heidegger relies heavily on the terms "vollziehen" and "Vollzug." As in the case of "Anzeige" it is important to note connotations that are not conveyed by a single term in English. In "Vollziehen" there is a sense of executing, carrying out, and performing but also a sense of accomplishing, perfecting, and fulfilling.

<sup>24</sup> *PLA*, 32–4, 51, 58

<sup>25</sup> Heidegger repeatedly employs the notion of a formal indication in *Sein und Zeit*, without, however, any further explanation, see *SZ*, 52–3, 114, 116–17, 179, 231, 313–15; see Oudemans, "Heideggers 'logische Untersuchungen,'" 85

from the presupposition, the preconception, the context, and the time of the interpretation<sup>26</sup>

Heidegger refers to this function explicitly as the "referring-prohibitive" (*hinweisend-prohibitive*) function.<sup>27</sup> (In what might be regarded as a specific instance of this function, the philosophical concept as a formal indication is said to provide a corrective guide [*Korrektion*, that is, *Mitleitung*] to theology.<sup>28</sup>) The second function of a philosophical concept as a formal indication is to reverse the customary way of objectifying whatever is entertained, a reversal that transforms the individual who philosophizes. Accordingly, this second function is referred to as the "reversing-transforming" function.<sup>29</sup>

The first of these functions illuminates why Heidegger utilizes the two terms "indicating" and "formal." The indicating as a pointing (*anzeigend als hinweisend*) is preliminary (*Ansatz*), it is binding for the investigation, giving it direction and principles, but as preliminary is not itself meant to specify in any adequate or "authentic" sense the object of the investigation.<sup>30</sup> The term "formal" is employed to emphasize that the philosophical concept, insofar as it is a formal indication, is not predetermined—or at least not in any number of customary or arbitrary ways.<sup>31</sup> Thus Heidegger lays great weight on the

<sup>26</sup> "Die formale Anzeige verwehrt jede Abdrift in eigenständige, von Interpretationsvoraussetzung, Interpretationsvorgriff, Interpretationszusammenhang und Interpretationszeit abgeloste, blind dogmatische Fixationen des kategorialen Sinnes zu Ansichbestimmtheiten einer auf ihren Seinssinn undiskutierten Gegenständigkeit", *PIA*, 142

<sup>27</sup> *PIA*, 34, 141–2. This function of the philosophical concept as a "formal indication" comprises Heidegger's way of appropriating the Husserlian epoché. For Heidegger's account of the transcendental and eidetic reductions elaborated by Husserl see *PGZ*, 135–39. An excellent discussion of the Husserlian epoché is to be found in Robert Sokolowski, *Husserlian Meditations: How Words Present Things* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974), 172–81.

<sup>28</sup> "Philosophie ist das formal anzeigende ontologische Korrektiv des ontischen, und zwar vorchristlichen Gehaltes des theologischen Grundbegriffe", *Wegmarken*, 65.

<sup>29</sup> The "reversal" function amplifies and clarifies the "prohibitive" function by indicating that the bracketing (*Ausschaltung*) involved "ist nicht getan mit einem einmaligen methodischen Diktat, sondern sie ist der mit dem Vollzug des Philosophierens standig gleichzeitliche Kampf der philosophischen faktischen Interpretation gegen ihre eigene faktische Ruinanz", *PIA*, 153. While the first function, as an appropriation of the Husserlian epoché, may be regarded as phenomenological, the second function is theological in a sense that will be made clearer below.

<sup>30</sup> *PIA*, 32.

<sup>31</sup> "Für den Anzeige- und Verweisungscharakter besagt die Bestimmung



fact that the concepts he employs are neither "formally logical" nor "formally thematic," but "formally indicating" (or, one might say, "formally signalling"). Formal logic is, in his view, not really formal at all since it springs from a region of objects that has already been determined and a corresponding manner of comprehension—"assembling so as to put in order" (*ordnendes Sammeln*)<sup>32</sup> Similarly, a "formally thematic" interpretation makes use of "neighboring" schemata and "settled" notions, instead of itself retrieving the original access to the objects.<sup>33</sup> By contrast, what is "formally indicated or signalled" is not given as something already complete and understandable through comparison, contrast, and classification; instead, what is "formally indicated" is understandable only insofar as the philosopher performs or carries out some activity himself.

Several concepts characterized by Heidegger as "formal indications" exemplify this first function. The "am" in "I am" points to the manner of being that is involved, deflecting attention away from the "I," while at the same time insuring that it not be taken as an instance of "something is"<sup>34</sup> The concept of "death" refers to the most extreme possibility in terms of which a human being can understand himself, while at the same time thereby precluding a conception of death as something present-at-hand<sup>35</sup> The "as-structure" of the hermeneutical understanding is involved in taking or using something *as* such and such, for example, using something as a chair or using a

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'formal' etwas Entscheidendes! Gegenstand 'leer' bedeutet und doch entscheidend! Nicht beliebig und ohne Ansatz, sondern gerade 'leer' und Richtung bestimmend, anzeigend, bindend", *PIA*, 33

<sup>32</sup> *PIA*, 20, 162–4, 178 Even the principle of noncontradiction, Heidegger contends in this connection, is conditioned by a "specific logic of ordering", see pp 163–4

<sup>33</sup> *PIA*, 80, 174

<sup>34</sup> *Wegmarken*, 10–11, 29–30, *PIA*, 172–4, see, however, *SZ*, 116 The list of "formal indications" and the "formally indicative" in *PIA* is extensive "the definition of philosophy" (pp 20, 32, 43, 59–60, 63, 66, 72), "determinations" and "observations," specifically regarding "comportment" and "content" (pp 52–3, 55), "the determinations of philosophizing" (pp 57, 183), "to be" (p 61), "caring" (pp 89–90, 98), "the object of philosophy," namely, what "to be" means in life, facticity (p 113), the method of starting for an "existenziellen kategorialen Interpretation" (p 134), the characterization of the kairological nature of the act of caring (p 137), the characteristics of "ruination" (*Ruinanz*) and the "countermovement," namely, philosophy (pp 140–1, 183), "nothing" (p 145), the way of illuminating the sense of a philosophical presupposition (pp 158–9), "life" and the definition of the theme (*Gegenstandlichkeit*) of philosophy (p 171), "I am" and the question "am I?" (pp 174–5)

<sup>35</sup> *GM*, 425–9, cf *SZ*, 240

chair as something to sit on or something to stand on, and so on. Heidegger construes this "as-structure" as a formal indication in order to emphasize that this relation must be grasped on its own terms, and not rashly assimilated to the derivative relation of two things presumably present together and capable of being so indicated and specified (predicated) in a theoretical judgment.<sup>36</sup>

These examples make it evident, if it is not so already, that Heidegger's emphasis on the formality of philosophical concepts is somewhat misleading. Philosophical concepts are clearly not understood by him as being so devoid of content that they are unable to preclude errant presumptive determinations of their meaning. A philosophical concept's referring (*Hinweis*) is, as he puts it, a "binding" and "principled" one.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, as his remarks about formal logic and formal themes reveal, philosophical concepts as formal indications exclude concepts of objects presupposed by specific sciences—insofar, at least, as the inquiry into what "to be" means in the case of these objects (and, thereby, the original access to them) has been put off or ignored.

The methodological functions ascribed by Heidegger to philosophical concepts as formal indications are thus, as is to be expected, governed by his specific understanding of the aim and content of philosophy. This characteristic is perhaps even more evident in regard to the second function of the formal indication. Because philosophy strives for an understanding of something that is highly questionable (the significance of "to be"), it stands in conflict with the easy confidence that words in their customary usage are reliable and that, when we speak (with others or ourselves), we generally know what we are talking about. The concepts that Heidegger understands as "philosophical" and, hence, "formal indications" are not, at least for the most part, neologisms or technical concepts. Instead they are themselves derived from the way of life that informs the normal use of language. Precisely because of this origin, however, Heidegger designates such concepts "formal indications" as a warning that authentic access to what they point to is not at all common.<sup>38</sup> In fact, that access runs

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<sup>36</sup> *GM*, 424–5

<sup>37</sup> *PIA*, 19–25, 56–61, 168–9

<sup>38</sup> See note 15 above. The formalization of everyday expressions creates, as Oudemans aptly observes, a certain distance to them, allowing us to look *at* them. "In diesem Mitgehen mit der Durchschnittlichkeit des Alltäglichen und mit der überlieferten Ontologie versucht Heidegger durch Formalisierung der Begriffe eine gewisse Distanz entstehen zu lassen", Oudemans, "Heideggers 'logische Untersuchungen'," 99

counter to the customary "plunge" (*Sturz*) into the usual ways of considering things, where the talk is less than explicit and the interpretation remains implicit.<sup>39</sup> The very "possibility and factual necessity . . . of the *formal indication* as the method from which one must begin" lie in this "plunge" or, as he would later put it in *Sein und Zeit*, in the "fallenness" of human existence, namely, in the propensity to yield to the anonymity of some public opinion.<sup>40</sup> In other words, the philosopher is required to invert the normal perspective and way of posing questions, namely, away from particular beings toward the generally unspoken and unexamined horizon within which they are respectively encountered and have the manner of being that they do. Thus, formal indications such as "life" and "existence" direct attention to a specific but unthematized and implicit meaning of "to be," a meaning the understanding of which, because it is unthematized, requires a certain reversal.<sup>41</sup>

In these early lectures Heidegger elaborates how the "plunge" into the world is a "movement" characteristic of the way we in fact typically live: we are bent on taking care of ourselves, but on the world's terms, that is to say, in terms of what that means in the eyes of the world. As a result, we no longer are familiar with ourselves, even when confronted with ourselves.<sup>42</sup> Philosophy, on the other hand, is "a movement running counter to this plunge into the world" (*eine gegenrinnante Bewegtheit*).<sup>43</sup> This movement directs attention, to be sure, at what it means "to be" within the concrete situ-

<sup>39</sup> For Heidegger's "formally-indicating" definition of this "plunge" (*Sturz*) or runation (*Rinnanz*) see *PIA*, 131, 136–7, 139–40, 143–55.

<sup>40</sup> "Sofern alles im faktischen Leben erhellt, in irgendwelcher unausdrucklicher Rede steht, in unabgehobener faktischer rinnanter Interpretation 'ist', liegt darin die Möglichkeit und faktische Notwendigkeit der formalen Anzeige als Ansatzmethode", *PIA*, 134. Heidegger mentions four "formally-indicative characters of runation [*Rinnanz*]" in *PIA*, 140–1.

<sup>41</sup> *GM*, 430, *PLA*, 19–20, 80, 88.

<sup>42</sup> *PIA*, 136, cf pp 130–2, 142. Plainly foreshadowed here is the content of the structural division of inauthenticity and authenticity (or, perhaps better, not being and being my own self *Eigentlichkeit*) so central to the argument and rhetoric of *Sein und Zeit*. In this connection Oudemans identifies a noteworthy shift in Heidegger's thinking. In the early Freiburg years, he contends, philosophy is depicted as the paradoxical movement both *within* and *counter* to the total movement of *Rinnanz*, succeeding only by pushing the latter to its limits, characterized as and by "emptiness" and "nothingness." By contrast, in *SZ* Heidegger ascribes a distinct topos to authenticity and, perhaps more fundamentally, refers to a prevailing indifference toward inauthenticity as well as authenticity, Oudemans, "Heideggers 'logische Untersuchungen'," 91–3, 101–4.

<sup>43</sup> *PIA*, 153.

ations of everyday life. Philosophy can make this meaning clear, however, only by articulating "the most fundamentally appropriate sense of what it means 'to be' " (*das Ureigene des Seinssinns*) and by bringing that meaning and its "binding character" to life.<sup>44</sup> To carry out this task is, in Heidegger's eyes, to live the philosophical life "Philosophy is a fundamental manner of living itself, such that philosophy in each case authentically re-treives life, taking it back from its downfall [*Abfall*], a taking back which, as a radical searching, is itself life."<sup>45</sup>

Thus reversal (*Umstellung*), as already noted, also entails a transformation (*Verwandlung*) of the individual philosophizing. One cannot thematize what is initially unthematic without putting oneself in question and, equivalently, one's comportment and world. As Heidegger puts it in the winter semester of 1929/30, it must be understood that "what philosophy deals with generally discloses itself only in and on the basis of a transformation of human *Dasein*."<sup>46</sup>

At the end of Heidegger's lectures of the 1925/26 winter semester he employs the notion of an "indication" in order to distinguish "specifically phenomenological, categorial" assertions from "worldly" assertions. While the worldly assertions point out something present-at-hand, phenomenological, categorial assertions refer to *Dasein*, not as something present-at-hand, but as something the understanding of which requires a reversal or transposition on the part of the thinker.<sup>47</sup> Once again Heidegger concedes that, insofar as the "phenomenological, categorial assertion" is articulated, it shares the structure of a worldly (apophantic) assertion and thereby means "something at first present-at-hand."<sup>48</sup> However, he adds

A worldly assertion about something present-at-hand, even if it is made in the context of a mere naming, can directly mean what has been said, while an assertion about *Dasein* and furthermore each assertion about being, each [phenomenological] categorial assertion requires, in order to be understood, the reversal of the understanding, a reversal in the direction of what has been indicated, which essentially is never something present-at-hand.<sup>49</sup>

<sup>44</sup> *PIA*, 168–9

<sup>45</sup> *PIA*, 80, cf. p. 88

<sup>46</sup> *GM*, 423

<sup>47</sup> In order to avoid possible confusion, it should be noted that this use of "specifically phenomenological, categorial" is replaced in *Sein und Zeit* by the use of "existential" and contrasted with the use of "categorial." Heidegger is plainly groping for terminology in the winter semester of 1925/26

<sup>48</sup> *Logik*, 410

<sup>49</sup> "Eine weltliche Aussage über Vorhandenes, auch wenn sie in einem

The uphill task that Heidegger sets for himself is obvious. He must be able to kick away the very ladder ("worldly" or "theoretical" assertions, "objectifying" concepts, and so on) on which he is forced to make his climb.

From Heidegger's own perspective, this ladder may be characterized as a "scientific method," and it is in this regard that Heidegger's conception of a "formal indication" and a "formally indicative method" takes on added significance. Throughout the decade of the 1920s Heidegger cautiously distinguished the sort of investigation appropriate to specific ("ontic") sciences from his own ("ontological") investigations into the meanings of "to be." He did not eschew the term "science" in characterizing his own project, however. After referring to "our scientific philosophy" in the summer semester of 1925, Heidegger characterizes the philosophizing logic, the topic of lectures the following semester, as "the science of truth."<sup>50</sup> "Phenomenology," he declares in *Sein und Zeit*, "is the science of being" and at the end of the summer semester of 1927 he describes philosophy as the science, even the "absolute science" of being, indeed, characterizing the latter as the "objectification [*sic*] of being."<sup>51</sup> In the final Marburg lectures a year later he continues to speak of a "philosophical science."<sup>52</sup>

Towards the close of those final Marburg lectures, however, and even more emphatically in his first lectures (of his subsequent stay) at Freiburg, the characterization of philosophy is unmistakably altered in this respect. Philosophy, he now urges, is "more original" than any science and it is both deceitful and degrading to characterize philosophy as a science.<sup>53</sup>

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bloßen Nennen vollzogen ist, kann direkt das Gesagte meinen, während eine Aussage über Dasein und weiterhin jede Aussage über Sein, jede kategoriale Aussage zu ihrem Verständnis notwendig der Umstellung des Verstehens bedarf, der Umstellung auf das Indizierte selbst, das wesentlich nie Vorhandenes ist", *Logik*, 410 n. 1

<sup>50</sup> PGZ, 2-3, 184, 190, *Logik*, 10-11

<sup>51</sup> SZ, 37, *Wegmarken*, 48, GP, 15-17, 459-60, 466. It is difficult to reconcile this last quotation ("Vergegenständlichung von Sein") with Oudemans's claim that Heidegger had no illusions about giving a scientific foundation to philosophy and that his characterization of philosophy as a science was chiefly a rhetorical means of warding off *Schwärmerei*, see Oudemans, "Heideggers 'logische Untersuchungen,'" 90.

<sup>52</sup> Martin Heidegger, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*, ed. Klaus Held, Marburg lectures of the summer semester 1928, GA 26 (1978), 11, 70.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 287, GM, 2-3, 22-4, 30, see also the previous note. Heidegger's changing views about the scientific character of his early philosophy are traced in Daniel O. Dahlstrom, "Heidegger's Last Word," *Review of Metaphysics* 41, no. 3 (March 1988): 593-6.

This rejection of a scientific understanding of philosophy is self-critical, to be sure, but hardly surprising especially in view of the methodological considerations prompting his demand that philosophical concepts be regarded as "formal indications." The very purpose of that demand is to avoid the sort of objectification characteristic of a theoretical or scientific thematization of things. If, indeed, "science" and "objectification" are synonymous or, in other words, if science can thematize its subject matter only by objectifying the latter, that is to say, by regarding its subject matter only insofar as it can be considered present-at-hand, then given Heidegger's understanding of philosophy, it is necessary for a philosophical thematization to distance itself from science.

For the theme of the present paper, what is particularly significant about this development (that is, Heidegger's departure from the notion of a "scientific philosophy") is the fact that the appeal to the "formally indicative" character of philosophical concepts survives it. Toward the end of the same lectures in which he declares that it is as embarrassing to regard philosophy as science as it is to regard it as the proclamation of some worldview, he insists that philosophical concepts be understood as "formal indications" in order to avoid—"at least to a relative degree"—the misunderstanding that all concepts are objectifying.

What is difficult about philosophical concepts—and the reason Heidegger stresses that they be regarded as formal indications—can be traced to philosophizing itself. Philosophizing is a way of being-in-the-world that at the same time aims at determining this way of being.<sup>54</sup> Being-in-the-world brings about what it is (*sich vollzieht*) *unthematically* in a fourfold way, namely, as an emotional state (*Be-findlichkeit*),<sup>55</sup> a specific sort of understanding or projecting, an absorption into a more or less public domain, and a way of talking. In each of these mutually complementary ways being-in-the-world discloses, again unthematically or implicitly, that temporality is its most basic horizon or meaning. Therefore, the task of philosophizing is to reflect upon what unthematically "is always already there" (*immer schon da ist*). Philosophizing is a kind of "re-iterating" (*Nach-voll-ziehen*), repeating in an explicit fashion the path (*iter*, *Weg*) that we

<sup>54</sup> *GM*, 13

<sup>55</sup> The difficulty of translating this term is aptly described in Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992), 168–9.

are constantly following (*iterare, vollziehen*), retrieving (*Wiederholen*) what it means "to be" from a well of forgottenness. Philosophical concepts such as "care," "life," "as," "world," and "existence" *indicate* (*zeigen . . . an*) "a concrete task to be carried out by philosophy alone" (*eine eigene konkrete Vollzugsaufgabe*); in other words, they point to what unthematically *is always already there* but must be expressed, which can occur only through its "retrieval" and "reiteration" (in the senses described above)

Reflection on this retrieving, "the methodical reflection" as Heidegger calls it, is itself mandatory. That is to say, the method may not be a kind of afterthought (*Nachgetragenes*), but rather must be developed through the interpretation "as an essential part of the execution of the interpretation itself."<sup>56</sup> In other words, the definition of philosophy is itself philosophical and hence a "formal indication"<sup>57</sup>

### III

There is an obvious similarity between Heidegger's characterization of philosophical concepts as "formal indications" and the nature of certain artistic compositions. Much as in a score and a script—in contrast to a sketch—something is expressed and formulated but in such a way that what it is can only be realized by being performed (rehearsed, interpreted, staged).<sup>58</sup> Indeed, insofar as the philosophical text, on this account, is not so much a statement about what is present-at-hand as it is a score or script to be performed, in a certain sense the question, Is it possible, by means of philosophical concepts as formal indications, to thematize without objectifying what "to be" means in the case of *Dasein*? cannot legitimately be put to Heidegger. Rather the question has to be put to his readers.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>56</sup> *SZ*, 308, 310–16, 391, *PIA*, 80, 133–4, 157, see also Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, 4th ed (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1973), 232

<sup>57</sup> *PIA*, 19–20, 32–4, 43, on these pages Heidegger elaborates "die formalanzeigende Definition der Philosophie"

<sup>58</sup> "In the drama, as in music, the work is a compliance-class of performances", Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976), 210

<sup>59</sup> This character of Heidegger's thinking figures in Rorty's rejection of Okrent's admonition to avoid Heidegger's dangerous recourse of maintaining that assertions about the truth of what "to be" means are not really assertions at all. Rorty finds nothing reproachable in such recourse, if pragmatism does

In later reflections on language Heidegger himself pursues the close proximity of artistic composing to a nonobjectifying, philosophical thinking. Thinking, he observes, proceeds down its path "in the neighborhood of composing."<sup>60</sup> Similarly, in a 1964 letter to a group of theologians gathered at Drew University in Madison, New Jersey, Heidegger suggests, "Poetic composition [*Dichtung*] can serve as an example of an excellent, nonobjectifying thinking and speaking."<sup>61</sup>

The fact that this last remark was made in a letter addressed to theologians is not insignificant. If Heidegger's characterization of philosophical concepts as formal indications possesses a significant similarity to the nature of artistic composition, it has even closer ties to what he understands as the theological formation and development of Christian belief. The relation of Christian theology to its faith and that of philosophizing to existence, on Heidegger's own understanding of theology and philosophizing, are profoundly homologous.

The deep affinity begins with parallels between belief and existence. Heidegger understands belief as "a manner of existing" that is developed (or, more literally, is "timed") from and by what becomes revealed in it and with it, namely, what is believed: the crucified God ( . . . *gezeitigt . . . aus dem, was in und mit dieser Existenzweise offenbar wird, aus dem Geglaubten . . . der gekreuzigte Gott*)<sup>62</sup> If "belief" is replaced with "existence," "revealed" with "disclosed," and the "believed" with "temporality," then it becomes clear just how closely this account of belief mirrors the structure that lies at the bottom of the analysis of *Dasein* in *Sein und Zeit*.

Moreover, the revelation in which the Christian believes is thoroughly historical (*geschichtlich*), not only in the sense that it in fact originally happened, but above all in the sense that it continues to happen (*immer noch geschieht*). The revelation thus makes believers "participants" in the happening (*Geschehen*) that revelation is.<sup>63</sup> In a corresponding way what it means for *Dasein* "to be" is "constituted by historicity" (*durch Geschichtlichkeit konstituiert*), not so much in

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have anything to say about such a truth, then he would like to see it "take the form of a proposal." See Richard Rorty, *Essays on Heidegger and Others* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 38n, and Mark Okrent, *Heidegger's Pragmatism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 292.

<sup>60</sup> "Darum ist es gut, an den Nachbarn, an den, der in derselben Nahe wohnt, zu denken", Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 6th ed (Pfulingen: Neske, 1979), 173. See also pp 195–6. Heidegger nonetheless insists on the difference between composing (*Dichten*) and thinking (*Denken*)

<sup>61</sup> *Wegmarken*, 78

<sup>62</sup> *Wegmarken*, 52

<sup>63</sup> *Wegmarken*, 53



the sense that *Dasein* has a history as in the sense that, as existing, it has the structure of the ecstatic-temporal happening, the "hidden ground" of which is the finitude of temporality.<sup>64</sup> Belief is not an "object" (*Gegenstand*) of theology as something standing over against it (*ihr gegenüberstehend*). Theology is rather part of the development and formation of belief in the sense that it participates all the more explicitly in the happening of revelation.<sup>65</sup> Likewise, the act of philosophizing completes and perfects itself (*sich vollzieht*) in a historical situation, in order to appropriate and develop that situation so as "to bring the specific theme of the philosophizing in its binding character to life"<sup>66</sup>

In belief, the entire *Dasein* is placed before God and, indeed, such that "the existence struck by this revelation . . . becomes revealed to itself in its forgottenness of God"<sup>67</sup> The phrase "being placed before God" signifies a reversal of existence (*ein Umgestelltwerden der Existenz*) That is to say, belief is a "rebirth as a mode of historically existing, on the part of the *Dasein* factually believing, in *that* history which begins with the happening of revelation, in *that* history to which, in accordance with the meaning of revelation, a definite uttermost end has already been posited."<sup>68</sup> What here happens in belief, namely, "being placed before God" and the rebirth (*Umgestelltwerden und Wiedergeburt*), respectively become in Heidegger's method that reversal and retrieval (*Umstellung und Wiederholung*) which, again parallel to the dynamics of belief, move a finite future into the forefront of the analysis of *Dasein*.<sup>69</sup>

With these parallels between belief and existence, the structural similarities between theology and philosophy are already apparent. In belief—as the historical existence in the sense of the happening of revelation— theology has its origin as well as its goal Hence it is a uniquely "historical science," motivated and legitimated by belief, am-

<sup>64</sup> SZ, 376, 382, 386, PIA, 161

<sup>65</sup> Wegmarken, 51, 54–5

<sup>66</sup> PIA, 169, see also p 62

<sup>67</sup> Wegmarken, 53

<sup>68</sup> "Der eigentliche existenzielle Sinn des Glaubens ist demnach Glaube = Wiedergeburt Und zwar Wiedergeburt nicht im Sinne einer momentanen Ausstattung mit irgendeiner Qualität, sondern Wiedergeburt als Modus des geschichtlichen Existierens des faktischen glaubigen Daseins in der Geschichte, die mit dem Geschehen der Offenbarung anhebt, in der Geschichte, der schon dem Sinne der Offenbarung gemäß ein bestimmtes äußerstes Ende gesetzt ist", Wegmarken, 53

<sup>69</sup> SZ, 391–2

ing at doing its part in abetting the development of the state of belief.<sup>70</sup> In other words, theology is the conceptual self-interpretation of the historical existence of belief which "first unveils itself in belief and only for belief."<sup>71</sup> In a directly corresponding fashion Heidegger explains how philosophy has its origin and its goal in factual life. Philosophy is thereby a kind of "historical knowledge", or, more precisely, it carries out "the temporality of the authentic historicity" through which (again much like theology) philosophy ideally lifts *Dasein* up from its fall into the world, bringing it back to authentic existence.<sup>72</sup>

Thus, both philosophy and theology assume the "fallenness" of human existence and accordingly employ concepts as "formal indications." Because such concepts signal a reversal and a transformation, a person can understand them only insofar as he or she authentically exists (in the case of philosophy) or believes (in the case of theology). To be sure, "being-in-the-world," like "the stance toward God" (*das Verhalten zu Gott*), takes place in any case, it is always already "there." What matters, however, is the authenticity of the existence or belief and this is dependent respectively upon a "retrieval" (*Wiederholung*) or "rebirth" (*Wiedergeburt*). Only on the basis of such a transformation, Heidegger urges in the winter semester of 1929/30, does the entire connection between inauthentic and authentic existence become conceivable.

The concepts that break [this connection] open are only then capable of being understood when they are not taken as meanings of properties and furnishings of something present-at-hand, but rather are taken as *indications or signals* [*Anzeigen*] for this, that the process of understanding must first disentangle itself from the ordinary conceptions of the particular being and explicitly transform itself into the being-there [*Da-sein*] within it.<sup>73</sup>

Only on the basis of such a transformation is a philosopher capable of attending, not simply to what things are or how they are used, but what it means to say *that they are*

Just as theologians do not understand themselves as closet anthropologists, so Heidegger does not understand himself as an

<sup>70</sup> *Wegmarken*, 55–7, 61

<sup>71</sup> *Wegmarken*, 55

<sup>72</sup> *SZ*, 384–5, 390–1

<sup>73</sup> *GM*, 428. Also, "Der Bedeutungsgehalt dieser Begriffe meint und sagt nicht direkt das, worauf er bezieht, er gibt nur eine Anzeige, einen Hinweis darauf, daß der Verstehende von diesem Begriffszusammenhang aufgefordert ist, eine Verwandlung seiner selbst in das Dasein zu vollziehen", *GM*, 430

existentialist.<sup>74</sup> Yet the ontological question can no more be adequately addressed without attending to precisely what it means for humans "to be" than can the theological question. What is evident from the texts considered on the last few pages is the fact that Heidegger's "formally indicative" method or, more precisely, its transformational function as a directive is modeled on a Christian theological understanding of human existence.

It is therefore hardly surprising when Heidegger in 1921 chastises Lowith for measuring him against the likes of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. "I am no philosopher," Heidegger insists, "and have no illusions of even doing anything at all comparable", rather "I am a Christian theologian."<sup>75</sup> The remarks are those of a still maturing thinker, to be sure, but they are made at a time when Heidegger, in lectures in a philosophy department on the method and subject matter of philosophy, is hammering out his methodological tactic of taking philosophical concepts as formal indications

The aim of this paper has been to elaborate Heidegger's method, as he conceived it in the 1920s, and to demonstrate how the method in fundamental ways is appropriated from what Heidegger understands by theology. To be sure, despite this appropriation, Heidegger insists that philosophy is in principle "a-theistic."<sup>76</sup> On the one hand, this claim might be taken simply as a reminder that the ontic, Christian theological question of what a particular being is (for example, God or revelation) is not to be confused with the ontological question of what "to be" means. On the other hand, some (for example, Kuhlmann) regard the claim as a ruse, obscuring the fact that Heidegger's analysis of authentic human existence is not neutral, but in fact antithetical to Christian theology.<sup>77</sup> In the same vein, still others emphasize how Heidegger's method calls for a transformation also on the part of the theologian, but without providing the possibility of a return to theology.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> *Wegmarken*, 63, "La question qui me préoccupe n'est pas celle de l'existence de l'homme; c'est celle de l'être dans son ensemble et en tant que tel", Martin Heidegger, *Bulletin de la société française de philosophie*, 37e année, no 5 (1937), 193. See also his "Brief über Humanismus," in *Wegmarken*, 329–30.

<sup>75</sup> The remarks are contained in a private letter to Lowith, cited by Gadamer, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Die religiöse Dimension," 142.

<sup>76</sup> "Philosophie muß in ihrer radikalen, sich auf sich selbst stellenden Fraglichkeit prinzipiell a-theistisch sein", *PIA*, 197, see also pp. 196, 199.

<sup>77</sup> Kuhlmann, "Zum theologischen Problem," 51.

<sup>78</sup> Oudemans, "Heideggers 'logische Untersuchungen'," 96.

There is, however, another way of understanding Heidegger's "a-theism." Just as the meaning of "a-letheia" presupposes that of hiddenness, so Heidegger's method is only understandable in terms of his theism, that is to say, his understanding of the ontic science, Christian theology. Heidegger claims in *Sein und Zeit* that at the bottom of the ontological interpretation of the existence of *Dasein* there lies "a specific, ontic conception of authentic existence."<sup>79</sup> If Christian theology, as suggested on these pages, is a prominent source of Heidegger's philosophical method, then there is ample reason to suppose that that specific ontic conception which Heidegger refrains from elaborating, while not theological in a strict sense, is nevertheless incomprehensible apart from Christian theology. Though it is an ontic science, Christian theology consists, as Heidegger himself emphasizes, not so much in making theoretical assertions as in formally signalling the revelation and the transformation of the believer its understanding entails.<sup>80</sup> So, too, Heidegger's fundamental ontology consists, not in formulating theoretical propositions about what is present-at-hand, but rather in formally signalling the presencing-and-absencing of *Dasein* and the authentic transformation of *Dasein*, the thinker, its understanding entails.

*The Catholic University of America*

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<sup>79</sup> SZ, 310. The ontic grounding of the ontological investigation is frequently cited by Heidegger, see SZ, 278, GP, 466

<sup>80</sup> *Wegmarken*, 56–8, 60–1

## BOOKS RECEIVED

### SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS\*

IAN BELL AND STAFF

ALMEDER, Robert *Blind Realism: An Essay on Human Knowledge and Natural Science* Studies in Epistemology and Cognitive Theory Lanham Rowman and Littlefield, 1992 xii + 247 pp \$47.50—Almeder begins by distinguishing between two senses of “knows.” What he calls “weak knowledge,” although nominally defined in the classical way as (completely) justified true belief, does not require truth in the correspondence sense. This follows from the fact that weak knowledge of a proposition  $p$  does not require evidence that entails  $p$ , yet weak knowledge of  $p$  requires evidence that entails the truth of  $p$ . Further, Almeder argues that any interesting definition of knowledge or truth must allow us to determine which things have these properties, and that a correspondence sense of truth would not allow such determination.

Almeder turns to Gettier-type counterexamples to the classical definition of knowledge in his second chapter. He first argues against rival accounts of knowledge and justification used to avoid the Gettier counterexamples, including reliabilism and causal theories. Almeder tries to avoid the Gettier counterexamples by maintaining that (1) the examples all assume that one can be completely justified in believing something false, a claim that Almeder denies, and (2) the evidence that is taken to defeat the knowledge-claims in the examples is either accessible or inaccessible. If the evidence is inaccessible, then the examples do not defeat weak knowledge (since weak knowledge requires only that there is no accessible defeating evidence), and if it is accessible then knowledge was not present to begin with.

The third chapter deals with the question of basic knowledge. Almeder argues that some knowledge need not satisfy an evidence condition, we need to satisfy an evidence condition for  $p$  only if the question “How do you know that  $p$ ?” makes sense. Further, such a question makes sense only if there can be some *real* doubt as opposed to a mere logical possibility of error. The chapter also contains an interesting presentation of Almeder’s notion of a “conceptual scheme,” a notion that he invokes in order to make sense of the fallibility of basic knowledge.

“Blind realism” consists of three theses, which I paraphrase for brevity. (1) Even if we abandon the correspondence theory of truth, we still

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\* Books received are acknowledged in this section by a brief resume, report, or criticism. Such acknowledgement does not preclude a more detailed examination in a subsequent Critical Study. From time to time, technical books dealing with such fields as mathematics, physics, anthropology, and the social sciences will be reviewed in this section, if it is thought that they might be of special interest to philosophers.

know that there is a real, mind-independent world, (2) At any given time some of what we know is true in a correspondence sense, but (3) We cannot reliably determine which of our present beliefs correspond to reality. Almeder argues for the existence of a real, mind-independent world by appealing to a version of the success argument: it would be a "miracle" that science is so successful otherwise.

The final chapter contains arguments intended to show that science will eventually answer all nontrivial empirical questions, by arguing first that there are only a finite number of such nontrivial questions, and second that revolutionary scientific progress will continue indefinitely. Almeder claims that in order to establish that the set of such questions is finite, it is sufficient for him to show that there is no good reason to think that there are infinitely many such questions, because of an initial presumption in favor of there being only finitely many. The book ends with a Jamesian argument to the effect that we are justified in believing (for moral-prudential reasons) that science will revolutionarily progress indefinitely.

I will close with one complaint about Almeder's argument: he does not define his notion of entailment. At one point Almeder suggests that if evidence entails that  $p$ , then it is logically impossible that  $p$  is false (p. 18). Later he says that some tautologies are not entailed by some evidence (p. 20). It is difficult to make sense of, and thereby evaluate, crucial parts of Almeder's arguments in the first chapter in the absence of a clear notion of entailment, and a clear distinction between what is logically possible on the one hand, and what is possible given some evidence on the other.

*Blind Realism* is exceptionally clearly written, and is densely packed with arguments. The book is clearly the result of years of careful thought, and should interest a wide variety of epistemologists and philosophers of science. —Cory Juhl, *University of Texas at Austin*

BAXTER, Timothy M. S. *The Cratylus: Plato's Critique of Naming*. Philo-sophia Antiqua, vol. 58. New York: E. J. Brill, 1992. ix + 203 pp. \$57.25.—The three stated goals of this book are to provide an interpretation of the *Cratylus* which determines the roles Hermogenes and Cratylus play in the argument, to do justice to the dialogue's etymologies, and to assess the value of its aporetic conclusions. Baxter succeeds in presenting the dialogue, with its seemingly divergent parts, as a well-constructed whole. Baxter's interpretation enables the reader to raise the same kind of interpretive, philosophical questions that arise when one reads Plato's more accessible dialogues.

In the first and second chapters Baxter describes Hermogenes' view that names are merely conventional and Cratylus's view that names are natural and must accurately describe what they name. Socrates rejects both views because they destroy the possibility of an inquiry in which a "dialectician's insights into the essences of things" (p. 4) guide the project of namegiving. According to Baxter, Socrates diagnoses the prob-

lem of these theories as their failure to distinguish between a prescriptive theory of naming, which provides a standard by which to measure the propriety of names in existing languages, and a descriptive theory of naming, which draws its conclusions from the names in existing languages. Baxter recognizes the same failure in modern interpreters of the *Cratylus* who criticize Socrates' etymological theory from a standpoint of modern descriptive grammar. Socrates' theory is prescriptive.

In the third chapter the author describes Socrates' two different etymological methods: the semantic method, which is directed at discovering the intentions of the original namegiver, and the mimetic method, which tries to discover the way the elements in a name reveal, through imitation, the essence of what they name. Baxter maintains that while the former method is a parody of earlier etymologists who overvalued names, the latter method represents Socrates' ideal of allowing the nature of the *nomina* to determine the propriety of names.

In the next two chapters Baxter examines the large section of the *Cratylus* which deals with various Greek etymologies. In chapter 4 Baxter argues that Socrates provides so many etymologies because he is attacking through parody a vast group of Greek thinkers and poets who use etymologies to support their beliefs. Socrates shows that etymology is an unreliable tool for attaining knowledge about things. The pre-Socratics had often supported their beliefs through isolated appeals to etymologies. Socrates' treatment of etymologies is meant to reveal the arbitrariness of such appeals by presenting a systematic, or at least extensive, review of etymologies.

In the fifth chapter the author relates Socrates' etymologies to the positions of Pherecydes, Heraclitus, Empedocles, the Homeric Interpreters, the Anaxagorean school, the Derveni Commentator, astronomers and cosmologists, tragedians and sophists. The work done in this long chapter is, by the author's own admission (p. 160), impressionistic. This feature can be defended given the limitations of our pre-Socratic sources, as well as the author's claim that Plato is creative in parodying his sources, often imitating their form rather than their content, and attacking tendencies in Greek thought rather than specific thinkers. The last part of the dialogue, in which Socrates refutes Cratylus' view that names function both mimetically and infallibly, is analyzed in chapter 6.

This book is a scholarly work. It contains a thorough index and an extensive bibliography which includes works from linguists as well as classicists and philosophers. Previous interpretations are noted. No translations are provided for many Greek and several German, French, and Latin quotations. The focus throughout the work is on interpretation. Criticisms of the *Cratylus* are presented as resulting from misinterpretations of the dialogue's purpose. This book is a useful source for anyone seeking a coherent interpretation of the *Cratylus* as a whole.—Matthew K. McCoy, *The Catholic University of America*

Benardete's commentary is preceded by a translation which, like his previous ones, places a premium on accuracy and literalness. It is therefore the most useful translation for those who want to get as close to the subtleties of Plato's writing as possible, short of reading him in Greek. For the same reason, Benardete's translations are also the most demanding, they are not translations that many would want to use as bait to lure beginners into Plato's world. An extreme example (most of the translation is quite readable and idiomatic) is at 24a, which Benardete translates, "in the case of hotter and colder, see whether you could ever conceive of some limit, or would the more and less, which dwell as a pair in them, as long as the pair is dwelling within, disallow to the genera an end and completion to come to be, for when an ending occurs, the pair of them also has come to an end." It is easier to follow Socrates' general point in translations like those of Fowler, Hackforth, and Gosling, but if one wants not only the general point but Plato's exact way of expressing it, Benardete's translation comes closest. The translation includes footnotes that provide very informative glosses on the text.

As one would expect, Benardete's commentary, too, is much more concerned with the literary dimension of the dialogue than are its predecessors, so much so in fact that they cannot really be compared. The difference is almost as fundamental as that between a world constituted by visual experiences and one constituted by aural ones. Benardete evinces no interest in some of the issues which most exercise other commentators, such as whether the theory of forms has undergone any revisions. On the other hand he offers many provocative insights of a kind that more argument-focused commentators neglect, for example, that the tension between the fixed limits of the *Philebus* and the fact that the *Philebus* is only a segment of a conversation that began before the part recorded, and has not yet ended when the record stops, is an image of the tension portrayed *within* the dialogue between the limit and the unlimited (pp 87, 242). This is not merely a nice point about Plato's use of imagery, but it implies that we must read the dialogue as a whole in a different way than we read a self-contained argument. On more specific issues as well, Benardete asks questions and provides insight into matters that do not interest more analytic commentators.

Just as Benardete does not read Plato in an analytic way, neither does he write in an analytic way. While that is appropriate for the kind of reflection that he engages in, it can be frustrating when we are puzzled by and would welcome clarification of his more provocative remarks. What, for example, does he mean by saying, "Truth is the enemy of the good" (p 195)? At first we may wonder whether he means only that truth is the enemy of Philebus's conception of the good as pleasure, but later he writes, "the beautiful now joins with truth as another enemy of the good" (p 209, cf p 214). Here the reason is, "because pure pleasures do not meet any experienced need." This implies that something must be instrumental to be good, however the *Philebus* speaks of intrinsic goods as greater than instrumental ones (54c, cf *Republic* 2 357b-d). Even after the latter passage Benardete continues to refer to pure pleasure and knowledge as "no good" (pp 224, 236). And even when Socrates says that "the power [meaning] of the good has fled for us into the nature of the beautiful" (64e, Benardete's translation and insertion),



Benardete acknowledges the connection between beautiful and good only in a subordinate clause "Socrates had admitted that the beautiful, into which the power or meaning of the good has fled, does not coincide completely with the good" (p 238) Has Benardete overlooked the importance of intrinsic goods? or has he accommodated it perhaps in an oblique way that is itself easy to overlook? Benardete's terse way of writing makes it difficult to answer such questions — Kenneth Dorter, *University of Guelph*

BOUDON, Raymond *The Analysis of Ideology* Translated by Malcom Slater Chicago The University of Chicago Press, 1989. 241 pp \$39.95— Boudon begins this work by posing the issue of ideology in Weberian terms "The explanation of any social phenomenon has to start by reducing it to the individual behavior patterns which gave rise to it, and moreover these behavior patterns have to be regarded as rational [O]nly if this kind of explanation fails can irrational elements be introduced into the description of the behaviour patterns of social actors" (p 1) The problem of ideology arises when one realizes that ideological positions seem to be largely irrational Boudon shows in what ways one can consider an ideology to be rational, that is, subject to the same truth conditions as any scientific statement

Boudon first sets forth the various positions social theorists have taken with respect to the rationality or irrationality of ideological positions He then sketches out a restricted theory of ideology Finally, he shows how the theory will work by presenting two case studies The "Epilogue" takes a stance against the irrationalist, or as he calls it, the skeptical explanation of ideology

His survey of the various positions social theorists have taken with respect to the issue of ideological behavior as rational or irrational includes such major thinkers as Marx, Weber, Mannheim, Geertz, and Aron-Shuls Each of these authors takes a stance with respect to the criterion of truth and falsity of ideological statements, but each thinker's theory has serious flaws In short, Boudon finds that one cannot claim that ideological statements are either true or false, but one cannot claim either that all ideological statements are simply irrational At the end of Part 1 it looks as if the social theorists have an insoluble conundrum

As Boudon begins Part 2 he shows that one must take into account the situation in which an ideological statement occurs He points out that there are a series of situation effects (both position and disposition) and what he calls E-effects (epistemological effects) which influence the development and flourishing of ideologies In this section he makes extensive use of Thomas Kuhn's theories of paradigm shifts to show how each of these effects will prejudice the truth values of ideological statements

In the final section Boudon applies his own analysis of ideology to two case studies, developmentalism and Third Worldism. In each instance

he shows how a received notion has been accepted as true by social theorists, and how this has resulted in a full-blown ideological interpretation of these two social phenomena. He then shows how the interpretation changes as one analyzes the various situation effects and E-effects to uncover the presuppositions of the ideology. Using his methodology one then sees the truth and falsity present in the ideology.

Perhaps the most important section of the work is the Epilogue, for in this part he provides a strong argument against any irrationalist approach to the analysis of ideology. He shows that ideologies are at base rational and are subject to the same truth conditions as any other scientific statement.

Boudon does an excellent job locating the problems surrounding the analysis of ideologies and proposing a solution for this issue in contemporary social theory. The book is important for anyone interested in the relationship of individual thought to social thought. The translator and editors of the English edition, however, should have taken more care with proofreading, there are multiple errors which this reader found distracting. —John L. Treloar, *Marquette University*

BUDD, Malcolm. *Music and the Emotions: The Philosophical Theories*. London and New York: Routledge, 1992. xiv + 190 pp. \$15.95.—Although the fundamental appeal of music, “the art of sounds that are not given a nonauditory interpretation,” is as “a structure that is its own *raison d'être*”—the work being both “non-propositional and non-representational” (p. ix)—it is not necessarily unrelated to the nonmusical world. It is the specific relationship between music and the emotions that Budd wants to investigate, but only when such a relationship is “involved in the understanding and appreciation of music and in the proper estimate of musical value and the value of music relative to other values—the values of the other art forms and the various kinds of non-artistic value” (p. x). The first chapter shows that it is useless to try to find a unique definition of the emotions, because they form a heterogeneous class whose membership is uncertain, but one can take as a model the idea that an emotion is a thought experienced with pleasure or pain, because many emotions conform to this model from which other emotions or other states of mind diverge in various ways and to different degrees. There are two groups of theories to consider: those holding that the value of music must be related to something outside music and in which we have an independent interest, and those that do not. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 deal with the latter group. According to Eduard Hanslick, the experience of music is a passionless contemplation of the purely musical features of the work, it has nothing to do with emotion. Carroll C. Pratt tries to explain the ascription of emotional qualities to music, and the use of emotion terms standing for audible features, by linking musical movement to bodily movements: some features of movement are perceived by organic and kinaesthetic feeling in the perception of bodily movement, and by hearing in the perception of musical move-

ment Against the humanist theory that the nonrepresentational and nonpropositional nature of music does not prevent many of its products from having a significance that can be explained only by their relation to familiar outside phenomena, Edmund Gurney defends the formalist theory "that the abstract art of music is devoid of any human meaning and is merely the source of a distinctive kind of deep and harmless pleasure" (p. 53). Inversely, theories from the first group, which are presented in the fifth, sixth and seventh chapters, find the value of music outside itself, in its relation to emotion. Thus, for Schopenhauer, music does not represent any particular emotion, but the essential nature of that emotion, the element of the will contained in it. For Susanne Langer, each significant piece of music is an unconsummated presentational (that is, nonlinguistic) symbol of the mere form of a feeling, not of its complete nature. It is possible also to consider musical expression to be based on the expressive character of the human voice. Finally (chapter 8), one can, like Leonard B. Meyer, try to reconcile the formalist and the expressionist points of view in a theory according to which an abstract, nonreferential succession of tones can arouse emotion in the listener who understands the composition, and have a meaning that he will understand intellectually. Budd's contention, however, is that none of these theories succeeds in making its point and in doing justice to music. A new theory of music is needed, for which he hopes to have cleared the ground. Thus he has done in a very systematic and thought-provoking way, and the suggestion that the new theory of music should be less monolithic than those he has rejected is most welcome — Guy Bouchard, *Université Laval*

CRANE, Tim, ed. *The Contents of Experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. xi + 275 pp. \$49.95—Crane's volume collects nine essays ranging over an impressive number of fundamental problems of perception. One unique feature of this volume is captured in Crane's hope that "some of the essays in this volume show that there is much that is worth recovering from the sense-data tradition" (p. 5).

J. J. Valberg's "The Puzzle of Experience" introduces a traditional problem about perception. From the third-person perspective, perception results from a causal process. So I can imagine various causal scenarios. I can imagine God as allowing me to have the experiences I do without there being any external objects, and so I can conclude that external objects are not essential to experience and that experience is awareness of an internal object. From the first-person perspective, however, I do seem to experience external objects directly. The puzzle, then, is how to integrate the two perspectives.

Paul Snowdon's "How to interpret 'direct perception'" spells out several interpretations of "direct perception" and defends an interpretation in terms of being in a position to make a demonstrative identification, supposing the perceiver were capable of demonstrative identification. E. J. Lowe's "Experience and its Objects" reacts to the fascinating

"blindsighter" cases. Some patients can detect events in parts of their visual field even while claiming not to see anything. Such cases seem to support the claim of computational accounts of perception that only the transmission of information is crucial. Lowe argues that judgments about objects depend on sensory experiences, and, accordingly, that sensory experience is not merely epiphenomenal. Christopher Peacocke's "Scenarios, concepts and perception" argues that perception's phenomenological content cannot be reduced to its representational content, and that perception has nonconceptual contents. Drawing on Peacocke's work, Tim Crane's "The Nonconceptual Content of Experience" defines the constraints on a perceptual system's producing "nonconceptual content" and argues that perception satisfies the definition.

Michael Tye's "Visual Qualia and Visual Content" denies the existence of visual qualia, that is, qualia "over and above their representational contents, intrinsic, introspectively accessible properties in virtue of which they have those contents" (p. 158). The "felt" aspects of a perceptual experience are simply their representational aspects. Thomas Baldwin's "The Projective Theory of Sensory Content" proposes a synthesis of the representative, adverbial, and informational theories of perception. He introduces the concept of "primitive intentionality": "the sensory quality which identifies the type of an experience is given as 'projected' into the region of space referred to in the experience" (p. 185). Michael Martin's "Sight and Touch" focuses on the phenomenological differences between the two modalities. He argues that the structural differences between the way visual experience involves a visual field and the way touch experience involves a sense field pose an obstacle to any unified theory of perception. Brian O'Shaughnessy's lengthy "The Diversity and Unity of Action and Experience" argues that action and perceptual experience are more closely related mental phenomena than often supposed. Perception is passive and the causal direction is from external environment to body to mind, while in action it is the opposite. O'Shaughnessy, however, discusses the action of "willing" our perceptions (as for example when we actively listen) and uses this phenomenon as evidence of a closer unity of action and experience.

This is a solid volume of essays. The essays are current and focused on core issues. While none of the essays struck me as a landmark in the history of the debate about perception, all are competent contributions to the discussion. —Stephen R. C. Hicks, *Rockford College*.

- DAVIS, Michael. *Aristotle's Poetics: The Poetry of Philosophy*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992. xviii + 183 pp. Cloth, \$55.00, paper, \$19.95.—Davis aims to rescue the *Poetics* from its initial appearance as a book merely about the art of poetry understood as imitation, without imposing upon it a "borrowed significance" beyond Aristotle's intention. This involves three major claims: (1) the *Poetics* is about the fundamental structure of human action, (2) it is also about human reason or

thought, and (3) Aristotle's silence about these alleged topics can be explained

The three parts of Davis's book correspond to the beginning five, the middle four and the concluding thirteen chapters of the *Poetics*. In Part 1, *Mimesis*, he begins to argue that action is, or involves, imitation. In Part 2, *Praxis*, he gives an account of the kind of action imitated in tragedy and the kind of imitation which tragedy is. In Part 3, *logos*, he tries to show how some of the same structures found in action/imitation are also found in *logos* speech, reason or thought.

The claim that the *Poetics* is about human action depends largely upon the claim that action, like poetry (according to Aristotle) involves imitation. This claim seems to depend on interpreting the intention behind any human action as a matter of envisioning (that is, telling oneself a story about) someone acting in a certain way, and then imitating this.

Having thus assimilated action and imitation, Davis elaborates the structure of action/imitation as exhibiting a fundamental doubleness or tension, which he characterizes in a number of ways, for instance, as unself-conscious versus self-conscious or as the actor's perspective versus the spectator's. In doing so he shows how this doubleness underlies a number of the doubles in Aristotle's text: mimicry and representation, part and *eidōs*, the likely and the necessary, *desis* and *lusis*, and so forth (see p. 90).

This "structural analysis" is then brought to bear on Aristotle's famous definition of tragedy as that which effects a catharsis, by means of pity and fear, of such emotions. Davis argues that catharsis means primarily purification, in the sense of idealization and simplification of the passions represented in tragedy, and only secondarily a kind of purification of the passions felt by the audience. This purification of the represented passions occurs in a story purified of the incidental events of real life, and given the unreal coherence of beginning, middle and end. It is effected by means of pity and fear because these emotions paradigmatically reflect the dual perspective in which the spectator must simultaneously respond to the represented action as real (fear) and as unreal (pity).

Moreover, what is specific to tragedy is that it represents the action of its protagonists as precisely this kind of poetic purification, that is, acting as if the story of their lives had a significance which they fully grasped. From such an attitude arises the *hamartia* of the tragic protagonist. This kind of spurious self-reflection is contrasted with the virtue of *epieikeia*, which is aware of the limits that the real world imposes on the realization of human virtue in actions that take the form of significant stories. Yet the virtue of *epieikeia* can only be achieved by telling oneself a story about the failure of *epieikeia*, that is, a tragedy. The following questions seem unanswered. Is this telling of a story to oneself a matter of thinking, making a poem, or acting? Does it matter which it is? Is all human action tragic as well as imitative in its structure? Insofar as Davis's argument depends on the interpretation of particular tragedies, it will be unconvincing and even unintelligible to readers not familiar with the work of Seth Benardete, as is indicated in the footnotes.

The argument of Part 3 seems to be that any signifier must have aspects of the strange and the ordinary, and that these two work together to signify with any definiteness only by virtue of being parts of a larger whole. For Davis, our (inevitable?) tendency to forget the latter and to regard the parts as self-sufficient is somehow akin to tragic *hamartia*, which is thus intrinsic to all thought, *qua* involving signification.

Finally, Aristotle's silence about the deeper intention of his book is explained by his intention to exhibit in the text itself the tragic structure of imitation/action/thought which it turns out to be discussing, so that the reader is induced to make mistakes (for instance, "this book is about poetry only") and then is encouraged to learn by reversal and recognition, *pathos mathos* —Michael Dink, *St John's College, Annapolis*

DEUTSCH, Eliot *Creative Being. The Crafting of Person and World* Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992. x + 270 pp. Cloth, \$50.00, paper, \$12.00—This book deals with the question what it is to be a person. It builds up a complex of concepts of a person, beginning with elementary notions of the unity and the identity of a person. The discussion of these notions integrates traditions both East and West.

Deutsch gives us a sensible, composite view of the double-sidedness of our nature: material and mental/spiritual. This view is then enriched with the addition of an account of speech and of time and space—the dimensions, after all, in which we find ourselves. Chapters 8 and 9 on time and space are very interesting, and the work on the right time and the architecture of space is particularly appealing.

There is a difficult chapter on causality and creativity, and Deutsch there comes to grips with the difficult concept or concepts of necessity (a topic to which he returns in the last chapter "Human Destiny").

At the center of the book, I think, is the view that a fully articulated concept of personhood includes the roots of valuation, the roots give rise to a full ethical and moral theory when nourished in the soil of freedom and spontaneity and when watered and tended in a caring and open community. There is an eloquent plea for a freedom which is compatible with a sensible account of our place in nature. The book may be seen as a renewal and a rearticulation of the great tradition of humanism tending (from the point of view of Chinese thought) rather to a daoist than to a Confucian point of view, for in living in rhythm with a dao of nature and a dao of community the articulation of value and morality does not reach a stage of differentiation into the virtues acknowledged in the Confucian or in the Aristotelian traditions.

It is a pleasant task to say that Deutsch's book is a pleasure to read: its style is clear and perspicuous. The last two chapters could admit of the format of a series of aphorisms. Deutsch is certainly capable of writing them. —R. N. Bosley, *The University of Alberta*

EMBERLY, Peter and COOPER, Barry, eds *Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin, 1934-1964* University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993. 368 pp. \$45.00—This book is of fundamental importance in political philosophy as well as in theology, philosophy itself, and history. The fact that it lacks an Index is unconscionable. The book consists of some one hundred six pages of precious correspondence between Strauss and Voegelin, plus a reprinting of Strauss's famous essays "Jerusalem and Athens" and "The Mutual Influence of Theology and Philosophy," with Voegelin's "The Gospel and Culture" and "Immortality: Experience and Symbol." To complete these essays and letters are perceptive, often brilliant, essays by James Wiser, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Stanley Rosen, Timothy Fuller, Ellis Sandoz, Thomas Pangle, and David Walsh. It would be difficult to find a more profound and stimulating book covering the whole history and understanding of faith and reason in Western intellectual history.

Strauss and Voegelin are, more than anyone else in this century, responsible for reinvigorating and deepening political philosophy as a means to confront and understand the meaning of our times. Both were German exiles from World War II who lived in the United States and devoted themselves to understanding what had happened in modernity in Europe and what was happening in the United States. Both recognized that a return to the classical Greek and Biblical origins of our civilization was necessary for grasping what the crisis was about and for curing it. Both agreed that modernity had taken a wrong road that resulted in ideologies and systems at war with the human spirit.

The seriousness with which both Voegelin and Strauss took their studies cannot be overestimated. This seriousness, itself reflective of the Platonic eros towards truth, was free enough to recognize that revelation could not be left aside in an estimation of the meaning and direction of our times. Few, if any, modern universities are so free, which is why both authors are treated with great reserve in them. On the other hand, both Strauss and Voegelin were fiercely philosophical as a way of life and as a search for the ground of being.

Thus correspondence is spare. Several of the commentators have taken great efforts to understand its import and the reasons why it did not proceed further. Wiser thinks that they are simply incompatible. Others opt for one or the other thinker. David Walsh, in a remarkable essay, has sought to resolve their differences, differences that each commentator realizes is a question posed by their correspondence. In so many ways, the correspondence itself, read in the light of the essays and commentaries, is simply gripping. One has to lack a soul not to realize that here we approach, haltingly, the ultimate things.

Strauss was a Jew, remarkably learned in both Jewish theology and Greek knowledge, who opted, by virtue of his own theory, for philosophy. He recognized, however, that philosophy itself could not exclude revelation, could not neglect Jerusalem. (Strauss's relation to Rome is abidingly enigmatic, as is Voegelin's.) For Strauss, the vitality of Western civilization included both revelation and reason and their irresolvability.

Voegelin was a Christian, though of a peculiar denominational sort. He sought to overcome the distinction of reason and revelation to include, on the basis of experience, the possibility of an intimate and ordered relationship between Judaism, Christianity, the other religions, and philosophy in its various manifestations. Voegelin saw modernity to be the result of the attempt to make revelation into a this-worldly project through doctrine, one which finally leads to the ideologies of our time. Political movements, thus, have philosophical and theological origins.

In the correspondence, both thinkers, though wary, are respectful of each other and, at the same time, precise and accurate. Each recognized in the other a philosophic friend and, at some level, a possible theoretic adversary. This book rightly includes the major essays of Voegelin and Strauss on the topic of reason and revelation to enable the reader to see the pertinence of their correspondence, something the commentaries seek further to clarify. The book, in short, is exciting and profound.

One cannot help but be conscious of the caution towards Catholic argumentation in both writers. All the commentators are aware of the Jewish and Christian elements in them, though no one remarked on the related Islamic question, most present in Strauss. Voegelin began his essay on "The Gospel and Culture" with a citation from the Dutch Catechism, itself a most flawed work in many ways. One cannot help but wonder how he would have reacted to *Le Cathéchisme de l'Eglise Catholique*, a far superior and more brilliantly "dogmatic" work.

Voegelin's systematic opposition to "dogmatism" seems at times to misunderstand the very purpose of the human intellect itself, in its very reception of revelation and reason, to seek to understand and formulate what it has received from both sources. In this sense, Strauss himself, rightly I think, claims to be more "Catholic" than Voegelin.

What seems clear from the work of both authors, however, is that political philosophy has been at the forefront of the meaning of revelation in modern times. Theologians, philosophers, and scientists have all in their own ways failed to grasp how their disciplines have contributed to the "modern project," to the attempt of man to explain himself only by himself, which, as Strauss said, has been the chief meaning of the disorders of modernity. This correspondence is a trumpet call from the political philosophers to theologians, scientists, philosophers, and historians to wake up, to attend to the real origins and meanings of the disorders of modernity that have arisen from a failure to understand reason and revelation. —James V. Schall, *Georgetown University*

FENVES, Peter D. *A Peculiar Fate: Metaphysics and World-History in Kant*. Ithaca. Cornell University Press, 1991. xii + 306 pp. \$36.50—Kant's writings on history have been enjoying increased recognition by Kant scholars, and Peter Fenves's *A Peculiar Fate* fits this trend. But here the similarity with mainstream Kant studies abruptly ends. This is no



ordinary monograph on Kant's philosophy of history neither in terms of the selection of Kant's writings discussed by its author, nor in terms of its style, nor in terms of its philosophical approach

Fenves discusses an unusual triad of texts. He starts out with the early *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755). He then focuses on the "Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View" (1784), Kant's first essay on history after the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. The final section is devoted to the second part of the *Conflict of the Faculties* (1798), which bears as its subtitle "Renewed Question: Whether the Human Race Is in Constant Progress towards the Better?" Although these three texts are the focus of Fenves's attention, the author copiously relates them to Kant's other writings and displays an impressive knowledge of the Kantian corpus. Moreover, he is well-versed in the discussions among Kant's contemporaries and the relevant modern secondary literature. Given his broad range, though, one is surprised to note that he does not discuss the third part of Kant's "On the Common Saying 'Thus May be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice,'" a text completely devoted to the question of historical progress.

Fenves's style and word choice display a literariness seldom found in the *Kant-Forschung* but lack the latter's rigor and systematicity. His sentences often border on the elusive, and the connections between them sometimes seem to be overly dependent on the author's individual associations for the reader to follow. Readers who cannot make the leap between two sentences will lose the thread, and then there is no way to get back on track.

In Fenves's deconstructivist approach to the texts, attention centers on Kant's "diction." This attention is not an end in itself, however. Fenves wishes to indicate an "impasse" (p. 4) that recurs in each of these texts and shows itself in the reading of Kant's philosophical language. The author explicitly refrains from concentrating on Kant's "train of philosophical theses" (p. 2), an approach he defends by saying that in the texts under consideration "world-history is no longer a matter of grounds and justification, but, rather, of certain signs" (p. 6).

This posited disjunction between "justification" and the reading of "signs" that underlies Fenves's book, however, is also responsible for its major weakness. It is true that Kant repeatedly speaks of traces and signs. But it is less clear that this shows that the aim of the texts under consideration is "less the securing of fundamental positions than their illustrative presentation" (p. 2) or that "these writings do not devolve upon the comprehensive and systematic, they always delay such aims" (p. 9). If one looks at the broader context in which Kant discusses "signs," it becomes clear that they may very well serve a systematic purpose. Contrary to Fenves's assumption, Kant puts the reading of signs in the service of justifying theses.

Let me give one example. In the "Idea for a Universal History" Kant starts out asking whether one can describe the course of history as following a certain order. He develops a possible guiding thread for such a historiographical project (the regulative "idea" of history as a teleological process) and subsequently asks whether there are any indications that would confirm his proposal ("traces," *Akademie*-edition vol. 8, p.

27) He points to progress in the legal sphere and takes this as confirmation of the usefulness of the guiding thread for representing history as a "system" rather than as an unordered "aggregate" (vol 8, p 29) Fenves, however, jumps straight to the passage where Kant uses the word "trace" and sets off on a discussion of this term (starting on p 89) without explaining its systematic context or, barring that, sufficiently demonstrating the lack of links to "the comprehensive and the systematic" More examples could be given to show that Kant's essays on history do entail justifications of positions and that Fenves too easily excludes Kant's systematic aims in these texts from his discussion

This is not to say that every Kant interpretation must focus exclusively on constructing a unified system out of disparate texts Deconstructivist readings can be valuable explorations of the limits of Kant's argumentative discourse and of what can be found beyond those limits There certainly is important work to be done here But in order to do it well, one must also do the slow and hard work of uncovering the argumentative structure of the texts —Pauline Kleingeld, *Washington University in St Louis*

FERRY, LUC *The System of Philosophies of History (Political Philosophy, Volume II)* Translated by Franklin Philip Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1992. x + 200 pp \$26 95

FERRY, LUC and RENAUT, Alain *From the Rights of Man to the Republican Idea (Political Philosophy, Volume III)* Translated by Franklin Philip Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1992 vii + 148 pp \$23 95— These two volumes complete this very ambitious trilogy, begun with *Rights—The New Quarrel between the Ancients and the Moderns* Volume 2 juxtaposes the major philosophies of history, which are said to occupy the crucial terrain between politics and "pure" philosophy The chapter-structure of the book parallels exactly the logic of the argument being made

Chapter 1 looks at the Hegelian philosophy of history as archetypical of one type of argument, that of the extreme of rationalism and metaphysics This must philosophically result in the assertion "that the real is the rational," and practically in a quiet acceptance of the inevitable unfolding of history Chapter 2 describes the other extreme, of (apparently) antimetaphysical Heideggerian phenomenology, which argues that there are basically *no* patterns discernible in history This eliminates the rational from history, as well as effectively negating *praxis* Chapter 3 looks at Kant's deconstruction of metaphysics and critique of historical reason as the proper resolution to the theoretical side of this antimony It is a philosophy which is theoretical yet not metaphysical, whose guiding principle is a "critical stance"

The following two chapters look mainly at the ideas of the young Fichte His central concept is said to be "the revolutionary transformation of the real in the name of a universal" (p 19) In chapter 6, the combination of Kant's "critical stance" (which rescues *theoria*) and the

young Fichte's philosophical argument for free will (which sees *praxis* as truly meaningful) is said to offer the best resolution to the dilemmas posed by the juxtaposition of the philosophies of history, together constituting "the moral view of the world." Vital to the logical acceptance of the argument is one's acceptance of the way in which the author sets up his Hegelian triad, as well as of the distinctions between opposition, antinomy, and contradiction in philosophical discourse. The Marxist philosophy of history, which is said to contradictorily straddle the Hegelian and Fichtean views, is briefly mentioned and dismissed.

Among the criticisms of the work that may be made is its unfortunate initial bracketing by "democracy vs totalitarianism" as unexamined terms. The looked-for nexus between "pure" philosophy and politics is, one might argue, not only constituted by the philosophies of history, but also by the clash of various worldviews striving for societal control and internal coherence. Ferry fails, for example, to disentangle the exaltation of an Enlightenment stance, as opposed to certain philosophical elements more broadly acceptable, in the young Fichte's ideas concerning free will. The exhaustiveness of Ferry's schematization of the possible philosophies of history might also be questioned.

Volume 3 proceeds to look at various doctrines of human rights, in a rather sudden transition from philosophies of history. The questionable bracketing assumption of the work is that today "human rights keep falling on hard times" (p. 1), which morally necessitates one to attempt to better theoretically defend them. The Introduction notes the basic dichotomy of permissions or "political democracy" (liberalism), and entitlements or "social democracy" (socialism), which is the central divide under study in the work. This is linked to the divide between the American Revolution, which saw democracy as arising spontaneously from individual interactions, and the French Revolution, which called for a state voluntarily to create democracy.

Chapter 1, "Ancient Natural Right versus Human Rights," argues that the attempt to reground right or rights in ancient conceptions (such as the attempt by Leo Strauss), because of the totalitarian implications often seen in modern rights-doctrines, is fraught with paradox. The central concept Ferry and Renaut are defending is "juridical humanism." Chapter 2 traces the coterminous emergence of modernity and human rights in history through a careful reading of Rousseau's doctrine of the General Will (or popular sovereignty), to the emergence of the state (entitlements)-society (permissions) distinction, to the liberalism of Constant and Abbé Sieyès, to the description of the problem in terms of Kant's doctrine of imperatives. Three possible modern political theories based on rights-discourse are described: anarchism, socialism, and liberalism. In chapter 3, Ferry and Renaut look at anarchism and Marxism, which see the division of society and the state as a problem: anarchism valorizing society at the expense of the state, and Marxism valorizing the state at the expense of society. In chapter 4 they look at liberalism, which values the division of society and state, but criticizes a certain extremism the position can bring, as in the cases of Tocqueville, Guizot, and especially Hayek.

The synthesis is "the Republican Idea"—"Republican" meaning generally liberal, democratic, and rights-centered, with "Idea" being used in

the Kantian sense as something that is not metaphysical but nevertheless is a *concept* against one which can measure social progress. The classical liberal absolutizes permissions at the expense of entitlements, while the socialist falls into metaphysical error by thinking of entitlements as wholly actualizable, as opposed to something to be incrementally worked towards. The "Republican Idea" is also part of the modern humanism which arose since the Enlightenment, "for it refers to the supposition that the public space—the *res publica*—is *ideally* grounded on the possibility of rational communication between men" (p. 126).

Ferry and Renaut conclude, in a philosophically questionable passage, "that the sentiment of universality, thus in a sense of ahistoricity elicited by human rights, or by at least some of them, is a literally uncircumventable fact of consciousness, and it is without any doubt preferable to seek to understand it rather than to try fiercely, and unsuccessfully moreover, to exterminate it" (p. 128). Constantly warning of "barbarism," they do not really consider the view of rights as rhetorical instrumentalities, grounded only in their current widespread acceptance and used to advance the interests of certain individuals and groups that are said to be lacking them, to the detriment of a genuine *res publica*. Seeing rights as inherently good, they dismiss the idea of what they would call "a return to the Ancients" not to revalidate rights in some fashion but because one sees that the effect of the triumph of rights-doctrines in society results in society's virtual disintegration. —Mark Wegierski, *Canadian-Polish Research Institute*

FODOR, Jerry. *A Theory of Content and Other Essays*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990. xii + 270 pp. Cloth, \$27.50, paper, \$14.95—This collection brings together eleven of Fodor's recent essays about mental content and cognitive processing. All of them have been previously published, save for the title-essays "A Theory of Content I" and "A Theory of Content II."

The essays divide into two broad categories. In the first seven, Fodor develops a distinctive naturalist and realist view of intentionality, and in the rest he defends the view that at least some cognitive processes, specifically those concerned with perception and language understanding, are, to a degree, modular in character. Fodor tells us in his introduction that these apparently disparate themes are united by their tendency to underwrite an atomistic conception of mental content. "Just as an informational view of semantics, of the sort developed in part I, offers the possibility of atomism about meaning, so a modular view of cognitive architecture, of the sort developed in part II, offers the possibility of atomism about perception" (p. xi).

The book is worth buying if only for Fodor's two new essays. Both are concerned with the question of how we might find sufficient conditions, couched in a physicalist, nonsemantic vocabulary, for one thing to be *about* another. The idea is to find a place for intentionality in the natural order of things by showing that intentional facts reduce to, or at

least supervene upon, physical facts. Most of the leading players in the field adopt some sort of causal theory, which, in its crudest form, has it that a symbol "*P*" means *P* if it is a law that *Ps* cause "*P*"s. Such theories face a difficulty which has come to be known as the *disjunction problem*. Dogs tend to cause thoughts of dogs, but surely other things do as well, such as (to take one obvious example) things that happen to look like dogs. If dogs and other things that look like dogs regularly cause tokenings of the symbol "dog," then it ought to be a law that dogs and things that look like dogs cause "dog"s. But then the extension of "dog" includes both dogs and dog-looking things, and so it looks like "dog" means not *dog*, but *dog or dog-looking thing*.

In a series of closely reasoned and clearly articulated arguments Fodor tries to show that recent attempts by Dretske, Millikan, and Israel to solve the disjunction problem do not succeed. The point that Fodor quite rightly emphasizes in all of these arguments is that causal theories underestimate the extent to which meaning is *robust*, the extent, that is, to which "the meaning of a symbol can be insensitive to the heterogeneity of the (actual and possible) causes of its tokens" (p. 90). The real challenge facing the naturalist is then to find a theory which preserves the intuition that meaning has *something* to do with causation, but which is nonetheless sensitive to the point that the tokening of a symbol may be caused by all sorts of things, what the symbol is about being just *one* of them.

Fodor's answer to the challenge is his theory of asymmetric dependence, which he first articulated in *Psychosemantics*, but which is significantly revised in "A Theory of Content II." The core idea is that a symbol "*P*" means *P* if (1) it is a law that *Ps* cause "*P*"s, and (2) if anything other than *Ps*, say *Qs*, cause "*P*"s, then (a) that causal connection would not hold if the *P* to "*P*" connection did not hold, and (b) the *P* to "*P*" connection would hold even if *Qs* did not cause "*P*"s.

The intuition here is that non-dogs cause tokenings of "dogs" either because they look like dogs or because they remind one of dogs. Thus, they would not cause such tokenings unless there were already a regular causal and semantic relation between actual *dogs* and "dog"s. If it works, the proposal allows for meaning to be as robust as we like (and thus solves the disjunction problem) but preserves the idea that the notion of meaning is nonetheless tightly connected to the notion of causation. In the conceptually basic cases, if not in the *usual* cases, a symbol means what causes its tokening.

Fodor's main concern in his essays on the modularity of mind is to show that it is at least not unreasonable to believe that some cognitive processes function, in certain important respects, independently of whatever theories and beliefs we might happen to hold regarding the world around us. The best argument Fodor has going for him here is that perceptual illusions typically persist in tricking us even when we know that they are illusions and even when we have a cognitive theory to explain how the trickery works. "It's part of the 'background theory' of anybody who lives in this culture and is at all into pop psychology that [the Muller-Lyer illusion is] in fact misleading and that it always turns out, on measurement, that the center lines of the arrows are the same length" (p. 242). Nonetheless, one of the lines still *looks* to us like

it is longer than the other, and so it seems that perception is in at least one respect "unpenetrated" by theory and belief. Fodor uses similar arguments to try to show that the mechanisms by which we understand the content of utterances are also insensitive, in some respects, to theory and belief.

Throughout these essays, Fodor exhibits a striking clarity of thought and expression, as well as his characteristic honesty about the philosophical presuppositions, commitments, and biases that inform his work. The arguments here, needless to say, will not convince everyone, but they are undeniably powerful, and always directed at provocative conclusions. This book will prove indispensable to anyone interested in recent work on intentionality or cognitive architecture. —David Barton, *Berkeley, Ca*

GASKINS, Richard H. *Burdens of Proof in Modern Discourse*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992. xix + 326 pp. \$35.00.—The argument from ignorance is an informal fallacy that holds either that a statement not known to be true or proven true is false, or a statement not known to be false or proven false is true. For example, some creationists hold that since the theory of evolution has not been proven to be true, it is false. There is, however, a subtlety to this fallacy that is exploited in Richard H. Gaskins's far-ranging study of rhetoric and persuasion in modern legal, philosophical, and scientific communities. The argument can assert that no evidence to support a claim entails that the claim is false if all the relevant supporting or refuting evidence has been collected. Thus, if a creationist claims that the earth was created some five thousand years ago, a critic could reply that abundant evidence refutes the claim. This additional claim in the argument, however, involves controversies about appropriate and adequate evidence, as well as questions of what Gaskins calls "finality and legitimacy." How long should one proceed with the search for evidence and how should one justify the procedures?

Gaskins points out that there has been no systematic study of the argument from ignorance in the literature, and his book is meant to fill that gap. This work, however, is not a formal or even an informal study of the argument pattern itself; rather it is a broader history of ideas. Gaskins traces different variants of the argument pattern through major Supreme Court decisions (from both the Warren and Burger courts) and in contemporary philosophy, including digressions on such topics as deconstruction, critical legal studies, theories of justice, and the use of scientific evidence in court cases. Gaskins's view is that public discourse is best studied through judicial debates where the argument from ignorance has proved institutionally and rhetorically powerful. "Judicial procedures institutionalize forms of argument that remain largely hidden in other arenas. In particular, judicial virtuosity in handling presumptions and proof burdens offer important clues to a tacit dimension of broader public discourse, in which central presumptions are virtually

exempt from direct scrutiny" (p. 103). What the author calls "shifting the burden of proof" in debate is seen as a central rhetorical technique that has spread from the judiciary to public discourse.

Though the tone of the book is descriptive and expository, the author intends to challenge what he considers the Kantian heritage of this argument and its subsequent legacy of disillusionment and pessimism. Kantianism posits an unresolvable conceptual dualism beneath human knowledge, yet appeals to "an inscrutable transcendental connection" between these divided realms. Gaskins devotes chapter 7 to Kant's transcendental argument and claims that it also is a version of the argument from ignorance. Gaskins's claim is that Kant's argument is wholly rhetorical. It shifts the burden of proof to opponents of Kant's transcendental postulates and these then become the "default" rules for all reasoning.

Gaskins's work is a very ambitious presentation of the argument from ignorance as the underlying rhetorical pattern in broad areas of contemporary public debate, though he is often more persuasive and detailed when discussing academic movements, such as critical legal studies, than in discussing actual public discourse. The very ubiquitous character of the argument pattern begins to wear as the book proceeds, however. It is never clear whether so much of contemporary thought fits this pattern because of the power or the empty flexibility of the argument itself. Gaskins's final chapter tries to use Hegel's criticisms of Kant to defend "dialectical alternatives" to this modern rhetorical argument. The book is most successful in its analytic and expository material on jurisprudence, but not as convincing on Kant, recent philosophy, or this new form of dialectics proclaimed in the conclusion. —Robert D'Amico, *University of Florida*

GUYER, Paul. *Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. xv + 449 pp. \$59.95. —The overall theme of this superb collection (ten of Guyer's papers, half of them previously unpublished) concerns the complex of relations among Kant's views of art and aesthetic experience, the interests of morality and society in the latter, and more generally the connection between morality and human sensibility. Except for the last and perhaps the penultimate chapter ("Duties Regarding Nature"), Guyer's main approach is from the direction of issues raised by the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment." However, the last and longest chapter, specially written for the book, is a detailed and penetrating examination of the extent to which Kant recognizes (or can consistently recognize) the moral significance of human sensibility. The chapter includes interesting comment on Kant's development and motivations, as well as helpful commentary on the different frameworks employed by Kant in his classification of virtues and duties.

The emphasis on aesthetics should not obscure the point that "Kant did not look to moral theory to solve a problem in aesthetic theory,"

instead, he looked to aesthetics to solve what he had come to recognize as crucial problems *for* morality," namely, the need for sensible *representation* (thus beyond the mere feeling of *Achtung*) of the rational demands of morality and for the capacity of the latter not "just [to] ignore the sensuous aspect of our being but [to] include it" (p. 19). In its connection with Kant's aesthetics, this point effectively unifies all of the essays in this book. Thereby, Guyer has made a unique and important contribution to the overcoming of widespread caricatures of the formalistic side of Kantian ethics. (As for the capacity of aesthetic experience to provide the representation in question—thus, preeminently, a sufficiently palpable sense of autonomy in one's higher cognitive powers—Guyer relies on the causal-judgmental model of his earlier work. Thus it is ultimately a matter of one's ability to *judge* regarding the underlying causal ground of various feelings.) Throughout, Guyer is of course attentive to the full range of Kant's writings on ethics.

Not looking to morality to solve a problem in aesthetics is central to Guyer's reply to critics of his *Kant and the Claims of Taste*. The present book attempts to correct for the exclusively epistemological-cum-psychological approach of the earlier book. Thus there is extensive and positive discussion of both beauty and the sublime as representations or symbols of morality, of the moral demand for taste, of art and nature, genius and society, and, to a lesser (and relatively minor) extent, of "the ideal of beauty" and the role of "aesthetic ideas" in art. Chapter 6 is devoted to the sublime. After brief dismissal of deconstructionist, psychoanalytic, and "ideological" approaches, Guyer shows in detail how Kant's analysis of judgments of the sublime (in terms, at least implicitly, of the quantity, quality, relation, and modality of judgment) fits with that of judgments of taste. In addition, a subtle but brief analysis of beauty and the sublime comprises part of the chapter on Kant and Schiller. (As for the relation between Kant and Schiller itself, perhaps more interesting is the brief discussion in chapter 10.) Throughout, Guyer displays his characteristic expertise in the detection of alternative lines of argument, as well as problems in those arguments, and in the connection of widely-separated texts for the purpose. The emphasis, however, is on sympathetic construction or reconstruction.

To an extent, Guyer grants the point of some of his earlier critics, namely, that—though the critics themselves are rarely clear how—considerable justice can in fact be done to Kant's claim that taste is demanded by morality. This still fails to meet Guyer's own earlier criticism (briefly repeated in the Introduction) of attempts to employ the link with morality in order to "complete" the *transcendental deduction* of judgments of taste, however. First, the latter would require an independent moral ground, not simply for demanding, but actually *expecting*, taste on the part of everyone, second, it would require a ground for the expectation of specific agreement in taste. The connection with morality is indeed crucial, but it cannot satisfy those two requirements. (The Introduction contains useful comment on some recent writers on the subject: most usefully, Crawford, Eagleton, and Savile.)

Obviously, little justice can be done to so rich and rewarding a book in this space. I conclude by noting that, in separate chapters as well as in parts of others, Guyer also treats in impressive detail of the historical



background and contemporary context of eighteenth-century British and German aesthetics. There is also a chapter on Hegel and Kant, like that on Schiller and Kant, it is perhaps mainly of interest as a foil for discussion of Kant. Taken together with Guyer's earlier *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, the pair amounts to a truly masterful study of Kant's aesthetics. On its own, the present book stands as a major contribution to a study of both the ethics and the aesthetics.—Richard E. Aquila, *The University of Tennessee*

HARRIS, Errol E. *The Spirit of Hegel*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1993. xii + 272 pp. \$45.00.—Harris finds the spirit of Hegel in his systematic thinking unified by dialectical logic, his uncompromising realism, and his powerful responses to the dilemmas of modernity in his time and ours. Writing from a lifetime of knowledge and obvious erudition about the history of philosophy, recurring central questions of philosophy, and modern science over the past few centuries, Harris seeks to revive interest in Hegel's philosophical thought and to indicate its relevance to the present.

Harris presents the spirit of Hegel in seventeen essays—thirteen previously published and revised for this book—that together touch on almost every major facet of Hegel's mature thought. They discuss Hegel sometimes with close textual argument, as in Harris's detailed critique of an article criticizing Hegel's logic (both article and critique originally published in this journal), sometimes with wide-ranging speculation, such as the meaning of sovereignty in a world of nuclear weapons, and—most frequently—by interweaving the specific with the comprehensive. What unifies the book is Harris's overall vision of Hegel's philosophy: the truth is the whole, a whole constituted by the ongoing and cumulative development of elements that are in tension with or opposition to each other.

Within that whole, Harris devotes most space to three aspects of Hegel's thought: his logic and system, his philosophy of nature, and his political philosophy. Both in chapters directly about Hegel's logic and throughout the book, Harris characterizes Hegel's dialectic with care and vivid images, reconstructs difficult dialectical moves (for instance, from logic to nature and from nature to spirit), and displays Hegel's logic as it engages major philosophical issues through the system. Harris makes a strong case for the philosophical soundness of Hegel's philosophy of nature, its uncompromising acceptance of the scientific knowledge of the time, and its relevance to the new findings of twentieth-century science. He provocatively examines the crucial open question of what philosophy can and should be in an age of post-Newtonian, post-Cartesian science. From Hegel's politics, Harris extracts the centrality of his philosophy of action to political life, and then critically engages Hegel's discussions of international relations and the "end of history" in order to better understand our present.

Other chapters fill in important remaining dimensions of Hegel's thought. Harris shows how specific Hegel texts open out into the totality of his thought, and Harris develops his arguments by moving easily among all of Hegel's works. Harris usually responds to opposing interpretations briefly, focusing on central disagreements. His entire book, however, argues against the contemporary Hegel scholarship that abandons Hegel's system and dialectic (frequently without any explicit philosophical reasons or any careful argumentation) so that the special sciences can be mined for whatever they are worth, a Hegel common in political and ethical philosophy. Similarly, his entire book argues against dominant approaches to the problems of modernity and suggests the scope and richness of Hegel's responses to those problems. (Harris does leave substantially unaddressed, however, the challenge to revitalizing Hegel that is posed by some postmodernist thought, such as Foucault's and Lyotard's alternate views of knowledge, power, and freedom and of science, judgment, and action.)

One-volume introductions to Hegel are notoriously difficult to write, but Harris has succeeded well. In a book that is extensive in coverage and relatively brief in pages, Harris elegantly presents careful philosophical arguments of some important and contentious points, raises significant issues regarding the meaning of philosophy, science, and politics, and conveys the spirit of a Hegel trying to wrestle with the ongoing dilemmas of the modern world — Peter G. Stillman, *Vassar College*

HAUSMAN, Daniel M. *Essays on Philosophy and Economic Methodology*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. v + 259 pp. \$49.95— In the first part of this book Hausman defends a Millian view of the nature of economics. Economic *models* are deductive constructs based on principles that are arrived at through empirical generalization conjoined with simplifying assumptions. Economic *theories* are models put into practice by filling in economic data as initial conditions and by deducing predictions that are open to testing. If predictions fail, a reasoned account of the failure is due. Such an account consists in a critical examination of whether the premises of the deduction do justice to the economic reality at hand, and may lead to modifications in the theory.

Critics come from two sides. Popperians charge that economics is not an empirical science because neither empirical evidence that directly contradicts the underlying principles nor failed predictions are taken as sufficient reason to reject the theory. Rather, the principles are said to be rough generalizations in that they come with *ceteris paribus* clauses attached to them. Economic theory is not falsifiable in that any direct counter evidence or failed prediction can be explained away in an *ad hoc* manner. Hausman counters that scientific claims are only falsifiable in the presence of background theories and a reasonable choice between background theories requires that an informed judgment can be made as to whether some background theory is more or less truthlike. falsifi-

cation does not supersede verification as a criterion for theory choice but rather presupposes it. Scientific theories may contain *ceteris paribus* clauses if (1) without these clauses the constitutive principles are *sufficiently* truthlike and (2) some detail can be brought to bear as to why the *ceteris paribus* clauses do not hold up in the face of counter-evidence or failed predictions. Hausman argues that there is sufficient verification for the constitutive principles of economic theory and that a reasoned account is aimed for to explain particular deviations.

Milton Friedman charges that what matters is the predictive and not the explanatory success of economic theories with respect to the tasks for which they are designed. Hence, the question of the truthlikeness of their constitutive principles is irrelevant. Hausman counters that, even if economic theory only had a predictive role, a realistic approach to the constitutive principles of economic theory would be conducive to theory improvement, since knowing why some *ceteris paribus* clause fails may motivate theory modifications that increase predictive success.

In Part 2 Hausman argues that economic models should represent the actual causal structure between the variables in question. Supply and demand (S/D) models for consumer goods represent a particular causal structure. S/D functions are causally prior to the market price and the exchanged quantity. However, S/D models in wage theory are more problematic. While S/D functions for labor causally affect wages and employment, the former are also causally dependent on the latter through the intermediate variable of relative prices. Hausman presents a historical sketch of economic theories of wages and employment and discusses how successive theories are more or less successful in representing the causal relations between the relevant variables.

In Part 3, Hausman addresses isolated questions: the role of equilibrium models, the rational expectations argument, and scientific progress in economics. He also discusses experimental disconfirmations of economic principles. In line with his Millian views, he insists that economic principles may be subject to revision informed by such results. I believe that the premises that enter into economic models are not only simplifications (for instance, continuity) and empirical generalizations (for instance, non-satiation), but also normative constraints on explanation (for instance, transitivity). The latter category is not subject to empirical criticism but is a precondition for economic theorizing to have explanatory value. What is needed when these normative constraints appear to be breached is not an inductive revision of economic principles but rather a concerted attempt to explain the phenomena within standard normative constraints or, failing this, the construction of an *error theory*, that is, a theoretical account as to why the agents violate standards of rationality in the situation at hand. Hausman claims that "a pragmatic preference for a theory of choice that is also a theory of rational choice will have to be abandoned" (p. 218). I agree that such a preference should not be held on pragmatic grounds—that is, because it aims for an explanation of a wide scope of phenomena on the basis of a small set of premises. I disagree, however, in that I argue that, *for explanation to be meaningful*, the theory of choice that is at the core

of economic models must be a theory of rational choice.—Luc Bovens, *University of Colorado at Boulder and Edelstein Center, Hebrew University.*

HEIDEGGER, Martin *Platon Sophistes* Gesamtausgabe, II Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1919–1944, Band 19 Frankfurt am Main Vittorio Klostermann, 1992 xxxi + 668 pp n p.—This volume contains the text of a lecture course Heidegger presented in Marburg in the winter semester of 1924/25, just a year before completing his work on the manuscript for *Being and Time*. A lengthy introductory section examines the concept of truth in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Metaphysics*. The "Main Section" presents a detailed commentary on the Greek text of Plato's *Sophist*. Part 1 deals with the various attempts made at the beginning of the dialogue (219a–236c) to define "the factual existence of the sophist." Part 2 is devoted to the ontological discussion which arises out of these attempts (236e–264b).

Heidegger refers frequently to the Aristotelian definition of the human being as *zōon logon echōn*. The term *logos* he takes to mean "discourse," especially discourse that is made public and shared with others, thus Aristotle's definition is understood to identify speech as a central human phenomenon. According to Heidegger, however, Aristotle also recognizes another human possibility, closely related to discourse yet distinct. More basic than speech is the human capacity for "seeing" the things themselves, for making present what our speech is about. Everyday human existence is dominated by obscurity and by "empty talk" (*Gerede*), in which the capacity for seeing is not fully activated. There is always a possibility, however, of moving from obscurity and emptiness to authentic presence. As the lecture makes clear, it is this basic phenomenological contrast that underlies Heidegger's interpretation of the Greek concept of truth as *alētheia*, as an "un-coveredness" of the things themselves (p. 16).

Heidegger calls attention to Aristotle's use of the verb *alētheuein*. He takes Aristotle to be saying that human beings are essentially "in the truth," that truth is "an essential characteristic of human existence itself" (p. 23). One manifestation of the tendency toward truth is *phronēsis*, a capacity for disclosing the human situations in which action takes place and one's own being is at issue. Although he does not fully develop the idea, Heidegger does identify some ways in which the truth of *phronēsis* is contrasted with corresponding forms of concealment. The allegedly higher truth of *sophia*, "authentic understanding," also represents a contrast with concealment. As Heidegger points out, Aristotle clarifies *sophia* by showing how it emerges from the relative obscurity of experience, art, and science. Each of these reflects a kind of partial exercise of the capacity for truth: something is "seen" in each, even though the *archai* or "starting points" remain obscure.

This introductory discussion of Aristotle is relevant because the *Sophist* turns out, on Heidegger's reading, to revolve around an understanding

of discourse and truth. The dialogue's various attempts to characterize the sophist have a common thread: all imply that *logos* is what somehow defines the sophist's mode of existence. This is most obviously true of the last two definitions, in which the sophist appears as a disputer who repeatedly opposes one opinion to another and as an imitator who uses words to paint false and misleading pictures of things. But it also applies to the earlier attempts. In each, "the basic phenomenon of *legein* becomes decisive" (p. 303).

To shed light on Plato's concept of discourse, Heidegger examines the *Phaedrus*, the dialogue which in his view "forms the center, so to speak, for all questions of Platonic philosophy" (p. 321). Here he shows that Plato also works with a distinction between a speaker who has only hearsay acquaintance with the subject of his discourse and a speaker who has actually "seen" what he speaks about "in its unconcealment" (p. 323). Plato's skepticism about the written word is to be understood in this context: far from making people wiser, trust in written discourse (or in any discourse that has been taken over from another) actually fosters *lēthē*, "forgetting" or "covering up," in that it leaves the reader or hearer unconcerned about the presence of the things themselves. The philosopher's dialectical art, on the other hand, is meant to lead to a genuine seeing; it is not a matter of making sterile divisions, but rather the means by which speakers can go back "through" (*dia*) what is ordinarily said to an authentic uncovering, an original appropriation, of that which is spoken about.

Heidegger believes that this phenomenological understanding of discourse and truth plays an important role in the *Sophist*. Implicit in the dialogue is the thesis that the sophist's medium is "uprooted," "free-floating" speech, empty discourse not anchored in genuine disclosure. The sophist creates an image or appearance instead of allowing the thing itself to be seen and appropriated. Where the philosopher's dialectical art seeks to uncover the things themselves, the sophist aims only at speaking well.

On Heidegger's interpretation, even the ontological section of the dialogue makes use of this phenomenological understanding of discourse and truth. Here Plato's Eleatic stranger proposes to modify the received Parmenidean ontology, since its absolute repudiation of non-being makes impossible any understanding of false discourse, and hence of the sophist's mode of existence. Heidegger finds the root of the problem in Parmenides' interpretation of being as sheer, undifferentiated "presence." Since this ontological position leads inevitably to a denial of non-being, Plato's stranger must somehow move beyond Parmenides. No Greek was able to transcend the ontology of presence, which arises naturally from ordinary ways of thinking about the world. But the stranger does introduce an important modification.

Heidegger suggests that Plato's ontology differs from that of Parmenides in that it is based on a careful study of the structure of discourse. Plato saw that *logos* is more than mere naming, that it always involves saying something "of" something else. By the same token, what the authentic speaker apprehends is not just the thing spoken about, but something that is present "as" something else. The presence that underlies authentic discourse is always the articulated presence of

something-as-something, not the sheer, undifferentiated presence envisioned by Parmenides. It always involves a certain *koinōnia* or "togetherness." What is decisive for Platonic ontology is thus an understanding of being as the "possibility of togetherness," *dunamis koinōnias* (p. 479), the potential for being present together with something else for an authentic speaker.

This ontological advance underlies the stranger's solution to the problem of the being of non-being. Once he has defined being in terms of *koinōnia*, the stranger goes on to show that "otherness" comes together with everything that is. And since otherness is a kind of non-being, the being of non-being is established, and the definition of the sophist in terms of false discourse is secured.

The lecture provides striking evidence of the degree to which Heidegger was absorbed in both phenomenology and Greek philosophy at the time he composed *Being and Time*. Phenomenological distinctions like that between authentic and inauthentic discourse pointed him toward a dramatically new way of understanding the Greek philosophers, understood in this way, the Greeks in turn suggested new approaches to a wide range of philosophical issues. The two perspectives are so fused in Heidegger's lecture that it is often difficult to distinguish his own voice from the voices of those whose works he comments on. Some will find this fusion of perspectives unsettling and disturbing, but phenomenologically oriented philosophers can look to the work for a wealth of provocative insights and suggestive interpretations. —J. Philip Miller, *Upper Montclair, N.J.*

HUGHES, Glenn. *Mystery and Myth in the Philosophy of Eric Voegelin*. Columbia. University of Missouri Press, 1993. viii + 131 pp. \$27.50.— This work aims "to analyze and relate the many discussions of mystery" (p. 1) in the writings of Eric Voegelin. Glenn Hughes succeeds in stating Voegelin's case so clearly that even those unfamiliar with Voegelin can follow the argument. Voegelin argues that "mysteries are depths of meaning whose hiddenness is apparent" (p. 2). We participate in mysteries but are unable to penetrate them because of our finitude. While the appreciation of myth is a prerequisite for the philosopher, the West has seen a "peculiar and growing eclipse of the awareness of mystery" (p. 1). The loss of the sense of mystery is a tragedy, and Voegelin's philosophy aims at rediscovering the mysterious. But how do we know the mysterious and, at the same time, not know it? To answer this question, Voegelin needs a theory of consciousness.

Chapter 1 provides an overview of this theory of consciousness. Consciousness belongs both to the subject and to the reality from which it appears. It is an event in the process of reality, and its ultimate source "is the mysterious ground of all things" (p. 9). It is "the site in finite existence where meaning itself is illuminated" (p. 12). In addition, consciousness transcends time by contemplating universal meanings and by experiencing the present as having no duration. Thus, consciousness

reveals itself to be part of the Whole, it is where "Being, or the Whole of what is, breaks into awareness and knowledge of itself" (p 20) Any other conception of consciousness, the Husserlian transcendental ego for instance, is a secondary phenomenon "Human consciousness is always an event within a historical context of language, community, world, and cosmos, whose ultimate reference point is a radically transcendent ground of being" (p 21)

Chapter 2 considers the most prominent activity for consciousness the search for the mysterious ground of existence This search is trans-historical and manifests itself in timeless questions Where did things come from? Where are they going? Why are they the way they are? What consciousness ultimately recognizes is that the finite cosmos is "inadequate as the source of its own meaning" (p 54) This view of consciousness informs Voegelin's understanding of history, the subject of chapter 3 History is not a sequence of events, but "a pattern of 'lines of meaning' that emerge from the efforts of persons and societies to understand the structure of reality" (p 72) We cannot know what history means, since history is still unfolding and its origins are shrouded in mystery In the most general sense "it involves a transformation from pre-differentiated consciousness to consciousness emphatically aware of its existence in relation to a meaning that transcends the meaning incarnate in the finite cosmos" (p 79) The whole of reality is involved in a process of transfiguration

The final chapter discusses the mysteries that Voegelin believed most important (1) the mystery of origins, (2) the mystery of personal meaning, (3) the mystery of history, and (4) the mystery of the relationship between individual destiny and universal history These mysteries lead us "to a meaning that is humanly unknowable, to a boundary where we are brought face to face with the fact of transcendent meaning" (p 96) These questions remind us "that being human means to search for the meaning of being human" (p 108) Myth reveals mystery, it provides us with vision—it is luminous Myth has lost its power for us, and Voegelin believes we are worse off for it We have forgotten "the primary fact of conscious existence to be participation in the Mystery of the Whole" (p 116) —John G Messerly, *Ursuline College*

HUNT, Robert P, and GRASSO, Kenneth L, eds *John Courtney Murray and the American Civil Conversation* Grand Rapids William B Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992 x + 298 pp \$21 95—The purpose of this book is to defend the John Courtney Murray project Participants in the project believe that American democracy is compatible with Catholicism For example, two principal elements of Catholic political thought are natural law and the "two spheres" doctrine, while two principal elements of American democracy are the "laws of Nature and Nature's God" and church-state separation Objective, transcendent principles, however, have been supplanted by skepticism and nihilism Now a moral pluralism which precludes practical agreements and leads to a

struggle for power dominates, threatening both democracy and the Church. Participants in the project therefore wish to rescue Catholicism and democracy from the onslaught of contemporary thought, and to do so it is necessary to reassert their originally compatible elements.

The book begins with theological views of the Murray project. Richard Neuhaus mentions areas of Catholic-Lutheran theological dispute and discusses areas of practical agreement between them (similar conceptions of the "two spheres" and the possible compatibility of Catholic natural law and the Lutheran orders of creation and preservation). William Luckey interprets Murray's thought on church-state relations: natural law ought to guide the "two powers," democracy requires virtue as well as freedom, and the common good requires consensus. David Novak denies the possibility of reviving natural law. The Aristotelian metaphysic supporting natural law has been supplanted by modern physics, therefore, religious communities must approach the secular world with pragmatic, temporal arguments.

"Murray and the American Experiment" is discussed by four authors. Robert Cuervo argues that democracy requires a public philosophy and that elements of the founders' public philosophy need reviving: a nation under God, natural law, republican virtue, human and historical rights, the principle of consent. Kenneth Grasso locates the political problem in the cultural transition from a Christian, doctrinal pluralism (a common morality allowing for practical agreements) to a moral pluralism (differing moralities rendering disputants intransigent). Peter Lawler contends that a metaphysical threat requires a metaphysical solution. Natural law is the best practical guide available and the best method for defending and improving the principles of the American regime. David Mason debates Murray, claiming that Murray's theology colors his version of Western intellectual history and the American founding, incorrectly bifurcates man, and unduly restricts philosophic activity and the understanding of political life.

The third section contains articles on Murray and current debates. Francis Canavan shows that for Murray the objective moral order supports the dignity of the person and therefore freedom of worship, and it supports the church-state distinction and therefore the freedom of the Church and constitutionalism. Gerard Bradley argues that Murray's description of the religion clauses as "articles of peace" inadvertently elevates the establishment over the free exercise clause, and that not all religions can coexist with a church-state dichotomy, noting a potential constitutional problem. John Cort contends that Murray's economics consists of a preferential option for a free economy, though his adherence to natural law and subsidiarity would lead to a rejection of economic laissez-faire and the acceptance of some public intervention. Mary Segers attempts to show that Murray's arguments against anticontraception laws and his distinction between morals and law could lead Catholics to eschew attempts to influence public morality (though policies within the Church and for Catholics would remain unaffected). Robert Hunt disputes this. Murray would not advocate a neutralist (or laicized) state. Inconsistent with natural law, such a state lacks the foundation and prudence necessary to a substantive moral consensus, a prerequisite to American democracy. In the Epilogue, George Weigel



asserts the importance of the Christian intellectual who transcends progressive and reactionary fads. The Murray project should become more ecumenical, work for a civil (not sacred or naked) public square, and attend to the new international situation.

This book will be of interest to those concerned with religion and democracy in the modern world. Participants in the Murray project know that much needs to be done, yet they admirably wrestle with these issues. Individuals and libraries will benefit by having this book in their collections. —Jeff Chuska, *Black Hills State University*

INGARDIA, Richard, ed. *Thomas Aquinas International Bibliography 1977–1990*. Bibliographies of Famous Philosophers. Bowling Green, Ohio. Philosophy Documentation Center, 1993. 492 pp. \$57.00.—At first sight this bibliography appears to be a sequel to the *Thomastic Bibliography, 1940–1978* compiled by Terry L. Miethe and Vernon J. Bourke, although the period which it surveys overlaps that of the earlier work by two years, and no account is given of the choice of 1977 as a starting date. As the name of the series to which it belongs intimates, however, and as the brief introduction makes clear, “the principal focus of this bibliography is limited to Aquinas’ philosophy” (p. 1). Nevertheless, the introduction also points to the vexing problem of distinguishing philosophy from theology in Aquinas’s thought, and announces the appropriately liberal policy that “works whose titles are clearly theological and whose focus is not principally philosophical, yet contain philosophically important discussions of Aquinas’s arguments, are listed in this bibliography” (p. 2).

Apart from its focus on philosophy, this bibliography also differs from the earlier one in the more “material” disposition of its listings. Miethe and Bourke, following even earlier arrangements, had divided their bibliography into five thematically subdivided general sections, on the life, writings, philosophical teachings, theological doctrines, and historical and doctrinal relations. The four thousand, two hundred and twenty-four items mentioned in the present work are grouped into three main divisions: “Primary Sources,” “Secondary Sources,” and “Congresses, Special Collections, Unpublished Papers, and Dissertations.” “Primary Sources” are presented according to language (English, French, German, Italian, Latin, and Miscellaneous), and, although the table of contents does not indicate this, each language is further divided into “Books” and “Articles.” “Secondary Sources” reverses this procedure, being itself subdivided into “Books” and “Articles,” each of which are further divided according to language (the list of languages is as above, except that there are no Latin entries, and “Articles” includes a Polish section). The section on articles in English constitutes one quarter of the entire bibliography. The third main division is true to its four-part title (although “Unpublished Papers” is restricted to a few American sources), but it also contains three surprises not mentioned in the table of contents: both “Special Collections” and “Dissertations” are subdivided into

"English" and "Miscellaneous", and a fifth part, entitled "Others" (pp 351–4), seems to have been added late in the editing process, for it gathers together items which belong in earlier sections. There are six indexes of authors (subdivided into "English" and "Non-English"), names within titles, book reviews, Latin words and phrases, Latin books, and keywords (subdivided into "English" and "Foreign")

Clearly, some awkwardness will be felt by the consultant of this work, who will have to complete the table of contents and deal with languages one at a time. Despite these inconveniences, and some typographical megalence, the editor may justly claim that the bibliography is "the most extensive and nearly complete one within the stated time parameters available today" (p 4). The inclusion of abstracts of books and articles where available and the citing of "significant" book reviews with many of the book entries contribute to the work's usefulness. Reflecting on the sizeable number of listings in this and earlier bibliographies, the editor offers a provocative thought: "it is clear that Aquinas may be the most discussed, yet the least influential, philosopher of the twentieth century" (p 1). — Kevin White, *The Catholic University of America*

JOHNSON, Mark *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993. xiv + 287 pp. \$29.95.—The subtitle of this book raises the question of what cognitive science can teach ethics. The answer, I believe, is "very little" or at least "little that ethics doesn't know already." This can be seen in the fact that, with one important exception, the authors to which Johnson most often refers are not cognitive scientists, but are instead those moral philosophers engaged in developing fundamental criticisms of "modern" or "enlightenment" morality, philosophers such as Taylor, Williams, and MacIntyre. What Johnson does take from cognitive science is a set of terms, a general viewpoint, and a methodology which leads him to look at how ordinary people actually go about solving moral problems. Fortunately, this methodology yields some interesting results.

It is Johnson's contention that when people engage in moral reasoning they necessarily use their moral imagination. This fact, however, is inconsistent with a widely—if implicitly—held view, which Johnson terms the "Moral Law theory." According to this view, moral reasoning "consist[s] entirely of the bringing of concrete cases under moral laws or rules that specify 'the right thing to do' in any given instance." Johnson holds that Moral Law theory and all its assumptions are "so pervasive in our cultural heritage that they form the shared folk theory of morality that underlies both religious ethics and our dominant nontheological rationalist ethics alike" (p 4). There are many aspects of this "folk theory" to which Johnson objects: its implicit dualism of body and mind and its faculty psychology that radically distinguishes the passions, reason, perception, and imagination, its separation between morality and prudence, its universalistic pretensions and emphasis on obligation, and its emphasis on rules, essentialistic understanding of concepts, and de-

ductivistic conception of reason. What he objects to most, however, is its distortion and denigration of the role of the imagination in moral reasoning. Johnson's attempt to show the centrality of moral imagination to moral reasoning forms the theme of the book.

Nowhere does Johnson give a formal definition of "moral imagination," but he clearly does not want to understand it as a psychological faculty. Instead, he describes its functions and its principle "mechanisms," most importantly, "metaphors" and "prototypes." Johnson argues that, contrary to the assumptions of Moral Law theory, these mechanisms are in evidence at every level of moral reasoning. In perhaps the most interesting chapter, "Metaphoric Morality," Johnson attempts to show how both everyday moral concepts and everyday moral reasoning depend on metaphors, especially metaphors of "location," "journey," and "accounting." This chapter, more than the others, is strongly influenced by the "empirical evidence" uncovered by cognitive science. It is followed by an examination of Kant's moral theory which seeks to show that even this, the most rationalistic of moral theories, is shot through with metaphor. Johnson argues that the centrality of imagination, as demonstrated by the universal presence of metaphor, not only undercuts the central assumptions of Moral Law theory but moves us toward a theory in which narrative, rather than rule, plays a central role—a theory in which the self can be understood as a natural, not a transcendental, entity.

Johnson's approach allows him to weave together these now common themes in an interesting and insightful way. Unfortunately, it does not allow him to move beyond criticism of Moral Law theory to its replacement. Clearly, one central but perhaps overemphasized role of moral theory is to help us make practical decisions. As Johnson puts it, however, "The kind of 'guidance' my theory gives is not the kind that tells us 'the right thing to do.' Rather, it explains why it may be harmful to think that there is *one* right thing to do" (p. xi). While this might be important, by itself it is not satisfying. Moral theory must give us guidance. Any account that does not help us in deciding what to do is fundamentally defective. While there may be many philosophical problems in Moral Law theory, until an alternative theory can provide practical solutions to moral problems—as Moral Law theory appears to do—Moral Law theory will continue to dominate our moral thought.—Roger Paden, *George Mason University*

KRUKOWSKI, Lucian. *Aesthetic Legacies*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992. 245 pp. \$44.00.—Krukowski sets out to examine the contemporary aesthetic scene by considering its roots. He begins by considering the shift in the last two centuries from the view that art has an epistemological mission to the quintessentially modernist view that art is autonomous. Krukowski seeks the origins of this shift in the aesthetic theories of Kant, Schopenhauer, and Hegel. Each proposed a grand ambition for philosophy and a prominent philosophical

role for art. Kant saw the aesthetic stance of the cultivated taste as a means of achieving the reconciliation of the orderly empirical realm with the autonomous freedom of the moral sphere. Schopenhauer considered the expressions of the artist of genius to communicate the essential structures of reality. Hegel saw the aesthetic dimension as a manifestation of the teleological progress of history, in which spirit comes increasingly to embody matter, thereby resolving the duality of thought and world.

With the advent of modernism and its insistence on artistic autonomy, Krukowski argues, these thematic concerns of "taste," "expression," and "progress" underwent transformation. The thematic of taste became concern for form, independent of all instrumental functions. The thematic of expression became concern for the intentions of the artist, documented by means of specific stylistic gestures. The thematic of progress became attention to criticism, now understood more as a gesture than an actual achievement in a teleological drama. In each case, modernists no longer saw a full-bodied social role for art, but instead saw art's sphere to be a separate realm, which aesthetics seeks to elucidate.

Late modernism, Krukowski argues, prepared the way for postmodernism by converting these modernist beliefs into dogmas. Concern for form, intention, and criticism became the dogmas that internal structure was always the central concern of art, that creativity is a value for everyone, and that progress is inevitable, even though the goal was increasingly indefinite. Given up, in these dogmas, are precisely the beliefs that launched the modernist move in the first place: belief in the authority of cultivated taste, the unique insight of genius, and the possibility of genuine progress.

Postmodernism emerged when these ideals were rejected explicitly. Postmodernism, as Krukowski sees it, renders questionable the modernist doctrines of aesthetic autonomy and the unity of the arts. Among the results of growing doubts about these doctrines, contemporary aesthetic attention is now directed at the ways in which art functions to represent the concerns of particular social groups and at the difficulties involved in attempts to establish a clear boundary between art and non-art.

Krukowski uses this analysis to account for such contemporary phenomena as the artistic endorsement of the popular, the methodologies of juxtaposition and eclecticism, the growing preeminence of art by members of subgroups within society, and the concept of art as action, not product. Krukowski concludes, however, that our postmodern era also contains tendencies toward the subversion of its own suppositions. In the recent debates over controversial artists and the legitimacy of censorship we are witnessing a new avant-garde, defending itself with appeals to art's autonomy, and a resurgence of efforts to subordinate artistic freedom to the social good, a new demand that art take its place within a drama of social progress.

Krukowski's book is an achievement. It proposes an elegantly organized account which is applied to a wide range of aesthetic developments. Indeed, the architectonically stable organization of his discussion serves as an effective foil for the many engagements Krukowski

makes with interpretive and analytical issues. Because he does analyze many phenomena, Krukowski is bound to find many readers who disagree with him in certain respects. At the same time, however, he is sure to sharpen the thinking of many on the confusing situation of our present and its aesthetic situation.—Kathleen Marie Higgins, *The University of Texas at Austin*

LANGHOLM, Odd. *Economics in the Medieval Schools: Wealth, Exchange, Value, Money and Usury according to the Paris Theological Tradition 1200–1350*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992. ix + 633 pp. \$151.00. — Odd Langholm has previously given us three important book-length studies on price and value, wealth and money in the Aristotelian tradition, and the Aristotelian analysis of usury. The present work is an effort to integrate virtually all the secondary literature on economic speculation by every significant figure who studied or taught at Paris during its golden age. This is no mere compilation of prior research, however. The author has made detailed examinations of unedited manuscripts and rare incunabula in order to present a panorama of diverse speculators, each with his own intellectual genotype. In offering new interpretations and important nuances to previously established conclusions (for instance, to doctrinal investigations of researchers such as John Noonan and Max Weber, as well as to inventories such as those established by Friedrich Stegmüller [pp. 244 n. 85, 353–5, 512 n. 15]), this work may well serve as an indispensable reference for future investigations into medieval and early modern economic thought.

While the subjects discussed by each figure vary in emphasis and focus, the metaphysical principles of their notions and arguments remain close to the surface. A few examples: Henry of Ghent's application of *participative* vs. *proprie* in considering the common and private in regard to possessions (p. 253 n. 16), nuances concerning necessity and voluntariness in relation to usurious loans as made virtually by all the thinkers considered, the criterion of judging profit as usurious if time is relevant merely as extrinsic measure of duration to justify surplus as found in Giles of Lessines's distinction between *causa temporis* and *per naturam temporis* (pp. 311–3), money as instrumental cause and human industry as principal cause in secondary profit as applied by Aquinas to the inappropriateness of money reproducing itself in terms of its *telos*—this is the proper interpretation of Aristotle in the *Politics* (1.3.1258a.38–68) and was confirmed by several subsequent thinkers, including Gerardo of Siena in his arguments concerning the “auto-valuation of fungibles” (pp. 245, 557).

The analysis is ordered as follows: transition from Canon Law in Robert of Courson and Thomas Chobham, William of Auxerre's *Golden Summa*, early Dominicans such as Roland of Cremona, Hugh of Saint-Cher and Peter of Tarentaise, early Franciscans such as Alexander of Hales and John of La Rochelle, Saint Bonaventure, Albertus Magnus and

the reception of Aristotle, two chapters on Aquinas, Henry of Ghent's synthesis, three masters of the *quodlibet*, Gerald of Abbeville, Gervais of Mont-Saint-Éloi, and Godfrey of Fontaines, the first economic treatise by Giles of Lessines; five chapters on Franciscan economics, respectfully divided among Matthew of Aquasparta, Richard of Middleton, and Raymond Rigauld, Peter Olivi; Duns Scotus, John of Bassolis, and Francis of Meyronnes; Alexander of Alessandria, Gerald Odonis and William of Rubio, Aristotelian commentary traditions as found in Giles of Rome and John of Paris, non-Thomists vs Thomists such as Tolomeo of Lucca, Remigio of Florence, and John of Naples, Augustinian contributors such as Henry of Friemar, Gerardo of Siena, and Gregory of Rimini. The final chapter presents the author's retrospective synthesis and prospective vision of the basic elements of a Christian economy.

No single work to date has so successfully presented such a detailed overview of how the medieval theologians viewed material wealth in a Christian society, the nature of property and economic incentive, the benefits of trade, the dynamics of bargaining power in terms of compulsion and consent, the fundamental interrelations between cost and market, and the role of money as medium. Virtually every relevant literary genera is examined: those which find principal inspiration in Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Politics*, such as the commentaries and the ethical and political treatises, those which tended to focus on Roman and Canon Law, such as legal commentaries and handbooks for confessors; and those which place explicit primacy on Sacred Scripture, the Fathers, and the *Sentences*, such as Scriptural and *Sentences* commentaries, theological and moral *summae*, sermons and letters, and polemical works. Finally, there are the treatises on exchange and usury, and academic disputations which are characterized by utilizing authorities and sources as needed. With exceptional caution, Langholm avoids any untempered attribution of "anticipatory ideas" to his subjects, but in maintaining such discipline in his judgments, he only manifests all the more how greatly modernity is indebted to its past for fashioning the intellectual tools needed to grapple with the fundamental questions about economics —Michael Ewbank, *Loras College*

LEMAY, Helen Rodnite, trans. *Women's Secrets: A Translation of Pseudo-Albertus Magnus's De Secretis Mulierum with Commentaries*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. ix + 200 pp. \$16.95. —The heart of this volume consists of an Introduction (pp. 1–58), the translation of *De Secretis Mulierum* with extensive selections from two running commentaries (pp. 59–149), and Notes (pp. 151–180). The text itself of *Women's Secrets* is quite short, comprising about half of the 90 pages of translation. As the Introduction makes clear, however, it is important for several reasons.

First, it was very widely read and disseminated after its composition in the late thirteenth or early fourteenth century by an unknown disciple of Albertus Magnus. Hence, in some sense it represents one common

view of women and the kinds of problems concerning them which comprise the domain of "knowledge of women." Lemay raises a number of important considerations concerning the intended audience of the treatise and the related problem of "in whose domain" such knowledge lies (pp 7–8).

*Women's Secrets* also raises the question of the choice of *genre* available to an author interested in such topics. In this treatise, two disciplines appear: natural philosophy, which aims at an understanding of phenomena (and dominates Pseudo-Albertus Magnus's interests), and medicine, which is practical and much less present here (pp 3–6). Because of the author's interest in natural philosophy, that is, in explaining rather than treating, there is considerable use of astrology. For instance, the motions of the lower world are explained as a result of motions in the "higher" world. Indeed, Lemay comments that it might almost be an "astrological treatise" (p 13). As an illustration of natural philosophy bearing on biological concerns, the treatise is very interesting.

As Lemay also points out in her introduction, a number of literary forms, for instance, "questions," "secrets," and "problems," were available to the author (pp 9–12). The final outcome most closely resembles encyclopedic literature, that is, a summary treatment of overlapping subjects often given with very little argument (p 13). Lynn Thorndike has argued that it may have been used as a teaching text at a lesser university, but Lemay argues convincingly against that view. A further interesting feature of this text lies in its use of sources. It evidences a knowledge (and control) of a wide range of authors from Hippocrates, Aristotle, and Galen to Arabic and Persian medical sources. The author quotes both accurately and inaccurately—presumably the former whenever possible and the latter whenever necessary.

Lemay makes a special argument at the end of her introduction for this treatise as misogynistic and perhaps exerting a direct influence on the fifteenth-century inquisitional treatise on witches, *Malleus Maleficarum* (pp 50–8). To make her case, she claims that Pseudo-Albertus Magnus was a follower of Albertus Magnus and that Albertus Magnus articulated a natural philosophy "based on Aristotle"—indeed, that he was "the master of thirteenth century Aristotelian science" (p 49). She characterizes Aristotle (and Aristotelianism generally) as the source of censure for women and as "antifemale," contrasting Aristotle with Galen and Avicenna, who are more "sympathetic" to women (pp 46–7). Additionally, she cites examples of "antifemale" attitudes in *Women's Secrets*.

There are several problems here. As is very important for *Women's Secrets*, Aristotle was the first writer in antiquity to consider the female body, discharges, and reproductive processes as proper subject matter for science. Earlier writers, including at least some in the Hippocratic school—the evidence here is very difficult—dismissed women and the unique features of the female body as too low and/or disgusting for consideration by the scientist. Here we may note that the thirteen chapters comprising *Women's Secrets* deal largely with topics deriving from Aristotle's biological works. In this sense, Aristotle's inclusion of women

within the domain of natural philosophy is the primary source of this treatise in the most constructive sense possible

The most notable exceptions, for instance, chapter 3 "Concerning the Influence of the Planets," clearly derive from Neoplatonic sources. Here is the second problem with Lemay's claims. Albertus Magnus has long been recognized as a Neoplatonic reader of Aristotle and may be considered "Aristotelian" only in the very weak sense that he read and commented on the writings of Aristotle. Evidence for the Neoplatonism of Pseudo-Albertus Magnus is extensive, from his chapter on the planets, to his claim that "intellective power . . . is infused by the celestial forms, and from these celestial forms the end and perfection of all forms existing in the inferior realm derive" (p. 101). The most Aristotelian feature of this treatise lies in its considering its subject matter proper for natural science, the treatment of this subject matter is extensively influenced by Avicenna and other Neoplatonists.

This point returns us to Lemay's distinction between Aristotle as "antifemale" and Galen/Avicenna as "sympathetic" to women. This distinction is artificial and misleading. Neoplatonism presents the first effort to synthesize the writings of Plato and Aristotle into a coherent whole. As Neoplatonists, Galen and Avicenna clearly belong to a tradition that, preferring Plato, nevertheless wish to absorb all that is best from Aristotle. Hence the common Neoplatonic union, maintained even by Pseudo-Albertus Magnus, of subject matter from Aristotle and treatment inspired by Plato.

Finally, Lemay cites evidence for her view of misogyny from the text. In one example that she cites (p. 58) women wishing to induce an abortion ("harlots and women learned in the art of midwifery") lead dances, have sex, and wrestle with men. "The reason for their great desire for coitus is that the pleasure that they experience will help them blot out the grief that they feel from the destruction of the fetus" (The text itself is found on p. 102). In her next paragraph Lemay concludes that pseudo-Albert "sets down a rationale eventually used to justify torture and burning at the stake" (p. 58). But the texts she cites, it seems to me, simply do not justify such radical conclusions and, at least in the case attributing grief to women who induce an abortion, may not be misogynistic at all.

This is not to say that there are not troubling moments in this text, but that these moments must be considered carefully and in their full context before any such conclusions can be drawn. Indeed, this text provides serious matter for reflection in this regard and therein lies one of its values. In addition to its intrinsic interest, this book is, for this reason, a fine addition to the history of medieval natural philosophy within the area of biology —Helen Lang, *Trinity College*

LYONS, David. *Moral Aspects of Legal Theory: Essays on Law, Justice, and Political Responsibility*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. xiii + 217 pp. —Irreverence for law, Lyons says in his preface, is



the dominant theme of this collection of ten essays. This irreverence is distinct from the virtually commonplace critical attitude of those who agree that law is fallible. Lyons's irreverence goes deeper. When he reflects on the sad history of legal systems, especially those in which law has been the instrument of genocide, chattel slavery, and other forms of injustice and inhumanity, he finds it difficult to be as complacent as, he argues, most other legal theorists—positivists, natural lawyers, and even Ronald Dworkin—seem to be. What legal theorists tend by and large to overlook, Lyons believes, is the basic truth that "someone whose conduct is regulated by a system of law has a right to be treated by the government in a morally defensible way" (p. 195). It is possible, Lyons argues, that a judicial decision be justified in every other relevant way yet still be morally indefensible. This is arguably what occurred in *Dred Scott vs. Sandford*. What is more, Lyons continues, it seems true that any legal system as such may be properly held to this standard. This follows not from a controversial claim concerning what law ought to be, but, as Lyons sees it, from a clear understanding of what law is.

The book collects essays written over the past twenty-two years, all but one of them previously published. The essays fall into two groups. The first six have generally to do with law and morality, the remaining four with legal interpretation. In general, Lyons defends an interpretive account of law similar to Ronald Dworkin's. He gives a superb and compelling critique of constitutional originalists; nonetheless, he suggests, "original-intent arguments [can] make sense and have some hope of being sound," but only when they identify a "*plausible justifying rationale* for the legislative or constitutional provision in question" (p. 206).

As to law and morality, Lyons proposes what he calls an expanded separation thesis. "The existence and content of law is determined by facts that make law subject to moral appraisal but do not guarantee it any moral value, the basic, most general law-determining facts do not entail or otherwise ensure any morality-determining facts" (p. 100). Legal positivists, on the whole, do not get this relationship quite right. Indeed, Lyons says, they seem oddly to be ambivalent about it. On the one hand, legal positivists hold that law as such has an exclusively social and not a moral source. From this they infer that if a law applies to a particular case, then that it does is a matter of value-free determination. Given the facts, what the law is must be clearly and evidently derivable from what is explicitly stated in the source documents alone. They often take this to imply that judges are not to appeal to moral principles except to the extent that moral language is explicitly incorporated in the legal texts themselves, and then only when this language wears clear criteria of application on its face. On the other hand, legal positivists also tend to hold both that formal justice is a kind of *justice*, with the implication that administrative noncompliance is always unjust, and that not following the law is always at least *prima facie* wrong. These positivist tenets are not consistent. Lyons thinks both are exaggerations of more sensible positions. First, the argument from the social origins of law does not clearly rule out the possibility that moral principles are implicit in some legal texts. Second, such moral terms as may appear in these texts, if lacking explicit criteria of application, may nonetheless

have determinate meaning discoverable by good moral reasoning. The Due Process Clause, for example, demands fairness without spelling out what fairness precisely is.

This oversimplified version of some of Lyons's main themes does not do justice to the complexity, the sensitivity to detail, the evenhandedness, or the deftness of Lyons's analyses and arguments. Lyons's examination of the dominant theories of law and of legal interpretation are penetrating and illuminating and his criticisms compelling. This is a very important contribution to legal philosophy — John Marshall, *University of Virginia*.

MOORE, A. W. *The Infinite: The Problems of Philosophy, Their Past and Present*. London and New York: Routledge, 1990. xii + 268 pp. \$42.00—After an Introduction (pp. 1–13), this volume consists of two parts: “The History” of Infinity (pp. 17–143) and “Infinity Assessed” (pp. 147–233), followed by Glossary, Notes, Bibliography and Index. Although “metaphysical concepts are to the fore in the book alongside mathematical concepts,” much more emphasis is placed on mathematical issues (p. 12). This emphasis is clear not only in the Introduction (“Paradoxes of the Infinite”), but also in Part 1, chapter 4, “The Calculus” (pp. 57–74), chapter 8, “The Mathematics of the Infinite, and the Impact of Cantor” (pp. 110–30), and chapter 9, “Reactions” (pp. 131–46). In this chapter Moore discusses intuitionism (for instance, L. E. J. Brouwer), finitism (for instance, David Hilbert, Ludwig Wittgenstein), and current thought (for instance, Michael Dummett, José Benardete, Rudy Rucker, W. V. O. Quine). A similar stress occurs in Part 2, as the titles of its chapters also indicate: chapter 10, “Transfinite Mathematics” (pp. 147–58), chapter 11, “The Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem” (pp. 159–71), and chapter 12, “Gödel’s Theorem” (pp. 172–84).

Besides the more pronounced emphasis on mathematical over metaphysical infinity just mentioned, what else characterizes the book? Moore rather often discloses where his heart lies. Because “generally acknowledged to have been one of the most brilliant thinkers of all time,” Plato achieved “a remarkable synthesis” of “the views of his predecessors with his own original insights” and thereby displayed “eclecticism of the best kind (such as we shall not see repeated until Kant)” (p. 26). This latter “developed a philosophical system of breathtaking depth and power,” which enables him “to arbitrate between the rationalists and empiricists” (p. 84, see chapters 6 and 7). Aristotle, however, “is a touch-stone for this whole inquiry” into the infinite (p. 34) by considering that “the only serious question that had to be addressed was whether anything *in nature* (anything in the world of space and time) was infinite.” This consideration led him to define “the infinity in a somewhat new way—not as that which has no limit or bound, but as that which is intraversable” (p. 35), as is a “uniform circular racecourse” or “a

treacherous river" or, most relevantly, the mathematically infinite as something which "goes on forever" (p 36).

In elaborating and applying that definition of intraversability Aristotle bequeathed "his greatest legacy to later thought" (p 39) "the infinite exists potentially but not actually" In different words "something can be potentially, but not actually, infinite" (ibid) As applied to time "the actual infinite is that whose infinitude exists *in* time The potentially infinite is that whose infinitude exists *over* time it is never wholly present" (p 40) Thus, the infinite is "what always has some part outside it" and "not what has no part outside it" Hence, the "metaphysical conception of the infinite [as that which has nothing outside but contains or is all] was a complete perversion of the true conception, which he now believed himself to have developed" (pp 43-4) Thus, "he abhorred the metaphysically infinite, and (relatively) the actual infinite," which would be a "kind of incoherent compromise between the metaphysical and the mathematical, whereby endlessness was supposed to be wholly and completely present all at once" (p 44)

What Moore has overlooked, though, is that what he calls "the metaphysical conception of the infinite" turned out to be not an "incoherent compromise between the metaphysical and the mathematical" but rather the rich metaphysical awareness achieved by Thomas Aquinas in the West and by Gregory of Nyssa in the East—namely, that God is not only *subsistent* but also *infinite in being* Thomas gained this insight by borrowing Aristotle's own doctrine of act and potency, each of which serves as determinant upon the other (a service of which Aristotle appears unaware)—act determines by perfecting potency, potency determines by limiting act Thus for Thomas God is fully perfect as subsistent existence and infinitely perfect as free of any limitation from potency Moore shows no awareness of the many studies available on this metaphysical notion of infinity, for instance this reviewer's *Divine Infinity in Greek and Medieval Thought* (Bern, 1992—a collection of essays previously published well before Moore's book), and *Infinity in the Pre-Socratics* (The Hague, 1972)

Gregory of Nyssa gained the insight by borrowing Plato's theory of participation when coping with the Arian Eunomius, who discussed the Trinity in terms of "being" (that is, the Father alone and not the Son or Spirit is divine being) and who thus forced Gregory to reply in terms of "being" too—God, although trine in really distinct persons, is also one Being with which the three persons are identical Thus according to Gregory God is being, goodness, wisdom, and power subsistently and also "infinitely so because those perfections are not participated or received in a participant, which would thereby determine them" Hence, "the divine Being is itself infinite as without the determination [and limitation] which would arise were participation to occur" (*Divine Infinity*, pp 485-6)

Moore's book would be better had he greater awareness of Plato's and Aristotle's influences on Greek and Latin Christian authors Even so, it is a genuinely helpful introduction to infinity, especially of a mathematical sort —Leo Sweeney, *Loyola University of Chicago*

NUSSBAUM, Martha C, and RORTY, Amélie Oksenberg, eds *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima*. Oxford Clarendon Press, 1992 viii + 439 pp \$55 00—This collection consists of a two-part Introduction by the editors Martha Nussbaum ("The Text of Aristotle's *De Anima*") and Amélie O Rorty ("*De Anima* and its Recent Interpreters"), nineteen articles, mostly published here for the first time, by M F Burnyeat ("Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? A Draft"), Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam ("Changing Aristotle's Mind"), S Marc Cohen ("Hylo-morphism and Functionalism," closely based on an earlier published version), Jennifer Whiting ("Living Bodies"), Michael Frede ("On Aristotle's Conception of Soul"), K V Wilkes ("*Psuchē* versus the Mind"), Alan Code and Julius Moravcsik ("Explaining Various Forms of Living"), G E R Lloyd ("Aspects of the Relationship between Aristotle's Psychology and his Zoology"), Charlotte Witt ("Dialectic, Motion, and Perception *De Anima*, Book I"), Gareth B Matthews ("*De Anima* 2 2–4 and the Meaning of *Life*"), Richard Sorabji ("Intentionality and Physiological Processes. Aristotle's Theory of Sense-Perception"), Cynthia Freeland ("Aristotle on the Sense of Touch"), Malcolm Schofield (the reprinted "Aristotle on the Imagination"), Dorothea Frede ("The Cognitive Role of *Phantasia* in Aristotle"), Julia Annas ("Aristotle on Memory and the Self," a revision of an earlier published paper), Franz Brentano ("*Nous Porētikos* Survey of Earlier Interpretations," excerpted from *The Psychology of Aristotle*), L A Kosman ("What does the Maker Mind Make?"), Charles Kahn ("Aristotle on Thinking"), and Henry S Richardson ("Desire and the Good in *De Anima*"), an extremely useful Bibliography of works cited in these twenty chapters with important additions, an Index Locorum, and a Name Index

As an ensemble piece this volume is outstanding, and no one with even a mild interest in Aristotle's *De Anima* will want to be without it. The individual pieces are without exception worthwhile and interesting, and some of them are exceptionally good (as I find, for instance, the chapters by Code and Moravcsik or Kahn), though the inclusion of the magisterial Brentano affords a glimpse of the higher standard often unmet today or here. The whole, however, and what it achieves is greater than the parts considered individually. The Introduction gathers information of a kind about the text, its transmission, and the history of its interpretation which ought to be a starting point for any serious study of the *De Anima*, but frequently is not. Then at least two principles of organization run through the rest of the volume. First, the order of themes in the *De Anima* itself is observed from the opening dialectical book (with the much-needed piece by Witt) to the closing section on animal motion and desire. All major themes are considered, though *De Anima* 3 9–13, ably served by Richardson and comments by others *passim*, as usual fails to receive enough of its due. Second, the article by Burnyeat, finally printed for all to see, sets an agenda for much of the volume. This piece, which argues that Aristotle involves no physiological change in his account of sense perception, galvanizes much of the whole. Most other authors feel compelled to weigh in regarding Burnyeat's argument, whose implications transcend the already fundamental issues concerning perception itself. As they describe their own task Nussbaum and Putnam arm for battle against it, Sorabji is brought to

refine and clarify his previous work, Kahn brings his usual measured and thoughtful perspective to Aristotle's non-Cartesianism

Burnyeat's article with its new way of thinking typifies what is so good about this volume. There is an abundance of fresh ideas, new approaches to old problems, and reassessment going on with respect to the *De Anima*, not only regarding his so-called philosophy of mind, but in all sorts of directions. A number of articles concern Aristotle's conception of life and life forms, and a good article on the sense of touch, which Freeland provides, is overdue. There is a vitality of interpretation in the volume, as befits one on *De Anima*, whatever its shortcomings and limitations.

There are, indeed, shortcomings and limitations, which go beyond disagreements with the positions taken. One worth noting here is a general narrowness of vision. As their citations show, many of the contributors are involved in discussion with a rather small and like-minded circle of scholarly peers, almost all of whom are writing in English. It is instructive to study the Bibliography which (with some mistakes) distinguishes entries cited by the contributors in their articles from those added by the editors and their assistant. Such a study shows how much literature of genuine worth is left unconsidered or underappreciated in the discussions of the volume. One example from the start of the book makes the point. In the Introduction Nussbaum says that an adequate study of the extant manuscripts of the *De Anima* remains to be done and notes that Ross's "*De Anima* work" (presumably both his 1956 OCT edition and his 1961 commentary edition) is "the most complete account of the manuscripts we have" (p. 2). This is not true. Her own Bibliography cites and tags as unconsidered in the volume the definitive study of Paul Siwek, *Le "De Anima" d'Aristote dans les manuscrits grecs* (Vatican City, 1965). Even worse, it fails to list his superior edition, *Tractatus De Anima* (Rome, 1965), which is based on 65 manuscripts in 9 families (compared to the 10 *De Anima* manuscripts [or 11, if *e* is distinguished from *E*] used by Ross). This narrowness is a problem, no doubt, but the lively and engaging consideration of new ideas and new directions found throughout this large and important collection shows (as do the fairly recent monographs of Modrak and Wedin) that scholarship on the *De Anima* is more alive than it has been in some time, and encourages the hope of a broader and more inclusive consideration and comprehension of Aristotle's positions in the *De Anima* to come. —Kurt Pritzl, *The Catholic University of America*

O'MEARA, DOMINIC J. *Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. ix + 142 pp. \$39.95.—It is difficult to imagine a major philosopher more in need of introduction than Plotinus, nor one whose thought is so deeply resistant to summary treatment. O'Meara succeeds by awakening the beginner's interest in his subject and reminding the specialist why it is so fascinating. First we are familiarized with the details of Plotinus's life, the diverse influences upon

him, stylistic features of his writings, and remarks on his philosophical method. One hundred pages are devoted to exploring Plotinus's philosophical views, beginning with his complex account of soul's relation to body and the intelligible world's relation to the sensible. O'Meara carefully articulates Plotinus's immaterialism, his comprehensive scheme of hierarchical ontological dependence (expressed by the "in" locution), and the dense dialectical context within which he seeks to solve difficulties in Plato's positions by responding to Aristotelian and Stoic objections. Chapter 4 tackles Plotinus's very difficult views on knowledge. He severely devalues knowledge of the external world, arguing that it is only a deficient form of self-knowledge. True knowledge (or wisdom) pertains to the divine intellect, which is self-reflexive and identical with its "objects." O'Meara rightly wonders whether Plotinus's epistemological stance amounts to a retreat and indeed whether he eliminates knowledge altogether, at least in the contemporary sense. But if—from the Plotinian perspective—pure thought is nonpropositional, it is puzzling why O'Meara believes it is not intuitive, not "a form of knowing that is an alternative to science and logic" (p. 43), in his view, it is the "goal" of the latter. It might, however, be the goal of scientific knowledge precisely by being an alternative to it.

The chapters on the relation between Intellect and the One and on the One's ineffability brilliantly survey difficult terrain. O'Meara shows how Plotinus relies on what he calls the Principle of Prior Simplicity in tracing each level of reality back to its transcendental source. More important, in explicating the metaphysical work done by the whole-part relation—elements both constitute and transcend wholes derived from them—he captures a crucially important point: the higher is both immanent in and transcendent to the lower. O'Meara's remarks about ineffability are brief but cut to the heart of the matter: talk about the One is talk about ourselves and our complete dependence on it.

He poses some tough questions about the familiar but mysterious doctrine of emanation. How does the "secondary activity" emerge from the One? How does it "turn towards" the One? and what does this "turning" mean? (p. 64). The analysis of the problem of evil is likewise thought-provoking. O'Meara wonders how the absolute Good, the source of everything, can be the source of matter, which is absolute evil. For Plotinus the logic of derivation ultimately yields an entity utterly devoid of being and goodness: matter as metaphysical evil. This account, O'Meara shows, provides the context for moral evil, the soul's self-assertion and self-externalization leading to its downfall. Questions about the soul's moral responsibility remain, however.

The final two chapters address topics for which Plotinus is justly famous: his optimistic accounts of beauty and the soul's mystical ascent to the One. The soul's metaphysical upward mobility enables it to live "as divine intellect" (p. 103), a crucial point often ignored. Finally, O'Meara argues convincingly that there is a profound harmony between the ethics of escape and the ethics of giving. He concludes with a useful survey of Plotinus's pervasive influence in Western philosophy. The guide to further reading and bibliography are outstanding. I recommend this book without qualification to anyone interested in Plotinus: it

will serve as an invaluable companion to scholars and students alike.—  
John Bussanich, *University of New Mexico*

RESNICK, I. M. *Divine Power & Possibility in St. Peter Damian's De Divina Omnipotentia*. Studien und Texte Zur Geistesgeschichte Des Mittelalters, vol. 31. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992. viii + 128 pp. \$43.00.—This is a well-written and interesting little book about a long and meandering letter drafted around 1067 by the great Christian reformer St. Peter Damian. It concerns the question of whether or not God can change the past. The letter is addressed to Desiderius, abbot of Monte Cassino and later Pope Victor III, but the object of Damian's concern apparently is certain dialecticians, possibly Berengar of Tours or Anselm of Besate (the Peripatetic), who put too great a stress on the capacity of reason to grasp truth independently of Scripture.

The debate revolves around a remark made by St. Jerome that although God can do anything, He cannot restore virginity to a woman who has once lost it. Damian worries that those who deny God this ability will also inevitably assert "that God cannot preserve the integrity of Mary's body before, during, and after the birth of Jesus." He thus sees significant theological implications in the question of whether or not God can change the past.

Resnick has done his reader a service by sorting out the wheat from the chaff in this letter. It rambles through a variety of disjointed topics including an odd miscellany of unbelievable tales complete with harrowing endings and none-too-subtle moral lessons, and several listings of strange and miraculous stories that Damian had assembled over the years. These digressions are meant to reinforce the claim that God's power is unlimited. From within this mass of material Resnick isolates the philosophical thread that God may choose to do whatever He pleases because He stands above the temporal order and the laws of nature. This power includes both altering the past and, more troubling philosophically, subverting the law of noncontradiction. The whole of the temporal order, argues Damian, appears as an instant to the Divine Being and as such He may alter any aspect of that instant "whenever" He pleases, so long as it does not conflict with His own essential goodness. What is past, though it has indeed happened, may not in fact be what is (or was) the case.

Resnick points out the logical flaw within this argument by noting that what is at issue here "is not only whether the principle of non-contradiction applies in an eternal present, but whether it applies to an eternal present which exists in relation to a temporal universe." He continues, "The concept of an eternal present does not allow Damian to argue legitimately that the simultaneous presence of all possibilities in God's eternity implies the possibility of their simultaneous presence in the temporal universe" (p. 100).

Damian attempts to circumvent this problem by arguing that it is the inadequacy of language that makes it *seem* as if God could execute an

act that involves contradiction. This stance calls into question the objective intelligibility of scientific description, but it also points to an issue of even deeper significance concerning the proper relationship between faith and reason. Damian is a good example of the tendency among some medieval figures to subordinate science and logic to the absolute authority of Scripture.

Specifically, the *Divina Omnipotentia* is itself intentionally self-contradictory. Damian contends that it must be possible for God to annul the past because He exists in an eternal present, but he also argues with equal conviction that God in fact would never annul the past because this would contradict the order of nature and so produce an evil. The point here is that, at the level of dialectical reasoning and on the basis of evidence derived solely from nature, the mind is led to contradictory conclusions about the power of God. But confronted with the inerrant testimony of Scripture the intellect must assent to the ability of God to change the past. This assent is rooted in the act of faith.

The self-contradictory conclusion of the *Divina Omnipotentia* is Damian's way of bearing witness to the ineffectuality of reason in these matters. Resnick does an effective job of defending Damian's arguments against those who might find them inherently irrational or self-defeating — Edward J. Furton, *St. Charles Seminary*

SCHROEDER, Frederic M. *Form and Transformation: A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1992. xiv + 125 pp. \$35.95—This is an introduction to the philosophy of Plotinus, with five chapters bearing the titles "Form," "Light," "Silence," "Word," and "Love." It contains a bibliography, an index of Plotinian passages referred to, and a general index.

In these five chapters the author displays several aspects of Plotinus's philosophy. The first chapter, "Form," deals with the relationship between the sensible and the intelligible realms. Here the author presents what will be the two key notions in his account of Plotinus's thought, which recur in the chapters that follow. He first presents the idea of the primacy of the intelligible (Form), not only as a postulate of explanation, but also as an object of direct experience. Second, he presents Plotinus' metaphysics of light as a key to his thought. Employing these leading ideas, the author also discusses here how central questions about Platonic metaphysics such as that of the nature of participation reappear in Plotinus and how the latter proposes to overcome them. In chapter 2, Schroeder explores further the role of light in Plotinus's thought and discusses in this connection the metaphysical principle of inner and outer act that pervades Plotinus's philosophy. The third chapter, "Silence," deals with creation in the Plotinian system, focusing on how intelligible cause produces by begetting its reflection while abiding in silence. The author interprets Plotinus's notion of immediate "begetting" as an answer to the Aristotelian criticism of Forms as causes.



Chapter 4, "Word," deals with language and discusses both the celebrated Plotinian claim about the ineffability of the highest principle, the One, and the function of language in philosophy. He explains how there can be discourse about the One, which however fails to disclose the One, and how in Plotinian philosophy there is a constant dialectic of analysis in language and silent intuition. In the fifth chapter, "Love," the author turns to "Plotinian ethics." The key concepts here are "presence to oneself" and "presence to others." The author sees Plotinus's views on relationships of actual persons as a reflection and expression of relationships in the metaphysical sphere.

There is much to recommend in this book. As befits an introductory work, while showing thorough familiarity with his material the author refrains from entering into scholarly intricacies. He admirably puts Plotinus into the context of his predecessors, especially Plato but also Aristotle and others, so that the reader who is previously unfamiliar with Plotinus will readily see Plotinus in the right light as their interlocutor and a contributor in the same field. He shows sensitivity to Plotinus's language and metaphors and fruitfully employs a method of studying semantic fields in Plotinus. He frequently takes a cluster of Plotinian terms and uses their semantic properties and relationships in ordinary language as a key to Plotinus's thought. Most valuable of all, there are many fine insights in the book. I did not find everything in the book equally likeable, however. The author is occasionally guilty of resorting to obscure exalted phrases. He makes the difficult philosophical issues look too easy, even for an introductory book. This regards both the philosophical issues in themselves and as presented from Plotinus's perspective. One of Plotinus's great virtues as a philosopher is his deep sensitivity to philosophical difficulties. He often addresses the same question many times, never quite pleased with his formulations and continually seeing new questions and new aspects of his subject matter. This important aspect is largely ignored in the book. —Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson, *The University of Iceland*

SARTRE, Jean-Paul. *Notebooks for an Ethics*. Translated by David Pellauer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. vii + 583 pp. \$49.95.—In contemporary continental philosophy there is the presumption that Sartre's existential-socialist humanism has been surpassed by clever and sophisticated postmodernist writings. This long and rich rendering of notations made by Sartre between 1947 and 1948 puts this belief in question. While retaining the basic philosophical terminology of *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre presents numerous phenomenologies of various subjective/social phenomena that are insightful and, once again, show the depth, power, and compassion of his thought. These notes serve as a well-constructed bridge that spans *Being and Nothingness* and the *Critique of Rational Dialectic*.

If there was any doubt about it, we see clearly in this coherent series of notes that Hegel was a central preoccupation of Sartre. He quarrels

with him, and continually refers back to the master/slave relationship, giving it a depth and pervasiveness that even Hegel did not discern. There is as much about history here as there is about the rudiments of a concrete, "ontological ethics." Sartre points to the contingencies in history, to our immersion in it, to the emergence of "inauthenticity" in history insofar as "the idea" has to become a thing to be efficacious in the historical process. The existence of a "plurality of consciousnesses" itself generates chance and even insignificance in history. In his numerous observations on history we see not only anticipations of the *Critique* but the specific details and precision of thought that support its arguments. One could call large portions of these notebooks a sketch for an illuminating philosophy of history.

Even though Sartre does not develop a formal ethics in these notes, he points to a concrete ethics that goes far beyond the slight ethical themes in *Existentialism as Humanism*. He sees ethics as a "negation of a negation," as dealing with human problems rooted in concrete sociohistorical circumstances. Abstract rights and abstract moralities are mystifications (p. 144). There is no termination of man's free transcendence toward what is not-yet since "the Manichean nature of violence" and the tendency toward oppression are persistent factors in the human world. In Sartre's repeated stress on treating others as persons whose being is freedom there is an echo of Kant's prescription to treat others as ends-in-themselves. However, there is another feature in Sartre's ethical ideal of a "revolutionary socialist ethics" that runs through his statements and restatements of his central concerns: the willingness to sacrifice for the sake of the liberation of others from oppression is not merely a Comtean altruism, but it is often framed in language that is clearly a secularized Christianity.

The humanistic-socialistic Sartre contends in these notebooks with an absent God, and frequently discusses the nature of creation, divine and human. The fragility, finitude, and contingency of human beings is the bond we have with each other, and we ought to express "authentic love" for the Other as a being-within-the-world and as a freedom surpassing the world via projects (pp. 500–7).

Sartre's penetrating phenomenology of oppression is the centerpiece of these multifaceted notes. The ways in which mankind masks oppression are unmasked. In a concluding appendix (written while traveling to America) we find a succinct, insightful analysis of the institutional enslavement of Afro-Americans that uncovers the justifying and mystifying mechanisms of oppression. The sincerity, compassion, and insightful analyses of concrete social/historical phenomena in these notebooks shows Sartre at his best and reveals a thinker whose hope in mankind, despite its "Manichean" propensities, erases the image of him as a philosopher of *despair*. —G. J. Stack, *State University of New York at Brockport*

Michael Slote feels, have not provided sufficiently systematic accounts of virtue theory. As a consequence it is difficult to see how a virtue-theoretic approach might deal with topics such as self-other asymmetries and moral luck that have attracted attention in recent discussions of the major alternatives, deontology, utilitarianism, and intuitionism. In *From Morality to Virtue* Slote provides a systematic version of virtue theory specifically designed to respond to such topics. As he admits, the theory that results differs noticeably from the proposals of other virtue theorists.

Slote begins by arguing that deontology and common sense morality suffer from serious difficulties. While he considers such topics as moral luck and the killing of one innocent person to prevent the killing of a larger number of innocent people, his central concern is the difficulties posed by self-other asymmetries. A self-other asymmetry exists where, for example, it is morally permissible to fail to do for oneself something that it would be morally impermissible to fail to do for another. Thus in Kantian moral theory, he argues, we are obliged to promote the happiness of others, but not our own happiness. Slote feels that self-other asymmetries devalue agents and lead to paradoxes.

Slote's version of virtue theory avoids the problem of self-other asymmetry in a novel way. The basic account involves two stages. The first stage of this response is reflected in his title *From Morality to Virtue*. Slote distinguishes between ethics and morality, ethics being concerned with action generally while morality is concerned only with other-regarding behavior. In perhaps his most radical move, Slote forgoes the use of moral terms of evaluation entirely, using the terms "admirable" and "deplorable" as *ethical* terms of evaluation instead. Thus, his account of virtue theory is an ethical doctrine, in which evaluation is not restricted to other-regarding actions.

This move sets up the second stage of his virtue-theoretic response to the self-other asymmetry. He argues that two forms of symmetry are possible. The first form—found, for example, in utilitarianism—involves equal concern for the agent and others considered as individuals. The second form, which he suggests is possessed by his version of virtue theory, involves equal concern for the agent and others *considered as a class*. On this account, the admirable person is one who achieves a balance between meeting her own needs and concerns and meeting the needs and concerns of others.

Thus, while utilitarianism and Slote's version of virtue theory both avoid the difficulties associated with self-other asymmetries, they do so in quite different ways. Slote describes their respective strategies as *reductive* in the case of utilitarianism and *eliminative* in the case of his version of virtue theory. His approach to virtue theory, however, does not involve the elimination of all terms of evaluation, just those that are specifically moral in character. He suggests that we might also contrast reductive strategies with strategies that elevate. Thus utilitarianism, a reductive approach, holds that overall good can be understood in terms of the "lower" notion of the personal good of individuals. In contrast, virtue ethics might involve elevation, understanding the good of individuals in terms of the "higher" notion of admirability (though Slote suggests that such an approach leads to some counter-intuitive results).

Slote argues that his version of virtue theory has two significant advantages over utilitarianism. First, he suggests that the virtue-theoretic approach to resolving the self-other asymmetry problem conforms more closely to our ordinary thinking about value in our lives. Second, he argues that utilitarianism suffers from problems of underdetermination — Patrick Croskery, *Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University*

SIMPLICIUS, *Corollaries on Place and Time*. Translated by J. O. Urmson and annotated by Lucas Siorvanes. Ithaca. Cornell University Press, 1992. 157 pp. \$47.95—The ancient commentators on Aristotle comprise the last great philosophical tradition in Greek to be translated into a modern language. The series of translations of which this volume is a part is under the general editorship of Richard Sorabji and includes works by Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, Dexippus, and Philoponus as well as Simplicius. The present volume is especially important not only because of the intrinsic interest of its subject, namely place and time, but also because of its philosophic interest both as expressing Neoplatonic views and as a critique of Aristotle.

The volume is comprised of two introductions by Richard Sorabji, one a general introduction to the Ancient Greek commentators—this introduction is apparently being included in each volume in this series and appears here as an appendix (pp. 128–37)—and an introduction specifically to the work of Simplicius on place and time (pp. 1–10). Textual Emendations appear on pp. 11–12 followed by a Translator's Note (p. 14) and analytic (and very helpful) Tables of Contents for each section (pp. 15–16, 83). The bulk of the volume is occupied by the translation of Simplicius and notes (pp. 17–124). A brief bibliography is found on pp. 125–7. An English-Greek Glossary (pp. 138–9), a Greek-English Index (pp. 140–54) and a Subject Index (pp. 155–7) complete the volume.

This volume has much to recommend it. First and foremost is the interest and importance of its topic and author. The closely related problems of place and time occupy a central place in antiquity from the “mythical beginnings” of philosophy in poetry and cosmic speculation to its close with the Byzantine commentators. Plato and Aristotle occupy a special place in this history and after them work on these problems was often conducted in commentaries on the *Timaeus* or *Physics* 4. These commentaries, however, were not philosophically neutral reports of the views of the masters, rather, they present active and aggressive engagement with the problems at stake in the texts at hand.

This engagement is particularly evident in Simplicius's commentaries on *Physics* 4 and the problems of place and time. We find here digressions, often called corollaries, on the problems of place and time that raise a number of questions about Aristotle's view, for instance, whether place exerts power on what is placed. The effect of these corollaries is to reveal much more fully than does direct commentary the view of the

commentator and the issues that must have occupied current debate. Hence the text being presented in this translation is especially important both philosophically and historically.

There is also much to recommend the translation. Urmson uses the least interpretive words for his translation. For example, although he lists the word *diastasis* in the Index (p. 143) as meaning "interval, dimension, extension," he translates it as interval or dimension whenever possible. This translation contrasts with Sorabji's introduction which takes *diastasis* to mean "extension." "Simplicius thinks of place not as an extension (*diastasis*)" (p. 4). As a term, "extension" is strongly associated with Descartes and post-Cartesian philosophy. While Descartes and his followers may well have been influenced by Simplicius or Philoponus, it is anachronistic to read this term back into Simplicius or his views. Urmson avoids this sort of overly interpretive translation.

The notes to the volume are also very helpful. They include not only emendations to the text, but also clarifications, references both within Simplicius and to other ancient authors, and modern citations. Many of the modern works cited in these notes are not included in the bibliography, however. It would have been very helpful to have these references collected together. But this is a minor quibble with an otherwise admirable volume. —Helen Lang, *Trinity College*

SWARTZ, Norman. *Beyond Experience: Metaphysical Theories and Philosophical Constraints*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991. xiii + 449 pp. Cloth, \$50.00, paper, \$19.95.—Swartz attempts the commendable task of motivating nonprofessional philosophers to engage in the activity of identifying and criticizing their own metaphysical theories. He does this first by explaining what a metaphysical theory is and how to evaluate it, and second by examining the plausibility of various theories concerning space, time, properties, synchronic identity, diachronic identity, and personal identity. A professional philosopher will find it easy to read. An upper-level undergraduate or beginning graduate student would, I imagine, find it challenging at times but readable. There is a glossary of technical terms, further readings suggested, bibliographical references, a name index, and a subject index at the end of the book.

Swartz lays out the currently-popular approach to metaphysics used by analytically-trained philosophers, that is, the testing of our intuitions in counterfactual situations. He claims that if we are to learn which metaphysical theories are better than others, we must go beyond what scientific theories are limited by, namely, experience. He shows convincingly that scientific theories are imbedded with metaphysical theories which cannot themselves be adjudicated using experience (or observation) alone. Moreover, there is no mechanical way to decide between metaphysical theories. One simply has to test these theories using conceptual analysis on a case by case basis. Swartz's understanding of conceptual analysis, then, involves analyzing a concept in counterfactual situations. That is, one has to ask whether a logically con-

sistent story could be told such that the story would make sense of a particularly odd use of a term. If so, then one has found out that a commonly-accepted use for a term is not necessarily, that is, metaphysically, the correct use for that term, but is only contingently the correct use.

Swartz then examines briefly (which is surprising in a 449-page book) various metaphysical theories concerning what space is, what time is, what a property is, what synchronic identity is, what diachronic identity is, and what being a person is. He suggests, but does not argue, that a negative theory of space, for example, is more plausible than a positive theory. That is, he suggests that a metaphysical theory which reduces talk of "space" to talk of physical objects without remainder is more plausible than a theory which posits the existence of space in addition to physical objects. He suggests, but again does not argue, that realism as opposed to conceptualism, nominalism, and a theory of tropes, is most plausible, although reluctantly so. This reluctance stems from, I think, his preference for negative theories in general. He then suggests that positive theories concerning synchronic identity just push the problem back one step, and do not solve the problem. On the other hand, negative theories do solve the problem. The same suggestion is made with respect to positive theories concerning diachronic identity and personal identity. In other words, the problems of individuation, identity through time, and personal identity are not solved by positing the existence of some additional kind of thing, called "substance." These problems are just postponed.

I found this book interesting to read. Swartz introduces and motivates nicely some metaphysical problems and some of the main metaphysical theories which have been proposed to solve them. However, his philosophical methodology will look more like a "language game" than a hard-nosed search after truth. Thus, I believe, makes his goal of motivating the nonprofessional philosopher difficult to achieve. Such a reader, in turn, may be left with the feeling that metaphysics is all "ivory tower" stuff, which, as Swartz agrees, it is not. —Scott Berman, *Saint Louis University*

WALTON, Douglas. *The Place of Emotion in Argument*. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992. xiv + 294 pp. Cloth, \$45.00, paper, \$14.95.—In this book Douglas Walton makes a subtle and scholarly case for a reconsideration of emotion in argument. The result is an important addition to the study of argumentation, one of several areas in which philosophy has contributed to rhetorical studies. A philosopher who teaches at the University of Winnipeg, Walton evinces erudition in both fields. He relates his study to classical dialectic and rhetoric, and deepens and modifies analyses of modern scholars.

Walton admits that emotional appeals are "inherently weak arguments based on presumptive reasoning" but argues that, when used in a reasonable way, they can be a legitimate and effective spring of action (p

19) Thus Walton takes issue with the "deductive-semantic" approach to argumentation, preferring the pragma-dialectical approach of practical reasoning, which he defines as "goal-directed, knowledge-based, action-guiding argumentation that steers an agent toward a prudent course of action in a particular set of circumstances" (p. 19)

The first two chapters serve as an introduction to the terminology and methods of argumentation theory. Chapter 1 takes up the historical treatment of fallacies, kinds of reasoning, dialogue, and dialectical shifts. The second defines presumptive reasoning and its relation to arguments *ad ignorantiam* and *ad verecundiam*. Using case studies largely drawn from contemporary political life, Walton devotes each of the following four chapters to the major emotional fallacies *ad populum*, *ad misericordiam*, *ad baculum*, and *ad hominem*. He next analyzes borderline cases and various combinations of fallacious argument. In the final chapter the author evaluates from a moral standpoint the use and abuse of emotion in argument.

For Walton the commission of a fallacy "involves the use of a technique of argumentation to go against legitimate goals of reasoned dialogue—it means an underlying systematic error or failure in the reasoning used to carry out goals of dialogue appropriate for the given case" (p. 158). Each of the four major fallacies relies on the prejudices of the audience for its force.

In the central four chapters he treats arguments as "dialogues," applying that term not only to exchanges between two speech partners but also to discussion between two (or more) parties in conflict. He distinguishes the following kinds of dialogues: persuasion and its subtype, critical discussion, information-seeking, negotiation, inquiry, scientific inquiry, and eristic, with its subspecies quarrel. The aims of these types are obviously different. Shifts in discourse from one kind to another can generate a fallacy. For example, in a scientific inquiry an emotional appeal would be regarded as a fallacy, but if that context shifts to become critical discussion, an *ad hominem* statement might be relevant to the doubts raised in such dialogues. In fact, emotional appeals of various kinds are seen as useful when they expose dark-sided commitments that can then be examined.

Walton thinks "gut feeling" deserves respect because it "may reflect an arguer's experience, wisdom, or better instincts." His related discussion of opinion in argumentation closely resembles that in Aristotle. Walton explains that arguments based on opinion may not be certain, but they can move the argument in the desired direction. He notes also the hindrances emotional argument can bring to dialogue in closing off discussion or preventing critical appraisals.

Although Walton refers to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, *Sophistical Refutations*, and *Analytics*, a student of classical argument might wish he had applied the distinctions developed in these works when explaining audience-based discourse, which he treats in chapter 3 on *ad populum* appeals. Instead, Walton turns to Chaim Perelman to distinguish between what in classical terms would be dialectical and rhetorical argument. That moves the critical criterion to the difference between discourse directed to a universal or a specific audience and embroils Walton in a needlessly verbose discussion. For example, "Knowledge-based

interactive reasoning would only be necessary and useful if all the participants in the dialogue shared the same (universal) knowledge base. Hence the universal audience is a kind of fiction as far as dialectical argument is concerned, never met with or required in the practices of persuasion dialogue" (pp. 72–3). This criticism is merely a cavil, for Walton succeeds admirably throughout the book in supplying extremely useful guidelines for assessing rhetorical arguments.

The author excels in showing that the four focal arguments are too narrowly typed as fallacious. He astutely exposes variations within these general types, as, for instance, when discussing evidence and *ad verecundiam* arguments (argument from authority), he distinguishes two important differences in the kinds of authorities, administrative and cognitive. Likewise in his examination of *ad hominem* arguments he describes four varieties: abusive, circumstantial, poisoning the well, and *tu quoque*. The treatment of *ad baculum* arguments similarly reveals three forms: appeals to force, fear, and threat.

Walton's thoughtful discussion, emendations, and additions to the literature on argumentation will be highly valued by philosophers, rhetoricians, and teachers of speech communication. The work should find wide use in both graduate and advanced undergraduate classrooms — Jean Dietz Moss, *The Catholic University of America*

WHITE, F. C. *On Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1992. xii + 184 pp. \$54.29.—Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860) wrote the *Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason* in 1813 and submitted it as his dissertation for the doctoral degree at Jena. He enlarged it for the edition of 1847 and thus was reprinted in 1864.

In the first two chapters of *On Schopenhauer's Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*, White provides an introduction to Schopenhauer's idealism. Everything depends upon the mind: dreams, fantasies, and all material objects. The "external world" is not an independent reality. Because phenomenal reality is mind-dependent we can know it. There is, additionally, noumenal reality which is "manifested" in phenomena. This reality is the will, simply sheer striving. Life is nothing more than struggle and pain. There are, however, two paths for partial relief: aesthetic contemplation or ascetic renunciation.

In his dissertation Schopenhauer chose a version of the first path and focused on the Principle of Sufficient Reason, namely, the principle which guarantees that all questions can be answered. This is a transcendental principle which, Schopenhauer claims, cannot be proven. It serves, though, as the ground of intelligibility for his four classes of objects: material things, concepts, space and time, and individuals. White treats all four classes but pays closer attention to the first two.

The manifestation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason regarding physical objects is causality, which is identical with the principle of becoming. Every event has a cause, and similar effects follow similar causes.



In practice we tend to identify only the final stage in a causal chain, though in theory the cause is the complete set of conditions that are necessary and sufficient for the change

In the chapters on concepts White explains Schopenhauer's faculty psychology. We have sensibility, understanding, reason, and judgment. Through understanding we gain full knowledge of the world of intuitive representations. It is through reason that we formulate concepts from these representations. Intuitions and concepts are linked by judgments. These concepts may be related to particulars or to other concepts, but in all cases they are universals which allow us to transcend particulars. They give rise to, among other things, scientific thinking.

White criticizes Schopenhauer often for being too sketchy, sometimes for making implausible claims, and occasionally for simply being wrong. In his view, however, these faults are outweighed by Schopenhauer's strengths, which include his methodological procedures, his analysis of causality, and especially his ambitious effort to explain reality.

There are some puzzling features about White's book. He discusses Schopenhauer's connections to numerous philosophers but virtually ignores Leibniz, the most vigorous champion of the Principle of Sufficient Reason. More curious is that while White claims to be concerned with the later editions, he disregards the numerous inflammatory and intriguing remarks that were added to the second edition. Schopenhauer inserted them because he believed that his contemporaries were not only wrong but pompous in their belief that they were right. He had given up hope of securing an academic post and could afford to make comments that would antagonize those whom he called the "Professors of Philosophy." He made caustic comments about many of his contemporaries, singling out Hegel for particularly bitter attacks. These remarks were prompted by Schopenhauer's belief that only he (and Kant) offered true philosophy. White ignores that which serves to characterize much of what is fascinating about Schopenhauer, remarks that undoubtedly attracted his many posthumous readers, including Nietzsche.

White offers a readable introduction to Schopenhauer's philosophy, paying close attention to the connections between the *Fourfold Root* and the better known work, *The World as Will and Representation* (1818). He provides an elementary explication of Schopenhauer's philosophy based upon his reading of the dissertation. Beginners in philosophy will find White's book helpful. Advanced students may consider looking at Schopenhauer's dissertation itself — Christopher Adair-Totef, *University of South Florida*.

WILLIAMS, Robert R. *Recognition. Fichte and Hegel on the Other*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992. xv + 332 pp. \$19.95—The purpose of this book is both scholarly and polemical: the author seeks not only to render an accurate picture of Fichte and Hegel on the issue of intersubjectivity, but also to correct contemporary misconceptions

which have led to the dismissal of German Idealism as abstract, rationalistic, and ahistorical

The book is divided into three main parts. In Part 1 (which is co-extensive with chapter 1), Williams presents a brief overview of Fichte's and Hegel's transformation of transcendental philosophy into "a concrete social philosophy of spirit" (p. 13). Part 2 (chapters 2 and 3) is dedicated to Fichte, who held that transcendental philosophy must be unified by reference to a single, underived first principle. By arguing that this (theoretically undecidable) first principle must be decided by reference to the practical domain, Fichte effectively brought the issues of intersubjectivity and historicity into the systematic philosophy of German Idealism.

Part 3 (chapters 4 through 12) explicates Hegel's conception of intersubjectivity. Williams shows in chapter 4 how the early Hegel already differed from Fichte in his understanding of the other as a potential enrichment, and not merely a restriction, of the self's own freedom. In chapter 5, Williams compares and contrasts Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenology, arguing that Hegel carried out the phenomenological reduction "more radically and consistently than any other phenomenological philosopher" (p. 102). In chapter 6 Williams analyzes the meaning and method of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* as a "self-accomplishing scepticism." Chapter 7 articulates what Williams calls the "eidetics of intersubjectivity," including the three stages of the dialectic of recognition between two selves: first, the phase of abstract and exclusive universality, second, the phase of opposition between the two selves as particular, and third, the phase of mutual recognition in which each self has its own identity confirmed through the other. In chapter 8 on the "empirics of recognition," Williams shows how the eidetics of recognition can be played out in concrete form, either unsuccessfully (in the master-slave dialectic) or successfully (in love). Chapter 9 explicates the meaning of *Geist* and its three stages: immediacy in Greek ethical life, cancellation of this immediacy through self-diremption, and the overcoming of this diremption through intersubjective conscience (leading to absolute *Geist*).

Chapter 10 takes up the issue of absolute *Geist*, explaining how religion is both human self-recognition in the divine and divine self-consciousness through human self-recognition. In chapter 11, while trying to show how Hegel's absolute knowledge preserves otherness within it, Williams contrasts two models of absolute knowledge—the "idealist" (solipsistic, a-historical) model and the "intersubjective" (social, historical) model—and argues for the latter. In a twelfth and final chapter, Williams criticizes the alternatives to Hegelian social ontology offered by Husserl, Sartre, and Levinas.

While admirable for its comprehensiveness and lucidity, this study also suffers from some weaknesses. Most seriously, Williams does not always distinguish adequately between two senses of the "other." Williams is quite right to insist that the individual consciousness must be open to the other as other. He is also correct in observing that the other as other is preserved within absolute *Geist*, even though absolute *Geist* has no opposite. Unfortunately, when Williams attempts to explain the preservation of otherness in the case of absolute *Geist*, he frequently

expresses it in terms of the otherness which is preserved in the case of individual consciousness. This conflation of the two senses of the "other" undermines Williams's defense of Hegel against contemporary critics, since such critics generally acknowledge Hegel's allowance of otherness in the case of individual consciousness, but not in the case of absolute *Geist*. A related weakness concerns Williams's explanation of absolute knowledge. Williams correctly observes that absolute knowledge should not be understood as an infinite that excludes the finite. If this is true, however, then the dichotomy which Williams accepts between two models of absolute knowledge (pp. 255ff.) should really be uncovered as a *false* dichotomy. These weaknesses, however, are relatively minor when viewed in light of Williams's achievement. Williams has begun the difficult task of filling a serious lacuna in scholarship on German Idealism — Michael Baur, *The Catholic University of America*.

ZAMMITO, John H. *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992. x + 479 pp. Cloth, \$65.00, paper, \$18.95—"In this study," Zammuto writes at one point, "the philosophical-historical question takes precedence over the epistemological one" (p. 48). Zammuto's primary task is not to discuss the contemporary relevance of Kant's thought, but to identify what Kant himself was trying to do within his own context. Yet the result is not just a commentary on Kant's third *Critique*. It is an intricate, subtle, and exciting explanation of how Kant's thinking developed and adjusted to new challenges over the decade from the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to the appearance of the *Critique of Judgment*.

Zammuto takes over from Giorgio Tonelli the thesis that a major shift in focus occurred in the midst of writing the third *Critique*. It started out as a Critique of Taste. While completing the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant realized that one could establish a transcendental basis for aesthetic judgments: based on the harmony of imagination with understanding, they purported to have intersubjective universality and exemplary necessity. In developing this thesis he amplified a distinction, already implicit in the *Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics*, between determinate and reflective judgments. The latter did not apply categories of the understanding, but concepts of reason, organizing experience in a way that was not strictly required. Once he noticed how reflective judgments were involved in ascribing beauty to nature, Kant realized that much more was possible. We recognize in nature something comparable to the purposiveness of art. Organisms, for example, require such a mode of interpretation. A similar pattern is involved when reason develops scientific explanations that organize data into coherent patterns (what Zammuto calls induction), and has in addition the potential of systematically uniting all reason's operations. Zammuto calls this shift, identified by Tonelli with Kant's use of the term "reflective judgment," the "cognitive turn." It found expression in the bulk of the Critique of Teleological Judgment, and in the first draft of the Introduction.

That first draft was abandoned (though Kant allowed it to be published separately later). Zammuto argues that this occurred because a second major shift in focus occurred late in 1789, what he calls the "ethical turn." While in the *Critique of Taste* Kant consciously distanced himself from Herder's idealization of the unschooled and intuitive genius, and in the *Critique of Teleological Judgment* he was showing how inappropriate was Herder's belief in the unity of the natural order as an expression of forces, it was the way Herder took up the Pantheism controversy, and the suggestion that the *Critique of Pure Reason* was also implicitly Spinozistic that instigated this third stage. Here Kant focused on the distinction between the sensible and the supersensible, and on the radical separation between the actualities of sense and the possibilities of understanding, not simply to maintain his theism against charges of unorthodoxy, but more critically to maintain man's moral and aesthetic freedom. The Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment showed how beauty was the symbol of morality. The Analytic of the Sublime explored how imagination could respond to the rational intimations of infinity. Finally, the Methodology of Teleological Judgment tackled the vexing question of how moral purposiveness could achieve its ends within the apparently mechanical natural order.

Into this three-part architectonic of aesthetic insight, cognitive turn, and ethical turn, Zammuto weaves a number of other themes. One is the implicit rivalry between Kant and Herder. By showing the close parallels in phrasing, he documents that many of the more polemical passages in the third *Critique* and elsewhere are pointed at Kant's former student. This was compounded by jealousy, since Kant's work was neglected while Herder was the focus of public attention.

Another subsidiary theme is the way Kant responded to problems left by the first *Critique*. The question of singular intuitions that were distinctive (and not simply applications of universal concepts) was elaborated into the theory of reflective judgments. The problems inherent in the transcendental deduction concerning how unity was possible became the basis for his lengthy discussion of purposiveness—a concept that, says Zammuto, provides the unifying motif of the third *Critique*. Difficulties with the concept of self-consciousness, referring as it does to the agent of cognitive and moral practice, were handled by exploring the intellectual feelings. When imagination and understanding are in harmony we have the feeling of beauty, when it is imagination and reason, the feeling of the sublime, and when will and reason, the feeling of respect. These together contribute to spiritual feeling (*Geistesgefühl*), a concept that anticipated the developments of Kant's idealist successors.

Zammuto develops this complex of theses with impressive competence. He refers to an extensive range of secondary literature in English, French, and German. He writes clearly and effectively, and his arguments are subtle and strongly defended. Whether or not his conclusions are finally accepted, *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment* will be required reading, not only for those concerned with the third *Critique* but for any who are interested in the systematic nature of Kant's thought as a whole. —John W. Burbidge, *Trent University*

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## CURRENT PERIODICAL ARTICLES

### PHILOSOPHICAL ABSTRACTS\*

AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY  
Vol 67, No 1, Winter 1993

#### *Duns Scotus's Doctrine on Universals and the Aphrodisian Tradition*, MARTIN M. TWEEDALE

There is a tradition of interpretation of Aristotle's doctrine of universals which begins with Alexander of Aphrodisias, runs through Avicenna, and is inherited by the Western medieval scholastics. The tension in Aristotle's thought between his scientific realism and his anti-Platonism led Alexander to the unsatisfactory theory that a nature is singular in its extramental existence but common when abstracted by the mind. Avicenna attempted to improve on Alexander by treating natures as "of themselves neither one nor many" but acquiring oneness by their existence in the mind and multiplicity by their existence in extramental reality. But the theory still leaves us with nothing that is common independently of the mind. Scotus is read here as overcoming this difficulty by introducing the idea that the nature has of itself "a less than numerical unity."

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AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY  
Vol 31, No 2, April 1994

#### *Does Acceptance Entail Belief?* D. S. CLARKE

This article examines the relationship between a subject *S*'s acceptance of a proposition *p* as a dateable psychological act and *S*'s belief that *p*. The *entailment thesis* is the thesis that acceptance entails belief, that one who has accepted *p* must be described as believing that *p*. This thesis is defended against recent attacks by Stalnaker, Bratman, and L. J. Cohen. Stalnaker and

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\* Abstracts of articles from leading philosophical journals are published as a regular feature of the *Review*. We wish to thank the editors of the journals represented for their cooperation, and the authors of the articles for their willingness to submit abstracts. Where abstracts have not been submitted, the name and author of the article are listed.

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Bratman base their rejection on context-relative aspects of local acceptance that are absent for global belief as a state that persists through changing contexts. It is argued that both use examples that misdescribe the proposition being accepted. Cohen contends that acceptance in science should not be accompanied by belief, but he seems to be referring to the provisional acceptance of a hypothesis as worthy of testing, not to terminal acceptance that concludes inquiry relative to available evidence. His argument is thus irrelevant to the acceptance-belief entailment thesis as applied to terminal acceptance. This article concludes with a description of two aspects of belief ascriptions, their use to both predict and explain and to evaluate what is believed as true or false. Their combination demonstrates the communicative nature of these ascriptions, and serves to strengthen the entailment thesis.

*Forgiveness*, BEREL LANG

The question of what the conditions of forgiveness are is addressed. In response to this, four principal conditions are cited: 1) that a wrongful (hence avoidable) harm to a person should have been committed, 2) that the person responsible for the wrong should acknowledge this fact and ask forgiveness, 3) that this acknowledgement and request should be directed to the person(s) who have suffered the harm, 4) that the latter then decide to grant forgiveness. Various issues related to these conditions include: the nature of "unforgivable" acts, the possibility of "third-party" forgiveness, the status of forgiveness's erasure of the past (for instance, as an illocutionary act), the character of corporate forgiveness; the granting or denial of forgiveness as (in the event) morally obligatory — and finally, the basis for regarding forgiveness as a moral value at all.

*Emergent Properties*, TIMOTHY O'CONNOR

The notion that a natural phenomenon might be at once *grounded in* and yet *emergent from* the underlying material structure with which it is associated has begun to receive renewed attention, with the focus of application being biological consciousness. The question of how such claims are to be interpreted remains controversial, however. This paper examines and criticizes a few important formulations of the concept of property emergence, and then defends an alternative account. These other accounts are inadequate because they fail to capture a type of macro-micro relationship that fits the desiderata suggested by reflection on the puzzling phenomena that motivate the enterprise. Thus, the alternative proposed amounts to a suggestion concerning how to elucidate the notion of property emergence in a way that best fits the purposes of philosophical and scientific theory. Finally, the neurophysiologist R. W. Sperry's theory of emergent consciousness is presented and clarified.

*Three Kinds of Incommensurability Thesis*, LANCE SIMMONS

This article offers a taxonomy of incommensurability theses. A survey of literature in the philosophy of science and ethics reveals that three distinct

kinds of incommensurability claims have been advanced in both areas. "Global" incommensurability theses concern rival scientific or moral thought-styles understood as total conceptual systems. "Thin" and "thick" incommensurability theses concern the relationships between particular elements embedded within rival thought-styles. Thin elements perform some function which must be discharged, without exception, in every scientific or moral thought-style. The function of thick elements, in contrast, is both specific to and adequately characterizable only in terms internal to some particular thought-style or range of thought-styles. This article distinguishes between these three kinds of incommensurability thesis, distinguishes incommensurability theses from relativity theses, and proposes initial analyses of all the claims discussed.

*A Moral Argument for Undertaking Theism*, DOUGLAS DRABKIN

We ought to aspire to become as good as we can become. It is better for us to be the sort of person who consistently performs good deeds joyfully—with a lively, hopeful feeling—than not to be this sort of person. But morality calls for us to live in a way that makes us vulnerable to misunderstanding, scorn, and abuse by other people. Theism (of the right sort) is particularly well suited to help us take heart and achieve a fully joyful moral life. Therefore, it is morally good for us to undertake theism. This argument is defended against two objections: (1) that fixing on what we want to believe and deliberately pursuing this belief cannot be done without weakening us as thinkers, and (2) that the practical benefits of hoping that God exists are equal to those of believing.

*The Concept of Autonomy*, THOMAS MAY

This paper explores the theoretical basis of the concept of autonomy, in terms of the view it takes toward external influences on an agent's determination of action. The view of moral autonomy developed by Kant, and the various contemporary discussions of autonomy developed from this Kantian perspective by writers such as R. P. Wolff, John Rawls, and Joel Feinberg, all conceive of autonomy as a form of independence, or self-sufficiency. This paper argues that this conception of autonomy is too rigorous to serve in the role which autonomy assumes in contemporary applied ethics. Offered in its place is a conception of autonomy drawn from Aristotle's conception of rulers (autonomy being self-rule). On this view, an agent may direct his behavior in the context of external influences, as a ship's helmsman may steer a ship within the context of the weather, currents, and so forth. Self-direction here does not require detachment from external influences, but rather sees the agent as steering his behavior in the context of these influences.

*Innocence*, NORVIN RICHARDS

This article concerns the quality we associate with childhood and take to make children incapable of culpably engaging in any very serious wrong-

doing It is argued that to be innocent about something consists in being unaware of its dark side because one lacks the necessary concepts, through no fault of one's own This analysis allows us to distinguish innocence from gullibility, it is contended, and to understand why someone might react to an experience not by losing his innocence but by retaining some measure of it The article also discusses the connection between the innocence of children and the quality we ascribe to an adult when we say she is "such an innocent about ———," and considers the difference in the attitude we take toward innocence in children and innocence in adults

*Necessary Beings*, YUVAL STEINITZ

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INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY  
Vol 34, No 4, June 1994

*Human Nature and Moral Understanding in Xunzi*,  
PHILIP J. IVANHOE

The early Chinese Confucian philosopher Xunzi (310–219 B.C.) advocated the theory that human nature inclines us toward bad action but that through a dedicated program of ritual practice, study and reflection we can reform our essentially bad nature so that it tends toward the good This put him in direct opposition to his contemporary Mencius (391–308 B.C.), also a Confucian, who taught that human nature naturally tends toward what is good This essay offers a description of Xunzi's theory of human nature and its relationship to that of Mencius It explains the role Xunzi's theory of human nature plays in his general view of how one can come to perceive the moral dimensions of life and how one can come to be a moral person

*Unity and University: The Neo-Humanist Perspective in an Age of Postmodernism*, GERHOLD K. BECKER

Postmodernism maintains that the search for the unity of being and knowledge is not only futile but also ideological in masquerading the drive for power and subjugation The breakdown of all-embracing metaphysical theories therefore is most welcome and should be regarded as irreversible Against this claim it is argued that whereas on the intellectual level the search for all-embracing unifying theories might be of little more than heuristic value, on the practical-educational level we can support a much stronger claim In clarification of this claim insights of nineteenth-century educational philosophy are being utilized and Fichte's and Humboldt's concepts of unity-in-diversity discussed as it forms the nucleus of an educational program around which both individual and communitarian forms of whole-person education can develop

*Knowledge, Skepticism, and the Diallelus*, DALE JACQUETTE

The Socratic definition of knowledge as justified true belief is examined in light of skeptical challenges. Roderick M. Chisholm's revision of the traditional definition in terms of nondefective justification is considered as an elegant solution to Edmund L. Gettier's famous counterexamples. The dilemma of the diallelus, wheel, or problem of the criterion, according to which justified belief presupposes an adequate criterion of justified belief, and conversely, is introduced as more deeply conceptual basis for skepticism. Chisholm's proposal to distinguish between two different approaches to epistemology, one that begins with a principle of justification, and another that begins with antecedently justified beliefs, is compared with Alvin I. Goldman's similar distinctions between direct and indirect internalist and externalist, and regulative versus nonregulative, theories of knowledge. It is argued that the problem of the diallelus need not arise if Chisholm's particularist methodology is combined with Goldman's direct nonregulative internalist conception of knowledge theory as the codification of accepted doxastic practice.

*Moral Philosophy as a Hermeneutics of Moral Experience*,  
PAUL J. M. VAN TONGEREN

In contradistinction from the conception of ethics as a problem-solving activity, this article proposes a conception of ethics as the hermeneutics of moral experience. It defines a threefold meaning of the hermeneutical concept of experience, and elaborates the moral nature of experience as such and the specific characteristics of *moral* as distinguished from other kinds of experience. The article shows how experience has to be learned by training, and why it demands interpretation. It is explained what "interpreting an experience" means and how this distinguishes a hermeneutical ethics from intuitionism and from an ethics of "checking by the facts." The proposed conception of ethics is defended against the reproach of its being relativist.

*The Body Comes All The Way Up*, ROBERT PAUL DOEDE

This paper compares Michael Polanyi's views of language and mind to the eliminativist proposals of Richard Rorty and Paul Churchland. All three writers recognize mind's plasticity and language's role in shaping mind. However, Polanyi's contention that the intentional (folk-psychological) idioms operative in all mother tongues (natural languages) are *historically* linked to the purposive bodily life whose evolution produced them casts doubt on eliminativist positions predicated on folk psychology's alleged *contingency* (Rorty) or *falsity* (Churchland). By extending itself through symbols of its own making, the intrinsic purposiveness of the human body transformed itself into the ineliminable intentionality of the human mind: however subtly, the body still comes all the way up.

*The Neo-Scholastic Analysis of Freedom*, JOHN M. McDERMOTT

*Spinoza and the Problem of Suicide*, STEVEN BARBONE and  
LEE RICE

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JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY  
Vol 91, No 1, January 1994

*Argumentation and Social Epistemology*, ALVIN I. GOLDMAN

Argumentation, a series of speech acts by one or more speakers, is distinguished from (formal) arguments, sets of sentences or propositions. The article explores principles of good argumentation. Seven rules are proposed that express tacit criteria of good argumentation embedded in common practice. These rules are based on a social quest for true belief and error-avoidance, in which speakers, with the help of suitable premises, may persuade hearers of truths, but may in turn be corrected by hearers for their mistaken premises or conclusions. Argumentation is not a branch of formal logic but of social epistemology. Social epistemology would also include a study of the factors that promote or impede good argumentation, illustrations of such a study are provided.

*The Limits of Public Reason*, BRUCE W. BOWER

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JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY  
Vol 91, No 2, February 1994

*Guilt and Virtue*, P. S. GREENSPAN

Feelings of guilt have a role to play in moral philosophy as a link between the ethics of virtue and duty. They allow for a notion of imperfect virtue as something still achievable despite serious moral lapses in the past. They also would seem to be required by *perfect* virtue in response to a moral dilemma. The defense of guilt in a case of dilemma has implications for virtue ethics insofar as it yields a distinction between character and the agent's record of action, or moral merit, and an asymmetrical justificatory treatment of guilt versus other-directed emotional blame.

*Rational Choice and Social Theory*, DEBRA SATZ and  
JOHN FEREJOHN

We contend that the received view of rational choice theory as a psychological and individualistic theory is mistaken. We argue that rational choice theory is consistent with nonpsychological interpretations that in many instances are more plausible. Rational choice explanations are most plausible in circumstances in which individual choice is severely constrained and thus where the theory gets its power from structure generated interests and not from individual psychology. Examination of the successful uses of the theory confirms this: we discuss the relative success of the theory in predicting the behavior of electoral parties in contrast with its limited ability to predict the actions of individual voters. The most important consequence of our argument is that structuralism can be compatible with rational choice theory. The apparent tension between the reductionism of rational choice theory and the holism of structural theories is superficial.

*General Anesthesia, Consciousness and the Skeptical Challenge*,  
DRAKON NIKOLINAKOS

P. S. Churchland and K. Wilkes have defended a skeptical position that challenges the legitimacy of the concept of consciousness and the reality of conscious phenomena. They argue that consciousness is not amenable to scientific investigation and that, as a result, we should expunge the concept of consciousness from our scientific vocabulary. The article evaluates some of the arguments advanced in support of the skeptical position by examining contemporary anesthesiology's approach to general anesthesia. Some of the theoretical issues, clinical problems, taxonomic concerns, and discoveries relevant to the practice of general anesthesia are explored. It is demonstrated that such practice entrenches the reality of conscious phenomena and legitimizes the scientific use of the concept of consciousness.

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JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY  
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*On Conditionals*, V. H. DUDMAN

A wholly new analysis is proposed for conditionals, these being messages such as the natural interpretations of

If the bough breaks the cradle will fall  
If the bough broke the cradle would fall  
If the bough had broken the cradle would have fallen,

in terms of a "core" responsible for everything the three sentences have in common and another factor which governs the choice between them. Time-line diagrams attempt to explain the contributions of the various elements of



the core and of the other factor, which transpires to be the *tense* of the conditional, present, past, or pastpast

*Dion and Theon An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle,*  
MICHAEL B. BURKE

There is a type of puzzle receiving much attention from contemporary identity theorists that was pondered more than two thousand years ago by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus. After surveying the many solutions currently on offer, and noting their drawbacks, this article presents a new solution, one that affirms the long-ignored position of Chrysippus, although not the reasoning by which he arrived at it. The solution employs (and assumes) the recently resurgent doctrine of Aristotelian essentialism, which provides a hitherto unexploited resource for dealing with the full range of putative exceptions to the principle that different objects cannot simultaneously occupy the same place.

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JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY  
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*Endurance and Indiscernibility,* TRENTON MERRICKS

Enduring objects last over time, but do not do so by way of temporal parts. John persists from yesterday to today, the endurantist claims, if and only if John of yesterday is identical with John of today. A clear understanding of endurance, it is argued, requires a semantics for expressions like "John of yesterday" and, generally, "*O* at *t*." The author argues that once these expressions are properly understood, we can conclude that the familiar objection that endurance violates the indiscernibility of identicals is misguided (and positive responses to this objection, such as claiming properties are really relations to times, are therefore unnecessary). The analysis of expressions like "*O* at *t*" also provides the resources for an account of what it is for an object to be "wholly present" at a time.

*Mental Properties,* GEORGE BEALER

Prevailing opinion is that the identity thesis is false. The most popular arguments for this opinion are the multiple-realizability argument and the Nagel-Jackson knowledge argument. In this paper it is argued that these two arguments are unsatisfactory. For better arguments, one must turn to two closely related arguments traceable to the writings of Descartes—the modal argument and the certainty argument. Although these arguments are also unsatisfactory as they stand, it is shown that they can be successfully reformulated. But for a refutation of the identity thesis in its full generality they need to be woven together into a single new argument. A unifying theme of

the paper is that each of the four arguments is plagued by the worry that perhaps mental properties have "scientific definitions." The proposed reformulations of the modal and certainty arguments incorporate a new line of defense against this aggressive scientific essentialism.

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JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY  
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*Aristotle's Natural Slaves: Incomplete Praxeis and Incomplete Human Beings*, EUGENE GARVER

Aristotle's claims that some people have slavish natures and that their slavery is naturally just are usually regarded as embarrassments. His claims and arguments, though, cannot be dismissed as special pleading. Among the complexities that have to be explored are the following: Why is a slave a tool for *praxis* rather than making? Why does he claim that the people naturally suited to be slaves are deficient not in *logos* but in *thymos*? Third, why should he reverse his usual order and first show the necessity for the institution of slavery and only then go on to establish the existence of natural slaves? The key in sorting through these questions will be in understanding precisely what Aristotle means by saying that slave's souls are incomplete.

*Locke on the Intellectual Basis of Sin*, VERE CHAPPELL

This article distinguishes and interprets three different theories of motivation that Locke states in the *Essay*. The first, presented in the first edition, is strongly "intellectualist" in character: an agent's will is determined by what she believes to be good. The second theory, expounded in the second edition, makes the will's determination dependent on some felt "uneasiness" which may occur in the absence of any cognition of good, and conversely. This is no longer a predominantly intellectualist theory, nonetheless, it still gives intellectual factors a central role in motivation. In the third theory, which appears in the *Essay*'s fifth edition, the intellectualist tendency in Locke's thinking again comes to the fore, it may even be more pronounced than in his original theory. Here Locke seems to claim that a moral agent is not only determined but necessitated to act in accordance with what she believes to be good.

*Intellect and Illumination in Malebranche*, NICHOLAS JOLLEY

One of the hallmarks of Descartes' philosophy is the doctrine that the human mind has a faculty of pure intellect. This doctrine is so central to Descartes' teachings that it is difficult to believe that any of his disciples would abandon it. Yet precisely this is what happened in the case of Malebranche. This paper argues that in his later philosophy Malebranche adopted

a version of the Augustinian theory of divine illumination which leaves no room for a Cartesian doctrine of pure intellect. It is argued that Malebranche's abandonment of the Cartesian doctrine left a void in his philosophy which he sought to fill with the theory of causally efficacious ideas. The paper concludes by suggesting that in his later philosophy of mind Malebranche has more in common with Berkeley than with Cartesian rationalism.

*Hume's Dissertation on the Passions*, JOHN IMMERWAHR

Hume composed the *Dissertation* by selecting and rearranging passages from Book 2 of the *Treatise*, but there is no consensus on what organizational principle or purpose guided Hume in developing the *Dissertation*. This article argues that Hume's goals in the *Dissertation* become much clearer if we read the *Dissertation* in its original publication context, which was to have been in a volume with the *Natural History of Religion* and "Of Tragedy." Hume appears to have selected certain passages from *Treatise* 2 in order to highlight the relevance of his theory of the passions to religion and aesthetics. Specifically, the *Dissertation* provides an analysis of fear which is essential to the argument of the *Natural History*, and also develops a theory of conflicting passions which supports the reasoning in "Of Tragedy."

*Reinterpreting Ryle. A Nonbehaviorist Analysis*, SHELLEY PARK

This paper argues for a nonbehaviorist interpretation of Ryle's *Concept of Mind* which renders that work internally coherent while also placing it within the larger corpus of Rylean works and the larger intellectual issues of Ryle's time. Prevalent interpretations of Ryle's *Concept of Mind* as a behaviorist attack on dualism fail to make sense of its substance, style, and avowed metaphilosophical purpose. In order to account for Ryle's explicit denunciations of materialism and idealism (as well as dualism) in the philosophy of mind, his distinctive method of argumentation, and his well-developed views on the nature of philosophy, *The Concept of Mind* must be read as advancing a nondenotational theory of meaning for mental conduct terms. As reinterpreted, Ryle's *Concept of Mind* presents a serious and virtually unexamined challenge to the prevalent assumption of materialistic monism in contemporary philosophy of mind.

*Hegel contra Hegel in his Philosophy of Right. The Contradictions of International Politics*, ADRIAAN PEPERZAK

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

Vol 44, No 175, April 1994

*Perception, Sensation and Non-conceptual Content*, D. W. HAMLYN

Some philosophers have argued recently that the content of perception is either entirely or mainly nonconceptual and that the proper place

for concepts is belief. Much of the motivation for that view derives from theories of information processing, which are a modern version of ancient considerations about the causal processes underlying perception. The paper argues to the contrary that perception is essentially concept-dependent. While perception must have a structure derived from what is purely sensory, and while it is dependent on processes involving information in the technical sense which Gibson said amounted to structure, the information which perception provides about the world depends on the concepts which we have. A failure to recognize the contributions made to perception by both concepts and sensation leads to an underestimation of the richness of experience.

*Interpretation Theory and the First-Person*, RICHARD A. MORAN

Many contemporary philosophers agree that our everyday talk about beliefs, desires and so forth, involves the application of a kind of *theory* to what people do. The paper discusses, as one influential version of such an idea, the view of psychological discourse as constituted by "rationalizing interpretation," and asks whether any such account can accommodate the special asymmetries between first-person and third-person psychological discourse, while preserving the assumption that terms like "belief" and the like are univocal across the two contexts. Problems with the "theory theory" in general have suggested to many people that we move away from rationalizing interpretation as an account of belief-attribution and move toward an account based on "cognitive simulation," projecting ourselves into the state of mind of the other person and determining what *we* would think in those circumstances. It is argued that the differences here are more apparent than real, and that preserving what is valuable in the general picture of rationalizing interpretation will require separating it from the assumption that the discourse of commonsense psychology has the structure of a theory.

*The Philosophy of the Conditioned*, H. O. MOUNCE

*The Content of Perceptual Experience*, JOHN McDOWELL

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW  
Vol 103, No 2, April 1994

*Moral Conflict and Its Structure*, DAVID O. BRINK

Moral dilemmas should be understood as conflicts of all-things-considered obligations. In addition to the familiar paradox that results from combining dilemmas with agglomeration and voluntarism, other paradoxes

are derived that rest on more secure deontic foundations. These paradoxes motivate skepticism about whether there can be competing all-things-considered obligations. Though insoluble conflicts are possible, they do not generate dilemmas, because the only obligation in an insoluble conflict is the disjunctive obligation to satisfy one or the other conflicting *prima facie* obligation. This disjunctive analysis of insoluble conflict is morally acceptable and rests on an independently attractive account of *prima facie* and all-things-considered obligations. If so, moral dilemmas would have paradoxical implications for ethical theory but we should deny that there could be moral dilemmas. Moreover, this analysis of the structure of moral conflict subverts a familiar argument from moral conflict to noncognitivism.

*The Argument of "On Denoting,"* MICHAEL KREMER

Russell's "On Denoting" has long been taken as a paradigm of analysis. Yet its central argument, the "Gray's Elegy" argument, has resisted many efforts at interpretation. This paper provides a new interpretation of the argument, clarifying both what is being attacked and how. The paper first summarizes the historical background, second, discusses the structure of "On Denoting" and the place of the argument within it, third, develops the new interpretation of the argument, and contrasts it with other interpretations, especially those of Simon Blackburn and Alan Code, and Peter Hylton, fourth, briefly discusses the theory of "On Denoting" in the light of the new interpretation of the argument.

*Is Platonism Epistemologically Bankrupt,* ROBERT HALE

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PHILOSOPHY

Vol 69, No 268, April 1994

*Human Beings and Giant Squids,* DAVID COCKBURN

Peter Singer suggests that to show that we have certain moral obligations towards nonhuman species we must first establish, by appeal to the bodily and behavioral similarities between human beings and other species, that these creatures are capable of suffering. The fundamental position which this gives to human beings is deeply at odds with his vision of our responsibilities towards animals. While there are striking similarities between the behavior of human beings and other species these similarities will be visible only to one who does not need Singer's argument. Similar points may apply to Wittgenstein's remark "Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say it has sensations, it sees, is blind, hears; is deaf, is conscious or unconscious." This remark might be

reversed, for our perception of behavioral similarities is a reflection of, not a condition of, our ability to ascribe pain or fear

*Platonist Manifesto*, GEOFFREY HUNTER

There exist things that are neither experiences nor the objects of sense-experiences. Some of Plato's arguments for that view are good ones. The Third Man Argument does not demolish it. In *Sophist* 242–251 Plato makes an important, and correct, point about existence, later found in Frege. Most of the article is about the existence of numbers. The objections of some philosophers to Platonism about numbers arise from incorrect models of existence, knowledge, understanding, or reference (that is the heart of the paper). Hartry Field's claim that mathematics is a body of fictions is rejected, as are Benacerraf's claim that numbers are not objects and Putnam's claim (at one time) that arithmetic is a part or application of modal logic. Finally, Bencivenga, with his system of arithmetic without existential theorems, shows just how inadequate such a system is.

*Religion, Virtue and Ethical Culture*, JOHN COTTINGHAM

It is sometimes suggested that the decline of religious observance has led to a weakening of moral standards. This paper begins by pointing out that the traditional conception of religion as shoring up morality is radically confused. But it is argued nevertheless that religion is one possible shaper of an "ethical culture" within which paradigms of virtue and vice can be located, and in terms of which they can acquire significance and power to influence our conduct—though often such influence operates at a prerational level. Part of our modern ethical predicament (as seen, for example, in the area of sexual morality) is that our deliberations have been cut adrift from the traditional models of virtue and vice which used to command allegiance. Without such cultural anchoring, much of our moral philosophizing will be largely idle.

*Why do Mirrors Reverse Left/Right and not Up/Down?*  
NICHOLAS DENYER

Part of the contrast is explained by the fact that heads are symmetrical whereas hands are not. The rest of the contrast is an artifact of our conceptual scheme. It is due mainly to the fact that in "left"/"right" and "head"/"foot," we have two different principles for labeling directions by reference to parts of the body. This is shown by defining a pair of terms ("cordial"/"uncordial") to label the sides of the body on just the same principle as "head" and "foot" label its ends, and by defining another pair ("A-end"/"Z-end") to label the ends of the body on just the same principle as "left" and "right" label its sides. It turns out that mirrors do not reverse cordial and uncordial, but do reverse

A-end and Z-end Our natural human shape explains why we use these two different principles for labelling directions

*Moral Certainty*, JUDITH LICHTENBERG

*User-Friendly Self-Deception*, AMELIE OKSENBERG RORTY

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PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH  
Vol 54, No 1, March 1994

*Wittgenstein, Phenomenology and What it Makes Sense to Say*,  
ROBERT ALVA NOE

The central argument of this paper is this First, Wittgenstein's interest in "phenomenology" (c 1929) does not represent a departure from the logicolinguistic concerns of the *Tractatus* The concept of "phenomenological language" and the enterprise of constructing such a language which become central to Wittgenstein's thinking at this stage are direct descendents of the logically clarified language of the *Tractatus* Second, Wittgenstein's later belief that it is neither necessary nor possible to construct a phenomenological language, contrary to what he had himself hitherto believed, is tantamount to the recognition that the enterprise of devising a *Begriffsschrift* (a symbolism perfectly reflecting the structure of pure thought), which was associated in different forms with Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein, is incoherent Third, I argue, against the view of the Hintikkas, that the chief reasons for the change in his thinking have to do with the concept of *grammar*

*Paradox and Privacy. On §§ 201–202 of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations*, EDWARD H. MINAR

The significance of Wittgenstein's treatment of rule-following in §§185–242 of *Philosophical Investigations* remains unclear In particular, understanding §201 (the "paradox of interpretation" and Wittgenstein's answer) and §202 (the denial of "private rule-following") requires examination of Wittgenstein's overarching aims Wittgenstein seeks to silence questions that prompt philosophical searches for grounding In this light, the answer to the paradox challenges the philosophical salience of the possibility of divergent interpretations of rules It undermines the idea that such "interpretability" poses a concern that could motivate a demand for a hidden structure of meanings that explain or justify our ways of following rules The attack on private rule-following demonstrates the emptiness of an initially plausible attempt to depict the problem with "underlying" meanings as merely a difficulty in *conveying* what they dictate. §§201–202 present crucial steps in a compelling

dialectic that forces reexamination of the need for, and the possibility of, foundations of language-use

*On Belief and the Captivity of the Will*, DION SCOTT-KAKURES

Many theorists argue that our inability to will beliefs directly is not a "contingent matter." Such philosophers have tended to argue that something about the nature of belief (its truth-directedness, or role in reasoning) rules out as incoherent such belief state transitions. I argue that such arguments must inevitably fail to establish the unwillability of belief. I point out, however, that the apologist for believing at will must distinguish the case of willing a belief directly (where the connection between the willing or intention and the installation of the belief makes for intentional basic action) from a case in which desires or intentions deviantly cause a belief. I argue that these cannot be distinguished, and that in no case could my intending here-and-now to believe that *p* produce the belief that *p* in a way which would make for intentional basic action.

*Real Emotion*, DAVID PUGMIRE

In an important way, a sincerely felt emotion can still fail to be genuine. The fault is located in deviant causation. Instead of arising from a value-judgment of the kind appropriate to the emotion in question, a factitious emotion arises from the desire to have it. Indignation, for instance, offers the enjoyment of moral superiority. Where this, rather than concern at the offense that the indignation is ostensibly and properly about, explains the occurrence of the emotion, the indignation is not what it seems. Nonetheless, something is felt, at least a convincing facsimile of indignation is present. This is made possible by the separability of emotion from feelings of it. The question of how the wrong cause can effect even the appearance of a given emotion is addressed. The theory developed in the paper has practical consequences: it makes a virtue of spontaneity. Relevant treatments of causally anomalous cases of emotion and of spontaneity (by Gordon and Hampshire) are criticized.

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RATIO

Vol 7, No 1, June 1994

*Supervenient Dualism*, HERBERT GRANGER

The paper examines the idea of "supervenient dualism," which Christopher Shields develops in "Soul and Body in Aristotle," *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 6 (1988). Shields takes supervenient dualism to be a form of substance supervenience, in which an immaterial substance supervenes upon a material or physical substance. Shields does not develop a



convincing version of supervenient dualism because he fails to develop a convincing version of substance supervenience. A plausible version of substance supervenience can be developed in the light of Jaegwon Kim's idea of multiple-domain supervenience in "Supervenience for Multiple Domains," *Philosophical Topics* 16 (1988). This version of substance supervenience depends, however, upon a relation of coordination between the substances, but there does not seem to be any relation of coordination that yields a form of substance supervenience that also counts as a form of supervenient dualism.

*Mental Arithmetic*, ROGER SQUIRES

The popular idea that mental calculation involves covert operations as counterparts to the scribblings, sayings, or shufflings involved in classroom calculation is rejected by familiar arguments in Section I. Philosophers do not readily agree on an alternative account. Section II considers reasons why they are puzzled, reasons which encourage a return to the discredited position. The currently fashionable causal or functionalist view, as expressed, for example, in the influential textbook *The Philosophy of Mind* by Peter Smith and O. R. Jones, is criticized and diagnosed in Section III. Section IV reconsiders the stubborn fact that when someone calculates in their head they do something at the time which explains their arithmetical successes or failures. Some dispositional descriptions are rejected as inadequate. Though a reasonable dispositionalism is finally supported, it does not have the implication that nothing was going on in the silence.

*Doughnuts and Dickie*, NICK ZANGWILL

This paper assesses Dickie's institutional theory of art. It compares the earlier and later forms of the theory, and points to various problems of detail in these accounts. It is then argued that Dickie's definition excludes Krispy Kreme doughnut boxes from possessing the status of being works of art, and those who made them from possessing the status of artists. There is no philosophical point or interest in a concept of art which excludes these doughnut boxes. The best way to see this is by contrast with a concept of art that includes them, a "creative" account. Our concept of art must help us understand a certain phenomenon in the world: the phenomenon we call "art." Dickie's theory tells us nothing about why people want to make art and why they want to experience it. By contrast, the creative theory, which embraces both doughnut boxes and things in galleries, is more explanatory.

*Game Theory and Knowledge by Simulation*, ADAM MORTON

*Cognitive Closure and the Limits of Understanding*, MARK SACKS

*Descartes and the Destruction of the Eternal Truths*,  
JAMES VAN CLEVE

## **ANNOUNCEMENTS**

The Department of Moral Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews announces a conference on Ethics and Practical Reason, to take place at the University of St. Andrews on March 23–26, 1995. A major focus of attention will be the question of the centrality of practical reason to ethics. Speakers will include Robert Audi, David Brink, Brad Hooker, Terence Irwin, Christine Korsgaard, Onora O'Neill, Peter Railton, Joseph Raz, John Skorupski, Michael Smith, and David Velleman. For additional information please contact Garret Cullity, Berys Gaut, or John Skorupski, Department of Moral Philosophy, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife KY16 9AL, United Kingdom, telephone 0334-62486.

The American Maritan Association, the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, and the Yves Simon Institute announce a conference on Maritan and the U N Human Rights, Human Nature, and Politics, to be held November 9–12, 1994, at New York University. For additional information contact Dr. Peter A. Redpath, Philosophy Theology Division, St. John's University, 300 Howard Avenue, Staten Island, New York 10301.

The Nineteenth Annual International Conference of the Merleau-Ponty Circle will be held on the campus of Berry College in Rome, Georgia, on September 22–24, 1994. This year's themes are politics, morality, and religion in the works of Merleau-Ponty. For additional information contact Dr. Michael B. Smith, 5021 Berry College, Mount Berry, Georgia 30149-5021, telephone 706-236-2205.

The Collaborative Projects Program of the National Endowment for the Humanities welcomes applications for projects of broad scholarly and public significance in the humanities that entail the collaboration of two or more scholars for periods of one to three years. All topics in the humanities are eligible, collaborative projects are expected to lead to major scholarly publications. Awards usually range from \$10,000 to about \$150,000. The deadline for application is October 15, 1994, for projects beginning no earlier than July of the next year. For additional information and application materials write or call Collaborative Projects/Interpretive Research, Division of Research Programs, Room 318, 1100 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20506, telephone 202-606-8210.

The Franklin J. Matchette Foundation announces an annual competition for three grants of \$5,000 each to finance Matchette Lecture and Seminar Series in North American Universities or Colleges by outstanding invited philosophers. Only institutions qualify for grants. Grants may be used for travel and other expenses and for reasonable honoraria. Qualifying proposals must show (1) that the philosophical issues to be discussed are important to the educated public, as well as to the philosophy community, (2) that the invited philosopher (or philosophers) can be expected to bring important insights into discussion of these issues, (3) how the activities of the invited

philosopher(s) will be designed to engage a general audience, as well as philosophy faculty and students, at the sponsoring University and in other accessible Universities, (4) how the grant will be spent, and (5) how the Lecture and Seminar Series will contribute to the development of philosophy studies in the sponsoring institution. Invited philosophers may come from North America or abroad. Typically, a single philosopher would be expected to spend at least one week in the sponsoring university, during which time he or she would deliver at least two major lectures and lead several, more informal, discussions. Alternatively, proposals will be considered for lectures and seminars by a pair of philosophers prepared to discuss alternative perspectives and interpretations on the subject for a period of two to three days. The grants do not cover publication costs, but specific plans for publication of the lectures and discussions will be considered in evaluating applications. The first three grants under this program will be for activities in the 1995-96 academic year. Applications must be received by February 1, 1995. For additional information about this series and other Foundation programs write to Maurice Ernst, Executive Secretary, The Franklin J. Matchette Foundation, 7979 North Pennsylvania Street, Indianapolis, Indiana 46240.

The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research awards approximately forty volunteer internships for undergraduates, graduate students, and postgraduates interested in public policy issues. Interns, placed every semester and summer, aid scholars and managers with specific research and projects. For additional information contact Kristin Walberg, Internship Coordinator, American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th Street NW, Washington, D C 20036, telephone 202-862-7184.

Peter Achinstein, Professor of philosophy at The Johns Hopkins University, and Alexander Rosenberg, Chair of philosophy at University of California at Riverside, have been selected as joint winners of the 1993 Lakatos award, an international prize administered by the London School of Economics. Dr. Achinstein won the award for his book, *Particles and Waves: Historical Essays in the Philosophy of Science* (Oxford, 1991), and Dr. Rosenberg for his book, *Economics: Mathematical Politics or Science of Diminishing Returns* (Chicago, 1992). Dr. Rosenberg received his Ph.D. in philosophy from Johns Hopkins in 1971, with Dr. Achinstein serving as his dissertation director.

The Department of Philosophy at Fordham University is pleased to announce that Brian Davies, O.P., of Blackfriars and Oxford University will be a visiting Professor in the fall 1994 term.

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
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